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Editors' Introduction
Peter P. Budetti, Richard V. Burkhauser,
Janice M. Gregory, and H. Allan Hunt

The number of older workers will nearly double in the next two
decades. Without immediate attention to the issues they present to
public and private health and income security programs, some workerprotection programs will be strained to bursting, and policymakers will
migrate from one quick-fix solution to another as they scramble to
respond to gaps in coverage and benefit inequities that become more
urgent as they grow larger.
Individuals and institutions concerned about preparing for the
sharp increase in the number of retired individuals in the United States
can turn to many volumes of excellent work that profile the characteris
tics and resources of present and future retirees, examine their impact
on the retirement and health programs designed to support them, and
suggest policy options to accommodate those programs to the future.
For the next 20 years, however, those who will produce this future
retirement bulge will first transform the workplace and the social insur
ance programs that are designed to support individuals while they are
working.
In 1999, almost 23 million Americans were between ages 55 and
64. But aging members of the so-called baby-boom cohort (individu
als born between 1946 and 1963) will nearly double that number in the
next two decades. In 1999, the age 45-54 cohort numbered 35.3 mil
lion, and the age 35-44 cohort checked in at 44.8 million. Who are
these people? What will they want? Who among them will be vulner
able? What will society ask of them? Should social insurance policies
support a pro-work agenda that keeps these cohorts in the workplace
longer? Or should those policies expand the income and health sup
port programs available to older workers, even if it encourages early
retirement? If so, how?
Responding to the phenomenon of an older workforce with ratio
nal policies and structurally sound programs is vitally important to
both the short- and long-term economic well-being of all of us. Many
older workers are at the height of their earning capabilities, but they

2 Editors' Introduction

also frequently carry heavy family responsibilities and have the least
ability to recoup and prepare adequately for their old age if disaster
strikes. How well we respond to older workers will, to a considerable
degree, dictate how much and what kind of assistance these same indi
viduals will require when they leave the workforce.
Very little research is available to guide employers, employees, and
policymakers through this period. This volume based on the
National Academy of Social Insurance's 12th annual conference,
"Ensuring Health and Income Security for an Aging Workforce,"
which was held in Washington, D.C., on January 26-27, 2000 begins
to fill that gap. The conference kicked off a multiyear, interdisciplinary
study of the social insurance problems of our aging workforce.
A group of papers were commissioned by the Academy about the
implications of an aging workforce for various social insurance pro
grams in the coming decades. Those papers are presented here,
together with the comments of the assigned conference reactors.
While authors were offered a chance to revise their remarks, the edited
papers in this volume reflect the content of the conference very well.
The papers in this volume provide a foundation for discussion of the
social insurance challenges affecting these older workers and the pol
icy issues that will be raised as they move toward retirement.
A critical feature of the Academy's work is its broad approach to
social policy questions. This is essential to any effort to address the
impact and needs of older workers; otherwise, efforts to deal with
issues and problems related to older workers that appear in one pro
gram can lead to dislocations in another program or create gaps in pro
tection that had not been there before. For example, policies that make
social security early retirement benefits less generous or that increase
the age of "early" retirement will likely lead to greater use of disability
programs. Policies designed to limit access to disability programs may
put pressure on workers' compensation and unemployment insurance
programs or may increase the number of individuals without adequate
health care insurance. Hence, policymakers must consider the implica
tions of any single policy change for the entire social safety net in
order to mitigate the economic risks associated with exiting the labor
force at older ages.
In the first section of this volume, four papers chart the current
landscape of older workers' access to and use of health insurance,
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workers' compensation, unemployment compensation, and disability
insurance. These examinations are then synthesized into cross-cutting
themes. Subsequent sections of the book target the worker risks of job
loss, chronic illness and disability, earlier (or later) retirement, and
access to health care from the specific vantage point of the older
worker.

SESSION I. CHARTING THE LANDSCAPE:
WHAT RISKS DO OLDER WORKERS FACE?
Katherine Swartz and Betsey Stevenson analyze 1999 Current
Population Survey data to provide a profile of health insurance cover
age of current 55- to 64-year-olds. Striking a theme that will recur in
other studies, they note that increases in the fraction of individuals in
this age cohort with no health coverage could have more serious shortand long-term consequences than similar gaps for younger individuals.
In the short term, older workers are more likely than younger ones to
need medical care, and in the long term, because they are less likely to
avail themselves of preventive care services, uninsured older workers
may later increase Medicare costs. Determining the causes of cover
age gaps among older workers will enable the development of bettertargeted public policies to provide coverage for this group at a critical
time.
John Burton and Emily Spieler examine older workers in workers'
compensation programs and highlight another recurring theme: current
programs often do not match the needs of older workers. In particular,
chronic impairments and disabilities common among older workers
present both diagnostic and therapeutic hurdles for workers' compen
sation programs. These programs have focused on traumatic injury
treatment and rehabilitation. However, many older workers are neither
impairment-free nor fully disabled they are somewhere in between.
Since workers' compensation programs are relatively unique among
social insurance programs in that they recognize partial disabilities,
pressure on these programs may intensify as the number of aged work
ers increases.
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Of course, as the number of older workers swells in the next
decades, the number of younger workers will decrease relatively.
Christopher O'Leary and Stephen Wandner call for greater understand
ing of the current and potential impact of unemployment insurance
programs on the income security and labor force participation of older
workers. They consider the labor market situation of older workers in
the context of unemployment insurance policies, including the plight
of older workers who move to part-time work or self-employed
arrangements.
Mark Nadel examines older workers' risk of long-term disability,
including circumstances under which long-term disability also leads to
loss of employment and income among older workers. He also reviews
systems of insurance coverage and gaps in protection of older workers
with disabilities, as well as the implications for disability programs of
increasing the age at which early retirement benefits are available.
Robert Haveman poses a central policy question arising from these
profiles, i.e., how should social insurance policy respond to the needs
of a growing group of older workers who tend to be more workimpaired than their younger peers and who face eroding personal capa
bilities and difficult decisions regarding transitioning into retirement?
Several additional questions flow from Haveman's overarching chal
lenge: Should public policy promote a pro-work agenda or seek to
improve the adequacy of income support? How can social insurance
policies simultaneously address the needs of two very different groups
of older workers, one group that is generally healthy, educated, and
working and a second group that has health conditions that limit their
ability to work, eroding job skills, and limited education? Where can
older workers get the training they need to stay current in their career
or to change to a new career? What access to public income support
and publicly financed health benefits should be provided to older work
ers who are working less than full time or in other "bridge" jobs prior
to full retirement?
Session I concludes with the comments of Walter Maher and David
Smith, who provide employer and union perspectives on these ques
tions.

Ensuring Health and Income Security for an Aging Workforce 5

SESSION II. JOB LOSS:
INCOME AND HEALTH COVERAGE
The use of employment-based insurance plans as the predominant
source of health coverage has created a complex interaction between
job status and access to health insurance. Not all individuals or fami
lies will have the requisite employment link at all times in their lives,
and not all employers will choose to offer coverage in a voluntary sys
tem. Public programs have filled some of the inevitable gaps, but these
programs are not comprehensive in their protection. Workers and their
spouses aged 65 and over, as well as those workers who become so
seriously disabled that they cannot work at all, are well covered by
Medicare. Persons who are aged 65 and older, or are unable to work at
all because of a disability and who are poor, are covered by Medicaid.
In addition, children are also eligible for Medicaid if their family
income is not substantially over the federal poverty level.
But other non-employed groups, such as "early retirees" and indi
viduals "between jobs" who are not sufficiently poor, are not protected
by public sources, nor are many workers younger than age 65 and their
families whose employers do not offer affordable coverage. Problems
of securing coverage in the private insurance market, especially for
older persons or persons with chronic health conditions, are well docu
mented. Thus, job loss has profound implications for older workers
(less than age 65) with employment-based health coverage, because
they are likely to fall outside of the scope of publicly provided health
coverage and may not be able to find new employment or affordable
private insurance that provides adequate coverage. This section
focuses on this issue and others related to job loss at older ages.
Ann Huff Stevens and Sewin Chan assess the effects of job loss on
the economic status of older workers. Analyzing Health and Retire
ment Study (HRS) data on the employment history of displaced work
ers aged 50 and over, they identified "large and lasting effects of job
loss on the future employment probabilities of older workers." That is,
workers who lose jobs at this stage of their lives are far less likely to be
working at subsequent ages than their nondisplaced counterparts.
Moreover, those who do find new jobs face substantial reductions in
earnings, averaging only two-thirds of what they would have made if

6 Editors' Introduction

they had not lost their previous jobs. Finally, although the findings are
less dramatic, displaced workers may use up their savings to cover lost
earnings, and job loss may also lead to substantial reductions in pen
sion benefits.
Jill Quadagno, David Macpherson, and Jennifer Reid Keene sur
veyed and conducted in-depth interviews with bank officers shortly
after layoffs were announced following a takeover of a major West
Coast bank. Some losses in retirement benefits occurred, and younger
displaced workers tended to spend down their retirement savings and
assets. But, even some of those who were retained felt they were being
set up to resign rather than being offered a generous severance pack
age. In addition, older employees were less likely than younger ones
to find new full-time jobs. Overall, however, most workers were
employed at follow-up, and there was very little disruption in their
health coverage. Thus, at least for this group of relatively well-edu
cated and high-income workers, the effects of job loss were moderate.
Karen Pollitz reviews the effects of public policies with respect to
the health and insurance status of older workers and early retirees, aged
55-64. The health care needs of this age group are far greater than for
younger individuals, but coverage opportunities may be less. Certain
specific federal policies play an important role for this age group.
COBRA continuation rights keep employment-related plans available
for 1.5 years after job loss. Medicare and Medicaid help to make up
for lower rates of work-based coverage in this age group, at least for
those with disabilities. Because premiums are relatively expensive,
even when people have the opportunity to buy individual insurance,
other federal statutes have had uncertain or quite limited effects, and
state laws and programs vary greatly in their ability to assist the nearelderly in obtaining coverage. New legislation may be required to
assure adequate coverage as the baby boom enters this age group.
This session finishes with the observations of Katherine Swartz on
the job problems and health insurance access problems of aging work
ers.
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SESSION III. CHRONIC ILLNESS AND DISABILITY:
POLICY ISSUES FOR AN AGING WORKFORCE
Jeffrey Biddle, Leslie Boden, and Robert Reville present evidence
from three states (Washington, Wisconsin and California) that income
replacement programs for permanent partial disability under workers'
compensation programs vary greatly, but in each case they leave work
ers with substantial losses. Older workers face particular problems;
they suffer more permanently disabling injuries, and even though those
disabilities are partial, older workers have higher rates of injury-related
non-employment. In addition, at least for the first few years after
injury, older workers recover a smaller proportion of their losses.
Richard Burkhauser, Mary Daly, and Andrew Houtenville raise an
issue that becomes increasingly worrisome if the rate of disability
among working-age individuals continues to grow. They found that
workers with disabilities did not do as well as other workers during the
recent economic expansion, and many had their employment and earn
ings fall in times of expansion, not just recession. Incomes of house
holds with working-age individuals with disabilities either lagged
behind other households or actually fell below previous levels even
during the economic boom of the 1990s. In particular, individuals with
disabilities had lower levels of employment and lower annual earnings,
and their households became increasingly dependent on public income
transfers to sustain income.
Bruce Flynn reports on the results of a survey of disability man
agement practices at large employers by the Washington Business
Group on Health and Watson Wyatt Worldwide. They found that
employer costs of disability have leveled off, or even decreased, in the
past three years. This is largely due to market forces, but also partly to
the emergence of integrated disability management programs. The
implications for older workers in the areas of health care, functional
outcomes, and workplace flexibility are discussed.
Commentary by Vicki Gottlich and Patricia Nemore focused on a
consumer perspective of the problems that older workers and persons
with disabilities have dealing with private health insurance, Medicare,
and Medicaid. The session concludes with an overview by Barbara
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Wolfe. She provides a framework for and a detailed critique of the
papers presented.

SESSION IV. IS WORKING LONGER AND RETIRING
LATER POSSIBLE? IS IT DESIRABLE?
Finally, we return to the question asked by Robert Haveman in his
overview: what about work at older ages? Is working longer and retir
ing later possible, or desirable? Gary Burtless and Joseph Quinn argue
that the burden of an aging population would rise more gradually if
workers delayed retirement and thereby continued contributing to the
health and pension systems rather than only being beneficiaries. After
a long slide, the long-term trend for earlier retirement, especially
among males, seems to have halted and perhaps even reversed in the
United States. Burtless and Quinn outline policies that might reinforce
this nascent turnaround.
Anna Rappaport explores these policies from the very different
perspective of employers, for whom retirement is defined as an
employee leaving a particular employer rather than exiting the work
force completely. Employers focus on business need when structuring
human resource programs, but they must also consider the constraints
of public policy. She calls for additional research on the costs and ben
efits of employing older workers.
Glen Pransky brings a medical perspective to the question of aging
and work capacity. He asks whether recent success in mortality reduc
tion has resulted in an aging population with more morbidity, less abil
ity to function, and thus less average work capacity at a given age; or,
have gains in morbidity paralleled the gains in mortality, with a prolon
gation of functional capacity? He reviews the evidence and finds few
broadly generalizable conclusions. Further research is needed to
define and evaluate the issues.
In her commentary, Teresa Ghilarducci examines the issue of how
much choice older workers should have over whether they continue to
work or not. Who is to decide when enough work is enough, if not the
worker him or herself? She cites falling male workforce participation
rates as a demonstration of how workers have chosen to spend the
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increases in the nation's productive capacity. She questions whether
public policy initiatives should encourage later retirement or whether
alternative ways to enable worker choice should be found.

SESSION V. FILLING GAPS IN HEALTH COVERAGE:
SHARING RESPONSIBILITY AND COSTS
Len Nichols makes a strong case for public policy initiatives to
assist the age 55-64 cohort with health coverage despite their rela
tively high insurance coverage rate by demonstrating, first, that their
health needs and the risks they face from being uninsured are far
greater than are those of younger cohorts, and second, that their num
bers are rapidly expanding even as their likelihood of having employersponsored retiree health insurance is declining.
After examining the opportunities and limitations presented by
public program and COBRA expansions, tax credits, and direct subsi
dies, and outlining the high financial costs of the current-nongroup
market and the high political costs of trying to reform that market, he
presents and simulates the costs and effects of three promising subsidy
policy options. He argues that major gains can be achieved at rela
tively low cost by targeting those with the most pressing needs within
the 55-64 age group, i.e., uncovered persons with low incomes and
those whose health is fair or poor but not impaired enough to qualify
for the current Medicare or Medicaid programs. Nichols concludes
with a set of four principles for public policy based on the greater
needs of these subgroups and the relative ease with which our society
could address those needs.
Deborah Chollet examines these arguments with a critical eye.
She wonders about the source of health care coverage, given experi
ence with high-risk pools at the state level. She submits that a princi
pal danger is to try and fix too much. Frank McArdle contributes an
employer's perspective on the policy solutions of the Nichols paper.
He finds merit in a defined-contribution approach to health care cover
age for retirees. Diane Rowland urges that we not throw out the good
in our public programs. Sometimes it is preferable to work on reform
ing what is "in the box" rather than going "outside the box."
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CONCLUSION
After seven years of vigorous economic growth, not only has the
federal budget been balanced for the first time in decades, but we are
actually rolling up sizable surpluses. Politicians are competing over
the most creative ways to invest this surplus, but it is clear that substan
tial reforms of our social welfare system will be required to finance the
growing income and health care needs of future cohorts of older work
ers. The authors in this book provide a variety of ways in which our
current public and private publicly financed safety net could be recon
structed to provide this protection.
In a very real sense, the future is in our hands. It is time for both
the public and private sector to focus on the special questions, chal
lenges, and needs of the growing population of older workers on pay
rolls across the land. The papers in this volume provide a beginning
for this process. The National Academy of Social Insurance intends to
pursue these issues at greater length and invites all interested parties to
participate.

Session 1
Charting the Landscape
What Risks Do Older Workers Face?
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Health Insurance Coverage
of People in the Ten Years
before Medicare Eligibility
Katherine Swartz
Harvard School of Public Health
Betsey Stevenson
Harvard University

A decade remains before the oldest members of the baby boom
generation begin to be eligible for Medicare. The potentially large
effects on the economy and federal budget have made understanding
this group's preretirement behavior essential. Small changes in behav
ior regarding the age of retirement and the preretirement use of preven
tive medical care could have dramatic consequences for Medicare
expenditures. Thus, we need answers to questions such as, how many
baby boomers will retire before the Social Security eligibility age,
either by choice or because of illness? How many will be financially
prepared, with health insurance as part of their preparation, to retire
early? How many will have retiree health insurance benefits from a
former employer and how many will be able to afford Medigap insur
ance to supplement Medicare?
Different subgenerations or successive five-year cohorts of baby
boomers are not all going to have the same preretirement experiences
as the oldest baby boomers, because the entire group was born over a
nearly 20-year span between 1946 and 1963. The different subgenera
tions have had quite different economic experiences since reaching
adulthood, and these different experiences are likely to have affected
asset accumulation for retirement. However, it is likely that there are
enough similarities among the subgroups to be able to gain insight into
the potential behavior of at least the older half of the baby boom gener
ation by studying the economic readiness to retire and health insurance
coverage of the current cohort of 55- to 64-year-olds.
Much has been written about the retirement incentives inherent in
access to employer-sponsored health insurance for retirees (e.g., Gust-

13

14

Swartz and Stevenson

man and Steinmeier 1994; Karoly and Rogowski 1994; Gruber and
Madrian 1995; Blau and Gilleskie 1997; Loprest 1998; Madrian and
Beaulieu 1998; Johnson, Davidoff, and Perese 1999), but we know
much less about the types of health insurance coverage (or lack
thereof) among people who are within 10 years of becoming eligible
for Medicare coverage. What we do know has come from Swartz and
Moon (1986), Jensen (1992), Johnson and Crystal (1997), and Loprest
and Uccello (1997). With all of the fast-paced changes occurring in
health insurance coverage and premiums and employer-sponsored
retiree health insurance in particular policymakers need to know
what types of health insurance coverage are held by people who cur
rently are 55 to 64 years of age. Understanding who has what types of
health insurance now will identify the types of people who are poten
tially at financial risk when faced with expensive medical care needs.
Further, identifying the characteristics of people who may need gov
ernment assistance in obtaining health coverage prior to Medicare eli
gibility will help in assessing the likely costs of such a program.
Finally, such knowledge will also help identify the types of people
most unlikely to have employer-sponsored health benefits when they
retire.
In 1999, 22.9 million Americans were ages 55 to 64, according to
the March 1999 Current Population Survey (CPS). Only 16.6 percent
of this age group were retired, with just over half of the retirees being
62 to 64 years of age. Two-thirds (65.6 percent) of the 55- to 64-yearolds had employer-sponsored health insurance, and another 8.4 percent
had private, nongroup coverage. Just over 9 percent had some form of
public health insurance (Medicare, Medicaid, a combination of Medi
care and Medicaid or Medicaid and private coverage, or Champus/VA)
during the year. Fifteen percent had no form of health insurance. His
torically, 55- to 64-year-olds have accounted for the smallest percent
age of the total population of the uninsured. For example, estimates
from the March 1999 Current Population Survey (CPS), indicate that
3.434 million uninsured people (less than 8 percent of the non-elderly
uninsured) were 55 to 64 years of age. This is very close to the 8.3 per
cent estimated from the March 1984 CPS (Sulvetta and Swartz 1986).
However, what is different between 1999 and 1984 is that the pro
portion of the 55- to 64-year-old cohort without any coverage has
increased from 13 percent to 15 percent. In part, this increase reflects
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the growth since 1984 in the total percentage of the population without
health insurance. The proportion of each of the younger adult-age
cohorts without health insurance has also increased in the intervening
15 years (Table 1; tables start on p. 27). This implies that as all the
baby boomers move through the 55- to 64-year-age range, we should
anticipate higher fractions of near-retirees being uninsured.
The increase in the fraction of people approaching retirement who
are without any health insurance coverage is cause for concern. As
people age, they are statistically more likely to need medical care, and
if they are uninsured, they are less likely to obtain preventive care. The
delays in obtaining preventive care may lead to an increase in the cost
of their medical care once they reach age 65 and are eligible for Medi
care coverage. Thus, an increase in the average expenditure per Medi
care recipient is likely just because higher percentages of younger age
cohorts are uninsured prior to age 65. In turn, this suggests that pro
jected expenditures for Medicare in the future may need to be revised
upwards.
The Clinton administration has proposed (and is expected to pro
pose again) that near-retirees who are uninsured be permitted to buy
into Medicare. By providing them early Medicare coverage, there may
be long-run savings stemming from obtaining timely preventive care.
However, the potential for adverse selection with such a plan means
that more information is needed about 55- to 64-year-olds who are
uninsured in order to evaluate such a plan (Reischauer 1998; Swartz
1998).
In addition, with the corporate downsizing that has occurred in the
past decade, people 55 to 64 years of age were especially likely to lose
their jobs or to become self-employed as consultants or contract work
ers for projects of specified duration. Such workers have two federal
protections that permit them to maintain insurance coverage. Under
the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985
(COBRA), such workers are permitted to continue their former
employer-group coverage for up to 18 months so long as they pay up to
102 percent of the total premium. Further, under the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), workers who
have had group coverage are able to convert such policies to individual
coverage without fearing loss of coverage for preexisting medical con
ditions. Yet, neither of these acts guarantees that the premium to be
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paid will be low or close to what a person may have paid for group cov
erage. The number of 55- to 64-year-olds with nongroup coverage
declined between 1998 and 1999 by 273,000 (from 9.9 percent to 8.4
percent of the age cohort). It may be that this decline is a reflection of
the rising costs of individual, nongroup policies. If so, the double-digit
increases in premiums that are projected for the next several years may
cause further erosion in the number of 55- to 64-year-olds covered by
nongroup policies.
The proportion of 55- to 64-year-olds with employer-group cover
age might be expected to provide an indication of the number of people
who are likely to have employer-sponsored retiree health benefits to
supplement Medicare coverage once they are 65 or older. However,
within the past decade, employers have been reducing retiree health
benefits and often are restricting such benefits to the worker rather than
the worker and dependents (GAO 1997). Consequently, while it is
important to know who among the 55- to 64-year-old cohort has
employer-group coverage, it is likely that having employer-sponsored
coverage before retirement is no longer a strong predictor of who will
have employer-sponsored health benefits when they retire.
In this paper, we present findings from an analysis of health insur
ance coverage among people 55 to 64 years of age in 1999 the age
cohort born between 1935 and 1944, just before the baby boom began
in 1946. This age cohort has been small by historical standards and has
benefited financially from its relatively small size. As a result, it is not
clear that its experiences with health insurance are good indicators of
the experiences subsequent age cohorts will experience when they are
55 to 64. But, if we view this age cohort's experiences as the most
optimistic scenarios for subsequent age cohorts, they permit policymakers to plan more realistically for the need for publicly funded or
subsidized health insurance programs for near-retirees in the future.
We particularly focus on the characteristics of the people who are in
the major types of health insurance categories: employer-sponsored
(with and without other private insurance), individual/nongroup cover
age only, Medicaid, and no health insurance. Our intent is twofold:
first, to identify the types of people who may not be able to afford med
ical care and face health risks, and second, to show how socioeconomic
characteristics are related to different types of health insurance cover
age.
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OVERVIEW
As noted above, there were almost 23 million people 55 to 64 years
of age in 1999. l This age cohort accounts for about 8.5 percent of the
total U.S. population. To place the size of this cohort in perspective,
the baby boomers in 1999 were in the 35- to 44-year-old and 45- to 54year-old cohorts, which had 44.8 million and 35.3 million people,
respectively.
Table 2 shows the distribution of types of health insurance that
people 55 to 64 years of age had according to the March 1999 Current
Population Survey (CPS). Two-thirds of the near-retirees have
employer-sponsored health insurance (ESI) and/or individual, nongroup coverage and another 8.4 percent have individual, nongroup cov
erage so, three-quarters of all 55- to 64-year-olds have some type of
private health insurance. About 10 percent of the age cohort have Medicaid, Medicare, Champus/VA, or a mix of these public types of cover
age and private coverage during the year. Finally, 15 percent of the
near-retirees are uninsured. We describe the characteristics of the peo
ple who have these major types of coverage in more detail below.
In analyzing the types of characteristics that may be associated
with different types of health insurance, it is useful to think about the
near-retirees as being composed of two major groups. In one group are
people who are seemingly healthy, working, with higher educational
levels and earning high incomes, i.e., people who are likely to work
until age 65 unless they decide that they have accumulated high enough
assets that they can retire early. The second group consists of people
who are less healthy, unemployed, or simply poor. This group includes
the less educated or less skilled, those forced into early retirement
because of employer downsizing, and those who have had other types
of bad luck (perhaps in the form of becoming widowed or divorced,
having lower incomes [in part because of no longer being married], or
having to leave the labor force in order to care for an ailing spouse or
elderly parent). A simple way of thinking of the two groups is to
regard the first group as fortunate and the second group as unfortunate.
One might expect the fortunate group to be largely covered by private
health insurance, while those less fortunate might be expected to have a
greater reliance on public coverage (Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid
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and Medicare, Medicaid and private coverage, or Champus/VA). As
we show in the next section, both of these assumptions are true.
Although having employer-sponsored coverage prior to retirement
is not a perfect predictor of retiree health insurance benefits, it is still a
useful indicator. Thus, the fact that people in our first group, the fortu
nate near-retirees, are more likely to have employer-sponsored cover
age implies that proposals to shift the age of eligibility for Medicare to
match the Social Security eligibility age will disproportionately hurt
people who already have problems with health insurance coverage in
their near-retirement years. Further, as the life expectancy of people
increases, it is likely that a significant portion of the baby boomers will
face choices between working to continue their own access to health
insurance and reducing work efforts in order to care for elderly parents.
This is especially likely to occur for those between the ages of 62 and
the age of eligibility for full Social Security benefits. Thus, the pat
terns of health insurance coverage of the near-retirees point to the need
to determine the consequences of proposals to enable people to buy
into Medicare at age 62.

CHARACTERISTICS ASSOCIATED WITH TYPE
OF HEALTH INSURANCE

Not surprisingly, the type of health insurance coverage a person
has is strongly linked to the person's labor force activity (Table 3).
Among 55- to 64-year-olds, there seem to be only two major labor
force activities: either working or else not in the labor force (i.e., only 2
percent were either unemployed and looking for work or on lay-off).
In 1999, almost three out of five 55- to 64-year-olds were working; the
other 40 percent were not engaged in the workforce. Among those
working, more than three-quarters were covered by employer-spon
sored insurance, while among those not in the labor force, just under
half had ESI.
Among the 9.2 million people who were not in the labor force,
almost 90 percent provided reasons for not working (Table 4). Of
those responding, almost half had retired, a third were ill or disabled
and could not work, and almost a fifth worked without pay on family
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and home responsibilities. Among those who worked in the home
without pay, 30 percent were uninsured, half had ESI, and 10 percent
purchased their own nongroup coverage. Those who were retired were
similar in their coverage, although there are fewer who are uninsured
(17.5 percent). In sharp contrast, half of the ill and disabled had public
coverage (Medicaid and/or Medicare), only a quarter had ESI, less than
8 percent had individual coverage, and 12 percent were uninsured.
Given the impact of being in the labor force on type of health
insurance, it should come as no surprise that family income is a strong
predictor of the type of coverage held by 55- to 64-year-olds (Table 5).
Among 55- to 64-year-olds, family income is somewhat skewed: 21
percent had 1998 incomes below $20,000; 18 percent had incomes
between $20,000 and $35,000; 16 percent had incomes between
$35,000 and $50,000; and 45 percent had incomes at or above $50,000.
Note that only when family incomes were above $20,000 do we
observe at least half of the people in particular income groups with
ESI, and family incomes have to exceed $35,000 before at least twothirds of the income group has ESI.
Family income, however, can be deceptive because it is the sum of
the incomes of all related people living in the same household. In the
case of near-retirees, we know that living arrangements can change as
an individual's financial situation changes. Thus, a widower or divor
cee between the ages of 55 and 64 may find him- or herself living with
adult children or with other adult relatives. In these circumstances,
family income does not necessarily indicate the financial circum
stances of the individual involved. Furthermore, insurance companies
define "family" as including only married couples and their dependent
children (or single parents and their dependent children), and therefore
they do not permit elderly parents to be covered by a family policy of
their adult children. Table 6 shows the insurance family unit types of
55- to 64-year-olds by whether or not the person has any type of health
insurance. Clearly, any 55- to 64- year-old who is living in a nuclear
family with or without children at home has the lowest probability of
being without health insurance. Single adults (with or without children
at home), single or married parents living with their adult children, and
adults living in other arrangements with related people are more likely
to be uninsured. Because one-fifth of all 55- to 64-year-olds live in
households where family income is more than the person's insurance
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family unit (IFU) income, it is important to examine the distribution of
types of health insurance that people have by their IFU income. This
provides a more accurate view of the insurance coverage of near-retir
ees relative to their available financial resources.
As a comparison of Tables 5, 7, and 8 indicate, uninsured nearretirees are less likely to be poor than the rest of the non-elderly unin
sured population. In 1998, 52 percent of uninsured 55- to 64-year-olds
had family incomes below 250 percent of the poverty level, compared
with 65 percent of the all the non-elderly uninsured. Although 26 per
cent had family incomes at or above $50,000, over a quarter of this was
the result of the uninsured near-elderly living with other relatives
whose income was counted as part of the person's family income. That
is, of the nearly 900,000 uninsured 55- to 64-year-olds with 1998 fam
ily incomes at or above $50,000, almost a quarter of a million had
"insurance family unit" incomes less than $50,000. Thus, as with all
the non-elderly, near-retirees with high IFU incomes were likely to
have ESI, while those with low IFU incomes were more likely to be
uninsured. When we examine only Tables 7 and 8 to distinguish the
near-retirees in terms of 55- to 61-year-olds and 62- to 64-year-olds,
we find that at the lower IFU income levels, the older near-retirees are
more likely to have public coverage than to be uninsured. This may
reflect age related higher probabilities of being eligible for Medicaid
and Medicare if one is disabled.
Not surprisingly, people who identify themselves as healthy are far
more likely to have ESI, while almost half of those who report poor
health (7.9 percent of the near-retirees) have public coverage (Table 9).
Among those reporting fair health (almost 15 percent of 55- to 64-yearolds), almost half have ESI and a quarter have public coverage.
Given the differences between men and women in employment
patterns and marriage status as they age, it is useful to examine the dis
tribution of health insurance types for men and women separately.
Table 10 provides an overview of the distribution of health coverage
among men and women, for 55- to 61-year-olds and 62- to 64-yearolds. Women are less likely to have ESI than men in each of the age
subgroups, but women are more likely to have nongroup private cover
age than their male counterparts. For both age groups, women are
more likely than men to be uninsured. Table 11 permits us to examine
the male-female health coverage differences in terms of how marital

Session 1: Charting the Landscape

21

status interacts with coverage options and decisions. Married people in
all four sex/age subgroups are most likely to have ESI. Among men in
both age subgroups, unmarried men are more likely to have either pub
lic coverage or no insurance. Both married and widowed women in the
older age group are more likely to have nongroup coverage. This find
ing is consistent with the observation that women are often married to
men one or more years older, and if the husband has retired or died, the
woman may obtain nongroup coverage for the one to three years' time
until eligible for Medicare. What is very clear from both tables is that
being married is a big advantage in terms of having ESI and not being
uninsured.
As with marriage, increasing levels of educational attainment raise
the probability that a person will have ESI rather than have public cov
erage or be uninsured. Table 12 indicates the distribution of type of
health insurance by educational level of near-retirees. Among the
nearly 20 percent of 55- to 64-year-olds without a high school diploma,
50 percent are either uninsured or relying on public coverage, and only
40 percent have ESI. In contrast, of the 37 percent with a high school
diploma, two-thirds have ESI. Among those with a college degree or
post-graduate education, more than three-fourths have ESI. This pat
tern is not surprising, since higher levels of education allow people to
choose jobs with better benefits and lower injury rates.
Finally, there are differences by race in the distribution of types of
health insurance among 55- to 64-year-olds. Table 13 shows the distri
bution for the two age subgroups (55 to 61 and 62 to 64 years of age).
Approximately two-thirds of white near-retirees have ESI and about 14
percent are uninsured. In contrast, just over half of 55- to 61-year-old
blacks have ESI, and only 41.5 percent of 62 to 64 year old blacks have
ESI. People in "other" racial categories (Asian, Native American,
Pacific Islander, and other), who comprise 4 percent of near-retirees,
are also more likely to have public coverage or no insurance at all.
In sum, near-retirees who have ESI coverage are most likely to be
in higher income categories, to be married, white, in good health, and
to have higher educational levels. For these people, raising the age of
eligibility for Medicare to 67 is unlikely to leave them uninsured.
However, for those near-retirees who are unmarried, nonwhite, in poor
health, or simply have less education, raising the Medicare eligibility
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age is likely to exacerbate the already high percentage who are unin
sured or relying on public coverage.

RELATIVE EFFECTS OF DIFFERENT CHARACTERISTICS
ON TYPE OF HEALTH INSURANCE
Examining the near-retirees' types of health insurance in terms of
different characteristics does not provide us with the relative impor
tance of each of the characteristics in predicting the type of coverage
that a near-retiree may have. It is important to understand the relative
effects because many of the characteristics examined in the previous
section are correlated with one another (for example, education and
income, or marital status and income). To estimate the relative effects
of these characteristics and determine which are most important for
predicting type of health coverage, we estimated a multinomial logit
model with four outcomes: ESI coverage (including possibly doublecoverage with nongroup), nongroup only, public coverage, and no
insurance. Table 14 contains the estimated coefficients for the model
with insurance family unit (IFU) income and other characteristics,
along with ^-statistics. The coefficients indicate the effect of each
characteristic on the probability (relative to having ESI) of having nongroup coverage, public coverage, or no insurance. We also estimated
the same model with family income substituted for IFU income.
Although the overall results do not change substantially when family
income is used instead of IFU income (as will be illustrated below), the
model with IFU income is slightly better in terms of goodness of fit
measures.
What is interesting about Table 14 is that almost all of the charac
teristics are statistically significant in their effect on the probability that
an individual would have each of the types of coverage. However,
holding all the other characteristics constant, being 55 to 61 years of
age rather than 62 to 64 is significant only in predicting nongroup cov
erage relative to ESI, not in predicting public coverage or no insurance
relative to ESI. Whether a person is a male or female also is not signif
icant in predicting no insurance relative to ESI when all other charac
teristics are held constant, which is surprising given the data in Table
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10. Being married (as opposed to any nonmarried marital state) is sta
tistically significant only in predicting no insurance relative to having
ESI. Whether or not a person is working is not statistically significant
in predicting whether a person has nongroup private insurance relative
to ESI, but if a person is working he or she is statistically significantly
less likely to have public coverage or be uninsured. In contrast, being
ill/disabled and unable to work or being retired and not working are
both statistically significant characteristics for predicting type of health
insurance. Similarly, being white (as opposed to nonwhite) is a statisti
cally significant characteristic, making a person less likely to have
either public coverage or be uninsured relative to having ESI. In gen
eral, IFU income, educational attainment, and health status are the
characteristics that have the largest effects on the probabilities of hav
ing each type of coverage, which is consistent with the theme we began
with, that the near-retirees consist of two distinct groups of people.
Tables 15 and 16 provide illustrations of prototypical male and
female (respectively) near-retirees and their probabilities of having
each of the four major types of insurance coverage. Both tables also
indicate how using IFU income (rather than family income) yields
somewhat different predicted probabilities of having each of the types
of insurance, but does not yield different outcomes in terms of the
types of insurance with the highest probability. This result is reassur
ing given that family income is easier to obtain than IFU income,
which often involves parsing out components of family income to the
separate IFUs in a household. The illustrations clearly show that hav
ing higher income, more education, and better health status increase
the probability of having ESI rather than public coverage or being
uninsured. Further, being ill/disabled and in poor health significantly
lowers the probability of having ESI and increases the probability of
having public coverage. Controlling for marital status, we find that
early retirement (for reasons other than illness/disability) significantly
lowers the probability of having ESI for men, but not for women.
Undoubtedly, this is indicative of access to a husband's ESI coverage
for women who retire early, while the reverse is less likely to be true
for men.
To place the prototypical examples in perspective, Table 17 shows
the distribution of near-elderly across the four types of health insurance
and the proportions with various characteristics in each type. Among
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the people who have ESI coverage, for example, far greater proportions
of the men and women are married than is true of the men and women
with public coverage or no insurance at all. Similarly, the people who
have ESI are far more likely to have higher levels of education than the
people with public coverage or no insurance.

CONCLUSIONS
The age cohort of 55- to 64-year-olds can be roughly divided into
two groups. The fortunate group consists of people who are able to
work until at least age 65; this group is more likely to have higher edu
cation and income levels, and better health, as well as employer-spon
sored insurance. The unfortunate group is that who either have
developed health conditions or otherwise find it difficult to continue
working, and have fewer financial resources (including ESI) in the
years before they reach age 65. The policy implication of this finding
is that proposals to extend the age of eligibility for Medicare to match
the age of eligibility for full Social Security benefits are more likely to
harm the second group of near-retirees.
In terms of developing public policies to help near-retirees who do
not have ESI and are uninsured, the major empirical issue is the extent
to which adverse selection might occur if 55- to 64-year-olds were pro
vided with a public program (Swartz 1998). One such option, pro
posed by the Clinton administration, is to permit people to purchase
Medicare coverage under restricted circumstances. Creating and eval
uating a demonstration program targeted at 55- to 64-year-olds to learn
how severe adverse selection might be would provide the empirical
evidence needed to estimate the costs of permitting early enrollment in
Medicare.
Finally, people who do not have health insurance prior to reaching
age 65 are less likely to have retiree health insurance benefits or to buy
Medigap policies to supplement Medicare. The fact that 15 percent of
people currently 55 to 64 years of age are uninsured has implications
for the health needs and costs of people when they reach age 65 and
begin to be covered by Medicare, but to understand why near-retirees
may not have health insurance, we need analyses of longitudinal data
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on people 50 years of age and older. We need to understand how
changes in employment, income, health status, marital status and fam
ily responsibilities over the ages of 50 to 65 affect access to health
insurance for people of different educational and occupational back
grounds. If all the 55- to 64-year-olds without health insurance lost
such coverage because of health problems, that would suggest a strong
need for expanding Medicare. Similarly, longitudinal analyses would
provide estimates of the numbers of near-retirees who stopped working
in order to care for older spouses or aging parents and used up their
own savings in the process. Determining why near-retirees become
uninsured, as well as how many people face pressures to retire early
and lose insurance coverage, would enable us to develop better-tar
geted public policies to help near-retirees maintain and obtain health
insurance coverage.

Notes
Partial funding for this paper was provided by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation
Grant no. 037484, which is gratefully acknowledged. The authors also thank Karen
Neoh for her superb research assistance. Opinions expressed in this paper are solely
those of the authors and are not necessarily those of the Robert Wood Johnson Founda
tion or Harvard University.
1. Data from the March 1999 Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS)
are the basis for the estimates of the numbers of people with various types of
health insurance and their socioeconomic and demographic characteristics. Ana
lysts disagree as to whether the CPS numbers on the uninsured refer to a point in
time (i.e., March of the year of the survey) or to the previous calendar year. We
believe the uninsured numbers are closer to point-in-time estimates than to esti
mates of the number who were uninsured during all of the previous year, and
therefore we refer to the year of the CPS when describing the uninsured as a par
ticular year. See Swartz (1986) for more details.
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Table 1 Changes in the Percentage of Non-Elderly Age Cohorts without
Health Insurance, 1984 and 1999
Share of age cohort
Share of uninsured (%)
uninsured (%)
1984
1999
1999
Cohort
1984
25.2
18.6
15.4
Less than 18 years
33.0
17.7
29.0
30.0
18-24 years
23.6
20.8
15.4
17.7
23.7
25-34 years
11.3
17.2
17.5
35-44 years
9.7
13.6
10.9
12.0
45-54 years
7.7
15.0
78
13.0
55-64 years
8.3
SOURCE: March 1984 and March 1999 Current Population Survey.

Table 2 Distribution of Types of Health Insurance of 55- to 64-Year-Olds
Number (millions)
Type of health insurance
15.028
Private (employer-group only and
employer-group + nongroup)
Nongroup only
1.924
0.724
Medicaid only
Medicare only
0.760
Medicaid and Medicare
0.476
Medicaid and private
0.182
Champus/VA
0.349
Not otherwise defined
0.033
Uninsured
3.434
22.909
Total
SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.

Percent
65.6
8.4
3.2
33
2.1
08
1.5
0.1
15.0
100.0
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Table 3 Health Insurance Coverage by Labor Force Activity of 55- to 64Year-Olds
Total
Nongroup
Public15 Uninsured Total
Private3
number
only
(millions)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Labor force activity (%)
100
12.7
13.293
2.5
7.3
77.5
Working
100
0.338
25.7
5.9
7.9
60.5
Unemployed
0.111
100
16.2
2.7
2.4
On lay-off
78.7
100
9.159
17.9
23.8
10.0
48.3
Not in labor force
SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group + nongroup.
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA, Medicaid
+ private, and other combinations.

Table 4 Health Insurance Coverage by Reasons for Not Working for
8.013 Million 55- to 64-Year-Olds
Total
Nongroup
number
Publicb Uninsured Total
Private"
Reason for
only
(millions)
not working
100
2.529
11.9
56.4
24.1
7.6
Ill/disabled
100
17.5
13.7
3.808
56.8
12.0
Retired
100
1.470
29.5
10.7
49.9
Home/family
9.9
_
c
100
42.7
0.206
39.8
17.5
Other
SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group + nongroup.
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA, Medicaid
+ private, and other combinations.
c A dash ( ) indicates a sample size too small for a statistically reliable estimate.
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Table 5 Health Insurance Coverage by Family Income for
55- to 64-Year-Olds
Total
Private3
Uninsured Total
number
Family income
(%)
Nongroup Publicb
(%)
(%)
(millions)
29.6
11.1
2.195
100
38.5
20.8
less than $10,000
24.7
2.551
100
25.7
11.1
38.5
$10,000-19,999
19.1
10.7
2.813
100
12.8
57.4
$20,000-29,999
2.649
100
163
8.0
10.8
64.9
$30,000-39,999
2.424
12.2
100
6.7
9.2
71.9
$40,000-49,999
4.323
100
9.8
3.5
5.8
80.9
$50,000-74,999
2.699
100
9.3
3.5
5.5
81.7
$75,000-99,999
6.5
5.9
3.256
100
1.3
86.3
$100,000 and more
SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group plus nongroup.
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA,
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.

Table 6 Insurance Family Unit Type in which 55- to 64-Year-Olds Live,
by Insurance Status
Number % of All 55-64
Insurance family
Insured
Uninsured
in IFU type
(millions)
unit type
21.5
Single adult, no kids
81.2
18.8
4.914
Married couple,
49.8
87.8
12.2
11.412
no kids
89.5
10.5
7.0
1.606
Married couple, kids
74.0
26.0
Single adult, kids
1.3
0.298
Single parent living
26.5
73.5
with adult kids
1.155
5.0
Married parent living
2791
85.4
14.6
with adult kids
12.2
78.9
21.1
Other
3.2
0.733
85.0
15.0
22.909
All
100
SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
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Table 7 Health Insurance Coverage by IFU Income among 55- to
61-Year-Olds
Total
Private3 Nongroup Public5 Uninsured Total
number
(millions)
(%)
(%)
IFU Income
(%)
(%)
(%)
2.157
100
33.7
267
11.3
18.3
Less than $10,000
41.6
1.979
100
27.6
21.6
9.2
$10,000-19,999
2.016
19.2
7.6
100
10.9
62.3
$20,000-29,999
1.920
100
13.9
5.1
8.1
72.9
$30,000-39,999
100
7.1
1.605
4.2
7.2
81.2
$40,000-49,999
1.473
100
78
2.8
4.9
84.5
$50,000-59,999
1.154
6.8
100
1.7
5.8
85.7
$60,000-69,999
0.945
100
7.6
2.6
4.8
85.0
$70,000-79,999
0.792
100
9.0
1.9
3.5
85.6
$80,000-89,999
0.559
100
7.1
4.5
3.2
85.2
$90,000-99,999
2.295
100
4.3
0.7
5.5
$100,000 and more 89.3
14.9
All
16923
100
10.0
7.5
67.6
SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group plus nongroup
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA,
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.
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Table 8 Health Insurance Coverage by IFU Income among
62- to 64-Year-Olds
Total
number
Private3 Nongroup Publicb Uninsured Total
(%)
(%)
(%)
(millions)
IFU Income
(%)
(%)
41.8
28.0
20.8
9.4
100
0.866
Less than $10,000
23.9
22.8
14.0
100
1.030
$10,000-19,999
39.3
10.9
11.6
13.1
100
64.4
0.982
$20,000-29,999
15.3
6.4
0.715
68.5
98
100
$30,000-39,999
5.0
109
73.6
10.5
100
0.642
$40,000-49,999
2.9
10.7
100
0.401
5.2
81.2
$50,000-59,999
2.5
84.3
4.8
8.4
100
0.317
$60,000-69,999
1.7
8.5
71
100
0236
82.7
$70,000-79,999
136
35
7.9
100
75.0
0.195
$80,000-89,999
13.1
0
9.4
100
0.157
77.5
$90,000-99,999
1.7
11.1
100
0444
$100,000 and more
78.7
85
14.0
10.9
15.2
100
All
59.9
5.986
SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
3 "Pnvate" includes employer-group only and employer-group plus nongroup.
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA,
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.

Table 9 Health Insurance Coverage by Health Status among
55- to 64-Year-Olds
Total
Private3
Nongroup Public" Uninsured
Total
number
(%)
(%)
Health status
(%)
(millions)
(%)
(%)
11.0
77.0
9.1
2.9
100
Excellent
4.319
8.3
3.4
13.3
100
Very good
75.0
6.763
17.4
67.1
8.1
7.4
100
Good
6.629
47.9
9.2
24.5
18.4
Fair
100
3383
46.4
Poor
312
15.5
100
6.9
1.816
SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
3 "Pnvate" includes employer-group only and employer-group plus nongroup.
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA,
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.
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Table 10 Health Insurance Coverage, by Sex among 55- to 61-Year-Olds
and 62- to 64-Year-Olds
Total
number
Private3 Nongroup Public13 Uninsured Total
(millions)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
Age/sex
8.180
100
12.9
9.2
6.3
71.6
5 5-61 /males
2.787
100
12.6
13.2
9.3
64.9
62-64/males
8.743
16.8
100
10.6
8.7
63.9
55-6 I/females
3.199
100
17.6
14.5
12.3
55.6
62-64/females
SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group plus nongroup.
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA,
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.
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Table 11 Type of Health Insurance among 55- to 61-Year-Olds and
62- to 64-Year-Olds by Sex and Marital Status
Total
Age/sex/marital Private3 Nongroup Public" Uninsured Total
number
(%)
(millions)
group
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
55 to 6 I/males
10.1
Married
74.1
5.6
10.2
100
6.670
6.2
20.1
26.8
100
Widowed
46.9
0.194
19.2
22.1
100
Divorced
52.9
5.8
0.995
_
c
Separated
26.1
100
0.165
43.6
14.6
100
Never married
49.1
11.1
25.2
0.460
62 to 64/males
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Separated
Never married
55 to 6 I/females
Married
Widowed
Divorced
Separated
Never married

9.1

10.3

10.7

8.5

23.3

18.4

43.1

I

-

71.7
45.3
57.8
26.6
46.5

7.9
12.3
9.1
12.1
8.9

5.8
19.7
15.7
32.7
18.0

69.9
43.0
49.8

24.8

100
100
100
100
100

2.192
0114
0.293
0.052
0.137

14.4
22.7
17.4
28.6
26.6

100
100
100
100
100

5.676
0.907
1.435
0.248
0.447

62 to 64/females
13.3
9.3
17.5
100
2.044
Married
59.9
12.1
18.3
Widowed
45.2
24.4
100
0.580
13.2
Divorced
9.3
21.9
100
0.378
55.6
Separated
100
0.044
Never married
49.7
23.1
100
0.147
SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group + nongroup.
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA,
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.
c A dash ( ) indicates a sample size too small for a statistically reliable estimate.

34

Swartz and Stevenson

Table 12 Health Insurance Coverage by Educational Attainment among
55- to 64-Year-Olds
Private3 Nongroup Public" Uninsured

Total

Total
number
(millions)

Education level
Less than high
8.0
25.9
100
4.314
school
404
257
High school
9.1
100
14.8
100
8.449
diploma
66.1
Some college
8.3
75
11.9
100
4.943
(1-3 yr.)
72.3
8.7
4.5
11.1
100
3.035
College degree
75.7
6.1
7.0
100
2168
Postgraduate study
84.4
2.5
SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group + nongroup.
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA,
Medicaid + pnvate, and other combinations.

Table 13 Health Insurance Coverage by Race among 55- to 61-Year-Olds
and 62- to 64-Year-Olds
Race and
age group
55- to 61-yr.-olds
White
Black
Other

Private3 Nongroup Public" Uninsured
(%)
(%)
(%)
(%)
69.9
51.4
59.7

7.9
5.7
5.1.

8.4
21.0
14.4

13.8
21.9
208

Total
(%)

Total
number
(millions)

100
100
100

14.560
1676
0.687

62- to 64-yr -olds
White
10.9
120
14.1
100
5.165
63.0
9.5
100
Black
41.5
25.7
233
0.609
14.6
20.3
100
0.212
Other
38.7
26.4
SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group + nongroup.
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA,
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.

Table 14 Estimated Multinomial Logit Model Predicting Type of Health Insurance for 55- to 64-Year-Olds3
Characteristic
Age 55-61
Male
High school
Some college
College degree
Postgraduate
Married
Working
Ill/disabled
Retired
White (vs. non white)
EFU income13
$10-19,999
$20-34,999
$35^9,999
$50,000 plus

Nongroup
Coefficient
z-stat.
-0.2939
-3.711
-0.2515
-3407
-0.0406
-0.385
-0.0582
0.494
-0.0595
0.431
-0.2082
-1.255
0.1191
1342
-0.0478
-0.454
0.4147
2.471
0.1802
1.502
0.3987
3.213

Public
Coefficient
0.1091
-0.1089
-0.5955
-0.6727
-0.6137
-1.0672
-0.0661
-0.3546
-0.5319
-0.3972
-0.1988

-0.8049
-1.2146
-1.5267
-2.0712

-1.0452
-1.9010
-2.5968
-2.7953

-5.759
-9.169
-10.514
-14.236

z-stat.
1.566
-1774
-7.718
-7.293
-5.479
-7.239
0.923
-4.418
-3.897
-4.046
-2.387

-10.005
-18.224
-21.010
-24.060

No insurance
Coefficient
z-stat.
-01097
-1.257
0.1156
1.422
-0.5819
-5.950
-0.4068
-3.412
-0.6383
-3.844
-1.1243
^.859
-0.4095
-4.400
-1.0259
-7.656
1.6035
11.830
0.4821
3.835
-0.2783
-2.668
-0.7953
-1.8870
-2.3618
-2.4369

-6.637
-14.341
-14.132
-15.299
(continued)

Table 14 (continued)
Characteristic
Health status
Very good
Good
Fair
Poor
Constant

Nongroup
z-stat.
Coefficient
-0.1771
-0.1630
-0.0806
-0.1595
-0.6002

-1742
-1.588
-0.627
-0.866
-2.857

Public
z-stat.
Coefficient
0.0256
0.1273
0.2476
0.3191
1 3315

0.280
1.409
2.290
2.185
8.375

No insurance
z-stat.
Coefficient
-0.1248
0.3627
0.9210
1.2437
0.1870

-0.742
2.363
5.774
7.017
0.865

11,128
Unweighted AT
log(likelihood) -9050.396
0.2044
Pseudo R2
SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a The coefficients indicate the affect of each characteristic on the probability of having nongroup coverage, public coverage, or no insur
ance relative to having employer-group coverage only and employer-group plus nongroup.
b EFU = insurance family unit.
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Table 15 Predicted Probabilities of Four Types of Insurance Coverage for
Prototypical Men
Characteristics of person
Using IFU income
1) 55- to 61-yr-old male,
married, did not complete
HS, working, white, EFU
income $20,000-34,999,
very good health
2) same as #1 except HS
graduate
3) same as #2 except ill/
disabled and poor health
4) same as #2 except retired
5) same as #2 except nonwhite
6) same as #1 except 62-64 yrs
of age
7) same as #6 except HS
graduate
8) same as #7 except ill/
disabled and poor health
9) same as #7 except retired
10) same as #7 except nonwhite
Using family income
1) 55- to 61-yr-old male,
married, did not complete
HS, working, white, family
income $20,000-34,999,
very good health
2) same as #1 except HS
graduate
3) same as #2 except ill/
disabled and poor health
4) same as #2 except retired
5) same as #2 except nonwhite
6) same as #1 except 62-64 yrs
of age

Private3
(%)

Nongroup
(%)

Public"
(%)

Uninsured

0.472

0.090

0.041

0.396

0.590

0.108

0.029

0.273

0.224
0.528
0.571

0.066
0.121
0.070

0.594
0.116
0.037

0.116
0.234
0.322

0.475

0.121

0.046

0.357

0.583

0.143

0.032

0.032

0.207
0.512
0.574

0.082
0.158
0.095

0.614
0.126
0.041

0.097
0.204
0.290

0.505

0.096

0.039

0.361

0 645

0108

0.025

0.222

0.237
0.556
0.605

0.070
0.123
0.074

0.578
0.107
0.035

0.115
0.215
0.286

0.503

0.129

0.044

0.324
(continued)
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Table 15 (continued)
Publicb
Nongroup
Private3
Uninsured
(%)
(%)
(%)
Characteristics of person
7) same as #6 except HS
0.196
0.028
0.144
0.633
graduate
8) same as #7 except ill/
0.095
0.217
0.600
0.088
disabled and poor health
0.187
0.116
0.537
0.160
9) same as #7 except retired
0257
0.039
0.010
0.604
10) same as #7 except non white
SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group + nongroup.
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA,
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.
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Table 16 Predicted Probabilities of Four Types of Insurance Coverage
for Prototypical Women
Private3
Nongroup
Public*3
Type of person_______(%)_____(%)_____(%)
Uninsured
Using IFU income
1)55-to 61-yr.-old female,
0.836
0.087
0.013
0.065
some college (1-3 yr.),
married, working, white,
IFU income $50,000 or
greater, very good health
2) same as #1 except IFU
0.682
0.166
0.020
0.132
income of $20,00034,999
3) same as #2 except not
0.694
0.150
0.030
0.125
married
4) same as #1 except 62 to
0.850
0 066
0.011
0.073
64 yr. of age
5) same as #4 except
0.801
0.078
0.054
0067
retired
Using family income
1)55-to 61-yr.-old female,
0.832
0.089
0.012
0.067
some college (1-3 yr.),
married, working, white,
family income $50,000
or greater, very good
health
2) same as #1 except family
0.687
0.167
0.022
0.124
income of $20,00034,999
3) same as #2 except not
0.642
0.164
0.041
0.153
married
4) same as #1 except 62 to
0.848
0.067
0.011
0.075
64 yr. of age
5) same as #4 except retired
0.785____0.081____0.054____0.079
SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group + nongroup.
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA,
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.
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Table 17 Proportion of People with the Listed Characteristics by Type of
Health Insurance, 1999
Public"
Nongroup
Private3
Uninsured
(%)
(%)
Characteristic
(%)
All 55- to 64-year-olds
3.434
1.924
2.523
15.028
Number (millions)
15.0
11.0
8.4
65.6
Share (%)
74.6
64.6
52.9
84.5
Married men (%)
58.1
39.6
62.5
71.9
Married women (%)
32.3
44.3
17.9
11.6
Less than HS education (%)
36.5
33.4
40.0
37.2
HS diploma (%)
17.1
14.8
21.4
23.8
Some college (%)
14.2
7.5
207
27.5
College degree or more (%)
74.1
69.3
88.7
43.4
With family income less than
$50,000 (%)
49.2
12.6
50.9
68.6
Working (%)
8.2
33.4
6.5
3.8
In poor health (%)
SOURCE: March 1999 Current Population Survey.
a "Private" includes employer-group only and employer-group + nongroup.
b "Public" includes Medicaid, Medicare, Medicaid + Medicare, Champus/VA,
Medicaid + private, and other combinations.

Workers' Compensation
and Older Workers
John F. Burton, Jr.
Rutgers University
Emily A. Spieler
West Virginia University

State and federal workers' compensation programs provide cash
payments and medical benefits to workers disabled by work-related
injuries and diseases. This chapter summarizes major issues facing
workers' compensation, with a focus on aging workers. In the first sec
tion, we give an introductory overview of workers' compensation that
may be most useful to those relatively unfamiliar with the program.
This section includes a description of eligibility requirements, particu
larly the work-relatedness tests; a brief summary of the critical ways in
which workers' compensation differs from other social insurance pro
grams; and a description of recent cost trends. 1 The second section
examines the particular issues of older workers relating to chronic
impairment and disability, and the third discusses the problem of
applying the standard of work-relatedness to chronic health conditions
that do not fit easily into the traditional definitions of compensable con
ditions, focusing on back conditions.2 The fourth section reviews some
of the recent legislative and judicial changes that are most likely to
impact older workers, particularly with regard to eligibility for bene
fits.
In the final section, we briefly address the following question: what
are the likely effects of changes in workers' compensation programs on
the adequacy of this program for older workers with work-related or
work-aggravated disabilities? Our attempt to answer this question
must be read with the understanding that there has been little empirical
investigation of the different experiences of older and younger workers
in these programs. We are thus forced to speculate, and we hope to
encourage additional research that will explore this question.
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Workers' compensation programs draw few overt distinctions
based upon the age of the applicant for benefits. Exceptions to this
general rule are discussed later in this paper.3 Perhaps more important
than overt age distinctions, however, is the inescapable fact that older
workers are themselves different from younger workers: older workers
are less prone to injuries resulting from traumatic events; they are more
prone to impairments associated with aging, including heart disease
and back conditions; they may take longer to heal and have greater
impairments resulting from injuries than younger workers; and their
mobility in the labor market may be more restricted than younger
workers with occupational disabilities. Older workers may therefore
be affected differently by certain aspects of the system. For example,
because of the legal rules used to determine eligibility for workers'
compensation benefits, health conditions associated with older age
may be less likely to be compensated. We believe that recent develop
ments in workers' compensation have increased the barriers to obtain
ing benefits for these conditions and have limited the amount of
available benefits for permanent disabilities that are more common in
older workers. As a result, costs of workplace injuries and diseases are
likely to be shifted to other public and private programs or to the work
ers themselves and their families.

OVERVIEW OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION

Unlike the civil justice system for compensation of injuries, work
ers' compensation is a "no-fault" system: employers are liable without
regard to fault, and employees only have to prove that the injury or dis
ease is work-related, not that the employer was negligent. Employers'
liability is limited to the benefits in the program, and employees cannot
(with very limited exceptions) bring a tort suit against the employer
and recover for full economic losses or for nonpecuniary losses such as
pain and suffering. This limited liability/no fault scheme is often
described as the two sides of the workers' compensation principle.
Workers' compensation provides benefits only to workers who suf
fer from work-related injuries or illnesses and, in some instances, to
their dependents. These benefits include medical treatment for the
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work-related condition; temporary total disability benefits for the
period that the worker is recovering but is unable to perform his or reg
ular job; permanent partial disability benefits to compensate for the
worker's permanent loss of earnings (or, in some states, permanent
level of impairment), although the worker is expected to return to
active work; permanent total disability benefits for workers who are
unable to work; and benefits to surviving dependents when a worker
dies as a result of an occupational injury or illness.
Most employees are covered by the workers' compensation sys
tem, although in some states there are exclusions for very small
employers or particular categories of workers (most commonly, agri
cultural and domestic employees). Persons who are not employees
(e.g., independent contractors) are generally not covered. For a claim
to be covered, the employee must incur medical expenses, suffer per
manent impairment, or be absent from work because of a work-related
health condition.
The most common type of workers' compensation claim involves
an injury that requires medical treatment but no claim for cash benefits.
In theory, these medical benefits are provided for the particular injury
or illness for the duration of the condition, irrespective of whether the
individual is working or is totally disabled. In fact, however, in cases
involving more serious injuries, medical benefits may be included in
cash settlements of claims, and workers may then not have medical
coverage for the condition if it persists.
The most common type of claim for cash benefits is for temporary
total disability benefits. Often, workers who suffer acute injuries will
collect these temporary benefits for a limited period of time and then
return to work. Once workers recover from the injury (reach "maxi
mum medical improvement," or MMI) or return to work, they are no
longer eligible for temporary total disability benefits. In some states,
when workers return to a reduced work schedule, they may receive
temporary partial disability benefits.
At the point of MMI or return to work, workers may be eligible for
permanent partial disability benefits if they have a permanent impair
ment or suffer wage loss or loss of earning capacity as a result of the
injury. Permanent partial disability (PPD) benefits are theoretically
designed to replace earnings lost as a result of the permanent impair
ment. The expectation is that workers who receive these benefits will
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return to work, either at their old job or at a new one. PPD benefits are,
in the aggregate, the most expensive (and most controversial) type of
benefits in workers' compensation programs. Despite their expense,
however, recent studies suggest that these, benefits do not fully replace
lost earnings for injured workers (Petersen et al. 1997; Boden and Galizzi 1999; Biddle, Boden, and Reville 2001). Permanent total disabil
ity benefits, which on average are the most expensive type of award,
are rarely granted.4
Eligibility for Workers' Compensation Benefits:
The Work-Relatedness Test
To be compensable, a claim must relate to an injury or illness that
"arises out of and "in the course of employment. Eligibility for
workers' compensation benefits is thus tied to the work-relatedness of
the health condition or disability. In most states, the employee must
meet four legal tests to establish that an injury is work-related and
therefore the employee is entitled to benefits:
1) there must be a personal injury, which in some jurisdictions is
interpreted to exclude mental illnesses;
2) that results from an accident, which is a test normally involving
two elements: the injury must be unexpected or unusual, and the
injury must be traceable, within reasonable limits, to a definite
time, place, and occasion;
3) that must arise out of employment, which means the source of
the injury must be related to the job (a worker shot at work by a
neighbor because of a personal quarrel is unlikely to satisfy the
arising out of employment test); and
4) that must occur during the course of employment, which nor
mally requires that the injury occur on the employer's premises
and during working hours.
Under the traditional rule, if a worker met these four tests, then he
or she was generally entitled to full cash and medical benefits, even if
the medical condition was due to multiple causes. There was, in short,
generally no effort to apportion causation.
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These four tests are relatively easy to apply for injuries resulting
from traumatic events, such as fractures or amputations resulting from
malfunctioning machinery at work (which normally are compensable)
or from automobile accidents (which normally are compensable if they
occur as part of the job during paid time, and are generally not com
pensable if they occur when a worker is driving to or from work).
These four tests are also relatively easy to apply to medical conditions
resulting from a single cause. For example, an asbestos-exposed
worker with a diagnosis of mesothelioma is likely to meet the workrelatedness test for compensation because this rare cancer is almost
always associated with exposure to asbestos (although there may be
other obstacles to compensability, such as the application of rules gov
erning time limits for the filing of claims).
The tests are more difficult to apply to diseases that occur regularly
in everyday life, or that have multiple causation, or that result from
long-term exposures at work. Historically, the exclusion of these dis
eases was often based on the application of the "accident" test. Work
ers' compensation statutes typically now have special compensability
rules for diseases, although often these contain restrictions that are not
used for injuries. Occupational diseases remain largely uncompensated today, as a result of a variety of factors: 1) the "accident" test per
sists in some states; 2) statutes of limitations sometimes require that a
claim be filed within a few years of the last exposure, and not all state
systems have expanded the time limits to include diseases with long
latency periods; 3) "ordinary diseases of life" are still often not com
pensable, even if the particular individual's disease is occupationally
caused; and 4) many occupationally caused diseases are not properly
diagnosed by physicians. The result of these factors is that workers'
compensation often does not provide benefits for disability associated
with chronic diseases that are caused by work.
In addition, there is a growing body of evidence that suggests a sig
nificant underreporting of work-related health problems to workers'
compensation programs (Biddle et al. 1998; Michaels 1998; Morse et
al. 1998; Pransky et al. 1999; Morse, Dillon, and Warren 2000). The
underreporting is likely to be a particular problem for older workers,
who are most likely to suffer the long-term effects of work exposures.
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Key Differences between Workers' Compensation and Other
Major Social Insurance Programs
Several aspects of workers' compensation distinguish it from other
social insurance programs in the United States. First, as noted in the
prior subsection, the injury or illness must be work-related. The ques
tion of work-relatedness is a difficult one, particularly when work and
nonwork factors contribute to an individual's disability. Individuals
whose conditions are deemed work-related by the compensation sys
tems will receive benefits; those whose conditions are not deemed
work-related will receive no benefits.
Second, workers' compensation programs emerged in the United
States about 1910, when a federal workers' compensation program for
private employees would have been unconstitutional. It is therefore a
state, rather than a federal, program. More accurately, it consists of
over 50 programs: one for each state, plus several federal programs for
federal employees, longshore workers, coal miners, and so on. Despite
several attempts during the last century, federal standards for the state
workers' compensation programs have never been adopted. This
means both that eligibility and benefit levels vary significantly among
states and that it is difficult to formulate broad conclusions regarding
trends without careful study.
Third, workers' compensation provides a variety of cash benefits
that do not require total and permanent disability. The duration of a
worker's cash or medical benefits may range from days to a lifetime.
Unlike other social programs, workers' compensation provides partial
benefits that recognize that a worker's earning capacity may be
reduced, but not eliminated, by the disability.
Fourth, the financing scheme for workers' compensation includes
private insurers and self-insurance, as well as state run funds.
Although premium rates are regulated in many states, this is neverthe
less primarily a private insurance market, more similar in some
respects to the health insurance market than to Social Security or
unemployment insurance.
Fifth, claims for workers' compensation benefits involve a substan
tial amount of litigation in some jurisdictions.5 Unlike Social Security
Disability Insurance (SSDI) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
claims, employers or their insurance carriers must pay the costs of
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claims, and therefore they have a strong incentive to mount a vigorous
defense. Litigation tends to focus on issues of compensability, particu
larly work-relatedness questions, and the extent or duration of perma
nent disability.
Sixth, these disputed cases can be, and often are, resolved by
"compromise and release agreements" that typically involve three ele
ments: a compromise between the worker and the employer concerning
the amount of benefits to be paid; the payment of the compromised
amount in a lump sum; and the release of the employer from further
liability for both cash and medical benefits. The terminology for com
promise and release agreements varies among states: examples of alter
native terms are "lump-sum settlements" and "wash-outs." It is likely
that many workers use these settlements to meet immediate, rather than
future, income needs.6
As a result of these differences, workers' compensation functions
in a manner that is quite different from federal programs (e.g., Social
Security), or state programs that operate with federal financing (e.g.,
vocational rehabilitation), or even state programs that are funded by
payroll taxes and are governed by some federal guidelines (e.g., unem
ployment insurance).
Financing and Cost Trends in Workers' Compensation Programs
Employers are nominally responsible for the cost of workers' com
pensation, although a substantial portion of the cost is shifted to
employees in the form of lower wages. Insurance premiums are paid
based on a percentage of payroll. Insurance rates are experience-rated
and vary among firms based on the benefits paid by all the firms in the
employer's industry and, for larger employers, on the amount of previ
ous benefit payments to the firm's own employees.
In 1998, workers' compensation programs provided $41.7 billion
of benefits to workers disabled by work-related injuries and diseases
(Mont, Burton, and Reno 2000). Cash benefits accounted for $25.8 bil
lion (62 percent of total benefits) and medical and rehabilitation bene
fits accounted for $15.9 billion (38 percent). Private carriers paid about
53 percent of these benefits, state and federal funds about 25 percent,
and self-insuring employers about 22 percent. Total employers' costs
were $52.1 billion in 1998. The $10.4 billion difference between total
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benefits and employers' costs was attributable to various factors,
including administrative expenses, profits for carriers, and attorneys'
fees.
Current figures do not give the full picture of the rapidly changing
costs and benefits paid by workers' compensation programs over the
past 15 years. In fact, conditions changed rapidly over this period, with
benefits paid and employers' costs increasing rapidly from 1984 to
1991, and then declining rapidly from 1991 to 1998. From 1984 to
1991, workers' compensation benefits (cash and medical) increased
from $19.7 billion to $42.2, or an average annual increase of 11.5 per
cent. Benefits increased from 1.21 percent of payroll in 1984 to 1.64
percent in 1991. Employers' workers' compensation costs also
increased during this period, from $25.1 billion in 1984 to $55.2 billion
in 1991, an average of 11.9 percent increase per year. This rapid esca
lation in costs far outpaced payroll growth. As a result, workers' com
pensation costs as a percentage of payroll increased rapidly, rising
from 1.66 percent in 1984 to 2.16 percent of payroll in 1991.
Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, many employers and
insurance carriers became concerned, if not alarmed, about these
increasing costs of the workers' compensation program. One result
was that employers and carriers supported a series of changes in the
program that are examined later in this chapter.
These changes (or "reforms") were important factors in the trends
in the aggregate benefits and costs for the workers' compensation pro
gram after 1991. Benefits paid to workers in current dollars decreased
from $42.2 billion in 1991 to $41.7 billion in 1998, which represented
a 0.2 percent annual rate of decrease. While benefit payments
declined, employment and payroll surged in the 1990s, and so benefits
as a percentage of payroll peaked at 1.66 percent of payroll in 1992 and
then plummeted to a low of 1.08 percent of payroll in 1998. The multiyear decline in benefits paid relative to payroll is unprecedented in
duration and magnitude since at least 1948, when the annual data from
the workers' compensation programs were first published for succes
sive years. Accompanying the slowdown or decline in benefit pay
ments to workers was a similar development for the employers' costs
of workers' compensation. The costs were $55.2 billion in 1991,
increased to $60.8 billion in 1993, and then fell to $52.1 billion in
1998. Because payroll grew rapidly during the period, the employers'
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costs as a percentage of payroll plateaued briefly (2.16 percent of pay
roll in 1991 and 2.17 percent of payroll in 1993) and then spiraled
down to 1.35 percent in 1998.
The sources of the rapid increases in workers' compensation bene
fits and costs between 1984 and 1991 and the stagnation or decline of
these aggregate measures of the workers' compensation program dur
ing the 1990s are examined in Spieler and Burton (1998) and Thomason, Schmidle, and Burton (forthcoming).

SPECIAL CONCERNS OF OLDER WORKERS
There are three relationships that are relevant to our interest in the
responsiveness of the workers' compensation program to the concerns
of older workers. First, what is the relationship between age and the
prevalence of impairments? We use the term impairment to mean "a
deviation from normal in a body part or organ system and its function
ing" (American Medical Association 1993, p. 1/1). An impairment
can result from an injury or an illness and can lead to the inability to
perform activities of daily living (American Medical Association
1993, p. 1/1). Second, what is the relationship between age and the
prevalence of disability? We use the term disability to mean reduction
or "alteration of an individual's capacity to meet personal, social, or
occupational demands or statutory or regulatory requirements because
of an impairment" (American Medical Association 1993, p. 1/2). Our
particular concern is work disability. The extent of work disability
resulting from an impairment is affected by personal attributes, such as
age, education, and job experience, as well as external factors, such as
the state of the labor market and the extent of job modifications.
Third, what is the relationship between age and the prevalence of
workers' compensation benefits? Even if work disability increases
with age, the compensability rules for workers' compensation may
preclude some of the disabled workers from obtaining benefits.
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Age and Impairment
The relationship between age and the prevalence of impairments
varies by the source or type of impairment. The frequency of workrelated injuries generally declines with age; severity, however, tends to
increase with age (Wegman 2000). This pattern is shown in Table 1;
the frequency of work injuries is lower for workers in the 45-64 years
age category than for younger workers (ages 18-24 and 25-^-4), while
the numbers of restricted-activity days and bed days associated with
work injuries are higher for workers in the 45-64 years age category
than for younger workers.
While the Table 1 data show that the frequency of work injuries is
lower for older workers, the data shown in Table 2 indicate that the
number of chronic conditions per 1,000 persons for those 45-64 years
old is considerably higher than the rate for persons aged 18-44 for sev
eral of the most common conditions, including intervertebral disc dis
orders, orthopedic impairments of the back, hearing impairment, and
heart disease.7 It is these "border-challenging" conditions that present
the most difficult issues regarding work-relatedness for workers' com
pensation systems. We explore the historical treatment of one of the
most common of these conditions, back injuries, in the following sec
tion.8
Table 1 Numbers of Episodes of Injuries at Work and Their
Consequences per 100 Persons, by Age3
25^44 yr.

45-64 yr.
1.7*

3.9

18-24yr.
5.4*b

Number of restrictedactivity days associated
with episodes

91 1

45.4*

100.5

142.5

Number of bed days
associated with episodes

21.9

3.1*

24.5

34.6

All ages
Episodes of persons injured

6.4

SOURCE: Adams, Hendershot, and Marano (1999), Tables 51, 53, and 55.
a Data are for the United States in 1996.
b An astensk (*) means the "figure does not meet standard of reliability or precision:
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Table 2 Number of Selected3 Reported Chronic Conditions
per 1,000 Persons, by Ageb
Type of
chronic condition

All ages

18^4
yr.

45-^4
yr.

65 yr
and over

127.3

50.1

240.1

482.7

Intervertebral discs

25.4

21.1

62.7

32.2

Hearing impairment

83.4

41.9

131.5

303.4

111.6

1224

177.8

157.6

Back

640

80.6

1028

687

Upper extremity

15.8

13.3

29.4

30.9

Lower extremity

48.0

43.2

82.5

72.6

78.2

39.3

116.4

268.7

107.1

49.6

214.1

363.5

Arthritis

Deformity or orthopedic
impairment

Heart disease
High blood pressure
(hypertension)
Chronic bronchitis

53.5

45.4

59.1

63.5

Asthma

55.2

56.9

486

45.5

Hay fever or allergic
rhinitis without asthma

89.8

109.4

104.8

67.7

125.5

144.7

174.1

117.1

Chronic sinusitis

SOURCE: Adams, Hendershot, and Marano (1999), Table 57.
a All conditions with at least 50 chronic conditions per 1,000 persons are included in
this table.
b Data are for the United States in 1996.

Age and Disability
The relationship between impairment and disability is complicated
because of the multiplicity of factors, including age, education, and
experience, that interact with a given impairment to produce work dis
ability. Isolating the effect of age per se on disability is especially
complicated because age may be correlated with other factors, notably
work experience. Berkowitz (1988) provided a good discussion of the
difficulties of capturing the independent effect of age and also provided
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an unambiguous conclusion: age is related to disability even after con
trolling for the other determinants of disability.
The general relationship between age and work disability (not con
trolling for factors such as experience) is documented by Pransky
(2001, Table 4). According to U.S. Census data from 1989, the per
centage of persons who report work disability increases steadily with
age. Thus, while 7.1 percent of 35- to 44-year-olds report work dis
ability, 10.3 percent of those aged 45-54 and 22.3 percent of those
aged 55-64 report they are disabled for work. Burkhauser, Daly, and
Houtenville (2001, Table A2) present data from the Current Population
Survey which indicate that disability is increasing over time for work
ers in the same age category. Thus, 6.7 percent of persons aged 35 to
44 reported they were disabled in 1999, up from 5.9 percent of persons
in that age category in 1988. Similarly, 10.4 percent of persons aged
45-54 indicated they were disabled in 1999, up from 9.1 percent of
persons in that age category in 1988. These and other studies clearly
demonstrate a general positive relationship between age and work dis
ability. This association is compounded and partially explained for
older workers by the general decrease in labor market mobility associ
ated with advancing age (Hirsch, Macpherson, and Hardy 2000).
Age and Workers' Compensation
The evidence concerning the relationship between age and the
receipt of workers' compensation benefits is more fragmentary and
inconclusive.9 Biddle, Boden, and Reville (2001, Tables 2, 4, and 7
and Figure 1) have provided evidence that the proportion of workers'
compensation cases paying permanent partial disability benefits
increases with age; that earnings losses and injury-related non-employ
ment for workers receiving permanent partial disability benefits
increase with age; and that replacement rates (workers' compensation
benefits as a percent of earnings losses) decline with age. Tattrie
(2000) has presented some preliminary data suggesting that a young
workforce has much lower costs per claim than a middle-aged work
force, but that average costs per claim of older workers are only mod
estly higher those of middle-aged workers.
Both of these studies provide clues that age is an important factor
in determining the award and payment of benefits, but they are more
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tantalizing than conclusive about the exact nature of the relationship
between age and the workers' compensation program. In order to bet
ter understand the performance of workers' compensation in providing
benefits to workers in different age categories, it would be useful to
have data showing for various age categories the frequency of workers'
compensation claims per 100,000 workers, the average benefits per
claim, and the total costs of workers' compensation benefits per
100,000 workers. These data should be disaggregated not only by age
but also by the nature of the impairment or medical condition causing
the disability. Specifically, the data should distinguish between disabil
ity resulting from injuries and disability resulting from the chronic
conditions identified in Table 2.
We are not suggesting that the patterns of workers' compensation
payments for different age groups should necessarily match the pat
terns of impairments or work disability for these age groups. Some of
the conditions showing an increasing incidence of impairments for
older persons in Table 2 may reflect the pure effect of aging. Workers'
compensation, with its work-related test, presumably should not have a
higher incidence of conditions for older workers that are due solely to
aging. Yet, conditions that are substantially aggravated by work may
be more prevalent among older workers. These conditions may be of
greater concern, particularly in view of the changes in compensability
standards (described later) that have occurred in some states. Some of
these conditions, notably disorders involving the back, have tradition
ally met the compensability tests for workers' compensation benefits.
If the data indicate that the frequency of compensable back disorders
does not increase with age, or if the overall frequency of compensable
back or similar disorders is declining, the results will suggest that
recent reforms of the eligibility rules for workers' compensation have
had a particularly deleterious effect on older workers.
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BACKS: CASE STUDY OF A MEDICAL CONDITION WITH
A HISTORICAL PROBLEM OF APPLYING THE
WORK-RELATED TESTS
Work-relatedness, as we have noted, is the key to eligibility for
workers' compensation benefits. The four legal tests described in the
first section of this chapter are particularly difficult to apply to medical
conditions resulting from multiple causes. Where impairments are
caused by workplace exposures combined with personal lifestyle,
aging, or hereditary factors, workers' compensation systems are con
fronted with a particularly challenging problem. The chronic impair
ments that increase with age (see Table 2) are among the conditions
that are likely to fall into this category. All of these conditions can be
considered "border-challenging" in the sense that they challenge the
boundaries of the work-related tests for workers' compensation. Thus,
a workers' compensation program is likely to have difficulty deciding
whether the work-related test is met for a heart attack of a worker who
is under job stress, smokes, is 55 years old, and has a family history of
heart disease.
The workers' compensation programs in the various states have
developed a variety of refinements to the work-related tests in order to
deal with these more complex cases involving medical conditions
resulting from exposures over time and/or conditions resulting from
multiple causes. Back injuries provide an interesting case study. An
examination of the issues pertaining to the compensability of back con
ditions in workers' compensation programs is instructive because of
the mixed etiology of many back conditions; the relative importance of
back cases in the workers' compensation program (they account for
about 40 percent of all benefit payments); and the prevalence of back
disorders in older workers. Burton (1992) examined the medical and
legal approaches to back disorders.
The Medical Approach
Three sources of back disorders can be distinguished from a medi
cal standpoint. First, there are fractures and dislocations of the back.
These conditions are relatively uncommon, although they can be quite
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serious. The common causes of fractures and dislocations are trau
matic events such as direct blows and falls from heights.
Second, there are sprains and strains of the back. The back is the
most frequently affected part of the body; each year nearly 1 out of 30
persons of working age experiences a strain or sprain of the back of
sufficient severity to either require medical care or restricted activity.
In general, strains and sprains have less serious consequences than
fractures and dislocations and are likely to result from less obvious
events.
Third, there are diseases of the back, in which damage to the body
results from a slowly developing condition rather than from an acute
traumatic event. However, the symptoms of many diseases can be pre
cipitated by trauma. Following the approach of Kelsey (1982), dis
eases can be separated into those involving specific conditions of the
back or neck (such as prolapsed discs, degenerated discs, and spondylolisthesis) and those of a more general nature that frequently affect the
back (such as osteoarthrosis).
Prolapsed intervertebral discs (also known as herniated discs, rup
tured discs, or "slipped" discs) are one of the most common sources of
disability among the working-age population. At one time, physical
trauma was believed to be the only cause of prolapsed discs. However,
the accepted medical view now is that, although trauma is sometimes
the precipitating event, many prolapsed discs occur without any ante
cedent trauma, and trauma is seldom the underlying cause.
Two other diseases affecting the back are disc degeneration and
spondylolisthesis. A confusing matter for each of these conditions is
many people with x-ray evidence of the disease have no symptoms. In
addition to the diseases specifically affecting the back, there are other
diseases of a general nature that can affect the back, including arthritic
disorders.
Burton (1992) made four generalizations about the medical
approach to back disorders.
1) Pain in the back and neck are very common problems.
2) In a large portion of cases of low back and neck pain, a definite
diagnosis cannot be made. This is partially because the symp
toms often are not uniquely associated with a particular disease;
partially because x-ray evidence of a disorder often is associated
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with no symptoms; and partially because a particular patient may
have multiple disorders.
3) The contribution of the workplace to back disorders is difficult to
ascertain.
4) The medical view of trauma as a cause varies among the three
sources of back disorders. For a fracture or dislocation, a trau
matic event normally is readily identifiable as the likely cause.
For a strain or sprain, a less significant and therefore less identifi
able trauma is the likely cause. For diseases, the role of trauma is
much more problematic. Trauma or mechanical stress seems to
be a precipitant or perhaps an aggravating factor, rather than the
underlying cause for diseases affecting the back. The true culprit
often is age, although factors such as hereditary disposition also
may be involved.
The Legal Approach
Backs are almost always treated as injuries rather than diseases in
workers' compensation programs. Consequently, the four legal tests
for a compensable injury are normally used to decide whether back
injuries are work-related. The most difficult legal test for claims
involving backs is the accident requirement.
There appears to be little problem with reconciling the medical
knowledge concerning fractures and dislocations with the legal
approach to these back disorders. There is normally an external trau
matic event that causes the back problem, and the application of the
accident test is no more difficult than in most workers' compensation
cases. However, fractures and dislocations represent only a small pro
portion of the back disorders handled by workers' compensation, so
there is little consolation to be derived from this congruence of the
medical and legal approaches.
Among back disorders caused by disease, the legal approach
makes it easier for herniated discs than for other back disorders to meet
the accident test. This is largely because the law relies on an outmoded
view of causation in which external trauma is assumed to be the cause
of discal herniation. Probably the most serious problem with the legal
approach, however, is the implicit assumption that herniated discs can
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be differentiated from other sources of back disorders, while medically
this is often not possible.
Another aspect of the legal approach to back disorders resulting
from diseases (other than herniated discs) is to hold that the accident
test is met when unusual exertion is the precipitant of the back disorder
but to deny compensation when there is only usual exertion. However,
from the medical standpoint (aside from the few cases involving obvi
ous trauma), there is little proof that pattern of use causes lower back
disease. In fact, the conclusion that results from this review of the legal
rules used to decide which back disorders are work-related (and there
fore are compensable) is that these rules have little scientific validity.
While backs are the most important medical condition for which
application of the work-related test causes problems, there are similar
problems for other medical conditions such as heart disease, stress, and
repetitive trauma, for which the etiology can involve a mixture of
hereditary, degenerative, and occupational factors. The higher preva
lence of these conditions in older workers poses a particular challenge
for workers' compensation systems.

CHANGING RULES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION:
RESPONSES TO THE COST INCREASES OF 1984-1991 10
The aggregate costs of workers' compensation, like those of other
social insurance programs, are primarily affected by four factors: the
number of claims that are filed, the number that are approved for pay
ment, the amount of benefits paid in approved claims, and the amount
of administrative and other costs associated with the provision of bene
fits. Over half of the state legislatures passed major amendments to
workers' compensation laws during the period 1989-1997, largely in
response to organized political opposition by employers and insurers to
escalating costs. During this period of retrenchment, these legislative
changes (together with judicial rulings) tightened eligibility rules, low
ered the amount of benefits paid on some claims, changed mechanisms
and time periods for payment for permanent disabilities, instituted var
ious health care cost containment strategies, and heightened require
ments for applicants' burden of proof. This section describes some of
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these changes and speculates regarding the likely effects of these
changes on older workers.
The specific changes in the availability of benefits vary consider
ably among states. Moreover, since each state's program is an interde
pendent system with its own history of tradeoffs among key provisions,
it is important to be careful in making generalizations about trends. It
is also important to note that the specific effects of these changes on
older workers have not yet been subjected to careful empirical
research; data based on age of applicants or beneficiaries are not gener
ally available. It does appear quite likely, however, that many of these
changes may particularly restrict the access of older workers to work
ers' compensation benefits. The result of these restrictions is therefore
likely to be a transfer of disability costs related to occupational morbid
ity to other social insurance programs or directly to aging workers and
their families. This is particularly true for those workers who cannot
meet SSDI eligibility requirements because they are only partially dis
abled, but who are unable to continue to work at their regular or similar
wage jobs as a result of their work-related disabilities.
Reducing the Number of Claims in the Workers'
Compensation System
The development of more restrictive rules governing eligibility for
benefits has been a prevalent feature of workers' compensation
changes in the 1990s.
Limitations on coverage when the injury involves
aggravation of a preexisting condition
Perhaps the most significant development for aging workers is the
growing restriction on compensation for disabilities when the worker
suffers from a preexisting health condition. This means that a predis
position to an injury or illness may bar a worker from receiving work
ers' compensation benefits for an injury or illness caused by current
workplace exposures, and that the systems are tightened for those con
ditions that we have characterized as "border-challenging."
As noted above, under traditional workers' compensation theory,
compensation did not depend on whether the worker's condition was
caused, in part, by a prior injury or an underlying chronic condition.
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Thus, a worker who was aging or who had some preexisting nondisabling condition was not barred from coverage for an injury occurring
at work, even if the underlying condition contributed to the occurrence
of the injury or to the extent of the resulting disability. Through a vari
ety of legislative and judicial changes, rules governing compensation
for preexisting conditions or aggravation have been tightened in many
jurisdictions.
Most significantly, a number of states have now limited compensa
tion when the current injury is not the sole or major cause of the dis
abling condition. These limitations come in a variety of forms:
requiring that work be the major or primary cause of the disability
(e.g., Oregon, Florida, South Dakota, and Nevada); excluding from
compensability injuries for which current work is merely the triggering
factor (Missouri); and requiring that any preexisting condition be
aggravated by a discrete accident, rather than chronic work exposures
(Idaho). A few of these changes specifically target older workers, or
the conditions that are prevalent among older workers. For example,
several states now specifically exclude injuries or resulting disabilities
or impairments from compensability if they are the effects of "the natu
ral aging process" (e.g., Kentucky, Missouri, and Wyoming), and one
state requires proof of a discrete injury if there is an underlying agingrelated condition (New Hampshire). These changes are further
strengthened both by heightened general evidentiary standards for
claimants, including the requirements for "objective medical evidence"
(discussed below) and by stricter rules and shorter time limits for
reopening prior claims when progression of a condition occurs (e.g.,
West Virginia, Kentucky, Wyoming, and Idaho). These changes have
resulted in the denial of claims involving cumulative trauma disorders,
asthma and other respiratory conditions, low back and other musculoskeletal disorders, and so on."
In Oregon, the revised rule meant that a steel worker who was pre
disposed to respiratory illness because of underlying airway irritation
disease and who suffered from an occupationally caused lung disease
was not entitled to compensation under the state workers' compensa
tion law. 12 Subsequent developments in Oregon show the interesting
underbelly of workers' compensation politics and litigation. Because
the worker was foreclosed from seeking workers' compensation bene
fits, he was successful in maintaining a common law tort action against
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his employer. The Oregon legislature then responded quickly to
employers' concerns about this erosion of the usual workers' compen
sation bar to civil actions, passing a revised state statute that extends
workers' compensation exclusivity "to all injuries and to diseases,
symptom complexes or similar conditions" arising out of employment
"whether or not they are determined to be compensable under this
chapter."13 Under this provision, workers with occupationally exacer
bated conditions are barred from recovering benefits both under the
workers' compensation program and in a civil law suit, even if the
injury was due to an employer's negligence. Another worker then chal
lenged the new statute as an unconstitutional denial of remedies; in
1997 an Oregon appellate court upheld its constitutionality. 14 As of
August 28, 2000, this case was still under consideration by the Oregon
Supreme Court. Similar cases are pending in other states, including
Idaho. 15
In addition, second-injury funds (instituted initially to promote the
employment of war veterans) historically provided insurance coverage
for disability that resulted from the combined effects of a new injury
and preexisting conditions. Over the past 20 years, costs associated
with second injuries rose, and employers and insurers had little incen
tive to defend against claims that would be charged to these funds.
These funds were generally underfunded, but reformulated accounting
principles forced states to recognize the magnitude of future unfunded
liabilities. In the 1990s, the private insurance industry led a lobbying
campaign for the elimination of the funds. Serious underfunding,
when combined with unsubstantiated arguments that disability dis
crimination laws have made these funds obsolete, resulted in the aboli
tion or severe restriction of second injury funds in a number of states
(e.g., Colorado, Utah, Florida, Minnesota, and New Mexico). To the
extent that the disability discrimination laws do in fact result in
increased hiring of previously injured workers, the elimination of the
financial protection offered by second-injury funds means that employ
ers might face increased workers' compensation liability for aggrava
tion of old injuries or chronic conditions. With the abolition of these
funds, employers have more incentive both to fight individual claims
and to argue in the political arena for reduced workers' compensation
coverage for injuries previously compensated by these funds.
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Although these changes vary in their scope, they all have the same
effect: they limit the liability of workers' compensation systems when
a worker brings to his or her current employment an increased level of
risk of injury or disability. The likely result may be the exclusion of
claims by workers, often older workers, with preexisting chronic musculoskeletal and pulmonary conditions and underlying chronic diseases
that predispose them to injury and illness caused by work.
Procedural and evidentiary changes in claims processing that
restrict compensability
More subtle, but equally restrictive, changes are occurring in the
approach to the evaluation of evidence in many state workers' compen
sation systems. For example, statutory changes in a number of states
now require that a claimant prove that his or her injury was both prima
rily work-related and that the resulting medical condition can be docu
mented by "objective medical" evidence. These heightened
requirements appear to be rooted both in a desire to save money and in
a distrust of subjective reports of injuries by claimants. A broad
requirement for objective evidence excludes from coverage those
claims based upon the subjective reports of patients that cannot be sub
stantiated by objective medical testing. Debilitating musculoskeletal
injuries involving soft tissue damage and reports of pain and psycho
logical impairment may be excluded from compensation based upon
this requirement.
In addition, in some jurisdictions, claimants are being required to
meet increasingly strict burdens of proof. In a landmark 1994 case
under the federal black lung compensation law, the U.S. Supreme
Court threw out the Department of Labor's "true doubt rule" under
which the claimant won if the medical evidence offered by the claimant
and the coal operator were equal in weight. The court ruled that, due to
requirements in the Administrative Procedures Act, claimants must
prove their cases by a "preponderance of the evidence." 16 Statutory
amendments to some state statutes now require, either in all claims or
for specifically delineated ones, that claimants meet this preponderance
standard or, for some injuries or diseases, the even more difficult stan
dard of "clear and convincing evidence." Because many compensation
programs gave claimants the benefit of the doubt in close or marginal
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cases in the past, these changes could prove to be significant, particu
larly for workers with "border-challenging" claims.
The general tightening of eligibility and compensability standards
appears to have a predictable, but difficult to document, effect on the
defense of claims. All over the country, claimants and their representa
tives claim that workers' compensation insurance carriers are more
likely to controvert or contest claims and less likely to offer what
claimants view as reasonable settlements. The Workers Compensation
Research Institute report regarding Massachusetts' experience supports
this claim (Gardner, Telles, and Moss 1996). Similarly, a study by phy
sicians at the Mount Sinai Center for Environmental Medicine in New
York City found that 81 percent of workers diagnosed in their occupa
tional medicine clinic with occupational cumulative trauma disorders
had their claims contested or received no response from the insurance
carrier when the claim was filed (Herbert, Janeway, and Schechter
1997). Thus, even in those jurisdictions that nominally compensate for
these injuries, many claims go uncompensated. This trend may further
magnify the statutory and judicial changes that restrict workers' access
to benefits for work-related injuries.
On the other hand, the interpretation of what constitutes objective
evidence, an excluded preexisting condition, or the preponderance of
the evidence is ultimately up to the courts. Judicial interpretations vary
and may not always prove to be as restrictive as the statutory language
appears to demand. 17 It is therefore difficult to assess fully the impact
of these statutory changes without further study.
Changes in compensability rules for particular conditions
As noted above, workers' compensation systems have often failed
to compensate occupational diseases. Because of changes in the state
laws during the period following the 1972 report of the National Com
mission on State Workmen's Compensation Laws, claims for condi
tions involving common physical and mental complaints (such as back
or other nonacute musculoskeletal injuries and mental stress) rose in
many states. As we have noted, these conditions challenge the bound
aries of the traditional work-relatedness test and are often caused by
chronic, rather than acute, exposures at work. They sometimes also
involve a higher degree of medical ambiguity than do many acute inju
ries, because they are not easily diagnosed using clearly objective med-
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ical tests. In those states in which compensation for these conditions
was paid, however, insurers and employers regarded them as a primary
cost-driver to the system. Perhaps not surprisingly, these types of con
ditions became the focus of some attempts to exclude conditions in
order to limit aggregate workers' compensation costs.
The two primary areas of exclusion have been psychological inju
ries and cumulative trauma disorders (CTDs), also known as repetitive
stress injuries. In the case of CTDs, as the reported incidence of inju
ries caused by repetitive trauma skyrocketed, some state legislatures
responded by tightening the eligibility standards for compensation.
This was done using a variety of mechanisms: heightened burdens of
proof; more specific causation requirements; or requirements for posi
tive findings on specific diagnostic tests. In the most notorious case,
the state supreme court in Virginia ruled that repetitive injury claims,
including both carpal tunnel syndrome and noise induced hearing loss,
were simply noncompensable under the language of the state workers'
compensation statute. In response to the political reaction to these
decisions, the Virginia legislature amended the workers' compensation
statute to provide nominal, but very narrow, coverage for these condi
tions. 18 It is important to note, however, that this is not a universal
trend. The majority of states do provide some compensation for these
conditions; in fact, in 1997, Oklahoma added cumulative trauma to the
statutory list of terms denoting compensable injuries.
Stress and other psychological injuries present a more extreme pic
ture. A number of states have made claims for psychological condi
tions (in the absence of a physical injury) noncompensable. In a much
smaller number of states, restrictions on compensation for psychologi
cal injury even include those that develop as a result of physical injury
and impairment. These restrictions have been designed in a number of
ways. Some state laws simply now provide that purely psychological
("mental-mental") claims are noncompensable (e.g., Wyoming, Okla
homa, South Dakota, and West Virginia). A second approach restricts
the availability of compensation by imposing heightened standards of
causation or increased burdens of proof. A third approach reduces the
amount of benefits: in Colorado, benefits for stress or mental injury are
now limited to 12 weeks, with a maximum weekly benefit of 50 per
cent of the state's average weekly wage.
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Several states explicitly limit mental-mental claims to situations
not involving lawful personnel actions or to situations involving
extraordinary or unusual circumstances (e.g., Hawaii, Connecticut,
South Carolina, California, Idaho, Missouri, and New York). Psycho
logical reactions to extremely stressful work situations that are not ille
gal or unusual are therefore noncompensable in these states. Thus,
while psychological sequelae from a physical injury remain compensable in most jurisdictions, psychological symptomatology caused by
events at work that do not involve physical injury are often no longer
compensable.
The motivation for these limitations is clear. Workers' responses to
physical and mental stressors at work are subject both to very individu
alized real responses and to serious measurement problems. The costs
are therefore both potentially large and uncertain. The filing of large
numbers of claims involving CTDs and stress was a relatively new phe
nomenon and appeared to be growing quickly in some jurisdictions.
By changing the legal rules, claims are made to disappear from the
workers' compensation programs. The result is that workers' compen
sation is eliminated as a primary payer for significant numbers of dis
abilities that are work-related, thereby externalizing costs from the
workers' compensation system.

Restrictions on compensability of permanent total
disability cases
Workers' compensation provides benefits for both long and shortterm disabilities. The political and economic pressure to reduce costs
has also been directed at the actuarially defined "long tail" of workers'
compensation claims those benefits that may continue for years.
Benefits for permanent disabilities, including permanent total disabil
ity, are the major cost drivers in the system. The assault on these bene
fits has taken two forms. First, eligibility has been restricted through
the mechanisms described above and through a more direct assault on
permanent total disability benefits. Second, as described in the next
section, payment has been tightened on those claims that are approved.
Permanent total disability (PTD) benefits are generally paid to dis
abled workers for life. 19 In view of the relatively high cost of a life
time award, it is not surprising that state legislatures have attempted to
reduce these costs. Prior to recent developments, many states had
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adopted the "odd-lot" doctrine, which allowed for the consideration of
a claimant's age, education and skills in addition to the nature of injury
in determining eligibility for benefits. Odd-lot workers were generally
older workers with a combination of health impairments and a history
of working in manual industries. This is the same population, for
example, that may qualify for SSDI benefits under the more lenient
provisions for workers who are over 55 years old and have limited edu
cation and a long work history in manual labor. 20 Recently, many
states have significantly restricted the use of the odd lot doctrine, most
adversely affecting older workers. In addition, some states, like Flor
ida, now require a "catastrophic" injury before a worker can be consid
ered for a PTD award. Others have established impairment thresholds
requiring the injury to result in a specified and very high level of func
tional impairment before a worker can be considered for a PTD award.
Many states have narrowed the definition of what it means to be perma
nently and totally disabled by abandoning the claimant's prior work as
a reference point. In Minnesota, the injured worker must be incapable
of working at any occupation that produces an income; in Colorado, it
is inability to earn a wage; in Oregon, a gainful occupation is defined as
one that pays the minimum wage.
The results of these eligibility restrictions for PTD benefits have
sometimes been startling. For example, in West Virginia, the adoption
of a threshold requirement that a claimant have at least 50 percent
functional impairment (within the definition in the Guides to the Eval
uation of Permanent Impairment [American Medical Association
1993]) resulted in a 97 percent reduction in the rate of permanent total
disability awards, from 117 to 5.8 per 100,000 workers in the first two
years after enactment (BNA 1997, p. 276).21 This spurred legislative
action in 1999 that relaxed the eligibility threshold to 40 percent func
tional impairment. The effects of this change have not yet been deter
mined.
Underfiling of claims and expansion of fraud prosecutions
State statutes during this period also expanded criminal liability for
fraud. Substantial, and perhaps excessive, media attention has been
focused on claimants who are viewed as illegally seeking to obtain or
extend benefits. Often, these articles assert that large numbers of
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claims in workers' compensation involve fraud, resulting in a broad
stigmatization of workers who file for benefits.22
Of course, the expansion and publicizing of fraud prosecutions of
claimants deters intentionally fraudulent claims, but it also may dis
courage the filing of legitimate claims. Current research indicates that
large numbers of workers with occupationally caused disabilities do
not file claims for workers' compensation (Biddle et al. 1998; Pransky
et al. 1999; Michaels 1998; Morse et al. 1998; and Morse, Dillon, and
Warren 2000). The decision by a worker not to seek benefits is a com
plex one and has been found to be affected by the severity of the injury,
the worker's level of knowledge about workers' compensation, and the
worker's own fears regarding how the employer and others will react to
the filing of a claim (Morse, Dillon, and Warren 2000). Older workers
may have more access to alternative benefits; they are more likely to
qualify for SSDI due to the consideration of age in the evaluation pro
cess and they are more likely to have vested pension benefits due to
duration of employment. To the extent that other programs lack the
same level of stigmatization, workers may preferentially seek these
alternative benefits, thereby shifting costs from workers' compensation
to these other programs.
Reductions in the Amount Paid in Approved Claims
Reduction in the costs of approved claims is primarily being
achieved through reductions in the amount that is paid for permanent
disabilities. In general, weekly benefit rates have not been reduced, in
large part because most states now provide that maximum weekly ben
efits automatically increase each year as the state's average weekly
wage increases.23
Reductions in payment of permanent partial disability benefits
A critical difference between workers' compensation and other
social insurance programs is the availability of permanent partial dis
ability benefits, designed to compensate the worker for loss of income
resulting from the injury or illness although the worker remains active
in the labor market. These benefits, which typically are the largest
component of disability benefit costs, were a primary target for reform
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in the 1990s. These changes have particular consequence to older
workers, whose injuries tend to be more severe (Wegman 2000).
Three patterns of reform are evident. First, there have been reduc
tions in the duration or weekly amount of the PPD benefits. For exam
ple, in Connecticut, an aggregate 27 percent reduction in PPD benefits
was achieved in 1993 by reducing the nominal replacement rate from
80 percent to 75 percent of spendable earnings; by reducing the dura
tion for scheduled injuries (e.g., the number of weeks for loss of a leg
was reduced from 238 to 155 weeks); and by reducing the maximum
duration of nonscheduled PPD benefits from 780 to 520 weeks. Other
states that curtailed the maximum number of weeks of PPD benefits
include Massachusetts, Florida, and Maine. The result of these reduc
tions is both to decrease the duration of compensation awards in the
more serious cases and to reduce the value of claims when they are set
tled early in litigation. According to a study by the Workers Compen
sation Research Institute, these and related changes in Massachusetts
drove the average lump sum settlement from $27,040 to $18,860
(Gardner, Telles, and Moss 1996, p. 98).
Second, there was a substantial curtailment of the wage-loss
approach to calculation of benefits in the 1990s. Pennsylvania enacted
legislation in 1996 that reduced the employer's responsibilities to offer
an actual employment opportunity in order to avoid responsibility for
wage-loss benefits. Florida had been viewed as a pioneer in 1979 when
it introduced a two-track system for PPD benefits, one track for impair
ment benefits if the worker experienced an actual physical loss of a
body member and another track that could be paid concurrently if the
worker had actual earnings losses due to the injury. During the 1980s,
the maximum duration for the wage-loss benefits was 525 weeks. In
1990, the maximum duration of the wage-loss benefits was seriously
curtailed (which reduced the actuarial valuation of the PPD benefits by
48.4 percent). And in 1994, the impairment benefits track was elimi
nated, the wage-loss benefits were restricted to a few workers with very
serious injuries, and the overall duration for all types of benefits in PPD
cases was limited to 401 weeks. The actuarial valuation indicated
these 1994 reforms reduced the Florida PPD benefits by another 16.7
percent (NCCI 2000, p. 101).
A third pattern in PPD reform in the 1990s was to move toward
benefits that are primarily determined on the basis of the assessment of
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the extent of impairment, rather than on the basis of an evaluation of
the extent of loss of earning capacity (or loss of actual earnings). The
claimed rationale was that the impairment ratings were more objective
and thus less prone to litigation. The switch to an impairment-only rat
ing system was often associated with adoption of the AMA's Guides to
the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment as the tool for assessment of
impairment. The Guides relies primarily on purportedly objective
medical testing but produces inconsistent ratings that may result in
devaluation of common disabling injuries for workers. (Spieler et al.
2000) The precise effect of the Guides' ratings has not been studied,
but claimants' advocates assert that the adoption of the impairmentonly PPD system is accompanied by reductions in the amount of PPD
benefits paid.

Reductions in benefits based on receipt of other income
Significantly for older workers, many states now mandate that dis
ability benefits be reduced by other income, most commonly Social
Security Old Age benefits, or be terminated when the claimant reaches
retirement age or becomes eligible to collect SSOA benefits.24 These
offset or termination provisions, which are designed to reduce the cost
of workers' compensation costs for employers, generally make no
allowance for the reduction in retirement income resulting from the
loss of wages associated with the disability. This means that workers
who leave the workforce with reduced old age or pension benefits have
their total income further reduced, often dollar for dollar, by the cuts in
workers' compensation payments. These restrictions have been chal
lenged in many states; state courts are split on whether this reduction or
termination of workers' compensation benefits constitutes an unconsti
tutional age-based classification.25
Medical Care Cost Containment
During the 1980s, workers' compensation health care continued to
be paid entirely by the employer and to rely primarily on fee-for-service reimbursement arrangements with medical practitioners. During
this same period, general group health insurance adopted and expanded
a variety of cost containment strategies. The results of the disparate
rules were that medical expenses for comparable conditions were con-
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siderably higher in workers' compensation than in the general health
care system. Such disparities provided an incentive for providers to
classify marginal conditions (such as backs) as work-related in order to
receive higher payments.
Since about 1990, because of a perception that workers' compen
sation was experiencing inordinate rates of increase in health care
costs, many states made changes in the health care component of their
workers' compensation programs. These included the adoption of "tra
ditional" approaches to limiting health care costs in workers' compen
sation (e.g., fee schedules, limits on the choice of treating physicians
and on the amount or duration of health care); the introduction of man
aged care networks; and some movement toward "24-hour coverage"
which integrated workers' compensation health care with other cover
age (Burton 1997, pp. 141-48).26 Most of these changes were designed
to reduce the costs of health care delivery in workers' compensation
and the cost shifting to workers' compensation from other payers. The
likely results of these changes include the transfer of health care costs
to the worker and to other health payers; decreases in medical costs in
workers' compensation; increases in the control that the insurer or
employer has over medical management; and, conversely, decreases in
the worker's own control of his or her health care.
Some of these developments may have particular impact on older
workers. For example, many states now restrict employees' choice of
physician for both treatment and evaluation of workplace injuries,
either directly or through employer-selected managed care net
works.27 In these instances, the employer-selected physician may con
trol both treatment and assessment of the worker for continuation of
weekly cash benefits. Not surprisingly, organized labor and many
workers argue that restrictions on employee choice of providers have
an adverse impact on the injured worker, damage the provider-patient
relationship, and lead to inferior treatment and premature return to
work. This may be especially true for older workers with chronic
health conditions, who are required to seek treatment from employerchosen physicians for health problems with complex etiology.
In addition, there has been considerable concern and political agi
tation regarding the issue of confidentiality of workers' compensation
medical records. Under pressure from employers, some states have
explicitly restricted the scope of confidentiality of medical records
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when an employee files for workers' compensation benefits, including
allowing both oral and written communications between the employer
or insurer and the employees' physician without a release by the
employee (e.g., West Virginia) and requiring the release of all medical
information relating to arguably relevant preexisting conditions (e.g.,
Nevada).
The effects of expansion of communication among third parties
about a worker's health status have not been studied. It is however rea
sonable to speculate that broad elimination of medical confidentiality
may have several effects. On the one hand, providing the health care
provider and employer with better information may promote appropri
ate disability management and return to work. On the other hand, this
erosion of confidentiality may discourage some workers from filing for
workers' compensation benefits, particularly those with chronic health
conditions who prefer not to reveal their health status to their employ
ers. This last group of workers is likely to include an overrepresentation of older workers.
Rise of Disability Management and Return-to-work Programs
Like the interest in expanding return to work for SSDI/SSI recipi
ents, there has been a significant shift to a focus on disability manage
ment and "return-to-work" programs in workers' compensation. In the
past, whether a disabled worker would return to his or her old job, or to
any job at all, was solely within the discretion of employers and was
not viewed as the concern of workers' compensation programs. In
contrast, work participation by disabled workers is now actively
encouraged.
Disability management can accomplish two critical goals: it can
save costs by decreasing both the length of time a worker is out of work
and the higher permanent disability rating that is thought to result from
longer absence from work, and it can improve quality of life for work
ers by increasing successful postinjury work participation. Clearly,
employers and insurers are economically motivated to decrease work
ers' compensation liability by encouraging or forcing employees to
return to work. Light duty programs are often designed specifically to
bring workers back to work, often at temporary job assignments, after
initial recovery from an occupational injury. In general, employers and
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insurers believe that earlier return to work will limit both the duration
of temporary benefits and any psychological "overlay" which may
result in increased permanent disability.
Not surprisingly, the strong economic motivation for insurers and
employers to focus on rapid return to work makes many labor union
officials and injured workers' groups wary of these developments. In
many states, an offer of a job, even before the worker has reached max
imum medical improvement after an injury, will lead to termination of
temporary total disability benefits; in states that measure permanent
disability based upon wage loss or loss of earning capacity, the job
offer may limit permanent disability benefits as well. Not all states
require that the job offered be an appropriate one that the worker can
perform. Workers and their unions have charged that injured workers
are asked to resume duties they are not yet physically capable of per
forming.
Legal changes have both supported and reflected this shift toward
disability management. Some of these changes are internal to workers'
compensation statutes: expanding rehabilitation opportunities, making
retaliation for filing workers' compensation claims actionable, and
establishing both incentives and requirements for returning an injured
worker to work. Other legal developments, outside of the workers'
compensation laws, have both encouraged and reinforced these trends.
Most importantly, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), state
disability discrimination laws, and the Family and Medical Leave Act
now regulate employers' treatment of injured workers. Workers with
disabilities caused by work-related injuries and diseases are within the
potential class of employees who receive the protection of these new
laws. The ADA clearly supports the return-to-work concepts now
espoused in workers' compensation. 28 However, the overall effective
ness of the ADA in promoting employment of occupationally injured
workers is currently in doubt (Acemoglu and Angrist 1998; American
Bar Association, Commission on Mental and Physical Disabilities
1998 and 2000; Colker 1999; DeLeire 1997).
The focus on return to work supports the decrease in the availabil
ity of permanent disability benefits. It may therefore affect older work
ers in two ways. First, if it results in successful extension of worklife
through appropriate workplace accommodations, it will tend to expand
both work earnings and retirement income levels. On the other hand,
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to the extent that it results in reductions in benefits without successful
extensions of work, it will erode the cushion provided by workers'
compensation benefits to those who face reduced earnings as a result of
partial disabilities.

EFFECTS OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION
DEVELOPMENTS ON OLDER WORKERS AND OTHER
SOCIAL INSURANCE PROGRAMS
The foregoing summary suggests that several factors must be con
sidered when analyzing the adequacy of workers' compensation pro
grams for older workers. First, workers' compensation has never
provided compensation for all occupationally induced disabilities, nor
has workers' compensation fully replaced lost wages when a worker is
eligible for benefits. Workers' compensation is most adequate, from
the standpoint of both eligibility and benefit rates, for workers who suf
fer short term, acute injuries. Occupational diseases, chronic condi
tions resulting from long-term job exposures, and conditions that are
caused by multiple factors have never been fully compensated by these
programs.
Second, under recent workers' compensation developments in
some states, the likelihood that workers with chronic impairments will
replace their lost wages through workers' compensation appears to be
shrinking. The reductions are due to changes in eligibility rules,
changes in the approach to permanent disability, and reductions in ben
efits on receipt of other old age benefits.
Third, the combined effect of the various changes in compensability of conditions will have their greatest impact on conditions that are
most medically ambiguous. Musculoskeletal conditions resulting from
the wearing down of a worker's body and chronic diseases such as
hearing loss, arthritis, respiratory ailments, and heart disease are all
more prevalent in older workers. These conditions involve questions
regarding causation; all are subject to challenge based on tightened evi
dentiary standards; many cannot be clearly diagnosed and evaluated
using "objective" medical tests; and several have been the specific tar
get of tightened eligibility standards. Aging workers are overrepre-
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sented among people with chronic disabilities and diseases that are
partially work-induced. Restrictions on compensation are therefore
likely to affect older workers more adversely.
Fourth, aging workers face barriers in the labor market when they
lose their jobs. The job mobility of all disabled workers is also limited.
It is certainly likely that aging workers with disabilities face even
greater barriers. Erosion of medical confidentiality, increases in stigmatization of workers who file for benefits, and generalized concern
about labor market mobility may all act to increase the reluctance of
aging workers to file claims for workers' compensation benefits, partic
ularly if other benefits are available to cover their medical costs.
Fifth, the decline of long-tailed indemnity benefits means that
workers' compensation is unlikely to be a useful source for wage and
pension replacement for aging workers in the coming period. This
problem is exacerbated by the practice of compromise and release,
which allows for lump-sum, non-annuity payments to workers in order
to end the adjudication of a claim.
Sixth, reductions in the availability of permanent disability benefits
(both through eligibility and duration/amount restrictions) result in a
loss of replacement income for injured workers. To the extent that this
affects workers who may be eligible for SSDI or SSI, the federal pro
grams become the primary payers for these disabilities.
Seventh, state legislatures and those who lobby for restrictions in
workers' compensation benefits focus only on the costs of workers'
compensation programs and not on the costs that are externalized to
other programs (or to workers and their families). This means that
there is little attention paid in the states to the effects of these legisla
tive changes on other, primarily federal, benefit programs.
The implications of these factors for older workers and for other
social and private insurance programs are troubling. Like other social
insurance programs, workers' compensation was designed to provide
protection against poverty and catastrophic losses. But more than other
programs, workers' compensation was also expected to provide dis
abled workers with a substantial proportion of the income lost as a
result of the work-related injury or illness. This latter goal is reflected
in various program design elements: relatively high maximum weekly
benefits, provision of partial disability benefits for people who con
tinue to work, a benefit structure designed to replace a substantial pro-
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portion of lost earnings, and so on. Currently, we are concerned that
workers' compensation may be increasingly failing to meet both goals.
Because of changes in compensability standards, workers suffering
from occupationally induced morbidity may not meet the work-relatedness tests to qualify for benefits, and in a number of jurisdictions, per
manent disability benefits designed to cushion the economic impact
of injuries for workers have been significantly reduced.
As a result, workers may be less likely to be able to retain their
economic status in the face of work-caused disabilities. To some
extent, other programs will fill the gap. But many workers who are not
totally disabled will face reductions in income that are not compen
sated. To the extent that workers' compensation reduces the availabil
ity of benefits to workers who cannot qualify for SSDI or other
benefits, the costs associated with these disabilities are transferred to
the workers (and their families). The reductions in benefits after dis
abled workers reach the age of 65 may mean that levels of poverty for
these workers will grow, since workers' compensation benefits will no
longer compensate for the reductions in pension and SSOA benefits
that were caused by the reduced lifetime earnings resulting from work
place injuries.
In addition, although conclusive evidence is not available, there are
some data that suggest workers turn to SSDI for income support when
workers' compensation benefits are unavailable.29 The proportion of
workers with occupationally caused disabilities may therefore rise in
the DI program. This means that the SSA expectation that workers
whose disability is occupationally caused will find benefits elsewhere
may be increasingly misplaced. Similarly, the growing restrictions on
both compensability and medical care are likely to transfer health care
costs from workers' compensation to Medicare (if the worker qualifies
for SSDI) or to Medicaid (if the worker is impoverished or does not
qualify for Medicare). From the standpoint of injured workers, the
effect of this is mixed. On the one hand, SSDI benefits tend to be lower
and the disability eligibility requirements have historically been stricter
than in workers' compensation programs. On the other, applicants for
DI benefits are unlikely to face equivalent resistance from employers or
carriers to their claims, and once eligibility for SSDI benefits has been
established, the benefits are more secure and the health care provided is
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more comprehensive than that available through workers' compensa
tion.
Costs are also likely to be shifted from workers' compensation to
employment-based insurance programs offered by employers. This
includes short- and long-term disability and general health plans.
Since the premium costs of these programs tend to be sensitive to spe
cific employer experience, this may then encourage large employers to
expand the integration of benefit and disability plans, including work
ers' compensation, in order to gain control over the firm's total expen
ditures on disability.

CONCLUSION
In summary, the recent decline in workers' compensation costs and
benefits in part reflects a decline in the adequacy and availability of
these benefits. In particular, workers in the second half of their work
lives are likely to be adversely affected by these declines. Although
workers' compensation will continue to provide adequate compensa
tion for acute short-term injuries, the availability of benefits for perma
nent disabilities, particularly those associated with aging, appears to be
declining in many states. This trend is likely to shift additional eco
nomic burdens to other social and private insurance systems. To the
extent that other social insurance programs fail to provide replacement
of a substantial proportion of earnings lost due to partial disability,
these costs are being transferred to workers and their families.

Notes
We appreciate the assistance of several persons who provided comments or other assis
tance during the preparation of this chapter: Keith Bateman, Leslie Boden, Ann Clayton, Alan Ducatman, Donald Elisburg, H. Allan Hunt, William Johnson, Barbara
Markiewicz, and Greg Wagner. We absolve them of responsibility for any remaining
errors of fact or analysis.
1. A more extensive description of the program and additional references can be
found in Spieler and Burton (1998).
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2. We use the term border-challenging for these often chronic conditions with com
plex etiology, in the sense that these conditions are on the border of the traditional
definitions of compensable conditions.
3. Three exceptions to the general rule are the following: 1) the doctrine of the "oddlot" worker (which considers age as a component of evaluation of eligibility for
permanent total disability benefits); 2) the reduction or termination of cash bene
fits when a worker receives Social Security Old Age benefits, reaches a particular
age (usually 65), or is eligible for a pension or other benefits; and 3) the use of age
adjustments to the ratings assigned to particular impairments (e.g., respiratory dis
eases and hearing loss). The first two of these exceptions are discussed in the
fourth section of this chapter.
4. Countrywide data indicate there are 6,837 workers' compensation cases per
100,000 workers, of which only 7 per 100,000 workers involve permanent total
disability benefits (NCCI 2000, Exhibit XII). The average total benefits per case
(including cash and medical benefits) for all workers' compensation cases are
$5,244, while the average total benefits for permanent total disability cases are
$513,284 (NCCI 2000, Exhibit XI).
5. The Workers Compensation Research Institute (WCRI) has published a series of
administrative inventories of state workers' compensation programs. One of the
measures of litigiousness used in these studies is requests for workers' compensa
tion agency intervention to resolve contested cases involving cash (or indemnity)
benefits Ballantyne and Shiman (1997, p. 75) summarized the results for 11
states the WCRI has recently studied. The low end of the range was from North
Carolina, where 9 percent of indemnity claims involved a hearing request; similar
results were found for Wisconsin (10 percent). States where litigation (as mea
sured by agency intervention to resolve disputes) was most extensive were Wash
ington (40 percent of state-fund indemnity claims involved a protest filing),
Missouri (43 percent of indemnity claims involved at least one meeting at the
agency), New Jersey (35 to 55 percent of indemnity claims involve one or more
claim petition filings), and Illinois (68 percent of indemnity claims involved
agency intervention).
6. Thomason and Burton (1993) surveyed the limited literature on the use of com
promise and release agreements. One of their conclusions (p. S12) is that the evi
dence "suggests that claimants who settle for lump sum awards are in a more
precarious financial position after their injury compared to claimants who do not
settle."
7. The data in Table 2 are inconsistent with the following statement in Bernard
(1997, p. B-2): "The prevalence of MSDs [musculoskeletal disorders] increases as
people enter their working years. By the age of 35, most people have had their
first episode of back pain . . . Once in their working years (ages 25 to 65), how
ever, the prevalence is relatively consistent..."
8. Pransky (2000) provides additional evidence (in his Table 2) of "the dramatic agerelated increase in prevalence of selected chronic diseases and the number of per
sons with . . any limitations in ability to do usual life activities."
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9. The relationship is particularly elusive because of the general underreporting of
work-related health problems (discussed earlier) that are likely to be especially
prevalent among older workers.
10. Much of the information in this section is drawn from Berreth (1992, 1994, 1996,
1997), Brown (1993, 1995), Tinsley (1990, 1991), and Whittington (1998, 1999,
2000).
11. In Idaho, for example, the Supreme Court has upheld denial of benefits in the fol
lowing types of claims where there was a preexisting condition: carpal tunnel syn
drome (Reyes v. Kit Manufacturing Co. [Id. 1998], Nelson v. Ponsness-Warren
IDGAS Enterprises, 879 P.2d 592 [Id. 1994]), asthma (Combes v. State of Idaho,
ISIF, 942 P.2d 554 [Id. 1997], second appeal pending, Idaho Supreme Court No.
25407); lumbar back pain (Demain v. Bruce McLaughlin Logging, 979 P2d 655
[Id. 1999]); and flexor tenosynovitis secondary to underlying diabetes (Nycum v.
Triangle Dairy, 712 P.2d 559 [Id. 1985]).
12. Errand v. Cascade Steel Rolling Mills, Inc., 888 P.2d 544 (Or. 1995). The com
pensation bureau had denied him workers' compensation benefits because "his
work was not the 'major cause' of his condition and, thus, he did not suffer 'compensable injury' within meaning of exclusivity provision."
13. 1996 Oregon Rev. Statutes, Title 51, Section 656.018.
14. Smothers v. Gresham Transfer Inc., 941 P.2d 1065 (Or. App. 1997), appeal
granted 977 P.2d 1170 (Or. Nov 24, 1998); pending as of August 28, 2000.
15 Combes v. State of Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, Idaho Supreme
Court No. 25407; pending as of August 28, 2000.
16. Director, OWCP v. Greenwich Collieries, 114 S.Ct. 2251 (1994).
17. See, for example, some of the cases decided by the Oregon appellate courts under
the more restrictive standards that were adopted by the legislature: Conner v. B&S
Logging, 957 P.2d 159 (Or. App. 1998); Beverly Enterprises v. Michl, 945 P.2d
658 (Or. App. 1997); SAIF Corp. v. Wilhamson, 882 P.2d 621 (Or. App. 1994) (a
finding of impairment may be based on a physically verifiable impairment or on
the physician's evaluation of the worker's description of the pain that she is expe
riencing.)
18. Stenrich Group v. Jemmott, 467 S.E.2d 795 (Va. 1996), carpal tunnel; Allied
Fibers v. Rhodes, as: 23 Va. 101, 474 S.E.2d 829 (Va. 1996), noise-induced hear
ing loss. The amended statute is Virginia Code Sec. 65.2-400(c) and 65.2-401.
19. It is important to note the following. First, PTD awards have always been rela
tively infrequent in workers' compensation programs (see note 4). These data
may, however, be somewhat misleading, since the frequent practice of settling
claims (termed compromise and release agreements or lump sum settlements)
often means that awards for significant disabilities are classified as permanent par
tial disability benefits, even when the workers' medical and economic conditions
could justify permanent total disability awards. Second, although the majority of
states provide for lifetime weekly benefits, some states set a maximum period of
eligibility for PTD benefits even before the recent legislative changes in these
types of benefits.
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20. According to §608 of the 1997 Social Security Handbook (13th ed.),
two special provisions may establish disability for persons who are unable to
perform any of their past relevant work.
A. A finding of disability may be made where the individual:
1. Has long-time work experience (35 years or more) limited to
arduous, unskilled, physical labor; and
2. Has little education; and
3. Has a significant impairment that prevents performance of
the previous kind of work; and
4. Has not demonstrated ability to do lighter work.
B. A finding of disability may also be made where the individual:
1. Has no past relevant work; and
2. Is of advanced age (55 years or older); and
3. Has less than a high school education; and
4 Has an impairment that is more than "not severe" (see §606).
However, considering age, education, and work experience, a younger or bet
ter educated worker, or one who has transferable skills to work that could be per
formed despite the impairment(s), might not be considered disabled. Although
advancing age may affect a person's capacity to work in competition with others,
unemployment due primarily to age (i.e., employers may not wish to hire older
workers) does not show inability to engage in substantial gainful activity by rea
son of a medical impairment.
21. The rate of PTD awards in West Virginia prior to the 1995 legislative amendments
far exceeded the national average of 7 per 100,000 (NCCI 2000, Exhibit XE).
The rate of PTD awards after the changes was below this national average. As
discussed in note 19, these data can be somewhat misleading (Spieler 1995).
22. Burton and Thomason (1993) provided a dispassionate critique of a series of arti
cles in the New York Times that alleged there was a "vast amount of fraud" in the
workers' compensation system.
23 In January 1990, 32 of 51 jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia) had
maximum weekly benefits for temporary total disability that were at least 100 per
cent of the jurisdiction's average weekly wage; by January 1998, 34 jurisdictions
met this standard. Again, this is not a universal development. Connecticut and
Massachusetts cut the nominal replacement rate for temporary total disability
benefits, and several states (including Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Texas)
reduced the maximum number of weeks of temporary total disability benefits
(usually to a limit of 104 weeks).
24. There are specific federal rules regarding offsets between SSDI and state workers'
compensation systems for workers who are below the age of SSOA eligibility (see
20 C.F.R. 404.408). In general, with the exception of some states that were
"grandfathered," SSDI benefits are reduced based upon receipt of total benefits
that exceed caps on income established in the Social Security Act. This is differ
ent from these new offset provisions, which generally provide for an automatic
dollar for dollar reduction in workers' compensation benefits after the worker
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26.
27.

28.

29.

becomes SSOA eligible, or which simply terminate workers' compensation bene
fits at age 65 without regard to the total income the retiree is receiving.
Cases that have held that these provisions are unconstitutional include Golden v.
Westark Community College, 969 S.W.2d 154 (Ark. 1998); State of West Virginia
ex rel. Boan v. Richardson, 482 S.E.2d 162 (W.Va. 1996); and Industrial Claim
Appeals Office v. Romero, 912 P.2d 62 (Colo. 1996). Cases that have upheld these
provisions include Sasso v. Ram Property Management, 431 So.2d 204
(Fla.Dist.Ct.App. 1983), aff'd, 452 So.2d 932 (Fla.1984); Tobin's Case, 675
N.E.2d 781 (Mass. 1997); and Vogel v. Wells Fargo Guard Services, 937 S.W.2d
856 (Tenn. 1996).
For a more complete discussion of medical care cost containment in workers'
compensation, see Dembe (1998) and Spieler and Burton (1998).
A survey by the Workers Compensation Research Institute indicated that, as of
1998, workers' compensation programs in 14 states gave employees an unre
stricted initial choice of the treating provider, a number that has been cut in half in
the last decade (Tanabe 1998, p. 41). Four jurisdictions required employees to
select from an insurer's or employer's list of providers, and 12 required the
employee to choose from within a managed care organization if one exists. The
employer selects the initial treating provider in 17 states Four other states have
choice rules that vary by circumstances.
See particularly, EEOC Enforcement Guidance: Workers' Compensation and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Reasonable Accommodation (September 3,
1996).
Mont, Burton, and Reno (2000, p. 25) speculate that
the opposite trends in workers' compensation and Social Security bene
fits during many years since the mid 1970s raise the question of whether
adjustments in one program increases demands placed on the other, and
vice versa. The substitutability of DI and workers' compensation for
workers with severe, long-term disabilities that are, at least arguably,
work-related, or might be exacerbated by the demands of work, has
received little attention by researchers and is not well understood.
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Unemployment Compensation
and Older Workers
Christopher J. O'Leary
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
Stephen A. Wandner
U.S. Department of Labor

Unemployment compensation in the United States is provided
through a federal-state system of unemployment insurance (UI). UI
provides temporary partial wage replacement to active job seekers who
are involuntarily out of work. Eligibility for UI benefits and compen
sation levels depend on recent earnings experience, the conditions of
job separation, and continuing job search activity. The amount of com
pensation paid for any week of joblessness can be affected by current
income from other sources, including part-time work and pensions.
During the second half of the working life, decisions about the pro
cess and timing of movement toward full retirement move to the fore
front. For many, the sequence is voluntary and orderly; for others, job
displacement greatly disrupts plans. While UI is critical for income
security of the latter group, it may also play an important role for the
former.
Most economic analysis of retirement patterns has focused on the
financial incentives created by public and private pension systems. 1
Quinn, Burkhauser, and Myers (1990, p. 5) pointed out that while an
abrupt and complete transition from full-time work is still the most
common avenue to retirement, a variety of others paths are often taken.
A crucial concept in their research is that of the career job. The career
job is the one in which a worker spends the bulk of his or her working
life, usually working full time. If transition from the career job to
retirement is not immediate, it may involve an hours reduction to parttime work on the career job. Alternatively, there may be an exit from
the career job to full- or part-time work on another job, which most
often is not in the same industry and occupation.
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Bridge employment is what Quinn (1999) calls work between the
career job and complete retirement. He estimates that a minimum of
49 percent of women and 34 percent of men engage in bridge employ
ment and that the great majority of bridge employment involves fewer
hours per week and less compensation per hour than the career job.
The probability of involuntary exit from the career job later in life is
high and has risen in recent years (Farber 1997). Furthermore, the
chance of gaining reemployment after displacement from a career job
diminishes with age (Chan and Stevens 1999).
Job and income security after age 45 and strategies for transition to
retirement can be greatly influenced by the institutional arrangements
of UI. Many issues at the forefront of the current UI policy debate are
also issues of prime importance to those in the second half of their
working life. Issues occur in all the standard areas of UI policy: cover
age, eligibility, benefit adequacy, duration of benefits, work incentives,
benefit financing, and interaction with other programs. We will exam
ine issues of prime concern to older workers in these areas of UI policy
after providing a brief background sketch of the labor market situation
of older workers.

BACKGROUND
Whether they can admit it to themselves or not, the second half of
their working life starts by age 45 for the great majority of Americans.
In this chapter, we examine the labor market and UI beneficiary experi
ence of those aged 45 and over relative to those who are younger. The
investigation is summary in nature and is meant to suggest topic areas
where focused research would be valuable. We rely on published sum
mary statistics reported in the Handbook of U.S. Labor Statistics
(Jacobs 1999), the Social Security Administration's publication Income
of the Population 55 or Older—1996 (Social Security Administration
1998), on samples drawn for evaluation and modeling in the states of
Michigan and Washington, and on unpublished data provided by the
U.S. Department of Labor based on their Benefit Accuracy Measure
ment (BAM) system of random audits.2
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The percentages of older workers among the labor force, the total
unemployed, and the insured unemployed are reported in Table 1 for
the United States in 1998; the data are based on monthly averages for
the year. The table indicates that those aged 45 years and over made up
one-third of the labor force, encompassed only one-fifth of those expe
riencing unemployment, but included one-third of all UI beneficiaries.
Table 2 provides an age distribution of insured unemployment by state
for 1998. Note that the retirement states Arizona and Florida reason
ably mimic the national shares of UI receipt by age, whereas the Dis
trict of Columbia pays a disproportionately large share to older
workers, and payments are weighted heavily toward younger workers
in Maryland, Oregon, and Puerto Rico. The national average numbers
suggest that older workers shoulder a proportionately small share of
the unemployment burden while enjoying a higher-than-average
chance of receiving UI compensation while jobless and seeking work.
These summary statistics on UI recipiency for older workers are at
odds with trends experienced by the work force as a whole since the
state UI reforms following the 1975 and 1982 recessions. Vroman
(1991) summarized research into causes of the decline in the ratio of
the insured unemployment rate to the total unemployment rate (IUR/
TUR). Burtless (1983) identified a raft of factors including tightened
eligibility requirements, a rising level of UI exhaustions, and the intro
duction of income taxes on UI benefits. This last factor operates
because those from higher-income households are less likely to apply
for benefits. Blank and Card (1991) found the decline partly explained
by tightened eligibility, but largely due to a decline in UI benefit appli
cation rates. They estimated the overall take-up rate among those eligi
ble for UI benefits to be only about 65 percent. Corson and Nicholson
(1988) identified declines in unionism and manufacturing employment
as causes of a declining IUR/TUR ratio. Concerning older workers,
Corson and Nicholson (1988) suggested that changed treatment of the
pension benefit offset required by the federal unemployment compen
sation amendments of 1976 may explain part of the declining IUR/
TUR. Details about the treatment of pensions in UI are provided
below.
One factor that could partly explain higher recipiency rates among
older unemployed workers is that a large share of older UI claimants
may be dislocated workers. In employment policy and research defini-

Table 1 Labor Force and Unemployment Concepts by Age for the United States, 1998
Total
137,673

<s24 yr.
21,894
15.9
2,286
36.8
8.9

25-34 yr.
32,813
23.8
1,419
22.9
25.8

35^4 yr.
37,536
27.3
1,258
20.3
29.6

45-54 yr.
28,368
20.6
782
12.6
20.6

55-64 yr.
13,215
9.6
343
5.5
10.9

s»65 yr.
3,847
2.8
122
20
2.5

Labor force3 (000)
% of labor force
6,210
Total unemployed13 (000)
% of total unemployed
% of insured unemployed0
1 Data from Jacobs (1999, Table 1-6).
b Data from Jacobs (1999, Table 1-26).
c Unpublished data from the U.S. Department of Labor, UI Service. Age information not available for 1.8 percent of beneficiaries.

Table 2 Age Distribution of the Insured Unemployed in the United States, 1998 (%)
State
United States
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky

Total no.
2,222,936
29,151
12,049
19,114
25,803
372,144
17,341
31,180
6,266
6,996
77,378
32,709
12,555
13,080
103,556
30,602
15,792
13,253
26,654

j£ 24 yr.
8.9
10.5
10.1
7.1
11.5
8.6
5.7
6.7
8.2
0.9
5.1
7.0
6.9
9.8
7.7
7.5
9.7
7.4
8.6

25-34 yr.
25.8
27.2
28.0
25.5
28.4
26.8
24.2
24.6
28.4
7.1
327
25.3
255
25.0
27.0
24.0
24.9
25.3
26.7

35-44 yr.
29.6
29.7
33.5
32.3
30.6
31.3
34.0
29.6
32.6
20.0
29.4
28.7
29.7
30.3
31.7
28.7
30.7
33.4
30.9

45-54 yr.
20.6
20.1
20.1
22.7
187
20.3
25.1
21.5
18.9
33.4
232
19.4
23.1
21.9
20.5
21.1
20.8
22.0
22.1

55-64 yr.
10.9
10. 1
7.3
10.7
9.0
10.4
10.2
13.8
89
28.8
13.8
9.1
11.4
11.0
10.4
10.3
11.3
10.2
9.8

* 65 yr.
2.5
2.2
1.2
1.7
1.7
2.6
0.8
3.8
2.4
10.0
5.4
2.0
3.5
1.7
2.7
1.9
2.5
1.7
1.9

INAa
1.8
0.2
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.6
0.0
05
8.6
0.0
0.3
0.0
6.5
0.0
0.0
00
(continued)

Table 2 (continued)
State
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon

Total
22,605
11,348
33,912
63,678
88,770
33,105
18,669
42,875
8,419
6,718
17,531
3,691
91,211
11,530
169,950
47,953
3,625
70,724
12,536
42,758

«s 24 yr.
7.7
7.8
18.1
7.4
9.1
9.6
9.8
9.0
8.6
9.8
6.3
4.7
8.0
6.5
7.3
9.2
8.5
7.6
7.1
17.9

25-34 yr.
26.4
24.1
25.8
26.6
26.8
26.2
27.1
26.7
24.0
26.6
236
20.5
261
26.5
21.9
27.1
24.2
25.6
24.4
28.6

35^4 yr.
32.6
27.0
27.9
30.3
31.3
30.7
31.1
31.8
32.9
30.6
30.2
31 3
28.4
32.2
22.6
29.9
31.1
32.1
32.1
28.4

45-54 yr.
21.5
198
17.1
21.3
21.3
20.8
20.6
19.8
22.2
20.6
227
26.8
20.4
22.0
16.6
20.9
213
23.3
227
17.3

55-64 yr.
9.9
10.1
8.6
11.8
9.7
10.9
10.1
9.9
10.1
101
12.9
13.7
12.6
10.8
9.8
10.5
10.8
104
11.3
5.8

;> 65 yr.
1.8
2.2
2.5
2.4
1.9
1.9
1.4
2.8
2.2
2.2
3.9
3.2
4.4
2.0
3.3
2.4
2.8
1.0
2.3
1.1

INAa
0.1
9.1
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
0.0
00
0.0
0.3
0.0
0.0
0.0
186
0.0
13
0.0
0.0
0.9

12.8
28.4
22.3
142,903
24.0
Pennsylvania
9.5
161
7.5
19.6
32.3
23.58
58,341
Puerto Rico
21.0
12.8
24.7
29.3
13,294
Rhode Island
7.3
23.8
17.0
32.3
19.7
24,323
5.4
South Carolina
16.8
23.4
18.6
276
7.7
South Dakota
2,309
22.3
13.0
28.4
41,157
24.1
7.9
Tennessee
20.8
9.4
31.0
111,624
27.9
9.5
Texas
19.1
8.1
13.8
285
30.0
Utah
9,619
11.4
20.6
25.5
288
10.3
Vermont
5,716
109
21.5
21.7
24.6
8.4
Virgin Islands
575
22.9
10.9
32.2
26.0
23,737
6.8
Virginia
31.8
9.6
27.2
30.9
72,273
9.0
Washington
106
24.4
25.9
305
8.2
West Virginia
16,455
20.3
10.8
26.2
30.7
50,033
9.7
Wisconsin
20.7
9.3
25.6
31.9
11.0
Wyoming
3,330
SOURCE: Unpublished U S Department of Labor data on claims filed for UI in the week including 12th of each
a INA = age information not available for this percentage of UI beneficiaries.

2.8
1.1
4.9
1.7
5.9
4.1
1.5
0.5
3.4
1.6
1.0
1.5
0.4
2.3
1.1
month.

0.3
0.0
00
0.0
0.0
0.3
00
0.0
0.0
11.2
0.1
0.1
0.0
00
0.5
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tions, dislocated workers are those with long job tenure who become
permanently separated from their employer. 3 Being dislocated
increases workers' chances of eligibility for UI benefits. Unfortu
nately, such circumstances may increase the probability of UI benefit
exhaustion. Relying on data from Hippie (1999a), Table 3 shows that
job dislocation increases with age; Farber (1997) found similar evi
dence.4 Table 3 also shows that employment rates decline precipitously
after age 54 and that the prospect of returning to full-time reemployment after displacement is 30-70 percent lower for older workers.
Less than one-tenth of displaced workers under 55 years of age leave
the labor force, but more than one-fourth of workers aged 55 to 64 and
nearly half of those 65 and over exit. Chan and Stevens (1999) simi
larly found that involuntary job loss reduces reemployment chances
more for older job seekers, who often make early transitions to being
permanently out of the labor force (i.e., fully retired).
Unpublished data from the displaced worker survey (Hippie
1999b) revealed that while only 51 percent of all displaced workers
received UI, the percentage rises as durations of unemployment
increase. Three-quarters of displaced workers unemployed for five or
more weeks received UI, and, among those unemployed for 15 or more
weeks, the proportion rises to four-fifths. Thus, it appears that some
displaced workers never file for UI benefits, as they search for jobs and
become reemployed quickly; only one-fifth of displaced workers
unemployed for less than five weeks collect benefits. These data also
indicate that while the rate of recipiency of UI is stable among age
groups around the mean of 51 percent, exhaustion rates rise sharply
with age.
The path of employment and income transition from a career job to
retirement income can be rocky. As shown in Table 3, displaced work
ers become reemployed at rapidly declining rates as they age. Older
displaced workers who gain reemployment also suffer larger earnings
losses. Among displaced workers aged 55 to 64, the earnings loss was
20 percent or more for 38.2 percent of those who got reemployed,
while an earnings reduction of that magnitude was experienced by less
than a quarter of younger displaced workers.
For those who do ultimately receive UI benefits, the Benefits Accu
racy Measurement (BAM) audit data provides a picture of their charac
teristics.5 Such a summary is provided in Table 4. Men tend to draw a

Table 3 Long-Tenured Displaced Workers by Age Group, 1995-1996 (%)
Characteristics
20-24 yr.
25-34 yr.
Displacement rates
1.9
2.9
Employment status, February 1998
Employed
Note a
88.5
Unemployed
Note a
2.5
Not in labor force
Note a
8.6
Among displaced
Reemployed full-time
60.0
74.6
Of those reemployed full time, %
Note a
24.6
experiencing earnings loss s» 20%
UI recipiency rate
0.30
0.53
UI exhaustion rate
0.19
0.45
SOURCE: First six rows, Hippie (1999a); last two rows, Hippie (1999b).
a Percentage not reported where the base is less than 75,000.
b Values for age 55 and over.

35-44 yr.
3.0

45-54 yr.
3.0

55-64 yr.
3.3

s>65 yr.
3.5

89.0
42
6.7

87.2
5.3
7.5

63.6
7.7
288

47.2
55
473

74.9
23.8

560
24.5

47.8
38.2

20.7
Note a

0.51
0.52

049
0.54

0.53b
0.70b

Table 4 Percentage Distribution by Age of UI Beneficiary Characteristics in the United States, 1998
Characteristic
U.S. citizen
Gender
Male
Female
Education
No formal schooling
Some high school, no diploma
High school graduate
Some college, but no degree
Associate's degree
BA/BS
Graduate degree
Ethnic group
White
African American
Hispanic
Native American
Asian/Pacific
Last occupation
Professional
Clerical

Total
89.5

<;24yr
903

25^4 yr.
88.8

45-54 yr.
90.3

55-64 yr.
90.3

s>65 yr.
94.2

56.7
43.3

58.3
41.7

57.2
42.8

56.6
43.4

54.9
45.1

49.2
50.8

0.5
20.9
42.2
20.8
4.9
8.2
2.5

0.1
19.6
51.1
24.1
2.4
2.6
0.1

0.3
19.4
42.4
21.9
5.4
8.7
1.9

0.7
20.4
39.2
20.9
5.5
9.1
4.4

1.1
27.5
42.4
14.2
3.5
7.1
4.2

1.9
33.1
34.8
13.0
3.2
11.4
2.6

63.1
15.4
17.6
0.9
2.9

56.8
13.8
25.3
1.1
2.9

59.8
17.3
19.1
1.0
2.7

67.4
13.9
14.8
0.9
3.0

74.0
109
11.5
0.5
3.2

73.8
10.7
11.1
0.5
3.8

17.5
14.1

78
175

17.2
14.2

20.6
12.8

19.8
14.2

17.2
13.7

7.1
5.5
Sales
11.6
11.2
Services
4.2
3.7
Processing
5.5
5.6
Machine trades
6.6
7.0
Bench work
18.0
17.3
Structural
14.3
12.2
Miscellaneous
7.2
5.8
Agriculture/mining
Last industry
8.3
6.9
Agriculture/mining
15.0
15.0
Construction
21.0
21.5
Manufacturing
3.8
5.1
Transportation, utilities,
communication
19.7
16.9
Trade
1.9
3.7
Finance/insurance/real estate
25.2
27.4
Services
4.3
3.2
Public administration
0.7
0.5
Other
SOURCE: BAM data for calendar year 1998, U.S. Department of Labor.

5.1
11.6
3.6
5.4
6.7
18.4
11.9
6.1

4.9
9.6
35
6.5
7.7
166
12.2
5.5

6.1
10.3
4.5
6.2
7.8
15.3
11.5
4.3

11.2
18.8
4.9
2.8
63
6.8
140
4.4

7.1
15.8
20.0
4.9

6.5
147
246
56

5.7
13.0
24.7
6.2

6.4
6.5
14.1
5.7

16.8
3.8
28.1
3.1
0.4

16.1
3.5
25.7
3.0
0.4

15.9
4.3
27.0
2.6
0.5

212
5.9
36.0
41
0.2
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larger share of UI benefits up until age 65. Older beneficiaries tend to
have lower levels of formal educational attainment. Beneficiaries over
age 54 are less likely to be Black or Hispanic and more likely to be
White1 or Asian/Pacific islander. The age distribution of the prior occu
pation is different for the oldest workers. After age 64, larger shares of
beneficiaries are from sales and services occupations and smaller
shares are from structural occupations. These results are consistent
with a movement into bridge occupations prior to full retirement.

COVERAGE
"The coverage provisions of state UI laws determine the employers
who are liable for contributions and the workers who accrue rights
under the laws" (U.S. Department of Labor 1999, p. 1-D). Original
federal requirements limited coverage to employers of 8 or more work
ers in each of 20 or more weeks in a year (Blaustein 1993, p. 162). UI
coverage today is nearly universal, with only four main exclusions
remaining: agricultural workers, household workers, employees of reli
gious organizations, and the self-employed (Bassi and McMurrer 1997,
pp. 54-61)
Exclusion of the self-employed is an issue of particular importance
to older workers. Table 5 indicates that 6.8 percent of all nonagricultural workers participate in self-employment, but the share rises to 10.9
percent of those aged 55 to 64 and to 17.2 percent of those aged 65 and
over. It is even more important among workers in agriculture, for
whom a majority of those 45 years of age and over are self-employed.
Since the depression-era beginnings of the federal-state UI pro
gram in the United States, the self-employed have generally not been
covered. The main reason is to avoid problems of moral hazard.6 With
UI for self-employment, those who would pay premiums and be eligi
ble for benefits would also manage the risk of unemployment and make
decisions about work stoppage. In particular, there is an inability to
determine whether individuals are involuntarily unemployed, to mea
sure the economic loss of income, and to determine whether an individ
ual is employed or unemployed for a given week. UI is social

Table 5 Employed and Self-Employed by Age in the United States, 1998
Total

<;24 yr.

25-34 yr.
Employment (000)
Total
131,463
19,611
31,395
Nonagriculture
128,084
19,009
30,677
Wage and salary
119,019
18,694
29,146
Self-employment
299
8,962
1,513
Nonpaid family
103
16
18
Agriculture
3,379
602
718
Wage and salary
531
519
2,000
Self-employment
1,341
64
179
Nonpaid family
19
38
8
Share of total employment
in group (%)
Nonagnculture
97.4
96.9
97.7
Wage and salary
90.5
95.3
928
Self-employment
6.8
4.8
1.5
Nonpaid family
0.1
0.1
0.1
Agriculture
3.1
2.6
2.3
Wage and salary
1.5
2.6
1.7
Self-employment
1.0
0.3
0.6
Nonpaid family
0.1
0.0
0.0
SOURCE: Employment and Earnings 46(1), January 1999, Table 15.

35-44 yr.

45-54 yr.

55-64 yr.

s65 yr.

36,278
35,486
32,750
2,710
26
792
473
314
5

27,587
26,991
24,565
2,403
23
596
275
319
2

12,873
12,477
11,066
1,399
12
396
149
245
2

3,725
3,448
2,800
639
9
277
53
221
3

97.8
90.3
7.5
0.1
2.2
1.3
0.9
00

97.8
89.0
8.7
0.1
2.2
1.0
1.2
0.0

96.9
860
10.9
0.1
3.1
1.2
1.9
0.0

92.6
75.2
17.2
0.2
7.4
1.4
5.9
0.1
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insurance and extending coverage to the self-employed compromises
the insurance nature of the program.
California is the only state that has a limited form of UI coverage
for the self-employed. The California scheme operates on a fully reim
bursable basis. This method of coverage has been used widely in the
UI program first for governmental agencies and since 1972 for private
nonprofit firms. In 1998, reimbursable benefits accounted for 5.7 per
cent of all payments in the federal-state system, with 42 percent of
these reimbursables going to employees separated from nonprofits
(U.S. Department of Labor 1998). Reimbursement may not be a par
ticularly effective approach to UI coverage, but it is a method of avoid
ing the moral hazard issue by not allowing manipulation of the system
for one's own benefit (Bassi and McMurrer 1997). Under the reim
bursable approach, repayment is due in the calendar quarter following
disbursement of benefits. Such a system would amount to short-term
loans to self-employed for reintegration back to regular wage and sal
ary employment. Feldstein and Altman (1998) suggested individual UI
savings accounts that could be established with pre-tax contributions
and might be particularly appropriate for the self-employed.7
While the UI system is not currently structured to provide tempo
rary income replacement to the self-employed, in several states UI ben
eficiaries can start their own business instead of searching for wage and
salary employment.8 While they establish their self-employment activ
ity they can receive self-employment assistance (SEA) payments in
lieu of UI weekly benefits. To date, 11 states have enacted conforming
state legislation.9
The SEA program, like similar programs in nearly 20 other OECD
(Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development) nations,
has been very small. 10 In 1996, no state had as many as 0.5 percent of
its regular UI recipients receiving SEA payments. SEA participants
are generally successful at starting up their own business; about twothirds do so. These participants differ dramatically from other UI
claimants: they are older; less likely to be a minority (particularly His
panic); more likely to be from professional, managerial and technical
occupations; have higher educational attainment; and are more likely to
be dislocated workers (Vroman 1999).
When the U.S. Department of Labor began the SEA experiments in
Massachusetts and Washington in the 1980s, the overrepresentation of
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older workers was not expected. Participating states imagined that the
program would be particularly valuable for minorities and women. It
did not turn out that way either in the experiments or the early program
operations." Rather, older permanently separated workers have found
SEA to be a promising alternative, apparently because of their greater
difficulty in finding wage and salary employment and because of skills
acquired through years of employment.

ELIGIBILITY—INITIAL AND CONTINUING
As stated in the introduction to this chapter, eligibility for UI bene
fits depends on recent earnings experience, the conditions of job sepa
ration, and continuing job search activity. Rules regarding recent
earnings activity call for checking for sufficient prior labor force
attachment in Ul-covered work. 12 Essentially these rules ensure that
UI premiums have been paid before compensation is granted. Earnings
are considered for a base period consisting of four calendar quarters,
which are usually the first four of the previous five completed quarters
for administrative practicality. 13 Table 1 showed that workers aged 45
and over make up only one-fifth of the unemployed, but they total more
than one-third of all the UI beneficiaries. This suggests that a high pro
portion of unemployed older workers had sufficient prior earnings to
qualify for UI benefits.
The conditions of job separation were set to minimize insurance
problems of moral hazard by essentially ensuring that the separation
was involuntary and primarily due to lack of work, not due to controlla
ble factors such as a quit, a collective bargaining dispute, or discharge
for misconduct. Joblessness is compensable in all states for voluntary
separations for good cause, which may include 1) sexual harassment,
2) illness, 3) leaving to accept other work, 4) joining the armed forces,
or 5) compulsory retirement (Nicholson 1997, p. 103). The last of
these is of interest to older workers. As Quinn (1999) pointed out,
mandatory retirement was outlawed entirely in 1986. Workers dis
missed for reason of age have been illegally discharged and are there
fore entitled to UI benefits, with the separating employer liable for
benefit charges.
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The final requirements for jobless benefits are known as continuing
eligibility conditions. These are set to ensure continuing labor force
attachment. They are of two types: job search requirements and limits
on refusing suitable work. The job search rules are known as "able,
available, and actively seeking work" requirements. Administration of
these rules is more art than science. 14
Job search requirements are not imposed on beneficiaries who are
still waiting to be recalled by the employer liable for benefit charges.
One of the original aims of UI was to prevent the dispersal of the expe
rienced workers for an enterprise. Employers may temporarily fur
lough workers and promise the employment security agency that the
workers will be recalled to their old jobs. Using the BAM data, Table 6
summarizes the recall status of UI beneficiaries by age, as well as the
age distribution of various work search requirements. Workers aged 45
and over are more likely to be on recall status during their period of UI
benefit receipt, and the proportion awaiting recall appears to increase
with age. Direct data on work search requirements suggest that the rate
of job attachment among UI beneficiaries increases with age, and, as a
result, there is a slight downward trend with age in required work
search.
The UI system was designed to operate for full-time, permanently
attached members of the labor force. Both initial and continuing UI
benefit eligibility issues are raised when part-time employment is con
sidered. As seen in Table 7, relative to those aged 25 to 54, part-time
work is popular among both younger and older workers. For those
aged 55 and over, more than one-quarter of all workers were employed
part-time in 1998. Furthermore, over 30 percent of unemployed job
seekers aged 55 and over were seeking part-time employment.
We now consider two questions concerning part-time work and ini
tial UI eligibility, and then two different questions about part-time
work and continuing eligibility.
A) If a part-time job is lost and the job seeker is without work, are
prior earnings and hours sufficient to qualify for benefits?
The crux of this issue is the current use and measurement of
monetary eligibility for UI using a measure of quarterly or
annual wages. Such measures have traditionally been used by
state UI programs to measure labor force attachment. The Advi-

Table 6 Return-to-work Issues for UI Beneficiaries by Age Group (%)
<;24 yr.
Issue
Total
45-54 yr.
55-64 yr.
25^4 yr.
Recall status
No recall
63.2
65.0
64.8
66.1
62.5
Definite recall
6.7
9.7
9.5
10.3
11.1
Indefinite recall
20.4
24.8
19.4
20.5
21.0
N/A (partial)
4.9
5.3
4.4
5.0
5.4
Work search requirement
No WS requirement
11.0
9.1
93
8.8
97
WS required
71.4
700
70.4
69.6
68.3
WS temporarily suspended
1.2
1.0
1.0
0.8
0.9
Union deferral
2.2
5.0
6.4
4.6
6.2
Job attached
11.1
12.7
12.8
12.6
13.6
Other deferral
3.2
20
1.8
2.1
1.3
Registered with a private
34
4.1
4.0
4.5
3.4
employment agency
SOURCE: Unpublished Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data for calendar year 1998, U.S. Department of Labor.

&65 yr.
563
13.8
24.4
5.5
10.0
682
0.3
30
17.2
1.2
1.6
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Table 7 Employed and Unemployed Full-Time and Part-Time by Age in
the United States, 1998
Employment status
«s24yr
Total
25-54 yr.
Total employment (000)
131,463
19,611
95,259
Full-time
108,202
11,593
84,274
Part-time
23,261
8,016
10,985
Total unemployment (000)
6,209
2,286
3,45
Seeking full-time work
4,916
1,494
3,097
Seeking part-time work
1,293
792
362
% of total employment
Full-time
82.3
59.1
88.5
Part-time
17.7
40.9
11.5
% of total unemployment
Seeking full-time work
79.2
65.4
89.5
Seeking part-time work
20.8
34.6
10.5
SOURCE: Employment and Earnings 46(1), January 1999, Table 8.

s55 yr.
16,597
12,336
4,261
464
325
139
74.3
25.7
700
300

sory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC 1996)
addressed this issue for both part-time and low-wage workers.
States examine earnings and hours in a base period that consists
of four calendar quarters to see if UI claimants can demonstrate
labor force attachment. In many states, someone working either
half-time at the state average covered wage or full-time at the
state minimum wage would not qualify for UI benefits. The
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC
1996, p. 20) recommended that "each state should set its law so
that its base period earnings requirements do not exceed 800
times the state's minimum hourly wage, and so that its high quar
ter earnings requirements do not exceed one-quarter of that
amount." The intent of the ACUC was to improve the likelihood
that part-time and low-wage workers who work at least 40 per
cent of the work year would be able to collect UI.
B) If two or more part-time jobs were held and one is lost, is there
eligibility for UI benefits?
Eligibility is possible in many states, but the answer depends
on the level of prior income and current income. All states will
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pay a weekly UI benefit to claimants with sufficient prior earn
ings if current weekly income drops to a low but positive level.
Most states have a lump sum earnings disregard. There are 11
states which have both a disregard and a benefit reduction tax
rate on earnings.
In 1994-1995, a field experiment was conducted in Washington
state to evaluate whether liberalizing the benefit reduction formula
would increase work effort. l5 The control group of 208,818 UI benefi
ciaries from that experiment provides some insight into earnings by
older workers while in claims status. For the control group, under
then-existing Washington state law, the earnings disregard was $5 per
week and benefits were reduced by 75 percent of weekly earnings
above $5. As shown in Table 8, workers 45 years of age and older
tended to have more weeks with a UI payment and more weeks with
reported earnings and a UI payment. Note that this pattern is most
exaggerated for the oldest group of workers (those 65 years of age and
over), who also had a significantly lower average weekly benefit
amount.
C) Will a beneficiary lose UI eligibility for refusing a new job
because it is full-time rather than part-time?
State UI laws would generally disqualify beneficiaries from
the receipt of benefits. The beneficiary would lose eligibility for
refusing suitable work, provided that the available job was in the
usual occupation and paid a wage close to that paid for recent
similar work. Thus, the UI program continues to expect that the
norm for labor force participation is full-time employment and
that only job seekers for such jobs should continue to receive UI.
D) Will a beneficiary lose UI eligibility for refusing a new job
because the hours of work would conflict with required hours on
a currently held part-time job?
State rules would suspend UI benefit eligibility for failing to
satisfy the availability requirement for job search. Current UI
eligibility rules are based on the assumption that people leave
full-time work and seek return to full-time work.
Thus, all part-time workers experience severe difficulty when they
apply to receive benefits. Even if they succeed in initially receiving

Table 8 Part-Time Earnings and UI Benefits in Washington State, 1994-95
Earnings/benefits
Earnings when on UI
claim ($)
UI amount received ($)
UI when earning ($)
UI when not earning ($)
% of UI dollars
When earning
When not earning
Weeks with UI receipt
Weeks UI when earning
Weeks UI when not
earning
% of weeks with UI
When earning
When not earning
Weekly benefit amount ($)
Base period earnings ($)
High quarter earnings ($)
Sample size

Mean
1,218

<;24 yr.
443

25-34 yr.
967

35-^4 yr.
1,485

45-54 yr.
1,766

55-64 yr.
1,853

s65 yr.
1,133

2,731
184
2,547

1,583
96
1,486

2,596
167
2,429

3,050
212
2,839

3,316
233
3,083

3,320
230
3,090

2,724
196
2,529

67
93.3
13.4
1.8
11.7

6.1
93.9
10.2
1.1
91

6.4
93.6
130
1.6
11.4

7.0
93.1
14.1
1.9
12.2

7.0
93.0
15.0
2.2
12.8

6.9
93.1
15.9
2.4
13.5

72
92.8
17.6
2.7
14.9

13.1
86.9
214
17,110
6,237

109
89.0
154
10,357
4,005
32,176

12.1
87.9
210
15,878
5,833
69,216

13.7
86.3
234
19,419
7,006
58,367

14.6
85.5
239
20,876
7,496
33,429

14.9
85.1
235
20,873
7,427
13,655

15.3
84.7
169
13,585
4,917
1,975

2
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benefits, they are in danger of loss of benefits if they are not prepared to
accept a full-time job. Since they participate in part-time work at a
greater rate than others, older workers are particularly disadvantaged
from receiving UI by these eligibility rules.

ADEQUACY OF BENEFITS
Unemployment insurance provides temporary partial wage
replacement to active job-seekers who are involuntarily out of work.
The level of the weekly benefit amount (WBA) is directly related to the
prior level of earnings. Having a wage-related benefit reinforces the
concept that unemployment insurance is an earned right, based on con
tributions required by law to be paid by the worker's employer as
"insurance premiums" against the risk of unemployment. The wagerelated benefit is intended neither to improve a prior low standard of
living nor to support a sumptuous living standard created by a high
income. Because UI is a social insurance program with the fundamen
tal social aim of preventing wide-spread poverty, all states impose UI
maximum benefit rates to spread benefits as widely as is practical.
The adequacy of the WBA in performing the income maintenance
function can be gauged by the percentage of lost income which benefits
replace (i.e., the replacement rate). Since the beginning of the federalstate UI program in the United States, there has been general accep
tance of the idea that the weekly benefit should replace one-half of the
worker's lost weekly wages (O'Leary and Rubin 1997, pp. 166-169).
More broadly, adequacy depends on how well UI benefits help to main
tain usual levels of household expenditure. We will briefly examine
both of these concepts for older workers. Naturally, the latter considers
all sources of income while out of work, including dissaving, pensions,
and other household members. To understand the role of UI in sup
porting income security of older workers, it is important to clearly
understand the interaction of pensions and UI. We give special atten
tion to this topic.
As shown in Table 9, the weekly benefit amount (WBA) for UI
claimants rises steadily with age up until age 65. While the WBA aver
aged $202 in 1998 across all age groups, it averaged only $157 for

Table 9 Benefit and Earnings Measures for UI Beneficiaries in the United States by Age Group, 1998
55-64 yr.
45-54 yr.
25-4 yr.
<;24 yr.
Total
Measure
216
215
201
157
202
Weekly benefit amount
(WBA) ($)
13.68
13.76
1172
8.69
12.14
Normal hourly wage ($)
11.55
11.48
9.96
7.38
10.28
Lowest acceptable hourly
wagea ($)
88.0
86.5
882
90.1
88.0
Reservation wage/normal
wage (%)
23.4
23.8
19.2
12.1
20.0
Base period wages (BPW)
($, 000)
7.6
7.9
6.4
4.2
6.6
High quarter wages (HQW)
($, 000)
37.6
37.9
38.9
41.5
38.8
HQW+BPW (%)
41.5
41.2
41.2
38.8
41.1
Base period weeks worked
564
578
466
312
487
Average weekly wageb
(AWW) ($)
38.3
37.2
43.1
50.3
41.5
Replacement ratio,
WBA+AWW (%)
SOURCE: Unpublished Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data for calendar year 1998, U.S. Department of Labor.
a Also called the "reservation wage."
b Average weekly wage is computed as base period wages divided by base penod weeks worked.

s65 yr.
174
11.50
10.17
91 1
15.7
5.5
40.6
41.1
382
45.6
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workers aged 24 or less and reached $216 for workers aged 55 to 64.
The average WBA for workers 65 and over was only $174. The
decline for these oldest workers most likely is related to the fact that
workers aged 65 and over often move into lower-wage bridge employ
ment as they near full retirement age (Quinn 1999). As shown in Table
9, the normal hourly wage for the 65-and-over group is appreciably
lower than that for the 55-to-64 age cohort. This dip translates into a
dip in the base period wage rate, since base period weeks worked are
on a par with those of younger age groups.
A common summary measure of UI benefit adequacy is the wage
replacement ratio. While this gross average ratio of mean WBA to
mean weekly earnings is a crude measure of adequacy with well docu
mented deficiencies, it is a commonly used measure. 16 By this mea
sure, Table 9 suggests that UI wage replacement tends to decline with
age until after age 64. Meeting the UI benefit adequacy standard of
one-half wage replacement may actually mean beneficiaries are receiv
ing more than half of potential future wages. This is most likely true
for displaced workers, who gain reemployment at average wages 20
percent below prior levels and suffer greater wage reductions if they
are forced to find work in a new industry or occupation. 17 Even if not
displaced, it may be true for many older workers who voluntarily seek
bridge employment after job separation later in their careers. Quinn
(1999) points out that bridge employment is usually for fewer hours if
in the same occupation and for lower wages if in a different occupation
than the career job.
The receipt of pension income had no effect on weekly UI benefit
payments until the advent of federal rules applied for special extended
benefits that were authorized during the 1961 recession. In response to
these recessionary rules, the states experimented with alternative treat
ment of pension income by UI beneficiaries. Merrill Murray (1967)
investigated the question, "Should pensioners receive unemployment
compensation?" based on a collection of 12 state studies of practices
and effects. He argued that there should be no reduction in UI benefits
because of pension receipt, that UI is social insurance based on prior
work experience that should be paid with dignity and dispatch to eligi
ble claimants with no means test applied. Furthermore, he asserted that
the state studies showed pensioners who were UI beneficiaries were
not becoming wealthy from "double dipping." He wrote that "the chief
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reason that pensioners work or seek work is economic necessity. Pen
sions are, in most instances, insufficient to provide even a modest but
adequate income" (Murray 1967, p. 37).
Nonetheless, 1976 federal UI amendments (Public Law 94-566)
required a dollar-for-dollar reduction of UI payments against any gov
ernmental or other pension, retirement or retired pay, annuity, or any
other similar periodic payment which is based on the previous work of
such individual (U.S. Department of Labor 1999, p. 4-19). The rule
applies only to payments from plans established by the base period or
UI chargeable employer. States may disregard pension income if
established by other than a base period employer, except that Social
Security and Railroad Retirement benefits reduce UI dollar-for-dollar
regardless of when entitlement was established. Also, states are per
mitted to reduce UI by less than each dollar of pension income if an
employee's own contributions helped establish the pension benefit.
Currently among the 53 state UI programs, 38 prorate UI benefit
reductions for employee contributions to pension plans, and 28 states
disregard benefits received from pensions established outside of the
base period. In recent years, states have experienced administrative
difficulty when pension accumulations in employer-established defined
contribution plans (401k) are rolled over into individual retirement
accounts (IRA). Since the IRA may have been previously established
with direct personal contributions, the state faces a complex problem
determining the proportion of IRA distributions to disregard. The
problem is further complicated when it is recognized that 401k type
funds may include both employer and employee contributions.
To understand the importance of UI in maintaining living standards
for older workers, consider the percentage of aged household units
with income from various sources. Table 10 shows that the proportion
having income from earnings declines with age. For the three age
groups 55-61, 62-64, and 65 plus, the respective percentages with
earnings were 80, 63, and 21; conversely for the same three groups, the
percentages with retirement income were 27, 63 and 93, respectively.
A uniform 61-63 percent had asset income, and a uniform 6 percent
had income from public assistance. UI benefits were received by 6 per
cent of the 55-to-61-year-old group, by 3 percent of those 62-64, and
by only 1 percent of those 65 or over. Table 11 considers the same
three age groups and shows that the majority of aggregate income
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Table 10 Percent of Aged Units3 with Money Income from Various
Sources by Age in the United States, 1996
Sources
Earnings
Wages and salaries
Self-employment income
Retirement benefits
Social security (SS)
Benefits other than SS
Income from assets
Veterans benefits
UI benefits
Workers' compensation
Public assistance
Personal contributions

55-61 yr.
80
77
12
27
13
18
63
2
6
2
6
2

62-64 yr.
63
59
10
63
53
33
61
4
3
2
6
2

s65 yr.
21
18
4
93
91
41
63
5
1
1
6
1

24,553
3,951
10,821
Number of aged units
(in thousands)
SOURCE: Social Security Administration (1998), Table I.I.
3 An aged unit is either a married couple living together or a nonmarried person.

Table 11 Aggregate Income of Aged Units3 by Source of Income and Age
in the United States, 1996
55-61 yr.
62-64 yr.
s65 yr
% of money income from
Earnings
61.6
20.0
80.3
Retirement benefits
25.6
87
588
Income from assets
8.2
18.0
9.7
Public assistance
0.7
0.8
0.8
Other
2.1
2.2
2.3
Number of aged units
10,821
24,553
3,951
(OOOs)
SOURCE: Social Security Administration (1998), Table I.I.
a An aged unit is either a married couple living together or a nonmarried person.
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comes from earnings and retirement benefits, with the latter most
important for the oldest group. The bulk of remaining income is pro
vided from assets, less than 1 percent from public assistance and
approximately 2 percent from other sources, including personal contri
butions and UI.
Only a small fraction of older citizens receive UI, and in total it
amounts to a small proportion of their aggregate income. An important
question regards the role of UI in maintaining living standards for older
workers who do receive UI: would their economic position be dramati
cally altered if UI benefits were not provided? These questions were
exhaustively examined by Daniel Hamermesh. The following are
some of his main findings which anticipate effects of the 1976 UI
reforms (Hamermesh 1980, pp. 83-84).
Unemployment insurance equalizes the distribution of income
among older workers compared to what it would be in the
absence of UI benefit payments.
Dollar-for-dollar reduction of UI for receipt of private or public
pension income would reduce UI payments by more than 25 per
cent among workers aged 59-64 and by over 40 percent among
workers aged 61-66. Because older Americans generally have
lower incomes, this increases the income gap between older
workers and others.
Within the population of households headed by older workers,
instituting the pension offset will increase income equality. This
is because the majority of those receiving both pension and UI
benefits are in the upper deciles of the income distribution for the
older population. These households also have a greater ability to
maintain consumption during periods of unemployment.
Among older UI recipients, about half have access to past savings
or borrowing in sufficient amounts such that the pension offset
would not cause hardship. Families without the capacity to bor
row when the head is unemployed cut back mostly on consump
tion of luxury goods.
The availability of UI benefits neither induces older workers to
remain in the labor force, nor does it facilitate quicker exit from
the labor force. However, UI functions as an income transfer to
workers who have made the decision to retire.

Session 1: Charting the Landscape

111

The social insurance aspect of UI explains the presence of maxi
mum and minimum weekly benefit amounts (WBAs). 18 States impose
maximum WBAs because the aim is to prevent widespread descent into
poverty, not to perfectly smooth consumption for high wage earn
ers. 19 The minimum WBA is probably of more concern to older work
ers, many of whom are involved in part-time and low-wage work.
WBA minimums are set in part to relieve the administrative burden of
processing weekly payments smaller than some reasonable amount, but
the minimum WBA often replaces more than half of lost wages
because of the social adequacy requirement to provide at least a modi
cum of cash income.20 If UI system changes meant to broaden recipi
ency by low-wage and part-time workers are considered, investigation
of minimum WBA policy is needed.

DURATION OF BENEFITS

In the absence of severe economic conditions which trigger benefit
payments of extended duration, the maximum entitled duration of UI
benefits is 26 weeks in all but two states. 21 Based on the Benefits
Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data, the average duration of benefits
across all age groups is 15.9 weeks, with the average duration increas
ing steadily with age (Table 12).22 Benefit durations for workers 24
years of age or less averaged 14.7 weeks; the average duration
increased with each age group and reached 16.7 weeks for workers 65
years of age or older.23
In recent years, some countries experiencing severe labor surplus
conditions have added a feature to unemployment compensation which
is targeted to older workers and is intended to provide income pay
ments as a bridge to private and/or public pension income receipt. In
1976, the Netherlands began paying benefits through age 65 to persons
exhausting regular entitlement at age 60 or over; in 1981, the U.K.
extended the duration and increased the benefit rate for long-term
recipients aged 60 and over; in the mid 1980s, Germany increased the
maximum duration of benefits from 12 to 32 months for those aged 54
and over (Blackwell, Okba, and Casey 1995, p. 84). Such early retire-

Table 12 Outcomes Observed for UI beneficiaries in the Benefits Accuracy Measurement Audit Data
s65 yr.
55-64 yr.
45-54 yr.
25^4 yr.
<24 yr.
Total
Outcome
174
216
215
201
157
202
Weekly benefit amount ($)
16.7
16.6
16.3
15.7
147
15.9
Duration of benefits (weeks)3
1.2
2.2
3.1
2.9
4.0
2.9
Entitlement based on earnings in more than
one state6 (%)
Outcomes during the key week:
10.4
11.5
12.0
12.6
11.0
12.2
Earnings reported ($)
6.4
10.4
11.1
11.4
7.6
10.8
Benefit reduced because of earnings ($)
18.6
4.4
0.8
0.8
04
16
Other income reported ($)
14.3
3.8
0.8
0.8
0.4
1.4
other
of
because
reduced
Benefit
income ($)
SOURCE: Unpublished Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data for calendar year 1998, U.S. Department of Labor.
a The duration of benefits is measured from the Benefit Year Beginning (B YB) date to the key week. The key week is the week in which a
payment was sampled for the BAM data.
b Called a combined wage claim.
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ment uses of unemployment compensation also became a popular tool
for supporting the transition to a competitive labor market in the for
merly planned economies of eastern and central Europe. For example,
in Hungary, where full public pension payments may begin at age 60
for men and 55 for women, early retirement unemployment compensa
tion payments were offered at even younger ages beginning in 1991.24
Within the past 15 years, additional countries have relaxed work search
rules for older workers, thereby permitting longer benefit durations.25
Given the tight labor market conditions in the United States at the
beginning of the twenty-first century, it is unlikely that UI program fea
tures intended to remove workers from the labor force will be consid
ered in the near future. The pattern of full- and part-time work by older
UI beneficiaries suggests a desire for prolonged labor force attachment
and greater flexibility in choosing employment and income sources. In
addition to recognizing the importance of work transitions between
career and bridge jobs and from bridge jobs to full retirement, switches
between bridge jobs should be accommodated. Flexibility in UI bene
fit duration, wage replacement, initial entitlement, and continuing enti
tlement are all elements in shaping a decision context to encourage
continued labor market involvement by older workers.

WORK INCENTIVES
In providing partial wage replacement, the UI system has the
potential of prolonging spells of unemployment. Several economists
following Feldstein (1974) have reported evidence suggesting that UI
lengthens jobless spells beyond what would occur in the absence of UI
compensation. Decker (1997) summarizes estimates of how the enti
tled duration of benefits and the rate of wage replacement affect the
length of joblessness. 26 None of the previous research has reported
how these effects of UI vary by age.
Two opposite solutions have been tried to solve this principal-agent
work-incentive problem. Traditional policy has been to monitor work
search, while positive reemployment incentives were evaluated through
field experiments in the 1980s.
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To ensure continuing labor force attachment by beneficiaries and to
guard against avoidable joblessness, work search requirements have
been part of continuing eligibility rules since the inception of UI. In
terms of carrot-and-stick incentives, work search rules represent the
stick. The stringency and enforcement of such rules has varied greatly
across the states, and the majority of benefit overpayment errors have
been traced to improper application of work search rules.27
Work search rules of varying stringency were evaluated in a field
experiment conducted in Tacoma, Washington, in 1986-1987. Johnson
and Klepinger (1991, 1994) found that eliminating the work test would
greatly lengthen the duration of UI benefit receipt. They also found
that requiring attendance at a job search workshop four weeks after the
claim and an in-person eligibility review interview halfway through the
entitled duration of benefits would measurably reduce UI benefit
receipt. A subgroup analysis of impacts by age found that those under
25 and those 55 and over behaved similarly to each other and some
what differently from other age groups. Both groups increased UI
receipt by the most of all age groups when the work search test was
relaxed (about 3.3 weeks more for both groups), and both reduced UI
receipt by the least of all age groups when the work test was strength
ened (about -0.4 weeks for both groups). The work test appears to be
particularly effective in changing the work search behavior of older
workers.
In the 1980s, inadequate forward financing of UI benefits, com
bined with political efforts to restrain tax increases, led to the explora
tion of new means for dealing with work disincentive problems while
retaining the income maintenance function of UI. A variety of new ini
tiatives were tested as field experiments, with the UI reemployment
bonus gaining considerable attention.
Decker and O'Leary (1992, 1995) examined the effect of offering
cash bonus payments to UI beneficiaries who return to work quickly in
Pennsylvania and Washington. Across the two experiments, the aver
age bonus offer of about 4 weeks of benefits for return to work within
about 10 weeks shortened UI benefit receipt by just under half a week.
A subgroup analysis by age for the Pennsylvania experiment sug
gested that the bonus impact decreased with age and had virtually no
impact on those over age 55; the Washington results suggested a gener
ally opposite pattern, with older beneficiaries responding more
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strongly. 28 However, in Washington, workers aged over 45 had an
appreciably smaller response to the biggest bonus offer, which had the
largest overall effects. In a pooled analysis of Pennsylvania and Wash
ington data, bonus impacts were virtually identical across the three age
groups: under 35, 35 to 54, and 55 plus.29 Age is neither a legal nor an
effective characteristic on which to target reemployment bonus offers;
however, recent research suggests that bonus offers targeted to those
most likely to exhaust benefits may be more cost-effective.30

FINANCING BENEFITS AND POTENTIAL
NEW LEGISLATION

UI is social insurance; it is neither private insurance nor social wel
fare.31 Social insurance embodies incentive aspects found in private
insurance contracts and eligibility and benefit features required by con
siderations of social adequacy. Key features which distinguish UI as
insurance are related to the financing provisions. UI benefits are
financed by employers through experience-rated payroll taxes. 32
Experience rating means that employer UI tax rates increase with their
experience in laying off workers who subsequently draw UI benefits.33
When the federal-state UI system was established by the Social
Security Act of 1935, the experience rating of employer UI taxes
greatly helped make the program acceptable to employers. It was rea
soned that allocating benefit costs to businesses responsible for unem
ployment benefit claims would make UI consistent with the free
market system. The costs of the goods and services produced by
insured workers would thus reflect the costs of any UI benefits paid to
them.
Experience rating results in employer involvement in initial eligi
bility determination and reduces the risk of moral hazard. The United
States is the only nation in the world which finances unemployment
compensation benefits with experience-rated taxes. 34 It is the main
cause of business-labor involvement in the system, but experience rat
ing ensures that UI will not become a dole on a par with social assis
tance. No stigma attaches to the receipt of UI, "which provides
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compensation for wage loss as a matter of right with dignity and dis
patch."35
Limitations of state UI tax systems mean that benefits are not
always completely charged back to prior employers. Tannenwald and
O'Leary (1997) identified a number of factors which interrupt the oper
ation of perfect experience rating: maximum and minimum tax rates,
limits on the taxable payroll, time lags, and exclusions.36 Among the
exclusions are state contributions to extended benefits, benefits paid to
former employees of bankrupt firms, and dependents allowances. Ben
efit payments which are not charged back to prior employers are said to
be socialized. They are paid for by tax features that are usually not
experience-rated, but instead are collected as a fixed percentage of the
taxable payrolls at UI covered employers.
For 65 years, the experience-rated UI tax system has operated to
finance hundreds of billions of dollars in UI benefits. Except for occa
sional and temporary loans to the states, the basic system has operated
independent of general tax revenues. The federal/state UI system cur
rently holds in excess of $50 billion in the Unemployment Trust Fund
(UTF) and has annual revenues and benefit payments of about $20 bil
lion (U.S. Department of Labor 1999). Since the Unified Budget Act
(UBA) of 1969, money held in the UTF is accounted for in the annual
budget of the United States government (West and Hildebrand 1997, p.
575). From the time of UBA enactment through 1997, the federal gov
ernment experienced annual budget deficits; in these years, the UTF
surplus was hoarded to improve federal unified budget reports. The
current federal government budget surplus and projections for future
surplus budgets have raised policy interest in expanded uses of UTF
money.
A particular policy concern of the Clinton administration has been
the decline in the ratio of the insured to the total unemployment rate
(IUR/TUR), that is, the decline in the recipiency ratio. This decline
threatens both the aggregate adequacy of income replacement and the
built-in stabilizer function of the UI benefit system for the macro-econ
omy.
We have recognized that displaced older workers have difficulty
gaining reemployment at wages which match their career jobs and that
voluntary transition from career jobs is often done gradually by a shift
to part-time work on the career job, or to a bridge job which usually

Session 1: Charting the Landscape

117

pays substantially less per hour of work. Late in life, workers make
transitions from career jobs to bridge jobs, between bridge jobs, some
times back to career jobs, and eventually to full retirement with income
from pensions and assets. What improvements in the federal/state UI
system would best facilitate these transitions, and what would be their
financing implications?
Changes in UI eligibility rules to accommodate workers in lowwage labor markets and workers with preferences for part-time work
could be financed within the current experience rating framework.37
As recommended by the ACUC (1996), permitting initial eligibility for
those working at least 800 hours in the base period, regardless of base
period wages, would benefit the low-wage group. Changing continu
ing eligibility requirements concerning the refusal of suitable work to
include not only customary wage and occupation, but also customary
hours per week, is a practical solution. These expansions would
impose UI tax cost increases on employers in low-wage industries such
as retail and hospitality, who customarily pay UI taxes at the minimum
rate. However, such increases would be shared in part by employees
through moderation in wage increases, and UI tax subsidies flowing
from these industries to high-wage, high-layoff industries such as con
struction and manufacturing would diminish.
Some other Ul-related policy accommodations to older workers,
which may be tempting given federal budget surplus projections and
the aim of broadening UI recipiency, would most certainly be financed
from socialized rather than experience-rated taxes. Dependents' allow
ances are financed by socialized taxes because they stretch the social
insurance standard, which sets a weekly maximum on partial income
replacement because of the aim to prevent a desent into poverty. While
not relevant to older workers, in the spring of 1999, President Clinton
announced his desire to use the UI system to provide "Birth and Adop
tion Unemployment Compensation." Such a program would most cer
tainly be financed by socialized UI taxes.38 A similar financing scheme
would be most natural for extensions of UI more relevant to older
workers, such as paying health insurance premiums for the unem
ployed or providing early retirement unemployment compensation
payments to support transition to pension income.39
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INTERACTION WITH OTHER
EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMS
While discussing the adequacy of UI for older workers, we
described the interaction between UI and Social Security retirement
payments: federal law requires that UI benefits be reduced by one dol
lar for each dollar of Social Security benefits received. In this section
of the chapter, we examine UI interactions with other employment pro
grams which may be of relevance for older workers.
The strongest linkage between UI and Employment Service (ES)
programs is provided through the work test for continuing UI eligibil
ity. Many state UI laws require registration with and active use of ES
services to maintain established UI benefit entitlement. For a variety of
reasons, including the fact that UI payment errors have often been due
to improper application of statutory work search rules, many states
have relaxed their work test.40 These changes have weakened the link
between UI and ES.
The UI-ES linkage was renewed and strengthened in 1993 by fed
eral legislation creating the Worker Profiling and Reemployment Ser
vices (WPRS) system. The legislation required states to establish
procedures for early identification of UI beneficiaries most likely to
exhaust their UI benefit entitlement and to refer these persons quickly
to special reemployment services. State UI and ES agencies were
identified as key partners in the WPRS, and Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA) service delivery agencies were encouraged to cooperate
and provide reemployment services, particularly for their Economic
Dislocation and Worker Adjustment Assistance (EDWAA) Act clients.
Most states choose to implement the WPRS system using a statisti
cal profiling model. The U.S. Department of Labor developed a proto
type statistical model and provided training to the states in how to
adapt principles of the prototype for their own uses. To examine the
model's sensitivity, the preliminary prototype prepared by the U.S.
Department of Labor included an age variable to help predict the likeli
hood of UI benefit exhaustion. This variable and certain others, how
ever, are prohibited by federal civil rights legislation and were
excluded from the final model recommended by the Department of
Labor. Nonetheless, an analysis was conducted to determine the
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impact of dropping the prohibited variables. In the case of age, it was
found that even though age was a significant variable, the effect of the
age variable was largely accounted for by the variable for tenure on the
prior job, which was adopted in the final model (Wandner 1998).
Table 13 presents predicted and actual UI benefit exhaustion rates
by age group, computed on a sample of beneficiaries drawn in Michi
gan before the WPRS was implemented. This sample was used to esti
mate the Michigan WPRS profiling model (Eberts and O'Leary 1996).
Because of the civil rights prohibition, age was not included in the logit
models estimated to predict UI benefit exhaustion in Michigan. The
table shows that the actual UI exhaustion rate for beneficiaries aged 65
and over is appreciably higher than for other age groups and that the
Michigan model predicts a modestly higher exhaustion rate for that
group. However, the actual exhaustion rate for all the age groups less
than 65 is nearly uniform, ranging between 21 and 25 percent. The
Michigan profiling model was estimated using nonlinear methods and
predicts the likelihood of exhaustion to increase exponentially with
age. This pattern was most likely captured by the tenure variable. The
model indirectly identifies those permanently separated from their
employer and industry, because they are likely to be long-term UI ben
eficiaries. Research by Chan and Stevens (1999) and others suggests
that unemployed older workers have a greater risk of prolonged jobless
spells. Data are not available on the age distribution of those referred
to WPRS job search workshops, but it is likely to include older workers
in high proportion to their numbers in UI benefit receipt. It should be
mentioned that both program staff and participants have responded
very positively to the special services given those profiled and referred
by the WPRS system (Dickinson, Decker, and Kreutzer 1999).
In addition to the WPRS system, several other global changes are
now altering the way that UI interacts with other employment pro
grams and the way that clients interact with UI. The local administra
tion of UI is rapidly changing from conducting in-person interviews to
taking claims by telephone. The new telephone systems are being used
for the filing of both new initial claims and continuing claims. Less
and less do unemployed workers wait in line at a UI claims center.
Unless older workers are either called in to attend a job search work
shop because of the WPRS or called to attend an eligibility review
interview to go over their job search efforts and plans, they may never

Table 13 Predicted and Actual UI Benefit Exhaustion Rates by Age in Michigan, 1994
55-64 yr.
45-54 yr.
35^4 yr.
25-34 yr.
<s24 yr.
Measure
0.231
0.231
0.217
0.208
0.187
Predicted UI exhaustion rate
0.250
0.225
0.212
0.226
0.244
Actual UI exhaustion rate
17,104
35,947
59,808
62,687
21,855
Sample size
SOURCE' For the control group used to develop the Michigan Worker Profiling and Reemployment Services model
(Eberts and O'Leary 1996)

s>65 yr
0.273
0.370
3,068
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enter a physical location for UI services. By 1998, half or more of con
tinued claims in 35 states were taken by telephone (24 states took
more than three-quarters of these claims by telephone). Furthermore,
11 states took about half or more of their initial claims by telephone.41
This move to telephone claims is now accelerating.
Sweeping change in the public reemployment services landscape is
coming soon because of requirements of the Workforce Investment Act
(WIA) of 1998. This law requires that public one-stop career centers
be established in local areas to deliver a coordinated package of reem
ployment services including UI, ES, skill retraining, and referral to
other employment programs. While UI is a required partner at onestop career centers, the trend toward telephone claims suggests that it
may be present simply as a telephone on the wall over which UI claims
can be made.
By July 2000, when WIA becomes operational nationally, an older
worker reaching a one-stop career center in most areas will find a dif
ferent mix of training and employment services than has been offered
under JTPA. Under WIA, there is a more structured approach to the
provision of services. It is expected that all individuals entering a onestop career center will first be offered core services that will consist of
self-service and modest staff-assisted services. Only if these core ser
vices do not suffice will the individual be offered intensive services
which will involve greater staff assistance. Skill training will be
offered only after other avenues to employment have been exhausted.
It is expected that training will be provided to a smaller proportion of
clients than under JTPA.
Under JTPA, most of the services received by older workers were
from two special programs, the Senior Community Service Employ
ment Program and Services for Older Workers (JTPA Title II, Section
204(D)). Older workers usually did not participate in regular JTPA
programs for disadvantaged adults. Older workers were greatly under
represented in their receipt of service under the program for disadvan
taged adults (Title IIA). Workers 45 years of age and over amounted
to about 45 percent of the eligible population in program year 1995,
but those 45 and over received only 13 percent of services. Notably,
those aged 55 and over received only 2 percent. For the dislocated
worker program (Title III), workers 45 years of age and over were pro-
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portionally represented, being about one-third of both the eligible and
service receiving populations (Poulos and Nightengale 1997).
The aim of new one-stop career centers under the Workforce
Investment Act (WIA) is to attempt to serve all workers who seek
assistance. No single group is targeted for services under WIA;
instead, a wide variety of services can be accessed by all workers.
Under the JTPA program, services for older workers were specified
under Section 204(D), and section 202(c)(l)(D) required that 5 percent
of the federal allocation to states had to be used for these older worker
services. No similar provision exists under the WIA to differentiate
older workers from other adults. On the other hand, in the establish
ment of the one-stop delivery system under WIA, there are a number of
required partners and programs. Some activities provided by the Older
Americans Act of 1965 are part of the required partnerships.42 The
result is that older workers will have certain activities available under
WIA, but these activities will not have special funding. Older workers
will be treated differently, but they will be subject to the same funding
constraints and have the same availability of services as any other adult
worker when entering a one-stop career center.43
There is a separate employment program funded by the federal
government for older workers. The Senior Community Service Pro
gram provides part-time employment, at least 20 hours per week, in
community service activities for older workers. This program is
funded by an annual federal appropriation. Strong congressional sup
port has resulted in a stable funding level for this program in recent
years. Congress appropriated $440.2 million for the program in the
1998 and 1999 fiscal year budgets and has appropriated the same
amount for the year 2000, which will be the first year of full operation
under WIA.

TOPICS FOR FUTURE POLICY ANALYSIS
AND RESEARCH
In studying economic security for older workers, considerable
attention should be given to unemployment insurance (UI) as a source
of income security and as a potential influence on work incentives.

Session 1: Charting the Landscape

123

Current policy reviews, such as the one by the Committee for Eco
nomic Development (1999), which have explored how the private sec
tor can make better use of older workers in the labor force, consider the
impact of governmental policy with respect to Social Security and
Medicare on older workers, but they do not address the important role
ofUI.
Previous policy analysis and research which does examine UI and
older workers has tended to be based on an earlier and more simplistic
model. It was a model of a single transition near the end of the work
ing life: a one-step move from full-time work in a career job to full
retirement. That model is rapidly being replaced by one involving a
chain of employment transitions: from career job to bridge job,
between bridge jobs, perhaps back from a bridge job to a career job,
and finally a gradual movement into full retirement.
New research should address how UI influences the choice and
timing of the wide variety of labor market transitions which happen in
the second half of the working life. Many older workers are already
electing to work rather than retire and to remain in their current com
munities rather than to move to retirement communities. This trend is
likely to continue strongly in the future. In particular, the role of parttime work and self-employment are likely to be very important in the
future. A recent survey sponsored by the American Association of
Retired Persons (AARP) found that four-fifths of all workers born
between 1946 and 1964, the "baby boomers," intend to continue work
ing after retirement: 58 percent in part-time employment; 5 percent in
full-time employment "doing something different"; and 17 percent in
self-employment (Roper Starch 1999).
Demographic patterns in United States labor markets at the start of
the twenty-first century suggest that it would be wise to investigate and
develop policies to encourage the continued labor market participation
of older workers. Employer groups are increasingly concerned about
maintaining labor market participation of older workers, given the
smaller cohorts that will follow. They want the supply of skilled labor
that older workers embody available for productive use. The new study
by the Committee on Economic Development (1999), entitled "New
Opportunities for Older Workers," is really about what employers and,
to a lesser extent, government can do to retain and hire older workers.
This study seems to focus more on the basic decision to work or not,
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rather than the ongoing decisions that older workers continually need
to make about what type of employment to pursue and what to do if a
given job ends. More attention needs to be paid to the impact of UI as
a source of income and as an influence on work incentives for older
workers.
Changes in UI rules concerning initial eligibility, continuing eligi
bility, wage replacement, and partial benefits should all be examined to
evaluate effects on the likely employment patterns of older workers.
Particular attention should be given to UI features affecting the choice
of self-employment, part-time work, seasonal work, and agricultural
jobs.
The financing consequences of possible UI program changes
should also be estimated, as should the macroeconomic impact of
broadening recipiency. UI program features that would promote flexi
ble and extended labor force participation by older workers should also
enrich the employment choice environment for other workers. There
fore, it-would be useful to examine the impact of such program changes
on UI as a built in stabilizer of aggregate expenditure.
The UI program has an impact on whether workers choose to work
or to enjoy leisure. The potential impact of policy change in the areas
outlined would probably have a greater impact on the behavior of older
workers than on that of younger workers, who are strongly attached to
the labor force. As our society tries to retain older workers in the labor
force, we need to look closely at the current and potential role of UI.

Notes
The opinions expressed are our own and do not necessarily reflect the position of either
the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research or the U.S. Department of Labor.
We thank Ench Lansch, Joe Quinn, Burman Skrable, Tom Stengle, Tom West, and
Steve Woodbury for useful contributions. Any errors are our responsibility
1. Burtless (1999) summarizes retirement trends and the economic research focusing
on retirement incentives.
2. Methods for collection and use of the Benefits Accuracy Measurement (BAM)
data is given in U.S. Department of Labor (1996). BAM samples are drawn
weekly in the 50 states, Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia. Procedures are
designed to ensure that each sample is representative of paid claims in the state
that week.
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3. Policy definitions are given in the Economic Dislocation and Worker Adjustment
Assistance (EDWAA) Act of 1988. These definitions largely earned over to the
Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998. An overview of research applications
of this concept are given in Leigh (1990).
4. Hippie's (1999a) data is from the Displaced Worker survey, which is conducted
every two years by the Bureau of Labor Statistics to provide information on the
number and characteristics of persons who have been displaced from their jobs
over the past three years. Based on a supplement to the February 1998 Current
Population Survey, the latest study is for the period 1995-1996. It reveals that
between 1995 and 1996, 2.2 million workers aged 20 years or older lost jobs they
had held for three or more years due to the plant or company closing or moving;
positions or shifts being abolished; or the employer not having enough work for
them to do. The data show that during the 1990s there was a steady decline in the
displacement rate of long-term workers from 3.9 percent in 1991-1992, to 3 3
percent in 1993-1994, to 2.9 percent in 1995-1996.
5. The BAM data are used to assess the accuracy of UI benefit payments by selecting
key weeks of benefit payments. Beneficiaries who have long durations of UI ben
efit receipt have a higher probability of being selected for the weekly BAM sam
ples.
6. The problem of moral hazard is present when the insured can affect the chance of
experiencing the unfavorable outcome insured against, without being observed by
the insurer. In unemployment insurance, moral hazard is present if a worker can
affect the chance of being unemployed while not being detected by the state
unemployment agency. The state agency will disqualify UI beneficiaries when a
job separation or continuing joblessness is determined to be avoidable.
7. For older workers, an appealing feature of Feldstein and Altaian's (1998) proposal
is that borrowing from the government takes place when accounts are exhausted,
and "negative account balances are forgiven at retirement age."
8. A temporary UI self-employment program was established in 1993 as part of the
North American Free Trade Act (NAFTA). Federal legislation in 1998 perma
nently gave states the option to provide self-employment assistance with UI trust
fund money.
9. The 11 states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Minne
sota, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. Among
these, Connecticut, Minnesota, and Rhode Island have not yet implemented their
programs.
10. Wandner (1992) provided an overview of the international experience. He also
summarized the two U.S. experiments which predated the NAFTA authorizing
legislation.
11 About the experiments, see Benus, Wood, and Grover (1994); about the programs,
see Vroman( 1999).
12. In many states there is also a requirement that a certain number of hours must
have been worked in the reference period called the base year.
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13. Following a 1994 decision by the U S. Court of Appeals in the Seventh Circuit
case of Pennington versus Didnckson, many states have implemented alternate
benefit year (ABY) rules which consider income and hours in the four most recent
calendar quarters if eligibility is not established using the standard rule. The
Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC 1996, p. 19)
endorsed general adoption of ABY rules.
14. Anderson (1997) examined state rules and practices in administering continuing
UI eligibility.
15. O'Leary (1997) found that liberalizing the benefit reduction formula increased
earnings reported to the employment security department but did not increase
work effort.
16. O'Leary (1998, pp. 66-71) discussed the deficiencies of such aggregate average
measures.
17. See the estimates of Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993).
18. A thorough discussion of these matters is provided by O'Leary and Rubin (1997,
pp. 194-199).
19. The Advisory Council on Unemployment Compensation (ACUC 1996) recom
mended a federal standard requiring the maximum weekly benefit amount to
equal two-thirds of the statewide average weekly wage, so as to allow a majonty
of covered workers to receive at least 50 percent wage replacement.
20 A 1962 Department of Labor recommendation urged that the minimum "be
related to the weekly wages of the lowest wage group in the state for which the
unemployment insurance program is considered appropriate" (U.S. Department of
Labor 1962).
21. Both Massachusetts and Washington offer regular benefit durations as long as 30
weeks Woodbury and Rubin (1997) provided an exhaustive review and critique
of UI extended benefit programs.
22. The Benefit Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data measures the duration of bene
fits from the beginning date of a worker's benefit year the date at which they
established their eligibility for benefits until the date when that worker's claim
was investigated (the key week).
23 These duration estimates underestimate claimant duration because the data is cen
sored. The claimant's benefit history is measured up until the BAM key week is
selected but not after.
24 In Hungary, the unemployment compensation financing system partially subsi
dized early retirement payments for surplus workers in struggling enterprises and
fully paid such benefits when the enterprise was bankrupt (O'Leary 1995, p. 732).
25. Australia in 1987, Belgium in 1985, and New Zealand in 1992 either eliminated
or greatly relaxed the work search requirement for older unemployment compen
sation beneficiaries (Blackwell, Okba, and Casey 1995, p. 85)
26. Lengthening the entitled duration of benefits by one week is estimated to lengthen
joblessness by between 0.1 and 0.5 weeks, while a 10 percent increase in the wage
replacement rate is estimated to increase the joblessness by between 0.3 and 1.5
weeks.
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27. Burgess and Kingston (1987, p. 235) cited "difficulty in monitoring claimant
compliance with weekly eligibility criteria" as a prime cause for UI payment
errors associated with the work test
28. Impact analyses by age for the Pennsylvania experiment are reported by Corson et
al. (1992, p. Ill), while those for Washington are reported by Spiegelman,
O'Leary, and Kline (1992, p. 127).
29. Decker and O'Leary (1992, p. 54) reported impact estimates by age group for a
pooled Pennsylvania and Washington sample while controlling for the interaction
of age with other factors.
30. Recent research suggests that when a low bonus amount with a long benefit dura
tion is targeted to those most likely to exhaust benefits (displaced workers), it
appears to be cost-effective (O'Leary, Decker, and Wandner 1998).
31. These arguments are developed more completely by Blaustem, O'Leary, and
Wandner (1997, pp. 11-17).
32. Employees make small direct contributions in Alaska, New Jersey, and Pennsyl
vania, but it has been estimated by Anderson and Meyer (1995) that employer UI
taxes are partly paid by workers who contribute to the system through accepting
lower wages.
33. Principles of experience rating UI taxes are explained in Tannenwald and O'Leary
(1997). Estimates of the degree of experience rating among states are provided by
Tannenwald, O'Leary, and Huang (1999).
34. The Netherlands and Poland have considered adopting experience rating of unem
ployment compensation taxes. Countries outside of the United States often levy
employer and employee contributions with rates set on a socialized basis to cover
recent benefit payments Unemployment compensation payments often are subsi
dized by central government general revenues; occasionally this is the only source
of financing.
35. Blaustem (1993), p. 47, from a statement of UI objectives issued by the U.S.
Department of Labor, Bureau of Employment Security, in 1955.
36. For example, when an employer's UI tax rate is at the maximum of the range,
additional UI benefit charges do not change the tax rate on wages. Tannenwald
and O'Leary (1997) explained that, in such circumstances, subsidies flow from
other employers.
37. These and related issues are discussed in a broader context by O'Leary and Wand
ner (1997, pp. 714-716). Other policies to increase UI recipiency, such as broad
ening coverage to seasonal workers and employees of small farms, are to a lesser
degree important to older workers, but could also be financed within the experi
ence rating framework.
38. The proposed rule for Birth and Adoption Unemployment Compensation allows
states to determine whether the benefits would be experience-rated or socialized
(Federal Register 64, no. 232, pp. 67971-67979). Pear (1999) described the polit
ical dispute over President Clinton's plan to pay cash benefits to those on parental
leave from the unemployment trust fund.
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39. In 1995, President Clinton "mentioned finding some way to help workers who
lose their jobs keep their health insurance while they look for work. Under fed
eral law they can continue their policy for a year and a half by paying 102 percent
of the combined employer-employee premium, but many cannot afford to do so.
Clinton favors some form of subsidy to help them" (Rich 1995). On December
17, 1999, the Ticket to Work and Work Incentive Improvement Act (Public Law
106-170) was enacted; it allows the extension of Medicare for those on Social
Security Disability Insurance and Medicaid for those on Social Security Income
after recipients earnings rise above a given level.
40. Burgess and Kingston (1987) identify the work test as a main source of UI over
payments, citing the complexity of the ES-UI monitoring as part of the problem.
41. Based on state UI Benefits Accuracy Measurement (BAM) data for 1998.
42. WIA section 121(b)(l)(B)(vi).
43. A training and technical assistance guide has been developed for providing spe
cial services for older workers under the Workforce Investment Act.
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Getting Older in the 21st Century
The Risks and Consequences of Disability
MarkV. Nadel
Social Security Administration

Among the fearful risks facing workers as they get older, disability
looms large. As insurance salespeople never tire of telling us, for
younger workers the risk of disability is greater than the risk of death.
It is a risk that is somewhat mitigated in that some workers can start
drawing pensions before they are in their mid sixties and nearly all
workers have been able to draw Social Security early retirement bene
fits starting at age 62. Yet, until reaching the age where retirement
income is available, workers confront an increased risk of disability as
they age. In light of the gradual increase in the normal retirement age
that began in January 2000 and concomitant diminution in early retire
ment benefits, the risk to older workers of becoming disabled is a par
ticularly timely issue. We are concerned about two groups of older
workers: those in what is commonly regarded as the latter years of
"normal employment age" (ages 55 to 64) who will be affected by
changes in the Early Retirement Age benefits and those 65 and older
who will be affected by current and proposed changes in the normal
retirement age.
This chapter has four objectives. The first is to examine older
workers' risk of disability, primarily the long-term disability that may
limit or end employment for the rest of a worker's life. The second is
to examine the risk of loss of employment resulting from disability and
the characteristics of workers that affect that employment risk. While
impairment does not necessarily equate to a loss of employment, being
able to overcome the impairment and work by no means guarantees
that anyone will give the older worker a job. Moreover, even with the
same impairment, different individuals have very different risks of los
ing employment or income. Third, I examine the systems of insurance
coverage against those risks; who is insured, by whom, and how ade-
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quately? Last, I consider the public policy implications of older work
ers' risk of disability, in particular the implications for proposals to
raise the retirement age. In this chapter, the term impairment is used to
mean diminished physical or mental health; disability refers to an
impairment that results in loss of employment or serious reduction in
income.

THE RISK OF DISABILITY
As we get older, we confront a greater risk of becoming disabled.
Almost one quarter of older Americans report that they have a signifi
cant disability that affects their ability to work. Data from the 1995
National Health Interview Survey (NHIS) show that 15.7 percent of
individuals aged 55 to 64 reported that they were unable to work due to
a disability. An additional 7 percent report that they are limited in their
work activity by a disability. In contrast, 7.9 percent of the 45- to 54year-old age group reported inability to work, but about the same pro
portion (6.5 percent) reported limitations in work.
It should be noted at the outset that these data, while the best avail
able, should still be viewed with caution. The findings are based on
self-reported assessments, and it is likely that some unknown number
of respondents prefer to ascribe their lack of work to a disability than to
the less socially acceptable reason that they just do not want to work
any more. If such fudging overstates the true state of disability, there is
also a countervailing trend. Almost one million 55- to 64-year-olds
who report that they have no disability simultaneously report that they
are unable to work due to health reasons. This may be due to some
people having an acute but temporary problem, and it probably
includes a number of mentally ill individuals.
We will soon have a much better assessment of the prevalence of
health impairments in the population. The Social Security Administra
tion (SSA) is embarking on an ambitious survey of disability status and
functioning in the population that will provide an estimate of the num
ber of people in the population who are severely disabled enough to
qualify for Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) benefits. 1
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Trends
The current prevalence of disability tells us just part of the story.
Ideally, we would want to know what this portends for older workers in
the future, and the best way to forecast the future is to examine recent
trends in disability.
From the time that the 1983 amendments enacting changes in the
normal retirement age were passed, there was concern that longer life
spans did not necessarily translate into longer work life. An important
article by Ernest Gruenberg advanced the argument that recent medical
successes in postponing death only resulted in the prolongation of sick
ness (Gruenberg 1977). That concern was underscored by subsequent
studies that pointed to evidence of deteriorating health and disability
status among the older working-age population from the late 1960s
through the 1970s. More recently, however, the data show a very dif
ferent picture. Crimmins, Reynolds, and Saito (1999), using data from
the National Health Interview Survey, analyzed trends in work ability
and work limitations during the period 1982 to 1993 for the 50- to 69year-old population. They found that in the later years of that period,
both men and women older than the age of 61 are less likely to report
inability to work. The size of the annual average decline in inability to
work ranged from 40 to 70 percent for men and 50 to 70 percent for
women. This improvement is also seen in older individuals.
Given the increase in the normal retirement age, disability trends
for individuals older than 65 are also relevant. The trend toward better
health is manifest for that group as well. For the 12 years between
1982 to 1994, analyses of the National Long Term Care Survey
(NLTCS) data have shown that the fraction of the 65- to 74-year-old
population that is not chronically disabled grew by 2.6 percentage
points, from 85.9 to 88.5 percent, and the fraction of the 75- to 84-yearolds not chronically disabled grew by 5.4 percentage points (Manton,
Corder, and Stallard 1997). These findings support the idea that as the
health and ability to work among older and younger retirement-age
workers improve, increasing the age of full eligibility for Social Secu
rity will not be as detrimental to older workers as some have argued.
However, the effect of health status is more complex than a simple
snapshot of point-in-time impairment would indicate. A recent analy
sis of the longitudinal Health and Retirement Survey found that it is not
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just poor health, but rapid declines in health ("health shocks") that
explain retirement behavior. What we don't know is whether the pro
portion of workers affected by the onset of such health shocks is also
declining. Presumably, those who do retire early due to such health
issues would be disproportionately affected by increasing the retire
ment age.
In summary, while becoming older increases the risk of disability,
the situation for workers is better than it was. Living longer does not
necessarily mean living sicker, and in the aggregate, the possibility of
longer work lives is somewhat less constrained by health concerns than
was true a generation ago (Bound et al. 1999).
International Perspectives
The decline in disability in the United States has also been seen in
other industrial countries. Waidmann and Manton (1998) reviewed
studies from 10 industrial countries and found that these nations also
recently experienced moderate to large declines in chronic disability in
the elderly. For example, Canadian studies have shown there was a sig
nificant increase in life expectancy free of severe disability for both
males and females at age 65 from 1986 to 1991. In Great Britain, anal
yses of Britain's three General Household Surveys in 1976, 1981, and
1985 found an improvement over time in the expectation of life with
out disability in for 65- and 75-year-olds. Also, in Italy, the Nether
lands, and for females in Switzerland, there were relative increases in
disability-free life expectancy (DFLE) over the respective time periods.
The reasons behind the improvement are hinted at by findings in
France, where disability-free life expectancy at birth increased signifi
cantly for both males and females from 1981 to 1991. For individuals
65 and older, DFLE also increased sizably in absolute and relative
terms for both males and females. Robine, Morrniche, and Sermet
(1998) assessed whether declines in disability were due to delayed
onset of morbidity or improved management of potentially disabling
conditions once they exist. The results showed that the prevalence of
potentially disabling conditions rose significantly between 1980 and
1991. However, the propensity of those having these conditions to
report themselves disabled fell (Robine, Mormiche, and Sermet 1998).
These findings, Waidmann and Manton argued, suggest the possibility
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that the treatment or management of diseases has improved or that
rehabilitation rates have increased.
Trends and Projections in the SSDI Program
As I discuss in more detail below, self-reported impairments are a
far cry from qualifying for SSDI. Nonetheless, Social Security disabil
ity awards seem to reinforce the findings of the recent survey research.
This can be seen by looking at the percentage of older workers who are
awarded disability benefits at different time periods. In 1975, among
55- to 59-year-olds, the disability incidence rate (i.e., the proportion of
workers in that age range who were determined to be disabled by
Social Security) was 2.1 percent; by 1997, the percentage had declined
to 1.4 percent. More notably, the incidence among workers aged 6064 declined from 2.9 to 1.6 percent (Social Security Administration
1999). This decline may be due largely to the trend toward early retire
ment, but the administrative data do not reveal the extent to which
older workers in declining health opt for early retirement in lieu of
applying for DI benefits. However, an analysis of HRS data by
Burkhauser, Couch, and Phillips (1996) found that the men who retired
early (at age 62) do not significantly differ in the prevalence of health
limitations from those who wait. While they caution that this does not
mean that health is unimportant, the finding at least casts some doubt
on the assumption that raising the retirement age will automatically
cause a proportional response in DI applications.
While trends in self-reported impairments for older workers and DI
award incidence rates show a slight decline, Social Security actuarial
estimates project an increase in the proportion of the workforce on the
rolls. This is not in contradiction to the improving health trends.
Rather, it is a reflection of the greater trend of the aging of the popula
tion as the baby boom bulges through middle age. An increasing pro
portion of the population will be in the over-50 age range, with its
higher disability incidence rates. The Social Security Actuary's inter
mediate projections of the disability insurance incidence rate in 2008 is
5.9 per thousand, compared with 4.7 per thousand in 1998. The esti
mate takes into account the increase in the normal retirement age, with
its consequent incentive for workers over 62 to seek to get on the SSDI
rolls.
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Who Gets Impaired and How?
As we contemplate the possible effects of current and potential
increases in retirement age, we can get a more complete understanding
of the consequences by getting behind the aggregate figures and exam
ining the disability status of different subgroups in the population. It is
useful to consider the categories of disabilities affecting older workers
and how disabilities are distributed across subgroups of older workers.
Not only are older workers more likely to be impaired, but the
nature of the probable impairments also change over the lifespan. Fig
ures 1, 2, and 3 show the prevalence of the three largest categories of
disability among different age groups (Social Security Administration
1998, p. 219). Not surprisingly, the prevalence of musculoskeletal and
circulatory disorders rise dramatically with age. Mental disorders do
not necessarily decrease with age in the population. Rather, the
decreasing proportion in that category for older workers reflects the
growth in mental impairment SSDI allowances for younger age work
ers and the consequent larger numbers of younger works in that cate
gory.
Age is not the only demographic characteristic for which disability
varies. Numerous studies have documented differences in health status
among racial and ethnic groups across the life cycle in the United
States. For example, compared with whites, African Americans report
higher rates of hypertension, diabetes, and arthritis, while Hispanics
report higher rates of hypertension and diabetes and a lower rate of
heart conditions (Kington and Smith 1997). Obviously, socioeconomic
status must be considered in assessing the independent effect of race.
In fact, Kington and Smith demonstrated that socioeconomic status
plays a significant role in explaining racial and ethnic differences in the
ability to function once a person has a chronic illness, but it plays a rel
atively minor role in explaining differences in the prevalence of
chronic disease. This seems to suggest that lower socioeconomic sta
tus may lead to poorer outcomes once a disease develops because of
such factors as reduced access to health care services.
Race and ethnicity are also related to employment. Crimmins,
Reynolds, and Saito (1999) found that relative to non-Hispanic whites,
African Americans are more than twice as likely to report inability to
work. Even looking across people with the same education levels (i.e.,
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Figure 1 Distribution of SSDI Beneficiaries with Musculoskeletal System
Diseases by Age
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Figure 2 Distribution of SSDI Beneficiaries with Circulatory System
Diseases by Age
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Figure 3 Distribution of SSDI Beneficiaries with Mental Disorders
by Age
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controlling for education), being African American increases the likeli
hood of being unable to work by about half. Similarly, Hispanics are
about one and a half times more likely than non-Hispanic whites to
have work disability; however, Hispanics' relative likelihood of being
unable to work is about 25 percent less than that of non-Hispanic
whites when education is controlled. For example, looking at the age
group of particular interest, their logistic regression estimated that the
probability of being unable to work among 62-year-old men with 10
years of education was 26.1 for African Americans, 18.4 for whites,
and only 14.4 for Hispanics. The pattern is similar for women.
These data are also mirrored by the composition of SSDI rolls. As
seen in Figure 4, African Americans are at higher risk of being severely
enough disabled to qualify for SSDI.2

AGING AND THE EMPLOYMENT RISKS OF IMPAIRMENT

This section focuses on the economic risk of disability in general
and the risk to older workers in particular. Age clearly has an effect on
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Figure 4 Race/Ethnic Representation of 55- to 57-Year-Olds in DI and
General Populations

Percent

White

Black

Other

Race/Ethnicity

SOURCE: Table 5.A1, Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement 1998,
p. 185. Data for General Population: Table No. 22, Resident Population, by Race and
Single Years of Age • 1997, U.S. Bureau of the Census.

gaining and sustaining employment. Not only are older workers more
likely to get DI benefits, data from Social Security's New Beneficiary
Survey show that, once on the rolls, older beneficiaries have a lower
tendency to return to work; once working they have a higher tendency
also to stop working (Hennessey 1997, p. 16). Age by itself, of course,
is not the only factor limiting an individual's ability to work in the
economy. Similarly, a medical impairment, by itself, does not neces
sarily limit an individual's ability to work in the economy. Rather, the
ability to work is a function of individual factors and factors in the
environment. Figure 5 presents a simple model of the process. The
following discussion gets below the aggregate data on disability and
focuses on factors that either mitigate or exacerbate the risk of loss of
employment once impairment has occurred.
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Figure 5 Factors Affecting Employability
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SOURCE: Adapted from Curtis et al. (1998).

The Impact of Underlying Economic Conditions
Whether a medical impairment becomes a cause of unemployment
is affected substantially by economic factors. First, economic incen
tives play a critical role in the decisions of people with disabilities to
participate in the labor force or to seek disability benefits. An individ
ual's decision to apply for benefits is influenced by a variety of such
factors. Examples of these factors might include the availability of
potential sources of other income such as pensions or savings, the
availability of health insurance and noncash benefits, and the costs
associated with the application process (Stapleton et al. 1998).
Secondly, underlying economic conditions affect the economic risk
of disability for workers who are already out of the labor force or who
are laid off. Rupp and Stapleton (1995) summarized the results of
numerous econometric studies estimating the effect of the business
cycle on Disability Insurance (DI) applications, awards, and caseloads.
The results varied in magnitude across these studies but remained con
sistent in direction. The authors reported strong results in two studies
they conducted. The first study analyzed DI applications and awards
using 1988-1992 data; the second looked at DI initial determinations
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and initial allowance rates using 1988-1993 data. Stronger effects
were found for applications. Specifically, they found that a 1-percent
age-point increase in the unemployment rate resulted in a 4 percent
growth in DI applications.
Similarly we would expect that disability insurance applications
should fall when the economy rebounds from a recession. In fact, the
DI application rate growth declined from a peak of 13.2 percent in
1991 to 2.7 percent in 1994, as the economy rebounded from the reces
sion. These results suggest that the labor market affects the number of
workers applying for SSDI, but note that this evidence covers only a
relatively short period of time, and the DI application rate, just as the
DI approval rate, is also affected by changes in SSA policy and imple
mentation practices. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to infer that
workers with disabilities would be more likely to seek SSDI benefits
when they have fewer alternatives in the economy.
Recent evidence indicates that the economic risk of disability does
not occur only during economic downturns but is present even when
the economy is robust. Burkhauser et al. (1999) evaluated how the
1990s business cycle impacted working-age disabled people. As
expected, they were able to quantitatively demonstrate the dispropor
tionately negative impact the downturns in the business cycle had on
people with disabilities relative to those without disabilities. What is
more disturbing, however, is that employment and labor earning of
individuals with disabilities declined over the entire 1990 business
cycle, although less so in recovery than in recession.
Mitigating Factors
Although aging does increase the risk of disability, and the econ
omy (expressed by the unemployment rate) can affect workers posi
tively or negatively, there are a number of factors for the individual and
for society that mitigate the economic risk of impairment for at least a
segment of the workforce. For the individual, these factors might
include employer accommodations, a supportive family, and good
medical care. In the aggregate, two factors of particular importance are
the changing nature of work and educational attainment.
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The changing nature of work
Whether a particular impairment results in loss of employment
depends largely on the kind of work one is doing when disabled and
the kind of jobs that are available. This relationship, in turn, depends
on broader trends affecting the physical nature of work. The replace
ment of high-paying manufacturing jobs with relatively low-paying
service sector jobs is seen by many as an important factor in DI appli
cation and award growth. Rupp and Stapleton (1995) suggested that in
the short-run this trend may increase the DI application rate, as workers
with disabilities who lose their manufacturing jobs may not find new
work in the service sector and then apply for disability benefits. In the
long run, however, it is thought the effect might be to reduce the num
ber of applications, because service sector workers are less susceptible
to disabling injuries and illnesses. Rupp and Stapleton suggested that
these long-run effects may vary across different impairment groups.
For example, workers with physical impairments would be less likely
to require DI benefits, while those with mental impairments would be
more likely to do so. If they are correct, another correlate of this differ
ence is that as work requires greater cognitive skills, those with mental
impairments will be less likely to retain or gain employment due to a
lack of skill match. At the same time, those with physical impairments
but lacking requisite cognitive skills for other reasons will also be less
likely to be employed because of a decline in jobs requiring only phys
ical exertion.
The importance of education
It has become a cliche to report that both income and likelihood of
employment are positively related to levels of education but, like
many cliches, it is true. The current economy requires higher-skilled
workers, and while there is an undersupply of more-skilled workers,
there is an oversupply of less-skilled workers (Bassi, Benson, and
Cheney 1996). Accordingly, among the general population, the jobless
rate is directly related to education. For example, the unemployment
rate of men who were not high school graduates was 61 percent higher
than those who were. Similarly, those whose education stopped at high
school graduation had a jobless rate 26 percent higher than those who
had been to college (Bureau of Labor Statistics 1998).
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The data on the relationship between education, disability, and
employment (while controlling for other factors) is more scant (Curtis
et al. 1998). Nonetheless, there have been studies that point to the
importance of education in allowing persons with disabilities to con
tinue working. For example, two-thirds of the relative reduction in
inability to work over the time period analyzed by Crimmins, Rey
nolds, and Saito (1999) was accounted for by the higher education
level of the older age cohort in the most recent time period studied.
Similarly, education level is a factor positively associated with those on
DI going back to work (Hennessey and Muller 1995).
The good news here is that the educational level of the population
has been rising. In 1969, 36 percent of the 35- to 45-year-old age
cohort had less than a high school degree. In 1994, only 12 percent of
this cohort had so limited an education. Similarly, the percentage of
that age group having college degrees has doubled to 27 percent (Friedland and Summer 1999).

INSURANCE COVERAGE FOR THE RISK OF DISABILITY
When the onset or worsening of an impairment results in the
inability to work, workers may be covered by a combination of public
and private benefit plans. Workers generally are covered by Social
Security disability programs, workers compensation, and, to a much
more limited extent, private disability insurance.
The first issue to raise in considering disability coverage is one of
scope. Far fewer individuals receive any disability insurance income,
public or private, than have self-reported work impairments. Using
data from the 1994 National Health Interview Survey on Disability,
Adler (1997) found that while 16.9 million working-age adults
reported having a work disability, only 9.1 million received benefits
from any disability program. Many of the respondents with selfreported disabilities may have only short-term disabilities or may be
overstating their condition, but we simply do not yet know how many
are in those categories and how many are have serious need for assis
tance but lack benefits.
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The Protection Offered by Social Security Disability Insurance
Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) is the
broadest protection available for workers who become disabled, and it
is the only disability insurance that the vast majority of Americans
have. In 1998, 133.4 million workers were insured for DI benefits. To
be disability-insured, workers over age 31 must have worked 5 of the
last 10 years immediately preceding their period of disability.3 As of
1997, 80 percent of the working-age population was SSDI insured, but
the smaller proportion of younger workers who are covered lower this
percentage. As a result of the exclusion of some categories of workers
(such as domestics and most government workers) from Social Secu
rity in the earlier years of the program, the percentage of covered work
ers also trails off slightly starting with the age 50-54 cohort (Figure 6).
This is especially true for women, probably because they were dispro
portionately out of the labor force earlier in their lives or exempt as
teachers (i.e., employees of local governments).
Figure 6 Age Groups that Are SSDI Insured (estimated)
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SOURCE: Social Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement, 1998, p. 181.
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While most workers are covered by Social Security, the extent to
which the SSDI program actually provides benefits in case of serious
impairment is limited by two factors: the criteria for receiving benefits
and the amount of those benefits relative to previous earnings.
The criteria for being awarded SSDI benefits are very stringent.
The law defines disability as the inability to engage in any "substantial
gainful activity" by reason of any medically determinable physical or
mental impairment(s) which can be expected to result in death or
which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of
not less than 12 months. Moreover, SSDI benefits generally do not
begin until five months after the onset of the disability. Many more
individuals apply for DI benefits than actually receive them. At latest
count, approximately 49 percent of applicants are ultimately awarded
benefits either initially or through the final administrative appeal.
Once awarded, the SSDI benefit amount, like retirement benefits,
is related to earnings, but is also progressive. That is, the more you
have earned, the more you get in benefits, but lower-wage workers
receive an amount that represents a higher proportion of the predisability earnings than higher-wage workers. The benefits and replacement
rate for a 50-year-old worker at different income levels is shown in
Table 1. Note that individuals on SSDI may earn up to $700 per month
and not lose any benefits. Benefits are generally also paid to spouses
when there is a dependent child and also to those children. In 1997,
those benefits averaged $178 to wives and $129 to husbands. Children
received an average of $195 ($292 if they were also disabled).
Table 1 Earnings Replacement Rates for Steady Workers Entitled to
SSDI (1998)a
Variable

Earnings
^^^-^level

Low

Average

High

Maximum

1997 Earnings ($)

12,342

27,426

43,882

65,400

Annual benefit6 ($)

7,060

11,629

15,446

17,920

Replacement rate (%)

57.2

42.4

35.2

274

a For a 50-year-old worker at four levels of covered earnings.
b Shown for illustrative purposes. Benefits are paid on a monthly basis.
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Accounting for Age
The connection between age and disability is inherent in the Social
Security Disability program. The initial cash benefit program estab
lished in the Social Security Amendments of 1956 provided benefits
only for disabled insured workers who were between the ages of 50
and 65. The House Ways and Means Committee Report on the legisla
tion stated
retirement protection for the 70 million workers under old-age and
survivors insurance is incomplete because it does not now provide
a lower retirement age for those who are demonstrably retired by
reason of a permanent and total disability. We recommend the
closing of this serious gap in the old-age and survivors insurance
system by providing for the payment of retirement benefits at age
50 to those regular workers who are forced into premature retire
ment because of disability.

Thus, disability insurance was conceived of as a necessary early retire
ment program for older workers.
In 1960, Congress removed the minimum age requirement of 50
years for disability insurance beneficiaries. Nonetheless, the Social
Security Administration considers age to be a significant factor in the
disability decision process. It is not that age makes an individual more
disabled; rather, the agency's assumption is that people in the latter
stages of work life who have impairments are less likely to be able to
adjust to new employment opportunities. To understand the place that
age plays in disability determination, it is useful to review briefly how
SSA determines that an individual is disabled for purposes of receiving
SSDI. SSA uses a five-step sequential evaluation process (Figure 7).
It is at step five determining whether there are other jobs the indi
vidual can perform that age comes into account, as required by the
Social Security Act. For younger persons (under age 50), SSA does
not consider that age will seriously affect one's ability to adapt to a
new work situation. Social Security regulations state that "if you are
closely approaching advanced age (50-54) we will consider that your
age, along with a severe impairment and limited work experience, may
seriously affect your ability to adjust to a significant number of jobs in
the national economy." "Advanced age" (55 or over) is that point
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Figure 7 Social Security Sequential Disability Decision-Making Process

1 Is the applicant engaging in substantial gainful activity?
(Earning more than $700/month)
Yes —> Deny
No
2. Does the applicant have severe impairment(s) that limits
basic work activities?
Deny
No ^
Yes
Is the impairment expected to last 12 months or result in death?
Deny
No —*•
Yes
3. Does the impairment meet or equal the medical listings7
No
Allow •<———— Yes
(Assess residual functional capacity)
4. Does the impairment prevent doing past work?
Yes

No ——^

Deny

I
(Consider the applicant's age, education and work expenence)
5. Does the impairment prevent any other work
that exists in the national economy?
No ——>• Deny
Allow -4———— Yes

where SSA regards age as significantly affecting a person's ability to
perform substantial gainful activity.
Both the increasing numbers of workers in the older age ranges and
the impact of the easing of standards for them in step five can be seen
in the proportion of persons who successfully apply for DI benefits
(Table 2).
The Protection Offered by Supplemental Security Income
As the name implies, the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) pro
gram supplements the coverage provided by SSDI. As a means-tested
program, it does so in two ways. First, it provides disability benefits to
individuals who are not covered by SSDI. For individuals who meet
the low income and assets test, the sequential evaluation to determine
whether they are disabled for Social Security purposes is the same as it
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Table 2 SSDI Awards and Applications by Age, 1997a
Age range

Applications filed

Awards

Applications allowed
(%)

30-39

209,355

70,735

34

40-49

283,343

116,438

41

50-59

320,861

195,883

61

SOURCE: Social Security Administration unpublished data.
a Both applications and awards are the total of first-time and reapphcations.

is for SSDI. Secondly, even for individuals who are receiving SSDI but
whose benefits are very low (currently below $500 a month), SSI pro
vides supplemental coverage with a total benefit somewhat higher than
$500 a month. Last year, 5.3 million persons received SSI on the basis
of a disability.4 Currently, out of 6.3 million SSDI beneficiaries, 1.6
million receive SSI as well. In addition to federal benefits, 44 states
also provide additional benefits. Unlike SSDI, every dollar of earnings
after the first $65 a month results in a 50-cent reduction in SSI benefits.
The Increased Retirement Age
In reviewing Social Security coverage for disability, we cannot
look only at the DI and SSI programs. Medicare and retirement bene
fits must also be considered as part of the protection available to work
ers who become disabled.
Medicare is provided to persons who have received SSDI benefits
for two years. While health insurance is obviously an important issue
for any adult, it is particularly important for persons with disabilities
because there is substantial evidence that they are at greater risk for
additional health complications (Marge 1998). Individuals who get
SSI benefits then get Medicaid immediately rather than having to wait
for Medicare. Medicaid, ironically, can be more useful to these indi
viduals because, unlike Medicare, it provides prescription drug cover
age.
Social Security retirement benefits are also closely linked to work
ers' financial status if they become disabled. Workers on DI automati
cally transition to retirement benefits upon reaching 65 years of age,
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but that retirement age is gradually increasing to 67. To the extent that
individuals retire early due to poor health, the current increase in the
normal retirement age and the eventual reduction in the amount of ben
efits from 80 to 70 percent of normal retirement for those workers who
retire at 62 is an incentive for more workers to seek SSDI. The amount
of SSDI benefits would be comparable to their normal retirement bene
fit. If they can get SSDI, they then convert at the normal retirement age
to whatever their full Social Security retirement benefit would be and
never suffer a reduction in benefits. GAO (1999) argued that while
future increases in the retirement age would result in net trust fund sav
ings, there would be some increase in disability insurance payments.
However, for workers who were in poor health but could not meet the
strict disability standards of SSDI, they would either have to continue
to work until normal retirement age or accept a reduced retirement ben
efit. In short, the Social Security retirement age affects how workers
mitigate the risk of disability as they age.
However, the relationship between health and retirement plans may
not be as simple as is sometimes assumed. As noted above, HRS data
indicate that the men who retired early (at age 62) do not significantly
differ in the prevalence of health limitations from those who wait
(Burkhauser, Couch, and Phillips 1996). The Congressional Budget
Office (1999) also found that only 8 percent of men and 11 percent of
women who took early retirement had non-Social Security income
below the poverty line and a work-related disability. This may suggest
that only a small proportion of early retirees are rendered extremely
dependent on early Social Security benefits retirement by virtue of both
disability and income.
Insuring against Workplace Injury—Workers Compensation
While the Social Security Disability Insurance system covers
workers with severe disabilities regardless of how they developed those
disabilities, workers' compensation (WC) insurance is a nearly univer
sal system to provide reimbursement of wages and expenses for work
ers who become disabled as a result of their job. WC will be discussed
only briefly here.
Private insurance companies provide WC insurance, but it is not an
entirely private system. Employers are generally required to provide
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the insurance, but its existence also protects employers from legal lia
bility. WC began in the early 1900s and now has separate programs for
each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Since the basic goal
of WC is to restore workers to their previous abilities, the programs
strongly emphasize rehabilitation. WC is fully funded by employers.
Benefits include a weekly amount until maximum medical improve
ment has been realized, with payments thereafter based on the degree
of disability; medical care is also covered. Benefit payments, which
include both cash payments and medical care, totaled $42.4 billion in
1996.
Insuring against Disability—Private Plans
While Social Security provides financial protection for workers
who become severely disabled over the long term and workers com
pensation provides coverage for those who become injured or sick on
the job, private disability insurance falls between these systems. It
should be noted at the outset that private plans are not independent of
Social Security; they developed in a climate that already included
Social Security and other public benefits. The private plans assumed
the existence of Social Security and generally are tailored to integrate
with it, by offsetting their benefits by the amount of Social Security
benefits. Private disability plans are broadly divided into two catego
ries, short-term and long-term, but beyond that there is great variety
and no standard terminology.
The definitions of disability within the types of plans vary to some
extent, but they generally share major characteristics. Short-term plans
typically cover impairments that are judged to prevent employees from
engaging in their usual occupation. They generally pick up workers
after sick pay is exhausted, although the plan may be in lieu of sick pay.
Benefit periods generally range from 30 days to six months. Nearly all
employees who end up getting short-term benefits return to work within
two months. Others may, if they are covered, "graduate" to long-term
disability coverage. Generally, long-term plans are more restrictive,
particularly after the first two years. While they initially provide pay
ments for employees unable to perform their usual occupation, after
two years the definition usually requires the employee to be unable to
perform any occupation. The earnings replacement rate of these long-
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term plans is about 60 percent, up to a contractual maximum dollar
amount. However, this generally includes any SSDI payments.
Private plans provide a useful measure of protection. The problem
is that relatively few workers are covered. According to Bureau of
Labor Statistics data, about 40 percent of full-time workers have shortterm policies, and about one-third of workers have employer-provided
long-term policies. As shown in Figure 8, workers in smaller firms are
less likely to have long-term policies. Note that blue-collar workers in
all categories of employers are the least likely to have long-term dis
ability insurance. That is, workers in the most arduous occupations are
least likely to be covered.
Individually purchased disability plans are also available, but we
were unable to obtain data on participation rates for such plans. They
are, however, mostly limited to highly compensated employees or selfemployed individuals. These plans may replace up to 80 percent of
earnings, though more typical replacement rates are 60-70 percent.
Often these plans do not offset payments by the amount of Social Secu
rity benefits.
Figure 8 Employees with Long-Term Disability Insurance
70
• Prof/tech
6050

D White collar
D Blue collar

State/local

Small/private
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SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics 1997 Employee Benefits Survey.
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As with individual and small-group health insurance, the disability
income insurance market is heavily underwritten. The workers we are
concerned about here, with their greater risk of disability, would likely
be deemed uninsurable or face extremely high premium payments.
Thus for most workers, especially most blue-collar and small-firm
employees, Social Security is the only game in town.
The extent of coverage and the resulting economic risk of disabil
ity-related employment loss can be put in perspective by comparison
with other countries, even though comparisons are inexact due to
broader definitions of disability in other nations and the use of disabil
ity rolls to cover more general unemployment. First, a higher propor
tion of the working-age population is receiving disability insurance
benefits in most European countries. Second, the economic well-being
of men with disabilities in the United States is often not equal to their
counterparts in those other countries. Burkhauser and Daly (1998)
made this point by comparing the experience of U.S. and German men.
Using cross-sectional data, they found that the average-income Ger
man who has a disability lives in a household which has an income that
is virtually the same as that of the average German without a disability.
In contrast, the income gap in the United States between those with and
without disabilities is approximately 25 percent. Additionally, in Ger
many the pre-tax and transfer income (composed largely of own wage
earnings) of men with disabilities is nearly 80 percent of that of men
without disabilities, whereas in the United States the pre-tax and trans
fer income gap for men is almost 35 percent.

CONCLUSION AND POLICY ISSUES
Older may be wiser, but it often is also weaker. For the individual,
the story is mixed. While any given individual is far more likely to be
impaired in the second half of work life than in the first, the good news
is that that individual is likely to be somewhat healthier than his coun
terpart of 20 years ago. For the social insurance system, however, the
improvements in health and functioning are still going to be trumped
by increased number of people in their late fifties and early sixties. It
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could have been worse, but demographic factors still present three key
policy problems having to do with distributional issues.
The first problem is that health status is not randomly distributed in
the population. Minorities and those with low educational levels are
more likely to have impairments affecting their employment. What
ever the covariance and root causes of the unequal health status of
minorities, under present trends, minorities will constitute a dispropor
tionate number of those with health impairments at the same time that
they are becoming a larger proportion of the general population.
The second problem is that the impact of disability on employment
is concentrated. Those with higher educational status are both less
likely to need to leave a job due to impairment and more likely to
regain employment after losing it because of disability. This factor
also reinforces the problem facing minority groups.
Finally, just as workers are admonished to have private pensions
and savings in addition to Social Security (completing the famous
three-legged stool), SSDI provides a benefit level that does not hold
workers harmless in the event of disability. The replacement rate is
less than 50 percent for most workers. However, while most people
have at least short legs on their stool for retirement, a similar supple
ment to Social Security Disability Insurance is generally not available.
We do not know the size of the assets of SSDI beneficiaries, but since
their average income tends to be low, it is very unlikely that their sav
ings are of much help when they become disabled. Similarly, private
long-term disability insurance covers only about one-third of workers.
Like employer-provided health insurance, it tends to be offered to
workers who are already better off. In short, the health risk to the older
population is not randomly distributed, and the consequences of
impairment add additional risk to traditionally disadvantaged groups.
In addition to the aging baby boomers, the other contextual issue
for assessing disability is the currently scheduled and potential
increases in the retirement age-. While we know that many people pre
fer to take Social Security retirement benefits at age 62, raising that age
will not affect as high a proportion of workers with impairments as
would have been true 20 years ago. Nonetheless, that trend will be
scant comfort to those who seek to retire early for health reasons but
whose impairments do not meet SSDI criteria. We are still learning
more about their numbers and characteristics, but suffice it to say for
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now that there will be groups that will be worse off if they must defer
retirement beyond the current early retirement age or take further
reductions in retirement benefits.
The current policy response to the increased prevalence of disabil
ity among older workers is to make it relatively easier for older work
ers to be awarded SSDI. To the extent that workers are required to
work longer to receive retirement benefits, additional options may be
considered. These would include modifying (i.e., easing) the sequen
tial evaluation system for older workers, allowing a partial disability
benefit for older workers, or lowering the Medicare eligibility age to
reduce health costs for workers forced to retire on reduced benefits.
These are all expensive propositions, but nonetheless, the impact on
older workers in fragile health must be considered as we examine pol
icy options to improve the solvency of the system.

Notes
Mark V. Nadel is Associate Commissioner, Office of Disability and Income Assistance
Policy, Social Security Administration. This paper was written with the assistance of
Stephane Philogene. Howard Bradley also provided useful help. I appreciate com
ments from Jane Ross, Eli Donkar, Kalman Rupp, and Michael Marge. The views
expressed in this paper are entirely my own and do not necessarily represent the posi
tion of the Social Security Administration.
1. The National Study of Health and Activity will do medical examinations and
functional assessments and collect other data from a sample of 5,500 working-age
individuals, most of whom will have been previously screened to get a sample of
individuals with some degree of impairment. SS A disability examiners will deter
mine whether individuals not now on the roles would qualify for benefits on the
basis of impairment.
2. The disability and survivors insurance features of Social Secunty are particularly
important to blacks. While a smaller proportion of all black beneficiaries receive
retirement benefits than do whites, a larger proportion of black beneficiaries
receive DI benefits than do whites (25 percent for blacks compared to 12 percent
for whites). See Hendley and Bihmoria (1999).
3. To be insured for DI, workers under age 65 must 1) be fully insured and 2) have
recent covered earnings, as follows. Workers age 31 and over must have covered
earnings in at least 20 of their last 40 quarters ending with the quarter in which the
worker became disabled. Workers who become disabled before age 31 may meet
an alternative to the 20/40 test: younger workers must have quarters of coverage
equal to at least half of the quarters in the period between the quarter of attain-

Session 1: Charting the Landscape

159

ment of age 21 and the quarter of onset of disability. (Any odd number of quarters
in that period is rounded off by one.) Even the youngest workers, however, must
have a minimum of 6 quarters. Workers who meet statutory blindness require
ments need only be fully insured and need not meet the second requirements for
recent earnings.
4. SSI can also be paid, if the low income and asset test is met, to the aged (65+) and
to children with disabilities
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Social Insurance and
the Older Worker
An Overview
Robert Haveman
University of Wisconsin-Madison

INTRODUCTION: OLDER WORKERS AND
PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD THEM
Older workers those older than, say, 45 years, but younger than
the normal retirement age face a set of constraints on their activities
that increases economic insecurity and vulnerability. An increasing
proportion of these older workers experience eroding strength and
health, and many of them are perceived by both their employers and
their younger worker peers as "long in the tooth," or "over the hill."
Often these perceptions guide employer and public decisions, and
these lead to both higher rates of job loss among older workers, and
feelings of economic insecurity.
This set of circumstances is undeniable and is a normal accompa
niment of the aging process. However, it is these circumstances that
account for the relatively high incidence of reliance by older workers
on the nation's social insurance system. The preceding chapters have
taken apart the social insurance system for older workers and focused
on four policy areas of special concern to them: health and health
insurance, Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI), workers' com
pensation, and unemployment compensation (UI). Interestingly, none
of the conference presentations dealt with the Social Security Retire
ment or Medicare programs, which are, in fact, the two largest pro
grams affecting older workers.
There is one overarching national policy issue that is central to the
situation of older workers:
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How should social insurance policy respond to the needs of a
growing group of older workers who tend to be less strong and
healthy than their younger peers and who face eroding personal
capabilities and difficult decisions regarding phasing into retire
ment?

Should we be promoting a pro-work agenda for older U.S. citizens by,
for example, reducing the bite of pension plans that discourage contin
ued work or by changing the employer culture regarding older workers,
or by modifying public benefit programs and public regulations that
inhibit flexible work arrangements? Or should we be seeking to
improve the adequacy of income support arrangements for these work
ers as they phase into retirement given existing institutions and incen
tives?

SOME BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF OLDER WORKERS

Before discussing this public policy issue, it is important to recog
nize several basic attributes of the older worker population. First, older
workers (those aged 45 to 65) are one-third of the workforce, one-fifth
of the unemployed, and one-third of the insured unemployed. Hence,
relative to younger workers, they shoulder a smaller burden of unem
ployment and reap a larger share of UI benefits. 1
Second, on average and relative to the remainder of the workforce,
older workers have less education, fewer skills, and less flexibility in
changing responsibilities and accepting new challenges. There are
fewer minorities among them. They earn higher wages than the
remainder of the workforce, even though a larger proportion of them
are in poor health. These higher wages, of course, are related to their
longer job tenure.
Third, the males in the group of 45- to 65-year-olds have shown a
rapid increase in the willingness to stop regular employment and
accept retirement.2 On the other hand, women in this age group appear
to have an increasing propensity to engage in formal work.
Fourth, today's cohort of older workers will live longer than prior
cohorts of older workers. As a result, today's cohort has more years of
expected retirement ahead of them than did prior older worker cohorts.3
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Americans now measure retirement in decades rather than years. As a
result, this cohort is under more social pressure to remain active in the
labor market than prior cohorts. Perhaps as a result of this increasing
social pressure, today's older workers confront a general public that
believes that access to support from both private and public programs
should be more difficult and that the support provided should be less
generous than it in fact is.
A final characteristic of today's older workers is that they can be
roughly allocated to two groups, with quite different policy implica
tions.4 The first and largest group is generally healthy, educated, work
ing, and tends to be white. For them, the primary issue is the difficult
set of decisions regarding the phasing into retirement and the lifestyle
to be adopted in retirement. For a sizable (and growing) proportion of
these older workers, increasing years of work will be desirable.
The second group of older workers consists of those with health
problems5 or with few years of schooling; minorities are prevalent in
this group. These workers tend to be marginal to the labor market, and
for them, the issue is the adequacy of support programs and access to
economic and health care resources. Except for the small proportion of
totally disabled workers among this population, SSDI is likely to be
unavailable to them. Moreover, early retirement benefits have eroded,
and unemployment compensation provides only temporary help if per
manent loss of a regular full time job occurs. For many of these moremarginal older workers, policy changes enacted over the past few
decades have caused economic hardship. This situation is not likely to
improve for subsequent cohorts of older workers.

OLDER WORKERS AND ECONOMIC SELF-SUFFICIENCY
The case for social insurance rests on the inability of the private
market to adequately protect individuals (and hence society) against
risk and uncertainty and on the need to assure an acceptable minimum
living standard for all citizens. Hence, designing social insurance pro
grams to meet the needs of older workers requires that the economic
status and vulnerability of older workers be understood. Consider the
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following generalizations regarding the economic well-being of the
population of older workers.
A primary problem for the group of regular workers who are
employees stems from the higher costs faced by employers in provid
ing them health insurance coverage and retirement pensions.6 As a
result, when pressures to reduce costs due to competition or declining
demand are encountered, employers are less likely to retain older
workers than young workers with the same sets of skills and competen
cies. Hence, job displacement for older workers is substantially more
likely than it is for equivalent young workers.7 Moreover, older work
ers are less likely to be reemployed full-time if they are displaced.8 It
follows that such displaced older workers who draw UI benefits are
more likely to exhaust their benefits than are younger workers.9
Relative to younger workers, the population of older workers is
more likely to be self-employed; 10 percent of older workers are selfemployed compared with but 4 percent of younger workers. Relying
on the prospects of an individual enterprise for income is risky, as the
failure rate for single proprietorships is substantially higher than for
larger enterprises (notwithstanding the relatively high prevalence of
legal and medical professionals in the population of self-employed
workers).
If they are working and are not self-employed, older workers are
more likely to be employed part-time than are younger workers. As a
result, they are less likely to be eligible for unemployment insurance
benefits if they lose their jobs, as UI covers only full time, regular
employees. Many of these part-time workers will be engaging in
"bridge employment," which typically carries less compensation and
fewer benefits than regular employment. 10 Many of these bridge
worker-retirees have been displaced from their regular jobs and have
exhausted their unemployment insurance benefits.
If they are not working most likely a result of taking early retire
ment they will be dependent on income from a combination of pri
vate pensions and early-retirement Social Security benefits. While
about one-half of the group of older workers is covered by employersupported pensions, this proportion is shrinking over time. Moreover,
those who are covered with defined-benefit plans face eroding real ben
efits.
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However, on average, these older workers have higher wage rates
than younger workers, primarily because of longer job tenures. More
over, they typically have fewer family responsibilities than do younger
workers.
Further, these older workers are more likely to have employersponsored health insurance and less likely to be uninsured than are
equivalent younger workers, 11 although the percentage with employersponsored health insurance has been decreasing.
Finally, if they are severely disabled, older workers are more likely
to receive SSDI benefits than equivalent younger workers, and once on
the disability benefit roles they are less likely to leave.
Given this profile, overall and on average it is hard to make the
case that older workers as a group are a particularly vulnerable seg
ment of American society. While they appear to face substantially
higher risks of job loss, part-time work, and exclusion from some
social insurance benefits, the average older worker starts from a higher
earnings and income base than does the average younger worker and is
less likely to be without health insurance and private pension coverage.
To find real vulnerability, we need to dig deeper into this popula
tion. In fact, such digging will reveal that second group of particularly
vulnerable older workers emphasized by Kathy Swartz namely, those
with low education, few skills and minority status. Moreover, even
among this group, all marginal to the labor force, true vulnerability is
found by digging deeper still, to locate those with ill health, those with
ill spouses, and those who have experienced job loss or perhaps the
loss of a spouse. Although people with these characteristics tend to be
at the bottom of any larger population grouping with which one begins,
the policy implications are quite different for those at the bottom end of
the distribution of the older worker group because of their age.

SELF-SUFFICIENCY IMPLICATIONS OF
RECENT SOCIAL POLICY CHANGES
As economic and political changes have occurred over the past
decade or so, there have been a number of developments that have
affected the self-sufficiency of the group of older workers, and more
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particularly that of the most vulnerable among them. In the following
pages, I will flag some of these developments but will not document
the details of each.
Perhaps the most significant development for older workers has
been the substantial increase in cost consciousness that has affected
most firms, especially those enterprises confronting increasingly severe
international competition. Because of the higher costs of employing
older workers both higher wage costs as well as higher benefit
costs they have been the first to have experienced job loss and, for
many, unplanned early retirement. Those older workers who retained
their jobs have experienced the stress that accompanies decreased job
security.
This same concern for employment costs has led to an erosion of
employer-sponsored health insurance coverage among older workers.
For those remaining covered, the private sector plans have tended to
shift from defined-benefit to defined-contribution plans. Although this
shift has increased work incentives among those covered, it has also
reduced the adequacy of expected pension benefits. For many older
workers, this trend has increased the perceived need to postpone retire
ment and to continue to work.
In addition to these changes, the brunt of which have tended to fall
on the most vulnerable group of older workers, there has also been a
downward trend in real wage rates for unskilled labor since the early
1970s. In relative terms, the wage rate gap between skilled and
unskilled workers has increased during this period, resulting in
increased inequality and a perception by older unskilled workers that
they have been left behind in the process of economic growth. 12 This
focus on gaps, however, masks the absolute deterioration of earnings
for those workers with few skills or low education; since the early
1970s, the real hourly wage rate for a man with a high school degree
(but no more education) has fallen by about 35 percent.
However, and to some extent offsetting these changes, there has
been a substantial decrease over time in the physical demands associ
ated with work; remaining employed today typically requires more
mental and less physical effort than it did a few decades ago. Indeed, a
survey taken in 1950 inquired as to whether workers were in "physi
cally demanding" jobs, and about 20 percent of this older-worker
group answered "yes." 13 Today, only about 7 percent of older workers
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answer this question affirmatively. When this shift is combined with
increasing average education levels of older workers, it enables some
of them to remain in the workforce longer, and with less effort, than
was the case a few decades ago.
Simultaneous with these demand-side changes in employment and
wages and the decrease in the physical demands of work have been
changes in social policy that have affected older workers. Perhaps the
most visible change has been the legislated increase in the Social Secu
rity full-benefit retirement age and the increase in the penalty for taking
early retirement. 14 These changes embody the social decision that
working lives should be extended and retirement pushed further up the
age distribution. 15
There have also been a large series of rule changes in workers'
compensation that have reduced access and compensation if disabled.
The background paper on workers' compensation by John Burton and
Emily Spieler emphasizes that, while few were watching, legislation
and judicial rulings since 1989 have substantially restricted the accessi
bility and generosity of workers' compensation benefits. Eligibility
has been tightened. Benefits have been lowered. Payment mechanisms
have been made more restrictive and health costs more tightly con
trolled. 16 As a result of these changes, health-related costs have been
increasingly shifted to recipients and their families or to other pro
grams such as SSDI and away from employers. An increased burden
of proof has been imposed on covered workers. All of these changes
have tended to fall most heavily on older workers. 17
Finally, there is the more recent development that colors all discus
sions of the economic self-sufficiency of all worker groups, namely,
eight years of sustained prosperity. Clearly the prosperity of this
period has benefited nearly all groups, in part through its promotion of
both the demand for and supply of labor. 18 Moreover, this development
has resulted in a run up in asset values for some, but not all. While
both of these developments have made the future less uncertain for
some older workers, there has been a disturbing increase in disparities
in both wealth holdings and earnings over time. Moreover, while the
prosperity has opened up additional options for phased retirement for
some older workers, it has imposed increased work demands and pres
sures on those who continue to work full time.
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POLICY ISSUES REGARDING OLDER WORKERS
The economic and policy developments mentioned in the previous
section raise several important issues that the nation should address in
terms of its treatment of older workers. The chapters of this book all
fasten on the following overarching policy issue:
Should the nation's major social insurance programs be
restructured to provide a more adequate safety net, or
should they be redesigned to increase work incentives for
older workers? Or, should policy changes seek to accom
plish both objectives?
Nestled in this issue are a number of important subquestions: 19
Should public regulations inhibiting flexible work arrangements
be redesigned so as to increase the availability of this option?
In the face of apparent reluctance by employers to provide train
ing for older workers,20 should training opportunities for retooling
or moving to bridge jobs be supported by public money?
In the face of large disincentives for continued work beyond some
early eligibility retirement age in numerous private pension
arrangements,21 and the apparent reluctance of employers to
change plans that contain these disincentives, should public regu
lations designed to encourage the restructuring of private pension
arrangements so as to increase incentives for continued work be
implemented?
Finally, should access to income support and benefits while work
ing less than full time or not working at all be expanded?
At any time, including the present, there are numerous policy pro
posals on the nation's table that address these questions. While some
of these proposals seek to increase the adequacy of programs targeted
on older workers, others stress work-continuation goals. The following
menu is designed to set the stage for the subsequent discussions of
numerous policy suggestions that were presented at the conference and
are contained in this volume.
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Social Security Retirement
In addition to the now-resolved issue regarding the elimination or
reduction of the earnings test, there have also been proposals to
increase the normal retirement age still further, and perhaps to increase
the early retirement age along with it. Like the elimination of the earn
ings test, both of these measures would promote work continuation.
Consistent with this thrust, there has been little discussion of increased
adequacy in benefit payments.
Medicare
Should we allow workers to buy into Medicare at age 62 a recent
proposal from the administration or should we restrict Medicare cov
erage to receipt of full retirement benefits given an increasing retire
ment age? The first of these options aids vulnerable older workers, but
it clearly contains troublesome problems of adverse selection. The sec
ond option promotes continued work, but it simultaneously imposes
costs on vulnerable older workers.
On another front, should we return the employer-as-first-payer pro
vision in Medicare to its 1982 standard, a standard that reduced health
insurance costs for employers, and hence, is a pro-work policy? Or do
the costs in reduced health care coverage and adequacy override the
pro-work gains?
Social Security Disability Insurance
For SSDI, should we adopt some subset of the several proposed
reforms designed to promote work? These proposals include a supple
mental EITC for SSDI recipients, allowing Medicare access to older
workers who leave SSDI (with perhaps an earnings-conditioned pre
mium), and the provision of vouchers for training for existing SSDI
recipients? Again, all of these are pro-work. We could also consider
changes in the benefit structure that would increase the adequacy of
income support to the most vulnerable older workers.
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Unemployment Compensation
Currently, self-employed and part-time workers are excluded from
the UI program, and that imposes a relative hardship on them; should
these workers be integrated into the unemployment insurance system?
For example, should we reduce the required hours of work in the base
period for initial eligibility? Such a change would encourage flexible
and partial retirement and facilitate the move from full work to retire
ment.
As an alternative, should we support tax-preferred savings
accounts for older workers as a means to encourage a flexible move
from full work to retirement? Should UI be used to support health
insurance premiums, an adequacy concern? Still further, should the
work option in UI be expanded to include more choice such as bridge
jobs?22
In terms of adequacy, should the minimum benefit award be
expanded? This award is targeted on older workers and, in particular,
vulnerable older workers. Should we increase the benefit duration for
the group of older workers? Or, should a self-employment assistance
program with the UI system be expanded (a change that would also be
pro-work)?
Workers' Compensation
One hardly knows what to say about workers' compensation, given
its diversity among the 50 states. Should there be some attempt to sys
tematize workers' compensation coverage, eligibility, and benefits?
Should there be efforts to reverse the reduced access and generosity of
workers' compensation that has occurred since the late 1980s?

CONCLUSION
These, then, form the major policy suggestions that one finds in
this book and that were talked about by participants in the NASI con
ference. We hope that the information regarding the composition and
self-sufficiency of older workers, how they are and have been treated
by our institutions and policies, and how they could be treated by pol-
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icy changes, sets the stage for the more in-depth analysis in subsequent
chapters of this volume.

Notes
1. See O'Leary and Wandner (2001)
2. There is evidence that this trend has slowed, or disappeared, in recent years. See
Quinn (1999).
3. In 1965, an older worker who reached age 65 could expect 13 years of retirement.
Today, such a worker can expect 18 years. See Gendell (1998).
4. This point was emphasized by Katherine Swartz in her discussion of health and
health insurance for older workers (Swartz 2001)
5. Although about 25 percent of those aged 55 to 64 have some work limitation, the
prevalence of ill health appears to be decreasing over time While health prob
lems are more prevalent among older workers than in the remainder of the work
force, conditional on having a problem, it is more likely to be age-related and less
traumatic. Their health problems tend to be from exposure to adverse environ
ments over time, stem from multiple causes, have long latency periods, and not be
directly job-related. Because these health problems tend not to be directly jobrelated, establishing eligibility for work-related support such as workers' compen
sation is often difficult. Because these health problems are unlikely to be totally
disabling, establishing eligibility for SSDI is also more difficult See Nadel
(2001) and Burton and Spieler (2001).
6. One study suggests that health insurance costs are twice as high for males over 50
than for male workers aged less than 50 (Clark 1994).
7. The displacement rate for older workers is about 3.5 percent, relative to a 2.5 per
cent rate for younger workers (O'Leary and Wandner 2001).
8. Indeed, the reemployment rate for displaced older workers displaced is about 50
percent, compared with a 70 percent reemployment rate for younger workers
(O'Leary and Wandner 2001).
9. Sixty percent of displaced older workers exhaust their benefits compared with 40
percent for younger workers (O'Leary and Wandner 2000).
10. One survey found that 49 percent of men and 34 percent of women over 55 were
"bridge, partial retirement" workers (Quinn 1999).
11. About 80 percent of older workers aged 55 to 65 are covered by employer spon
sored health insurance; only about 15 percent of this group is uninsured. See
Swartz (2001) and Committee for Economic Development (1999).
12. The earnings premium received by a college graduate, relative to a worker with a
high school degree or less, increased from about 30 percent in the 1970s to over
60 percent by the early 1990s.
13. From C. Eugene Steurele, Rich Johnson, and Chris Spiro, The Urban Institute,
1998; cited in Committee for Economic Development (1999).
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14. The legislative change in early retirement benefits increased the penalty for early
retirement from 20 percent of the primary insurance amount to 30 percent. See
Committee for Economic Development (1999).
15. In fact, these changes have also improved the neutrality of the Social Security sys
tem. An interesting question with respect to these legislated changes is whether
they will lead to increased prevalence of disability claims among future older
workers and an increase in SSDI applications.
16. An example of this trend is the adoption by workers' compensation plans in sev
eral states of the requirement that employer's physicians make the final determi
nation regarding the work-related nature of injuries and illnesses and hence
coverage by workers' compensation plans.
17. It should be noted that the incentives designed to increase the employment of
workers with disabilities implicit in the Americans with Disabilities Act tend to be
offset by the pattern of reduced coverage of these workers by both the UI and the
workers' compensation programs.
18. A recent study concluded that, if the unemployment rate were 4 percent, about 18
percent of older workers who lose their jobs would retire; however, if the unem
ployment rate were 8 percent, retirement would be chosen by about 44 percent of
older worker job losers. See Sandell and Baldwin (1990).
19. At the time of the Academy Conference, one of these sub-questions was, Should
the earnings test in Social Security be relaxed or eliminated so as to promote con
tinued work by retirement benefit recipients? Congress and the President have
now acted positively on this issue, and this anti-work continuation measure has
become a relic of the past.
20. In a recent survey of employers, 19 percent of younger workers report having
been given training; 13 percent of older workers so report (Armrault 1992).
21. In some pnvate pension plans now, there is an implicit tax of up to 50 percent on
continued work beyond some early eligibility retirement date. One study of about
1000 private pension plans found that working beyond the early retirement eligi
bility date typically implied sizable reductions in lifetime benefits, ranging up to
30 percent (Kotlikoff and Wise 1989).
22. One possibility would be to ease the policy of denying benefits if full-time work is
available but not taken for older workers. This denial of benefits policy imposes a
relative hardship on older workers.
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Commentary
Walter B.Maher
DaimlerChrysler Corporation

Well, good morning, and congratulations on making it here. I'm
Wally Maher. I'm with DaimlerChrysler Corporation and I want to
first really congratulate the Academy on the initiative it's taken to
tackle this problem. It's a very real problem. I've been asked to com
ment on the various background papers from the perspective of an
employer. As the background papers and the summary that you just
heard reflect, for many employers, including my company, there is con
siderable linkage between the public and private plans covering health
care, pension, and disability benefits. And for this reason, a major ben
efit of the Academy effort will be to help assure that these linkages are
understood by policymakers, lest anyone believe that you can cut back
on one without impacting the other.
As I begin this morning, I'm sure that and if it isn't, it should be
clear to all of you that my company and my industry is not your typi
cal U.S. employer relative to the types of benefit plans that we offer.
First, the great majority of our employees are represented by a union,
the UAW, and notwithstanding the fine and substantial efforts of the
organizing staffs of the AFL-CIO member unions, this is not true of
most U.S. employers. Second and not totally divorced from the
first is the fact that we provide comprehensive benefits for our
employees and retirees that relate to the subject of this conference:
health care, pension, disability, and life insurance.
Third, my company and our industry and this may come as a sur
prise to some of you is in the relatively early stage of a massive num
ber of retirements and related hiring, based largely on the fact that we
had a large hiring binge in the mid to late 1960s. So we at my com
pany, and I'm fairly sure that this is true of GM and Ford, are actually
witnessing the start of a reduction in the average age of our workforce,
and I'm sure that this phenomenon is being experienced by some of the
larger auto supply firms with similar benefit structures. Finally, it is
very clear that there are many companies with an aging workforce that
do not provide the health and disability benefits that we do, and it is
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here where the risks that the Academy is studying can be most pro
found.
The reason I wanted to point these facts out is that I believe they
tend to validate the data that was portrayed particularly in the paper by
Katherine Swartz, which shows that there is progressively less insur
ance coverage among the various baby-boomer cohorts that are moving
through the system and approaching retirement age. I believe that this
could reflect both the then-current trend towards less unionization of
workplaces and the shift in U.S. employment away from traditional
manufacturing jobs.
Now, despite what I said about the fact that we have at my com
pany an average age that is starting to decline, we still have many older
employees, and I do want to discuss the major challenges that we face
to assure that these workers continue to have productive jobs and that
we're able to reduce the cost associated with having disabled workers.
I also wish to discuss the fact that while the benefit programs we have
in place are not representative of the employer population generally,
there are indeed many employers with similar plans, and these
employee protections could well be jeopardized by ill-conceived public
policies.
Let me first discuss the major challenges that my company is con
fronting as we face the reality of an older workforce. First, it has
become very clear that there is a priority in designing jobs in a way to
reduce the risk of injury. It has been established in our industry that
standardized work practices are critical to injury prevention. Second is
training: you can have all the standardized work practices in the world,
but unless workers are adequately trained to perform the job as
designed, you're not going to avoid the risk of injury. Third, we have
to have adequate supervision. Finally, in addition to these core require
ments, we've also found that it's been quite helpful to have available
for employees wellness programs and other information so that they
understand the value of healthy lifestyles.
Now, if all that fails, another challenge is to have the resources at
hand to retrain workers to be able to perform jobs that are compatible
with their physical limitations. And since I brought up the subject of
retraining, I should point out that this is an issue which I personally
believe as a country we would be well served to focus more attention
on, specifically the need to have adequate programs in place to assist
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workers who are unable to perform the jobs that they currently have
and who have lost their jobs as a result. Now this could be the result of
disability or it could also be the result of the continued globalization of
the economy. In either case, just as my company has an interest in hav
ing all of our employees working productively, the country has a simi
lar interest in having every American living as productive a life as
possible. The private sector has lots of experience in, and understands
the value of, retraining, and we would hope that more and more of that
filters into the public sector, because retraining truly can open new
horizons for workers.
Now what about some of the other concerns that I mentioned?
First as I mentioned earlier and as you just heard in the summary and
in the background papers there are many employers that don't pro
vide the level of benefits that we do, and my concern is that despite the
continued and sustained level of prosperity that we've enjoyed here in
the United States, there are many employers that still do not provide
even a basic level of health benefits for their employees, not to mention
short- and long-term disability benefits or a pension plan with a PTD
component.
What are some of the reasons for this? First, of course, they're not
required to by law. Second, they may not be able to afford it. And
third, they may not have to in order to attract employees. And this is
particularly true for lower-paid and lower-skilled jobs, and I frankly
don't see this changing. One reason it's unlikely to change is the everincreasing cost of health benefits. In this regard, it's been pretty evi
dent that health benefits are particularly cost-sensitive, and that's why
most employees today find themselves in some form of managed-care
plan and why many employers offer only HMOs because that's all
they can afford.
So a concern I have is what do you think will happen if, as a result
of increased regulations, health premiums rise even faster? Or, more
daunting, if the eligibility age for Medicare is increased to 67 or 70? In
my judgment, you can bet that fewer employers will offer health bene
fits. If the Medicare eligibility age is increased, the cost of health ben
efits for workers who elect to continue working until 67 or 70 will rise
sharply, and the incidence of employer-provided retiree health benefits
will continue to plummet. The same will be true for lesser provided
benefits like disability plans.
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I continue to wince every time I hear the proposal to increase the
Medicare eligibility age to 67 described as one merely intended to
bring Medicare eligibility in sync with Social Security. I mean, while
numerically this is correct, there is one fundamental, compelling differ
ence which argues against using this analogy. It's the fact that today,
given the existing, steadily increasing eligibility age for full Social
Security benefits, if any American chooses to remain in the workforce
beyond age 65, so as not to experience a reduction in Social Security
benefits, that American is assured at the very least of getting cash
wages from an employer equal to the minimum wage, and in most
cases substantially more. However, that same employee has zero
assurance of getting any health benefits from the employer. And in lieu
of that, if they tread out into the private insurance market to buy a pol
icy for the employee and a spouse at age 65 or 66, you can imagine the
portion of the person's take home pay that that premium would repre
sent. So that's the reason that I tend to wince about that when I hear
that analogy used.
Now clearly, is the Medicare program a perfect program? No. Is it
in need of reform? Yes. Does it have to more resemble the type of
plans that employees have available today, including structures to help
retard cost increases? Yes. Do benefits have to be modernized? Yes.
But as we embrace and try to craft those reform strategies, we have to
endeavor not to adopt reforms that will exacerbate the problems of the
uninsured.
I would be remiss if I didn't point out that the biggest challenge we
confront is to assure that any actions we take to address the problems
of an aging society are consistent with maintaining a strong economy.
As the background papers made clear, as the U.S. unemployment rate
increases, the incidence of disability increases geometrically. Further,
having a strong economy and the resulting surpluses could eliminate at
least one of the barriers for improving many social programs designed
to assist the elderly, the ill and disabled. So there's a compelling rea
son to keep U.S. employers competitive in the global economy and to
keep good paying jobs here in the United States, both of which are
essential ingredients for a strong economy.
I bring this up because it should be recognized that if we, in an
effort to moderate the cost of public safety-net programs, shift costs to
employers or otherwise pass laws which have the same effect and
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unreasonably increase labor costs, there will be two inevitable results,
neither of which is good for workers or the economy. While employers
like us and those in our industry are unlikely to cancel our benefit
plans, there could be some impact on overall compensation plans; or
worse, if we become less competitive, employment opportunities could
stall. Again, neither of those is good news. Worse, however, is that
many employers could just drop or substantially diminish their benefit
plans, and new employers would be less likely to implement them in
the first place. Again, neither is good news for workers.
As the cost of health and disability benefits continues to increase,
in part due to an older workforce, it's important to recognize that
employers do need some flexibility to manage their health and disabil
ity benefit programs, including the cost of workers' compensation, to
keep them more affordable. We can't forget the fact that, under the
current laws of this country, the provision of benefit programs, includ
ing health and disability benefits, is voluntary, and if employers drop
their coverage, the cost shifting that results from a diminishing number
of employers providing benefits will continue to grow.
In conclusion, I believe it is possible for employers to maintain
programs which are sensitive to the needs of an older workforce and to
act reasonably to keep the costs of these programs in line. I also
believe that as a nation we are prosperous enough to have safety-net
programs to meet the needs of an aging society. I hope that we are able
to pursue both paths in a way that continues to provide a strong econ
omy and good job opportunities here in the United States.
Thank you.

Commentary
David A. Smith
AFL-CIO

Good morning. As I was walking in this morning I was reminded
that the time must have been 1978 or 1979, and I was due at a meet
ing here. I was teaching at the University of Massachusetts at that
point, got on a plane in a blizzard in Boston, and the plane landed at
National just like it was supposed to. I got on the subway and got to
my meeting. Seven or eight people were supposed to be there, all of
whom lived in the District, none of whom made it. You're to be con
gratulated for your perseverance this morning.
Let me begin by echoing something that Wally said. The Academy
is to be not only congratulated, but encouraged to do more. All four
papers deal with pressing issues. They deal with them intelligently.
They pose a compelling agenda and raise questions in an enormously
thoughtful way. Bob's summary and discussion of cross-cutting issues
highlighted that. He also made my job of trying to respond either more
difficult or easier, depending on which way you think about it.
Let me make five points; none of them will come as a surprise
because of the extraordinary good work that went into the preparation
for this panel. First, Bob noted, and I think we need to underscore, the
enormous asymmetry in both circumstance and access to benefits
among older workers, whether it's the asymmetry in health status, the
asymmetry that results from different employment relationships which
in turn create an asymmetry with access to the public side of the pro
gram, and most importantly (as I'll come back to and as Wally men
tioned), asymmetry in access to employer-provided benefits,
particularly for workers who've left their permanent attachment to the
workforce.
The difference between a unionized DaimlerChrysler employee
and her access to an employer-provided benefit system in the early
years of her retirement or the late years of her working life and the
access that most workers (sadly, a growing proportion of workers) have
to those supports is enormous. There is a clear racial dimension to this
asymmetry, and increasingly, I think we'll find that there's a gender
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dimension to it as well; and, of course, it is attenuated by differences in
health status. We have to pay an enormous amount of attention to that,
and Bob framed and I think purposefully Bob framed a question in
an either/or fashion. He framed it as, should we be encouraging work,
or should we be improving the adequacy of the public safety net and
social insurance systems or should we be doing both?
I think the asymmetry argument (among others, but powerfully)
leads you (or me, at least) to the answer that I suspect Bob wanted us
all to come to: obviously, both. There are good reasons; first, but not
only, labor market reasons. The fulfillment of older workers' hopes for
the shape of their own lives and the increase in longevity argue that we
ought to be trying to encourage work and we ought to remove perversi
ties from both the public and private benefit systems that discourage
work or inappropriately tax it. But we don't all come to that moment
in our lives similarly situated. Many of us come to that moment more
dependent on the safety net and the social insurance system. We find it
badly structured and in many cases quantitatively insufficient, and we
need to be strengthening it as well. So there is not a simple answer to
the work-or-safety-net question, and we won't do ourselves a service
by trying to answer Bob's question in any way except "both."
Let me make a third point, which builds on something that Wally
said and try to put a sharper point on it. The employer-based, collec
tively bargained system, as you all know, is eroding. And Wally made
a point which I think sort of helps us understand this in a deeper way.
It's eroding even more dramatically than aggregate data show, and
more than we often think because the workers covered by it are older.
They are older than the average worker. Just as Chrysler faces a shift
down the demographic ladder, as a huge cohort of older workers retire,
we took a look at union retirements anticipated retirements of all
organized workers in the first decade of this century and it's a 45
degree line going up the graph. We are going to find an enormous
increase in the retirement of represented workers in the next decade,
and that means we are also going to see an enormous decrease in the
number of workers who are represented in places where employer-pro
vided benefits are the norm. While some firms, like Chrysler, will be
replacing those workers, the covered share, all else being equal, will
continue to decrease, and decrease very dramatically through about
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2018, when we'll begin to see the same phenomenon among our mem
bers of a substantial increase in younger workers.
That ought to make us enormously careful, for exactly the reasons
that Wally mentioned about tinkering with the existing apparatus in
ways that make it more difficult to access. The number and share of
rehires who are going to need it will increase; the number of people
who are going to come into their early retirement years or their late
work years without the protections that have allowed some to suggest
increasing the retirement age will also increase; and we, therefore,
must be enormously cautious, particularly about Medicare eligibility.
Let me make a fourth point that I've talked about a little bit, and
Bob mentioned it particularly in terms of older workers. Do we need
to modify the public side of the safety net to take account of changing
employment relationships? The answer is obviously yes, but I caution
against thinking that that's a problem which we can isolate to older
workers. The number of people entering the labor force in some sort of
nonstandard arrangement contract work, temporary work, serial
employment is increasing (sharply in some sectors of the economy).
And, the number of part-time workers is already large; it isn't increas
ing, but is already a big chunk of the labor force. None of our systems
of social insurance adequately reflect the changing nature of our
employment relationships. It may be a particularly acute problem in
the short run for older workers, but it is a problem that isn't limited to
that part of the population. I underscore that for reasons that you all
know well both employer preference and to a large extent the conse
quences of the maturation of the entry of women into the labor force
these nonstandard arrangements are unlikely to go away. Even with
the relatively strong enormously strong, in fact employment growth
over the last three years, the rate of increase in nonstandard attachment
has continued to accelerate. We should expect that to continue.
Let me just make one last comment provoked by something that
Wally said, which is the issue of training. We do a terrible job.
Chrysler, AT&T, a handful of other corporations do a decent job, but as
a society we do an enormously inadequate job of providing training for
people during their working lives. We don't spend enough money. We
spend about 1 percent of payroll. We skew it up the income ladder. We
devote 7 or 8 times as many training dollars (private training dollars) to
managers as we do to front-line workers, and we provide almost no
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training at the bottom of the labor market where folks are most mobile.
This is a problem that will haunt us for the productivity reasons that
Wally mentioned, but also for the demographic reasons that we have
both talked about. We are going to be replacing a significant share of
the American workforce over the next decade, and we will have sys
tematically underinvested in those replacements.
Thank you very much.
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The Effects of Job Loss
on Older Workers
Employment, Earnings, and Wealth
Sewin Chan
Rutgers University
Ann Huff Stevens
Yale University

The impact of job loss on an older worker's economic well-being is
likely to be substantial, with the displacement affecting both subse
quent employment patterns and financial resources available before
and after retirement. This paper uses data from the Health and Retire
ment Study (HRS) to examine employment, earnings, and wealth
changes that follow involuntary job loss among workers aged 50 and
over.
We find that job loss leads to very long spells of non-employment,
with large differences in the employment rates of displaced and nondisplaced workers lasting for more than five years. In addition, the earn
ings of those who do return to work are dramatically reduced over the
remaining years of the working life. Even six years after job loss, earn
ings are significantly below those of similar, nondisplaced individu
als. Although employment-based pensions are not typically lost with
displacement, account balances and expected annual pension benefits
may be somewhat diminished. Among displaced men, nonhousingrelated asset holdings also tend to fall after a job loss.
These results are particularly pertinent in light of the dispropor
tionate increase in job loss rates among older workers during the last
recession (Farber 1997). While job loss rates for all age groups have
subsequently declined, the aging of the workforce in the United States
makes it important to better document and understand the effects on
older workers.
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THE DATA

To examine job loss and its effects on earnings, assets, pensions,
and employment, we used publicly available data from the first three
waves of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), which were con
ducted in 1992, 1994, and 1996. We include all men and women aged
50 and over as of 1992 who remain in the survey at least through the
second wave.
We identified and followed job loss among older workers in the
HRS using the extensive information on earnings and employment col
lected at each wave, including information on job changes that took
place between the waves. We also used information collected at the
initial survey wave on up to two previous jobs. First, for those working
at the wave 1 survey date, we used information on their current earn
ings and employment characteristics; for those who are not working at
wave 1, we used information on their previous job, including when and
why it ended and their final earnings. Second, all individuals at wave 1
(employed or not) were asked to provide information on their most
recent previous job that lasted at least five years, thus giving us retro
spective data on relatively long-term jobs that ended prior to wave 1.
In subsequent waves of the HRS, employed individuals were asked
whether they hold the same job as in the previous wave; if not, the rea
son for leaving was ascertained. Non-employed individuals were also
asked about what happened to their last job. All of this employment
information enabled us to construct a continuous series of monthly
indicators, designating each individual as working or not in each month
from 1992 through the final survey date in 1996.
Based on these jobs that end before or during the course of the
three waves, we defined as our sample of "displaced" workers those
who respond that their job ended when either 1) the "business closed"
or 2) they were "laid off or let go." While the second part of this defini
tion may include some individuals fired for cause, we included them
for consistency with many recent definitions of displaced workers and
to include individuals who have been "downsized." 1 Thus, our sample
of job losses consists of reported displacements from long-term jobs
ending prior to wave 1, jobs held immediately prior to becoming non-
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employed at the wave 1 survey date, (up to two) jobs ending between
waves 1 and 2, and (up to two) jobs ending between waves 2 and 3.
For each of the jobs documented in the HRS, information was also
collected on pension eligibility, structure, and benefit amounts.
Employer-matched pension-provider data have been gathered as part of
the HRS and used recently by several researchers.2 We note however,
that we are relying on self-reported pension information from the three
surveys, because the matched pension file provides details for a single
point in time only (wave 1). Given that our interest is in how pensions
change with displacement, we had to use the self-reported longitudinal
data. While concerns have been raised regarding the accuracy and
completeness of self-reported pensions in the HRS (see Gustman and
Steinmeier 1999), it is the only available source of detailed longitudi
nal data on private pension wealth and eligibility rules among older
workers.
Additional information was collected from the HRS surveys
regarding health status and demographic information, as well as
income and assets. Summary statistics for men and women by their
displacement status are shown in Appendix Table 1.

EMPLOYMENT

We analyzed the probability and timing of returning to work, as
well as the durability of postdisplacement employment, by estimating
hazard models both for entering and exiting employment. The esti
mated transition rates are then used to describe the employment pat
terns of displaced workers following an involuntary job loss.3 The full
details of this estimation strategy and the results are discussed in Chan
and Stevens (forthcoming).
First, we estimated the probability that a non-employed individual
returns to work in a given month, controlling for individual characteris
tics, whether the worker is non-employed due to a recent job displace
ment, and the length of the current spell of non-employment. This
provided us with an estimate of how many displaced workers return to
employment and how quickly they do so.4
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Second, we examined the persistence of postdisplacement employ
ment for older workers who return to work by estimating the probabil
ity of leaving employment, again, controlling for demographic
characteristics and whether the individual has experienced a job loss in
the recent past.5 This allowed us to consider whether displaced indi
viduals are more or less likely to leave employment than are compara
ble individuals who have not been displaced. If postdisplacement jobs
offer lower wages or other less desirable job characteristics or repre
sent poor matches between workers and firms, we would expect
recently displaced workers to leave employment at a higher rate.
To understand the total impact of displacement on employment
among older workers, we calculated the employment rates implied by
the estimated coefficients of the transition probability models. In each
month, the coefficients from the entry-to-work model along with an
individual's characteristics tell us the probability that a non-employed
individual returns to work. Once a displaced individual does return to
work, the coefficients from the model for exiting employment tell us
the probability of leaving the workforce. Using the estimated transi
tion probabilities in this way, we produced a series of monthly employ
ment patterns over several years for workers who are displaced at a
given age and for comparable workers who are employed and not dis
placed at that age.
Results from the probit estimation of transition probabilities from
non-employment to employment and from employment to nonemployment are shown in Table 1. Although our main focus will be on
the employment rates implied by these transition probabilities, we
briefly summarize the key results from the hazard models. The rates at
which older workers return to work implied by these coefficients are
fairly low, ranging up to 8 percent per month. For non-employed men
and women in their fifties, the variables for a prior job loss are positive
and statistically significant, indicating that displaced workers in their
fifties return to the workforce more quickly than similar workers who
are not employed for reasons other than displacement. This is not
surprising, since many of the nondisplaced have retired voluntarily.
For workers in their sixties, however, displaced and nondisplaced
individuals return to work at similar rates. For example, a married,
recently displaced man aged 55, with a high school education and in
excellent health, has roughly a 5 percent probability of returning to the

Table 1 Entry to Work and Exit from Work Probabilities1
-___IDependent variable
^~~~~~~
-~-^_
Characteristic
Intercept
Age: 55
56 to 60
61
62
63
64
65
66+
1993
1994
1995
1996
Married
Disability
Physical health
White
High school graduate
Some college

Entry to work
Men
-1.553 (0.108)b
-0.019 (0.077)
-0.060 (0.048)
-0.209 (0.080)
-0.262 (0086)
-0289 (0.092)
-0.305 (0.111)
-0.145 (0.104)
-0.300 (0.076)
-0.036 (0.074)
0.107 (0.072)
-0.388 (0.082)
-0.397 (0091)
0.019 (0.045)
-0.167 (0.048)
-0.089 (0.018)
0.001 (0.044)
0.035 (0.046)
0.175 (0.051)

Women
-1.600 (0.093)
0.040 (0.059)
-0.053 (0.038)
-0.272 (0.068)
-0.333 (0.081)
-0.171 (0.085)
-0.233 (0.130)
-0.624 (0.311)
-0.181 (0.149)
-0.021 (0.062)
0.072 (0.061)
-0.386 (0.071)
-0.406 (0.083)
-0.145 (0037)
-0.179 (0.044)
-0.070 (0.016)
0014 (0.041)
0.016 (0.041)
. 0.042 (0.048)

Exit from work
Men
-2.503 (0.055)
0.069 (0.041)
0.046 (0.026)
0.142 (0.043)
0.460 (0.041)
0.417 (0.047)
0.234 (0.063)
0.469 (0.060)
0.299 (0.044)
-0.070 (0039)
-0.031 (0.039)
-0.263 (0.043)
-0.132 (0.045)
-0.123 (0.025)
0.139 (0.028)
0.054 (0010)
-0.005 (0.025)
0.030 (0.025)
0.023 (0028)

Women
-2.442 (0.061)
0.058 (0.038)
-0.002 (0.027)
0.121 (0.042)
0.387 (0043)
0.328 (0.055)
0.338 (0.076)
0.682 (0.092)
0.205 (0 126)
-0.013 (0.041)
0.027 (0041)
-0.140 (0.044)
0.008 (0.046)
0.014 (0.024)
0.165 (0032)
0.048 (0.012)
-0.004 (0.028)
-0.064 (0.030)
-0.071 (0.034)
(continued)

Table 1 (continued)
^~~~~~~~-----^___^ Dependent variable
Characteristic ^^"~~~~-------____^^

Entry to work

Men
Women
College graduate
0.047 (0.052)
-0.009 (0.056)
Months not working
-0.032 (0.004)
-0.013 (0.002)
(Months not working)2
3.72E-04 (6.72E-05) 7.25E-05 (1.33E-05)
(Months not working)3
-1.60E-06 (3.72E-07) -1.52E-07 (3.76E-08)
(Months not working)4
1.80E-09 (4.82E-10) 105E-10 (3.30E-11)
Prior job loss
0.240 (0.068)
0.308 (0.060)
x age 62(+)
-0.510 (0.215)
-0.018 (0.106)
x Age 63
-0.124 (0.172)
x Age 64
-0.104 (0.189)
x Age 65(+)
-0.446 (0.245)
x Age 66 +
0.137 (0.121)
x Months not working
0.007 (0.006)
-0.009 (0.003)
x (Months not working)2
-1.56E-04 (8.24E-05) 7.26E-05 (3.25E-05)
x 12-23 months working
x 24-35 months working
x 36 47 months working
x 48-59 months working
x 60+ months working
a Coefficients from probit discrete hazard model.
b Standard errors in parentheses.

Exit from work
Men
-0.017 (0.028)

Women
-0.054 (0.037)

0.256
-0.224
-0.292
-0.034
-0.243
-0.113

(0.054)
(0.101)
(0.133)
(0.157)
(0.184)
(0.105)

0.143
-0.237
-0.417
-0.741
-0.190

(0060)
(0.134)
(0.199)
(0.339)
(0.274)

0.119
0.066
-0.149
-0.107
-0.309

(0.074)
(0.082)
(0.097)
(0.098)
(0.072)

-0.070
0.057
0.076
-0.298
-0.134

(0.088)
(0.093)
(0.102)
(0.150)
(0.089)
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workforce each month. A similar nondisplaced man has only about a 2
percent chance of returning to work each month. Differences between
displaced and nondisplaced women are similar in magnitude.
The probability of exiting employment also depends on a worker's
displacement experience. The coefficient for a prior job loss in the
model for leaving employment is positive and statistically significant,
indicating that individuals with a previous job loss are more likely to
leave employment than similar nondisplaced individuals. Thus, even
after returning to work, recently displaced individuals are less likely
than others to remain employed at each subsequent age.
Other individual characteristics have the expected effects on entry
into and exit from the workforce. Poor health and disabilities reduce
the probability of returning to work and increase the likelihood of leav
ing the workforce. There are no statistically significant effects of race
or education for men or women. Married women are much less likely
to go back to work, and married men are less likely to leave employ
ment.
To better summarize the employment patterns of displaced and
nondisplaced workers, charts A and B of Figure 1 show the probability
of employment over the next 10 years for two groups of workers: indi
viduals displaced at age 55 and individuals working and not displaced
at age 55. Charts C and D repeat the analysis for men and women dis
placed and working as of age 60. These take into account both the
rates at which workers return to work and the predicted rates at which
they subsequently leave the workforce.
Focusing first on the workers losing jobs at age 55, the fraction
working in each month initially rises quickly but flattens out after
approximately three years. One year after the job loss, 50 percent of
displaced men and 46 percent of displaced women are working, com
pared with 95 and 92 percent of men and women who were working as
of age 55. After two years, 61 and 55 percent of displaced men and
women are back at work, compared with 91 and 88 percent of the nondisplaced group. This employment gap is due both to the initial period
of unemployment and to postdisplacement employment instability
among those reemployed. For example, taking the entry rates alone
would imply that 74 percent of displaced men return to work by two
years after displacement. Once we consider subsequent exit behavior,
however, employment rates fall to 61 percent. These results also high-
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Figure 1 Fraction Employed by Displacement Status at Age 55 and 60
A: Men, age 55
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light the long-term nature of the impact of displacement on the
employment rates of older workers. It takes at least seven years after a
job loss for the employment rates of displaced and nondisplaced work
ers to converge to within 10 percentage points of each other. Only
when the nondisplaced workers begin to retire more rapidly, at age 62,
does the employment gap narrow substantially.
The monthly employment probabilities following displacement or
work at age 60 are similar to the results at age 55. The main difference
is that the fraction of those working at age 60 who are still working in
each subsequent month declines more rapidly as this cohort moves
through ages of much higher retirement probabilities. The older dis
placed workers, however, also return to work more slowly, and so there
remains a significant gap in the employment rates of the two groups.
These results suggest that workers who have lost jobs in the later
portion of their careers have substantially different employment and
retirement patterns throughout their fifties and sixties. One concern,
however, is whether the results can be correctly interpreted as the
impact of displacement, or whether they instead reflect worker hetero
geneity that is correlated with job loss probabilities. We have tried
including several additional controls for potential unobserved differ
ences that could bias our findings. Including controls for predisplacement wages, pension eligibility, assets, and retirement expectations had
virtually no effect on our estimated employment patterns. Moreover,
when we limited the sample of displaced workers to those losing jobs
only through plant or business closings (which may be more exoge
nous with respect to worker characteristics than layoffs), we also
obtained very similar results.

EARNINGS

For displaced workers who do return to work, we next examine the
earnings on postdisplacement jobs. Many researchers have docu
mented the large earnings reductions that accompany job loss for
workers of all ages.6 Older workers may face particularly large earn
ings reductions because they are likely to have been with their previous
employers for many years and may have large stocks of firm-specific
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skills that are rendered useless by displacement. To measure the
effects of job loss on earnings, we followed many recent studies and
estimated fixed-effects regressions to control for both observable and
unobservable worker characteristics that might be correlated with dis
placement probabilities. The results, shown in Table 2, use all wage
observations from 1980 and later.7 Earnings reported from jobs start
ing or ending prior to 1980 were eliminated because of concerns about
the accuracy of retrospective information from more than a decade ear
lier. The dependent variable is the log of annual salary based on fullyear full-time work: individuals were asked how much they earn on a
given job, and these reports were converted to earnings on an annual
basis.
Table 2 Earnings Effects of Displacement (fixed-effects estimates)3
log(annual full-time earnings)13
Characteristic
Men
Women
1 year prior to displacement
-0.041
-0.119
(0.033)c
(0.029)
1 year after displacement
-0.392
-0.388
(0.050)
(0.045)
2 years after displacement
-0.361
-0349
(0.059)
(0.054)
3 years after displacement
-0.327
-0.348
(0.062)
(0.059)
4 years after displacement
-0.311
-0.300
(0.066)
(0.058)
5 years after displacement
-0.316
-0.280
(0.069)
(0.064)
6 or more years after displacement
-0.262
-0.336
(0.058)
(0.052)
After displacement x <3 years
0.108
0.230
predisplacement tenure
(0.061)
(0 058)
After displacement x >10 years of
-0.040
-0.057
predisplacement tenure
(0.047)
(0.046)
a Additional controls: year dummies and quartic in age.
b Dependent variable.
c Standard errors are in parentheses.
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Among our sample of older workers, the earnings reductions asso
ciated with job loss are large and persistent, in line with much previous
research on the effects of displacement. In the year before job loss, our
estimates indicate a 4 percent earnings reduction for men and an 11
percent reduction for women.8 Such predisplacement earnings reduc
tions have been found by many other authors. We have also included a
control for two years before job loss but found this had no significant
impact and, so we restricted the effect of two or more years prior to job
loss to be zero. Following job loss, there is a 32 percent reduction in
earnings for both men and women, much of which persists for several
years. Six or more years after job loss, displaced men and women face
earnings reductions of 23 and 29 percent, respectively. These effects,
of course, are estimated only for individuals who are reemployed fol
lowing displacement. It is very likely that these results overstate the
wage opportunities available to a typical displaced worker, because
those who are not reemployed may receive lower wage offers and have
generally worse postdisplacement earnings opportunities.
We also interacted the postdisplacement earnings reduction with
workers' predisplacement job tenure, which may serve as a proxy for
the amount of specific human capital or the quality of the job match
that has been lost. The main effects shown in the table are for the omit
ted category of workers with between 3 and 10 years of predisplace
ment job tenure. Average tenure prior to displacement in this sample is
approximately 11 years. We find that the effect of job loss on earnings
increases with predisplacement tenure. Individuals with fewer than
three years of predisplacement tenure are estimated to face signifi
cantly lower earnings losses than those with higher predisplacement
job tenure.

WEALTH
We next consider the effects of job loss on older workers' holdings
of wealth, including both pension and nonpension assets. We begin by
exploring the effects of job loss on pension eligibility and benefit lev
els. The first question that arises is whether older workers who lose
jobs typically retain pension benefits from their previous employers. If
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workers are not fully vested, the loss of a job might also result in the
loss of future pension benefits. Given that all workers in our sample
are at least 50 years of age, and on average have relatively high tenure
with their predisplacement employers, we expect the complete loss of
pension benefits with job loss to be relatively rare. Most of the workers
losing jobs are already vested in their pension plans or have accumu
lated defined-contribution accounts that can be moved to a new
employer or rolled over into an IRA.
This is confirmed in Table 3, which tabulates answers to the ques
tion "What happened to the pension associated with your previous
job?" that was asked of all recent job-changers, whether the change
was voluntary or involuntary. Fewer than 3 percent of displaced work
ers with defined-contribution (DC) plans on the previous job, and less
Table 3 Pensions from Previous Jobs (%)a
Plan/status13

No displacement

Displacement

DB plan on previous job
Receiving benefits now

510

33.2

Will receive benefits in future

20.9

42.7

1.1

1.3

19.7

18.9

Rolled over to IRA
Received cash settlement
Lost pension
Number of observations

9.0

5.5

2214

597

DC plan on previous job
9.7

6.2

Rolled over to IRA

17.8

24.2

Left in account to accumulate

27.4

34.8

4.9

2.2

Transferred to a new employer

Converted to annuity

28.8

25.8

Lost pension

3.0

2.5

Unknown/other

7.6

3.8

822

322

Received cash settlement

Number of observations

a Percentages do not sum to 100 because multiple responses were allowed (but were
rare) and because of rounding.
b DB = defined-benefit; DC = defined-contribution.
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than 6 percent of those with defined-benefit (DB) plans report that they
completely lost pension accounts, benefits, or eligibility along with the
job loss. Slightly more of those voluntarily changing or leaving jobs
report losing pensions. Among those with DB pension accounts, 43
percent report that, despite having lost the job, they expect to receive
pension benefits sometime in the future. An additional 33 percent of
job losers are currently receiving benefits from their previous employ
ers' DB plans. As might be expected, those with DC accounts gener
ally retain their pension rights in some form after losing jobs. Sixtyfive percent of displaced workers with DC accounts on the previous job
either leave their accounts to continue accumulating, transfer them to a
new employer, or roll them over into an IRA. A substantial fraction of
displaced workers (19 percent of those with DB plans and 26 percent
of those with DC plans) also report receiving cash settlements for their
prior job pensions.
Because we did not find that pension plans are frequently lost with
displacement, in the remainder of this analysis we focus on changes in
pension wealth following job loss, conditional on having some pension
plan prior to the job loss. Since displaced workers may have (at a min
imum) several years in which they do not have a pension plan with
their current employer, one possible effect of displacement may be to
reduce the total amount accumulated in defined-contribution accounts.
At the very least, employers will not be contributing to these accounts
in the years following job loss. In addition, the lengthy spells of nonemployment and reduced earnings that follow job loss may mean that
individuals are more likely to withdraw funds from DC accounts. As a
result, we should expect total pension wealth held in DC accounts to be
reduced by displacement.
To explore this hypothesis, the first column of Table 4 shows
results from regressions of the natural logarithm of the total amount
accumulated in workers' DC accounts on indicators for before and
after job loss.9 We also controlled for age, health, education, race and
calendar year. We used only the initial postdisplacement observation
for each person because displaced individuals are only asked about
account balances in the survey immediately after the job ended; in sub
sequent waves we cannot trace withdrawals or additions to these
accounts. 10 Men with DC accounts in the years prior to job loss have
roughly the same accumulated wealth in pension accounts as men who
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will not lose jobs. In the years after job loss, the estimated coefficient
is -0.497, suggesting a reduction in DC account balances of 39 per
cent. Prior to job loss, women who are eventually displaced have DC
accounts that are approximately 10 percent above those of nondisplaced women, although this difference is not statistically different
from zero. After job loss, displaced women have account balances that
are approximately 15 percent below those of nondisplaced women.
The difference between the variables for prior to displacement and
after displacement is statistically significant for men but not for
women. Men who lose jobs face substantial reductions in their
defined-contribution pension accounts, but there is no evidence of sta
tistically significant reductions in these pension holdings for women
who are displaced.
We also estimated fixed-effects regressions of DC account bal
ances on job loss indicators. These specifications use the within-person variation in pension balances from before to after job loss to
estimate an effect of displacement on account holdings. Including a
person-specific fixed-effect in the regressions means that we are using
only individuals who are observed both before and after job loss to
identify the effect of job loss on pension wealth, rather than estimating
average effects for before and after job loss and relying on the differ
ence as our measure of displacement's impact. The fixed-effects
results for DC account balances are similar to those estimated by ordi
nary least squares regressions. There is a sizable impact of displace
ment among men (a coefficient of -0.44, or a 36 percent reduction) and
no statistically significant effect for women.
The effect of job loss on defined-benefit pension plans is more dif
ficult to anticipate. We know that workers rarely report losing eligibil
ity for such pension plans completely, but the effects on benefit
amounts are less obvious. One possibility is that displacement may
result in workers being eligible for some benefits from their previous
employer, but not at the "optimal" or wealth-maximizing age. That is,
a worker who loses a job at age 55 may be eligible to collect some pen
sion benefits from the employer from whom she has separated, but
would have been eligible for higher benefits if she had remained with
the employer to age 62 or 65.
Examination of individual records for displaced workers who
reported DB pension plans prior to job loss suggests that displacement

Table 4 Effects of Displacement on Pensions and Assets
^^^ Dependent variable/
Sample
^^^^
Characteristic^^^^
Men
Prior to displacement
After displacement
Number of observations
Women
Prior to displacement

log(total DC account)
Has DC plan
Fixed-effects
OLS
0.015
(0 147)b
-0.497
(0.155)
2,058

_a

-0.445
(0.217)
2,058

log(expected annual DB benefit)
Has DB plan
Fixed-effects
OLS
-0.113
(0.087)
-0.446
(0.060)
5,601

-0.033
(0.057)
5,601

-0.194
0.103
(0.173)
(0.184)
-0.285
-0.569
0.132
-0.162
After displacement
(0.103)
(0.101)
(0.236)
(0.141)
2,839
2,839
1,719
1,719
Number of observations
a A dash ( ) indicates that the variables were not included in the fixed-effect regressions.
b Standard errors in parentheses.

log(nonhousing assets)
All
Fixed-effects
OLS
-0.282
(0.087)
-0.439
(0.059)
2,279

-0.094
(0.055)
12,279

-0.211
-(0 102)
-0.267
-(0 062)
12,814

-0.054
(0.060)
12,814
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results in both changes in the age at which pension benefits are
received and changes in the amounts of these benefits. Prior to job
loss, for example, a worker may report an expected annual pension
benefit of $20,000 that can be received no earlier than age 62. After
displacement, the same worker reports that he is currently receiving
pension benefits from the previous job (despite being younger than age
62), but the annual benefit amount is smaller than that expected before
displacement. Partial or reduced pension benefits may be offered as a
form of severance package for workers displaced prior to reaching the
"normal" eligibility age. Alternatively, Gustman and Steinmeier
(1999) report that individuals in the HRS appear to be quite unin
formed with respect to early eligibility ages for employer pension ben
efits, and thus it is not surprising that displaced individuals seem to
receive benefits despite being younger than their self-reported eligibil
ity age.
To understand the effect of job loss on benefits available from DB
pensions, we estimated regressions of the log of current or future
annual pension benefit amounts on job loss indicators for the sample of
individuals reporting DB pension plans; the results are reported in the
middle columns of Table 4. Men who will be displaced in a future year
have expected annual pension benefits that are approximately 10 per
cent lower than those of similar workers who will not be displaced. In
the years after job loss, annual benefits are reduced further. Men have
benefit amounts in the years after job loss that are 36 percent lower
than those of nondisplaced men. Women face similar reductions in
annual benefit amounts. Prior to displacement, women have benefits
that are 17 percent below the benefits of women who are not displaced;
after job loss, displaced women report benefits that are 43 percent
below those of nondisplaced women. Again, taking the difference
from before to after displacement as our measure of displacement's
impact, men and women are estimated to lose 30 and 32 percent of
their annual benefit amounts.
The fixed-effects results for defined-benefit pensions paint a some
what different picture. For women, the fixed-effects results are similar
to the OLS results, suggesting a reduction in pension benefits of 24
percent. Among men, however, the fixed-effects results show no evi
dence of reductions in pension benefits. The fact that the results for
men are not robust to the inclusion of individual fixed effects suggests
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that the benefit reductions reported here should be viewed cautiously.
Work by Haider and Stephens (1999) using employer-provided pension
data from the HRS points to modest negative effects of displacement
on pension wealth.
These findings suggest that job loss may significantly reduce pen
sion wealth, particularly for those with defined-contribution accounts,
and for women with defined-benefit accounts. Some additional caveats
should also be mentioned here. First, because we are using selfreported pension data, it is possible that displaced workers may know
more (or less) about their actual pension coverage and wealth than the
comparison groups. 11 If this knowledge is correlated with job loss, it
could bias our estimates of displacement effects on pensions. Second,
if job loss results in pension wealth being transferred to savings
accounts or IRAs, the above calculations could overstate the loss in
total wealth since they include only DB plans or DC accounts. To
examine this issue and to further our understanding of the overall effect
of job loss on older workers' economic well-being, we next examined
the effects of job loss on workers' asset holdings, including IRAs and
other potential retirement savings.
The final columns of Table 4 show the effect of job loss on the log
of nonhousing assets in the three waves. 12 The drawback of using the
log specification here is that we must eliminate individuals who report
zero or negative values of nonhousing assets (roughly 10 percent of
men and 15 percent of women). 13 As expected, displacement reduces
nonhousing wealth, although the estimates are not statistically signifi
cant for women. 14 The coefficients on the variable indicating workers
prior to job loss shows that there are large differences in nonhousing
(nonpension) asset levels prior to any displacement. For women, there
is not a statistically significant difference between the pre- and postdisplacement coefficients, so we cannot reject the hypothesis that dis
placement has no effect on their nonhousing asset holdings. The fixedeffects results for women are consistent with this finding. Because
many women in our sample are not the primary earners in their house
hold, displacement among older women may have a relatively small
impact on household-level asset holdings.
For men, the coefficient for after job loss is statistically different
from the predisplacement control and implies that the displacement of
older men reduces nonhousing asset levels by approximately 15 per-
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cent. Fixed-effects results for men show a slightly smaller effect of
displacement on nonhousing wealth that is significant at the 10 percent
level. This is consistent with recent evidence reported by Gruber
(1999) for younger workers. He finds that wealth holdings decline
substantially with realized unemployment durations. Because older
displaced workers typically have much longer spells of non-employ
ment than younger displaced workers, it is not surprising that we find
significant wealth reductions. As shown above, far less than half of
older displaced workers have returned to work within one year, and it
appears that private wealth holdings may provide a mechanism for
replacing lost earnings in the short run.

CONCLUSIONS
Our findings point to large and lasting effects of job loss on the
future employment probabilities of older workers. Two years after a
job loss at age 55, just 61 and 55 percent of men and women are
employed, compared with employment rates of more than 80 percent
among nondisplaced men and women who were working at age 55.
Even four years after job loss, there is a gap in employment rates of
approximately 20 percent between the displaced and nondisplaced
groups. These long-term employment effects of displacement come as
the result of both the rates of return to employment after displacement
and elevated rates of exit from postdisplacement jobs.
The earnings of individuals who return to work following job loss
are also dramatically affected. Immediately after displacement, earn
ings are only two-thirds of their expected value had the job loss not
occurred. Even six years after the job loss, displaced men and women
face earnings reductions of more than 20 percent.
Our findings with respect to pension and nonpension wealth are
less stark. Most displaced workers over the age of 50 do not lose pen
sion eligibility or benefits with displacement, and many of them begin
to receive benefits immediately from their future employer, expect ben
efits at a later date, or receive a cash settlement. Nevertheless, we do
find some evidence of possible reductions in the amount of definedbenefit pension payouts and in defined-contribution account balances.
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Finally, for men, there is evidence that nonpension asset holdings are
reduced following displacement.
The long spells of non-employment, large earnings reductions, and
perhaps some reductions in pension and nonpension wealth point to
significant costs of job loss for workers in their fifties and sixties. Even
if these workers were well prepared for retirement prior to a job loss,
changes in earnings and wealth associated with displacement may sig
nificantly reduce the private resources available to them during retire
ment. Our future research will focus on understanding how shocks to
earnings and asset holdings such as those following job loss may affect
the behavior and welfare of these workers as they consider retirement.

Notes
The authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the National Science Foun
dation, grants 9905275 and 9907824.
1. Other possible responses to the question regarding how the previous job ended
include "quit," "retired," "temporary layoff," and "wanted a better job."
2. See Gustman and Steinmeier (1998), McGarry and Davenport (1997), and Vend
and Wise (1998), among others.
3. Blau (1994) and Peracchi and Welch (1994) similarly focused on transition proba
bilities between different employment states for older workers.
4. Specifically, the probability h" of making a transition from nonwork to work in
each month, given that the individual is not currently working, is represented with
a standard probit functional form (<D is the standard cumulative normal distribu
tion):
where ylt = f"(Ageu, Xlt, Months-not-working,,, Prior-job-loss,,).
That is, the hazard h", gives the probability that nonworking individual i returns
to work in month t, conditional on age, other individual characteristics (X),
months since the individual last worked, and whether the individual has lost a job
in the recent past. We can interpret ylt as an underlying latent variable that takes a
value greater than zero if a transition from nonwork to work occurs. Interactions
between the variables Age, X, Months-not-working, and Prior-job-loss are
included in the/" function.
5. This second hazard is of the form:

*;-*(«„)

where zlt = f w (Age,r, Xlt, Prior-job-loss,,). This gives the probability that work
ing individual i makes a work to nonwork transition in month t, conditional on
age, other control variables X, and Prior-job-loss status.
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6. See, for example, Ruhm (1991), Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993), Stevens
(1997), and Schoeni and Dardia (1997).
7 We obtain similar results using a balanced sample in which each individual con
tributes four wage observations to the sample, one in each survey wave and one
from a long-term job prior to wave 1.
8. In Table 2, the dependent variable is in log form and the percentage effect is given
by e$ -1, where |3 is the estimated coefficient on the dummy variable of interest.
9. Individuals who claim to have a defined-contribution plan but have missing values
for the amount held in the account were dropped from the sample.
10. These data limitations are thoroughly discussed in Uccello and Perese (1999).
11. In future work, we can explore this issue by utilizing restricted-access employer
reports of pension plans. While these are currently available only for wave 1, we
can at least make comparisons at wave 1 between nondisplaced workers, those
displaced prior to wave 1, and those who will lose jobs after wave 1.
12. We have also examined total assets, including the value of housing, and several
other subsets of the wealth variables. We find that housing does not respond to
job loss, and so we focus on nonhousing-related assets.
13. We have examined the effect of job loss on the level of assets for those individuals
who start out with zero or negative assets and found no statistically significant
effects. The log specification results in a substantially better fit than a specifica
tion using asset levels.
14 Couch and Gallo (1998) have also examined asset changes using data from the
first two waves of the HRS. They found reductions in nonhousing net worth of
roughly 20 to 30 percent following displacement, although the effects are also not
always statistically significant.
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Appendix Table 1 Sample Means by Displacement Status

Characteristic

Not displaced
58.4
76
12.3
2.5

Age
% Working
Education (yr.)
Health (l=excellent,
5=poor)
Annual earnings ($)
35,086
% with private pension
66
% of workers with pension
57
from current job
DC account balances3 ($)
123,260
mean
median
40,000
DB expected annual
benefits3 ($)
22,272
mean
median
16,320
Nonhousing assets ($)
204,256
mean
median
55,000
' Among workers with this type of pension.

Not displaced
55.9
66
12.3
2.5

Women
Prior to
displacement
56
86
11.9
2.4

After
displacement
56.8
45
11.8
2.5

29,737
60
36

19,976
46
53

17,404
41
37

15,996
34
27

71,555
31,000

55,152
27,500

70,894
15,000

30,747
11,000

21,399
7,100

20,332
15,600

13,343
9,600

16,139
9,600

11,792
8,880

6,536
2,940

120,129
35,500

131,429
31,775

172,520
39,931

111,662
28,000

132,547
23,000

Men
Prior to
displacement
57.1
92
12.1
2.4

After
displacement
58.5
58
11.9
2.5

31,641
65
48

The Effect of a Job Loss on the
Employment Experience, Benefits,
and Retirement Savings
of Bank Officers
Jill S. Quadagno
David A. Macpherson
Jennifer Reid Keene
Florida State University

Although the financial consequences of the wave of mergers and
acquisitions between large corporations in the 1990s have been well
documented, the human costs in the form of downsizing and job losses
are often ignored. The problems associated with the loss of a job may
appear less compelling in the current prosperous economic environ
ment, when workers who lose their jobs have a good chance of finding
new employment. Yet there are longer-term risks that may not be visi
ble until workers who have experienced a series of job losses reach
retirement age. In this chapter, we document the effect of job loss on
the employment experiences, benefits, and retirement savings of
former officers of First Interstate Bank, who were among 7,500 bank
employees who lost their jobs following the 1996 merger with Wells
Fargo Bank. This case study of banking employees provides a detailed
account of the life course consequences of job loss among employees
in a service sector industry where the rate of job loss has increased in
the 1990s (Farber 1997) and who face different risks and different
opportunities than the blue-collar job losers of the 1980s.
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TRENDS IN JOB LOSS
The Distribution of Job Loss
During the 1980s job loss was greatest in the manufacturing sector
(Gordon 1996). Blue-collar workers still make up a majority of dis
placed workers, but there has been an increase in job loss among ser
vice-sector workers, who comprise over 75 percent of the workforce in
the United States (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 1995). The first to
lose their jobs in the service sector were lower-level employees. For
example, Sears automated many of its customer service operations and
eliminated 21,000 positions between 1990 and 1993 (Marks 1994).
Recent mergers have eliminated jobs at all levels. The job losers of the
1990s are more educated and older than those of the 1980s. College
graduates are now most likely to have a job loss because their job was
abolished. In fact, the most dramatic increase in job loss rates has
occurred among managers (Farber 1996, p. 16).
The Consequences of Job Loss
The effect of a job loss varies depending on the age of the worker.
Younger workers are more likely than older workers to report experi
encing a job loss, but older workers, particularly those 55 years and
older, have a more difficult time finding new employment. Older
workers are also less likely than younger workers to find employment
at previous wage levels (EBRI 1997b, p. 9; Ruhm 1989). Older work
ers may have a difficult time with job searches because their skills have
become obsolete or because of discrimination by employers (MorBarak and Tynan 1993).
Workers are currently saving only 35 percent of what they will
require to maintain their preretirement lifestyle through retirement,
even though they have more opportunities than ever to save for retire
ment (Bernheim 1997). One factor that reduces retirement saving is
the loss of a job. Workers who experience a prolonged job search may
be forced to deplete their personal savings and their retirement funds to
pay for basic living expenses for themselves and their families (Newman 1989). Many retirement plans provide for the distribution of the
individual's accrued vested benefits in a lump sum payment when ser-
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vice with the employer is terminated. Although workers are allowed to
preserve their retirement savings after a job loss by "rolling over" the
account balance into an IRA or into a new employer's plan, most
employees who receive a lump sum payment spend it rather than sav
ing it for retirement. One study found that only 28 percent of workers
who received lump sum payments rolled them over into tax-qualified
savings plans (Basset, Fleming, and Rodriguez 1996). Other research
indicates that fewer than half of all workers who receive a lump-sum
distribution roll over any portion of it (EBRI 1997b, p. 13). One might
expect older workers to be savers, but only one-third of workers over
age 55 who receive a lump-sum distribution invest that money in a
retirement annuity or savings account (Salisbury 1993). Results from
the Health and Retirement Survey demonstrate a similar pattern: only
25 percent of older workers (45-54) saved a defined-benefit (DB) plan
distribution, and fewer than half saved a defined-contribution (DC)
plan distribution (Korczyk 1996). Overall, spenders are more likely
than savers to be younger, as well as less educated, female, low-paid,
and African American (Salisbury 1998; Hardy and Shuey in press). It
seems likely that displaced workers who are insecure about their
immediate financial futures may choose not to roll over their lump
retirement fund but rather keep it available during the period of unem
ployment (EBRIb 1997, p. 13). While such a decision makes sense as
a short-term hedge against uncertainty, it is likely to have long-term
consequences in the form of lower retirement income.
Job Loss and Health Insurance
The health care system in the United States is employer-based
(Harrington Meyer, and Pavalko 1996). Individuals with full-time,
year-round jobs are the most likely to have health benefits. In 1996, 64
percent of Americans were covered by employer-provided plans either
directly through their employer or indirectly as a dependent (EBRI
1997a); 75.9 percent of individuals in families headed by full-year,
full-time workers were covered by employer-provided health insur
ance, compared with 38.2 percent of individuals in families headed by
other workers and 18.6 percent of individuals in families headed by
nonworkers (EBRI 1997a, p. 7).
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Because the majority of American families depend on employers
for health benefits, the loss of a job has significant implications for
health care coverage. According to the Current Population Survey, just
over half (50.3 percent) of workers who were displaced in the period
from 1993 to 1995 had health insurance at the job they lost. Of those
displaced workers who were still unemployed in 1996, only 37.3 per
cent now had health insurance (EBRI 1997b, p. 11).
Job Loss in the Banking Industry
The banking industry provides a useful case for studying the longterm consequences of job loss in the service sector because of heavy
rates of job loss resulting from a series of mergers and takeovers that
began in the 1980s as a consequence of deregulation. Unlike most
other industrialized nations, which have fewer than 1,000 commercial
banks, the United States lacks a national banking system in which a
few banks have branches throughout the country. In 1993, there were
more than 12,000 commercial banks, 2,000 savings and loans, and
16,000 credit unions in the United States. In contrast, only 3,000 banks
serve the entire European community; Japan has only 170 commercial
banks (Marks 1994). The presence of so many banks reflects the effect
of federal regulations, which until recently have restricted the ability of
these financial institutions to open branches (Mishkin 1994).
During the 1980s deregulation allowed bank holding companies
headquartered in one state to purchase banks in another state. Recent
changes in banking regulation allow banks to operate branches across
state lines. A few large banks have taken advantage of the opportuni
ties opened by deregulation to engage in an aggressive series of take
overs to eliminate competition and expand their asset holdings.
Industry experts predict that the banking system will consolidate to
only 2,000 early in the twenty-first century (Zey 1993).
Each merger has resulted in job losses among employees at all lev
els, from bank tellers to bank officers. Along with declines in employ
ment has come a paring of employee benefits. In some cases, workers
have become ineligible for any benefits. For example, during a period
of restructuring, the Bank of America cut the hours of the bottom of its
workforce (the low-paid full-time tellers) to 19 hours a week, making
them ineligible for fringe benefits (Marks 1994). Another component
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of the fringe benefit strategy has been ending the "paternalism" of
defined-benefit pension plans. For example, J.P. Morgan and Company
changed its benefit package from a defmed-benefit plan to a definedcontribution plan. Similarly, following its 1988 merger, the Bank of
America eliminated its defmed-benefit plan and installed a definedcontribution plan.

DESCRIPTION OF THE STUDY
In 1997, the ninth largest bank in the United States was Wells
Fargo. Wells Fargo achieved its position in the banking industry as a
result of an acquisition campaign, which began when Wells Fargo
bought National Corporation and Crocker Bank ($19.2 billion in
assets) in 1986. Then, in 1987, it purchased the personal trust busi
nesses of Bank of America, and in 1988, the Barclay's Bank of Califor
nia ($1.3 billion in assets). In 1989, Wells Fargo reached a cooperative
agreement with the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corp. Ltd.
According to the agreement, HSBC would service the overseas bank
ing needs of Wells Fargo customers, while Wells Fargo handled
HSBC's retail customers in California. A new bank jointly owned by
the two companies would provide trade, finance, and international
banking services. That same year Wells Fargo also purchased the Bank
of Paradise ($61 million in assets) and its three branches in California,
as well as five other smaller California banks and their subsidiaries
(Wells Fargo Today: www.Wellsfargo.com, February 27, 1996). On
January 23, 1996, Wells Fargo announced plans to purchase First Inter
state Bancorp (FIB) at a purchase price of $11 billion.
On April 1, 1996, the date the merger took effect, over 1,700 First
Interstate employees were notified that their positions would be elimi
nated. On April 18, Wells Fargo announced it would close 25 branches
throughout Orange County in Los Angeles and lay off 187 branch
employees. Statewide, the bank closed 260 branches and laid off
another 2,000 branch employees. By the end of 1996, another 7,200
First Interstate employees lost their jobs through attrition and further
layoffs (Wells Fargo, 1996c).
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In April 1996, we mailed a short survey to 5,326 officers at FIB
immediately after the first round of layoffs was announced. We
obtained the work addresses of the officers from the 1995 company
phone book provided by a FIB officer. A letter accompanying the sur
vey explained the objectives of the project and asked the workers to fill
out the form and return it. The main purpose of the first survey was to
obtain basic demographic data and the home addresses and telephone
numbers of the First Interstate employees. A total of 1,006 surveys
were returned, for a response rate of 19 percent. The actual response
rate is likely higher than 19 percent: we estimate that at least 1,000
workers did not receive the survey because they were dismissed or left
FIB before the survey arrived.
The mail survey was followed by in-depth telephone interviews
with 20 randomly selected respondents. The telephone interviews pro
vided background information on how FIB employees were notified
about the merger, what options FIB and Wells Fargo were offering to
employees, and how employees responded to the threatened layoff.
A second survey was mailed in mid October 1996 to the homes of
all individuals who had responded to wave 1 and who agreed to partic
ipate in follow-up interviews. The survey included questions on cur
rent employment status, previous employment history, savings
behavior, health, and family finances. Respondents were also asked to
complete a financial statement concerning current salary, salary while a
FIB employee, receipt of a severance package, and severance package
expenditures. A total of 750 workers completed both the first and sec
ond surveys. In addition to the mail survey, another 32 in-depth tele
phone interviews were conducted. One year after the merger, we
mailed a third survey as a follow-up to survey 2. By wave 3, we had
lost 222 subjects to attrition, leaving a sample of 528.
Table 1 presents the descriptive characteristics of the respondents
at wave 3. They ranged in age from 25 to 66. Forty percent were 45 or
older, 36 percent were 37 to 44, and 24 percent were younger than 37.
Forty-five percent were male and 55 percent were female, a distribution
that reflects the feminization of the banking industry (Rich 1995).
Eighty-seven percent were white, 3.8 percent of Hispanic origin, 2.8
percent African American, and 2 percent "other." A substantial fraction
of the former First Interstate Bank managers were well educated. Over
63 percent of the officers had graduated from college, including one-
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Table 1 Percentage of Respondents by Employment Status at Wells
Fargo and Select Demographic Characteristics
LeftWF

Retained by WF

Total

Age
36 or younger

17.07

6.75

23.83

37 to 44

24.77

10.88

35.65

45 or older

30.39

10.13

40.53

Total

72.23

27.77

100.00

Male

32.15

13.08

45.23

Female

40.00

14.77

54.77

Total

72.15

27.85

100.00

Single

22.24

6.73

28.95

Married

49.91

21 12

71.03

Total

72.15

27.85

100.00

< $45,000

26.64

12.36

39.00

$45,000-$64,999

21.81

8.11

29.92

> $65,000

24.13

6.95

3108

Total

72.59

27.41

100.00

Some college or less

25.75

1090

36.65

College

23.12

8.46

31.58

Graduate school

23.50

8.27

31.77

Total

72.37

2763

100.00

63.23

24.20

87.43

1.88

094

2.81

Asian

3.38

0.56

3.94

Hispanic

2.06

1.69

3.75

Native American, Other

1.50

056

2.06

7205

27.95

10000

Gender

Marital status

Salary at wave 3

Education

Race
White
African American

Total
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third who had some graduate education; fewer than 10 percent had
only a high school diploma. Salaries were well above median income.
About one-third earned more than $65,000 per year and nearly twothirds earned more than $45,000 annually.

RESULTS
The Effect of a Job Loss on Employment
At the wave 1 timepoint, 360 of the respondents had been laid off,
482 were told they would be employed in a new job with Wells Fargo,
and 264 did not yet know whether they would be laid off. At wave 3,
nearly half (46 percent) had been retained by Wells Fargo, over onethird (36 percent) were now employed elsewhere, 7 percent were
unemployed, and 11 percent had left the labor force. Among respon
dents who had been laid off, older employees were less likely than the
youngest employees to be employed full-time (63 percent versus 80
percent) and more likely to be employed part-time, unemployed, or out
of the labor force entirely (Figure 1).
In the open-ended interviews, many older workers expressed feel
ings of insecurity about their jobs. Some who were retained by Wells
Fargo felt that they were not terminated because Wells Fargo feared an
age discrimination suit. As Sandra Shanahan explained, "The job was
given to me because of my age. I'm 58 and one-half. And its tempo
rary. Originally, I was going to be terminated. It's a good job. I think
they gave me a job because of a lawsuit. I don't think it will last
beyond the first quarter of next year. I'm too young to retire but too old
to get another job."
Older workers who were retained by Wells Fargo also felt they
were being given difficult assignments to push them to retire. In
response to the question, "Do you feel you were placed in a dead-end
job?", 18 percent of younger and middle-aged workers, but 24 percent
of older workers, said "Yes." John Cole, a 56-year-old project analyst,
had worked for FIB for 20 years. He was targeted for a layoff until he
questioned the company's age bias. As he explained, "Like so many
50+ employees, I have been removed from a line position in favor of
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Figure 1 Employment Status of Leavers by Age

Full-time

Part-time

Self-employed

Unemployed

Not in labor force

Employment Status

younger, less-qualified, lower-pay employees." He had been a team
leader with six people reporting to him. When new management came
in, they got rid of the team leaders and gave them impossible goals.
John got put on special projects that were a dead end. When he com
plained, he was told there was nothing he could do. Then the bank pro
posed a program that would add years of service toward his retirement
benefit if he would retire early. He was told, "Just to help you make
your decision, just to let you know, by the end of the year your job will
be eliminated." Four people were told that, all four over 50.
By contrast, the merger provided an opportunity for 32-year-old
Thomas Chan to change jobs, something he had planned to do anyway.
This was his first job. When he graduated college, he saw his class
mates taking temporary jobs but decided he wanted more stability in
his life. "Now," he cynically explained, "every job is a temporary job.
There are people who believe in company loyalty. If you do a good
job, you will be rewarded. It hasn't worked for me." Thomas became
an auditor for FIB in asset-based lending, then transferred to the real
estate department, doing budgets and forecasting. Before the merger
was announced, he was planning to quit anyway because he doesn't
like being office-based, so the severance package was a windfall for
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him. A Berkeley graduate with foreign language skills, he has been
offered a new position with San Wah Bank, a subsidiary of a Japanese
parent bank, in international banking. He will get a raise on this new
job and can pursue his interest in business prospects overseas. For
Thomas, the merger was "a blessing in disguise," yet he is cautious
about his future. He won't take just any job. He needs to figure out
what he can do best with his time. "The question is, are you flexible
enough to change? Being flexible is pretty important. You have to
keep pace or strike out on your own. I can't work for somebody the
rest of my life. I don't want my future to depend on how other's see
me." So maybe he'll work for San Wah or maybe he'll open a restau
rant.

The Severance Package
When the merger occurred, FIB employees were offered a gener
ous severance package by industry standards. Terminated FIB employ
ees were eligible for a severance package of one month of separation
pay for each year of service. Vice presidents were guaranteed one year
of severance pay, regardless of years of service, and senior vice presi
dents were guaranteed two years of severance pay. Terminated
employees had the choice of taking the severance package as monthly
salary or as a lump sum (Wells Fargo 1996a). Those who took the sal
ary continuation plan also received health insurance for up to two years
and continued 401(k) benefits. However, terminated employees who
found a new job had to take a lump-sum package. Anyone who quit
voluntarily lost all rights to severance pay, as did those who were fired
for poor performance.
Because of the generosity of the severance package, employees
jockeyed to be terminated without quitting. As one woman explained
about two of her co-workers, one aged 47 and the other 48, "They had
high salaries, they wanted the severance package. They were con
nected and could get it." Her own situation was more precarious. She
feared she might be fired because a recently diagnosed illness had
made work more difficult for her:
If I'm terminated because of lack of performance, then there
would be no severance package. There are many people who have
gotten attorneys for one reason or another . . . When all this
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started, at the beginning of the year the merger was announced,
we all knew. I became very ill this year. I was diagnosed with
epilepsy ... In the meanwhile, I've lost no time off from work. I
spent three days in the hospital but I didn't tell my employer. The
minute I tell them, they say there is an expectation that you fulfill
it or you leave. I'm tired all the time. I have to go home from
work and lie down. They haven't given out that many severance
packages. They've done little groups at a time so it doesn't get in
the newspaper. I do know people who got it. It's managers who
make 80 grand a year. They know someone in the hierarchy.

Seventy-seven percent of the terminated respondents received a
severance package. Older managers were more likely than younger
respondents to receive a severance package. Eighty-four percent of
older workers received some severance pay, compared with 80 percent
of the middle group and only 66 percent of the youngest officers.
Some received just a few weeks of salary, while long-term employees
or high-ranking officers received more than 200 percent of their former
salary. Not surprisingly, the older officers had larger severance pack
ages than younger respondents, no doubt because of their longer tenure
at First Interstate as well as their higher salary levels and higher posi
tions. Nearly 35 percent of workers 45 or older received a severance
package that was 200 percent or more of their previous salary.
One year after the layoff, some of the former FIB employees had
saved their severance packages while others had spent it all and also
dipped into personal savings. The likelihood of saving varied by age.
Half of the younger respondents spent their entire severance package,
but 70 percent of both middle-aged and older workers saved their sev
erance package (Figure 2).
The Effect of Job Loss on Pension Benefits
FIB had provided three retirement plans for its employees. The
first was a defined-benefit plan open to employees with at least five
years of service. The benefit amount was based on age, average yearly
salary, and years of service. Regular retirement began at age 65 and
early retirement at 55, with an early retirement penalty of 68.5 percent
of the full benefit (First Interstate Bancorp 1995).
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Figure 2 Percent Who Saved Severance Package by Age

100

<37

37-44

>44

Age (yr.)

FIB employees who had been employed for five years also could
contribute to a defined-contribution (40Ik-type) plan (First Interstate
Bancorp 1993). In addition, the FirstMatch Long-Term Savings Plan
was introduced in 1979. FirstMatch allowed all employees who had
completed at least one year of service to contribute up to 16 percent of
salary with a maximum of $9,500 (according to federal regulations at
that time). First Interstate matched 6 percent of these contributions and
10 percent were not matched. The matched portion of the contribution
included $1 of base pay contributed by the company for every $2 con
tributed by the worker. Wells Fargo had terminated its own definedbenefit pension in 1984 but it did have a defined-contribution plan.
Employees who were offered jobs with Wells Fargo received a lump
sum that they could convert from FirstMatch to the Wells Fargo 401(k)
plan (Wells Fargo 1996a).
The company's share of pension contributions was invested in First
Interstate Bancorp common stock. Laid-off workers who were vested
received two-thirds of a share of Wells Fargo stock for every share of
First Interstate common stock owned, the same arrangement provided
for all First Interstate shareholders. However, employees were not
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fully vested in the company's contributions to the plan until they had
been contributing for a minimum of four years. Thus, any employee
who had worked for FIB for less than four years lost a portion of the
company's match, with the amount of loss decreasing for longer-tenure
workers.
Under the terms of the merger agreement, laid-off FIB employees
who had up to nine years of service when their severance payments
ended could begin receiving a pension at age 65. Those with 10 or
more years of service could begin receiving a pension at age 55. How
ever, the period in which they were receiving severance pay would not
count toward "years of service" for the defmed-benefit plan. Thus,
although workers who were not offered jobs with Wells Fargo retained
their eligibility for the First Interstate defmed-benefit pension, they
stood to lose the years of benefit accrual while they were receiving sev
erance pay plus the cost of any additional years out of the labor market.
The loss of pension income was the hidden price of the merger.
The Effect of Job Loss on Retirement Savings
The layoff reduced the retirement savings of the young and mid
dle-aged respondents, but not that of the older respondents. As Figure
3 shows, the median retirement savings of younger workers who kept
their jobs was $40,000, compared with only $30,000 for leavers. There
was an even greater disparity in retirement savings among workers
aged 37 to 44, with stayers having $102,000 in retirement savings com
pared with only $70,000 for leavers. This trend was reversed among
former FIB employees age 45 or over, with median retirement savings
being higher among leavers ($273,000) than stayers ($259,000).
Apparently the older group used their generous severance package to
augment their retirement savings.
How did the spenders spend their money? A very few former FIB
employees chose to spend their savings to pursue new opportunities or
different life course paths. One young man opened his own business.
One woman quit her job and used her retirement package to stay home
and take care of her baby. She hoped to rebuild her retirement funds
soon. Most, however, were forced to spend their retirement assets.
Bruce Winters, a 43-year-old African American, got his first job in the
banking industry in 1970. After working for 18 years for the Bank of

226 Quadagno, Macpherson, and Keene

Figure 3 Median Retirement Savings by Age
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America, he lost his job in a 1988 merger. When he left the Bank of
America, he received two checks. One was the lump-sum value of his
defined-benefit pension, the other his severance pay. He was out of
work for six months. During that period of unemployment, he depleted
all his savings, including his children's college tuition.
Bruce finally found a position with First Chicago bank and moved
to Los Angeles. That was a costly move in terms of housing. He sold
for $400,000 the home he had purchased in the Bay area for $200,000,
a nice profit, and then bought a new home in Los Angeles for the same
price, around $400,000. However, he financed his new home at a
higher interest rate and, because the new home was assessed at the
higher value, his taxes increased. As a result, his house payments in
Los Angeles were much higher than they had been, and he had the
additional expense of moving costs. Then First Chicago was bought
out and he lost his job again. He was fortunate to find a new job at First
Interstate after being out of work for only three months. He was
employed for five years at First Interstate. Now he is unemployed
again and starting a job search. He worries that if he has to sell his
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home and move again, he will lose money because housing values in
his neighborhood have declined. Each position he has had represents a
step back in terms of financial security, because he has been unable to
replace his lost savings. His youngest child will start college next year,
and he worries about how he will pay for her education.
Thirty-five-year-old Hosanna Batista tells a similar story. She
experienced her second lay-off when Wells Fargo bought out First
Interstate. She had been employed at her previous job for 10 years
when she was laid off. She was unemployed for nine and a half
months. During that period she wiped out her savings, her 401k, her
IRAs, and had to pay a tax penalty. She is still trying recover finan
cially from the first layoff experience and will only receive two
months' salary as severance pay because she has only been employed
by First Interstate for two years.
By contrast, the merger has provided an opportunity for 48-yearold Mitchell Freeman to increase his retirement savings and make an
attractive life change. "I look at it as a golden opportunity, because I'm
young enough and strong enough to do something else. The merger
allowed for a wonderful severance package." He doubled his salary at
his new job as president of a food distribution company. It also was a
boon to Bruce Bloom. Bruce managed a team of technical people who
rapidly found new jobs rapidly in the Phoenix area. He had been
employed by First Interstate for 26 years there and was anticipating the
merger. Now he hoped to use his past teaching experience to find a job
teaching business. He currently has $125,000 in a 401k plus a definedbenefit plan that will pay him $2,040 at age 65. He will receive two
years' severance, which he will take as salary and work on a contract
basis. He plans to be debt free by then, with his mortgage paid off.
Others among his co-workers fared even better. Among the top tier of
vice presidents in his group, 13 received three years' salary plus three
years of bonuses, which he called a "golden parachute."
The Effect of Job Loss on Health Insurance
Since most workers have health insurance through their jobs, the
loss of a job poses the risk of the loss of health insurance as well.
Among the employees in this study, however, health insurance cover
age was virtually unaffected by the merger. One year after the merger,
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98 percent of the leavers had health insurance coverage. Those who
stayed with Wells Fargo were covered by their employer. All those
who received the severance package as salary continuation had health
insurance benefits. Among respondents who elected to receive the sev
erance package as a lump-sum benefit, some purchased COBRA con
tinuation coverage and others had coverage through a spouse or from a
new job.

CONCLUSION
The stream of mergers in the 1990s is just one component of a
larger pattern associated with the mobility of the workforce in the
United States, as employers increased their use of contingent, tempo
rary, and part-time work arrangements (Mishel and Bernstein 1994).
In 1991, more than half of all employees had less than five years of ten
ure with their current employer (Korczyk 1996). The question that
remains unanswered is how the increasingly transitory nature of the
employment relationship affects benefits, particularly retirement plan
vesting, pension portability, and continuity of health care coverage
(EBRI 1997b, p. 3).
Most research indicates that a job loss poses a greater risk to an
older worker than to a younger worker. Older workers often take
longer to find a new job and are more likely to experience a drop in sal
ary when they do (Ruhm 1989). Older workers with long tenure at a
firm may have expected to retire gracefully, only to find themselves
pushed into early retirement in the wake of a merger. The degree of
choice workers have, as well as the amount of preparation and plan
ning, are important predictors of how they experience the transition to
retirement, as well as their satisfaction with the outcome (Hardy and
Quadagno 1995). Unplanned retirement may create emotional anxiety
and make the transition more difficult. Older workers who spend their
retirement savings during a period of unemployment also have little
opportunity to rebuild their portfolios. Older workers who lose their
jobs also might lose their health insurance and have to purchase expen
sive private policies, or worse, find themselves uninsurable. Then they
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have to pay for health care out of pocket or forego needed exams and
procedures.
The banking officers in this study lost their jobs under optimal con
ditions. As a group, they were well educated and well paid. Most rap
idly found new jobs, their health insurance was not interrupted, and
many received a generous severance package. Many older workers
took advantage of this opportunity to increase their retirement savings,
but a substantial portion of the youngest group of employees spent a
considerable share of their retirement savings and assets. Unlike work
ers of previous generations who believed in the permanence of the
employer/employee attachment, younger workers seem to hold fewer
expectations that they will have lifetime employment. This conclusion
is indicated by the fact that younger workers are less likely than older
workers to participate in their employer's pension plan, which suggests
that they do not view their jobs as long term. Yet what this study shows
is that even if younger workers don't expect long tenure with a single
employer, job turnover does pose a long-term threat to their economic
security in terms of lost retirement savings.
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Extending Health Insurance
Coverage for Older Workers
and Early Retirees
How Well Have Public Policies Worked?
Karen Pollitz
Georgetown University

Our voluntary system of health insurance, regulated by a patch
work of federal and state laws, leaves many gaps for older Americans.
There are gaps of access that is, coverage can be denied or made
more difficult to obtain specifically because of a person's advancing
age and declining health. There also are gaps of affordability faced by
uninsured Americans of all ages who have low incomes and who sim
ply cannot afford the cost of health insurance.
This chapter does not attempt to measure the prevalence of prob
lems of access and affordability faced by older Americans. Such prob
lems are a distinct possibility for older Americans, and when they do
arise, they can have tragic results. Many of us take comfort in the con
ventional wisdom that the uninsured do, eventually, somehow, obtain
the health care they need. This conventional wisdom is wrong.
The American College of Physicians-American Society of Internal
Medicine recently compiled and summarized the findings of over 100
scientific studies documenting that "lack of health insurance is not sim
ply an inconvenience . . . [It] is a public health risk that results in
poorer health and earlier death" (ACPI-ASIM 1999). Mortality and
morbidity are higher among the uninsured. People who lack coverage
delay or forego care and medications that they need, but cannot afford.
They suffer greater complications and unnecessary hospitalizations
when manageable health conditions go untreated. Cancer is detected at
later stages, diminishing treatment options and the chances for sur-
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vival. And the uninsured who manage to get hospital care nevertheless
are much more likely to die than are people who are privately insured.
This mounting evidence notwithstanding, we do not have a guaran
tee of health security in America for people under the age of 65.
Instead we have adopted a patchwork of public policies, federal and
state, that seem to help some people in some circumstances and leave
gaps in assistance for others. This chapter examines the health and
insurance status of older workers and early retirees, aged 55-64. It
reviews the menu of public policies we have adopted to promote access
to and affordability of coverage. It concludes that some of these public
policies have added tangible protections for the near-elderly, while oth
ers have not, and that significant gaps in health security remain for
older workers and early retirees in the United States.

HEALTH STATUS AND COVERAGE
OF THE NEAR-ELDERLY
A recent report to the Congress by the General Accounting Office
documented the health status and the health insurance status of Ameri
cans between the ages of 55 and 64. Relative to other non-elderly
Americans, people between these ages have the highest rate of health
insurance coverage. In 1996, 13.8 percent of this near-elderly age
cohort were uninsured, compared with almost 18 percent of all nonelderly Americans. Further, health coverage for the near-elderly has
remained relatively stable over time, while the proportion of uninsured
has climbed steadily for younger age groups (GAO 1998, p. 38).
The near-elderly's relative advantage in health insurance status
should not, however, necessarily be viewed as a health security success
story. It may well be that because their need for health insurance cov
erage is so pressing that people in this age bracket will tolerate higher
expenses, job lock, deferred retirement, or other inconveniences or
hardships in order to maintain coverage. Indeed, researchers at the
Urban Institute who studied how health insurance needs are factored
into retirement decisions found that both the availability and afford
ability of coverage were important considerations that shape people's
plans for retirement (Loprest and Zedlewski 1998).
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This finding is not at all surprising, given the health care needs of
the near-elderly. Advancing age tends to bring a decline in health sta
tus. Less than half of the near-elderly report themselves to be in excel
lent health, compared with almost three-quarters of 25- to 34-yearolds. Almost one-quarter of the elderly report themselves to be in poor
health, compared with 6 percent of 25- to 34-year-olds (GAO 1998, pp.
27-29). The incidence of serious and chronic health conditions is far
more prevalent among the near-elderly than among younger people.
Ironically, the onset of these health conditions, which make the need
for health coverage more pressing, also makes the near-elderly more
"uninsurable" (Table 1).
The near-elderly, like other Americans, rely primarily on
employer-sponsored insurance (ESI) for their health coverage. Twothirds of people aged 55-64 have employer-based health coverage.
ESI is more common among the near-elderly who work full time, but
early retirement does not necessarily mean the loss of ESI. Almost half
of the near-elderly who do not work have employer-based coverage,
through a working or retired spouse, through their own employer-sponTable 1 Number of Health Conditions per 1000 People among Four Age
Groups
Condition
Arthritis
Cataract
Cerebrovascular disease
Diabetes
Gallbladder disease
Glaucoma
Ischemic heart disease
Heart rhythm disorders
Other heart disease
Hernia
Hypertension
Ulcer
Varicose veins
SOURCE: GAO 1998,
Survey.

55-64 yr.
45-54 yr.
35-44 yr.
25-34 yr.
294.75
174.48
79.85
41.19
33.73
5.85
3.21
3.42
27.73
11.62
3.30
1.98
46.74
20.17
86.09
935
11.17
5.49
304
6.34
7.63
17.70
5.30
195
72.30
29.23
7.90
2.71
53.25
38.82
30.43
21.75
36.47
7.88
19.35
3.62
25.27
1706
39.80
7.40
285.88
176.21
82.45
40.42
36.01
17.26
2279
19.45
62.57
42.07
31.00
19.82
p 30. Data derived from the NCHS 1994 Health Interview
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sored retirement health benefits, or through COBRA. Even so, the rate
of ESI coverage is lower for the near-elderly than for most younger
people. As a result, the near-elderly today rely disproportionately on
individually purchased health insurance coverage and on Medicare.
This is especially the case for the oldest near-elderly, i.e., between the
ages of 62 and 64 (Table 2).
Trends suggest this reliance on individual coverage and public pro
grams may increase over time. In particular, the prevalence of
employer-sponsored retiree health benefits has declined over the past
decade and shows evidence of continuing to do so. Fewer employers
are offering such benefits to retirees and, among those that do, eligibil
ity standards and required retiree contributions are becoming more
stringent (McArdle et al. 1999). People who retire without employersponsored health benefits before the age of Medicare eligibility are
more likely to be uninsured (Table 2).
Table 2 Percentage of Insured and Uninsured Individuals by Source of
Insurance and Age Group, 1996
Employerbased
Military/
coverage Individual Medicare Medicaid veteran Uninsured
65.1
6.2
4.0
0.9
15
22.3
71.0
4.6
1.4
5.3
1.3
16.3
73.7
3.7
5.3
2.0
16
13.7
65.3
8.6
44
138
5.9
1.9

Age group
25-34
35-44
45-54
55-64
Near-elderly
subgroups
55-61
67.4
59.6
62-64
81.3
Work full time
Not working
46.1
GAO 1998, pp. 40, 41, 44.

8.0
10.1
7.4
8.1

4.9
8.5
0.2
15.2

4.6
4.0
0.7
10.1

1.9
2.1
1.4
2.3

13.2
15.5
9.0
18.2
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WHAT PUBLIC POLICIES HAVE BEEN ADOPTED
TO PROMOTE HEALTH INSURANCE ACCESS
AND AFFORDABILITY?
Private health insurance markets tend to distinguish customers
based on their health and risk status, and they sell (or renew) coverage
accordingly. Low-cost, low-risk customers are the most profitable, and
insurers will try to attract them and discourage high-cost, high-risk
customers through their medical underwriting practices, benefit
design, and premium pricing. Left unregulated, these practices make it
more difficult for the near-elderly to obtain health insurance and leave
them vulnerable to losing the coverage they have as they age and as
health declines. Risk segmentation and selection practices are less of a
threat to a near-elderly person in large group coverage (where the
impact of any one person on an entire group's premium will be less)
but become more so as group size declines. Access and affordability
are most problematic in the individual market, where an older person
with preexisting health conditions is unlikely to find standard coverage
at standard rates and may find it unavailable at any price.
Over the past 15 years, states and the federal government have
enacted health insurance reform laws to curb risk segmentation and
selection practices. How well these policies have improved protections
for older workers and early retirees depends on the type of health cov
erage and where it is obtained.
Access to Group Coverage
COBRA 1
As noted above, early retirees depend primarily on employer-spon
sored health insurance for their coverage. When retirement health ben
efits are not offered, many early retirees have the option under COBRA
of remaining in their former group plan for a limited time. Assuming
for a moment that an early retiree may be leaving work because of
health problems, this option becomes especially important. It allows
people not only to remain covered, but to keep their current policy
with its covered benefits and providers on which they already
depend.
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COBRA requires some group health plans to offer temporary con
tinuation of coverage for people who would otherwise lose it due to a
qualifying event. A recent study estimates that at any time, some 4.7
million people rely on COBRA for their health coverage (Levitt and
Gabel et al. 1999).
Workers and their dependents qualify for COBRA continuation
coverage when employment ends due to retirement, voluntary separa
tion, layoff, or when eligibility for health benefits ends due to a reduc
tion in hours worked. COBRA continuation coverage resulting from
these qualifying events can last up to 18 months. In some cases, when
a disability causes the end of employment or reduction in hours
worked, COBRA continuation can extend an additional 11 months.
Dependents also qualify for continuation coverage when they
become divorced or widowed from a covered worker, when they age
out of dependent status, or when the covered worker relinquishes cov
erage upon reaching Medicare eligibility. Under these qualifying
events, COBRA continuation can last up to 36 months. Each covered
worker and dependent has an independent right to elect COBRA. Con
tinuation coverage must be the same as that offered to active workers.
COBRA's protections have limits. First, certain changes can oper
ate to cut short COBRA continuation coverage. COBRA coverage
ends when the employer ceases to offer health benefits to active work
ers. If an older worker retires involuntarily, for example, when a firm
goes out of business, there may no longer be a health plan in which to
continue. COBRA also ends if a covered person moves out of their
COBRA health plan's service area. Early retirees who are "snow
birds" need to consider whether they can use their COBRA coverage if
they move.
Second, COBRA applies to group health plans offered by employ
ers with 20 or more workers. People separating from coverage spon
sored by smaller firms don't have federal COBRA protections.
However, 38 states have enacted "mini-COBRA" laws requiring con
tinuation coverage under small-employer plans for fewer than 20 work
ers. Some of these state laws mirror federal COBRA protections.
Others offer shorter periods of continuation coverage (e.g., three to six
months).
Finally, individuals electing COBRA must pay the full premium,
including the portion formerly contributed by the employer, plus an
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administrative charge of up to 2 percent. While COBRA's guarantee of
access to group rates generally makes coverage more affordable than it
would otherwise be in the nongroup market, the sticker shock of losing
the employer's premium subsidy can be considerable. In general,
about one in five people eligible for COBRA coverage elect it. This
election rate increases with age, however; reaching 38 percent for those
age 61 or older (Flynn 1992 and Loprest 1997, as cited in GAO 1998,
p. 89). One study suggests that COBRA election is very high (up to 75
percent) among early retirees who have no other coverage options
(Gruber and Madrian 1993, as cited in GAO 1998, p. 89)
On average, 61- to 64-year-olds who elect COBRA remain in that
coverage for 12 months (Flynn 1992, as cited in GAO 1998). This sug
gests COBRA may be an important bridge helping early retirees to
remain covered until Medicare eligibility begins. .
HIPAA
Another potentially important contribution to the health security of
the near-elderly when they are covered under group health plans
was made by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
of 1996, or HIPAA.2 HIPAA established national standards to protect
access to group health coverage. These national standards apply to all
group health plans sponsored by employers with two or more workers.
They include
Nondiscrimination: Employers and group insurance carriers may
not set rules for group members' eligibility for health coverage
based on any health status-related factor. Nor can plans and car
riers vary benefits or premium contributions for enrollees based
on health status-related factors. These factors include medical
history, claims experience, evidence of insurability, and genetic
information.
Limits on preexisting condition exclusions: No group health plan
can impose a preexisting condition exclusion period longer than
12 months (or 18 months for late enrollees). HIPAA defines a
preexisting condition as one for which diagnosis, medical advice,
care, or treatment was actually recommended or received in the
six-month period immediately preceding enrollment in the group
plan.
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Portability: HIPAA limits the repeated imposition of preexisting
condition exclusion periods by group health plans by requiring
that persons get credit for qualifying prior coverage. Most prior
coverage (including group and individual coverage, Medicare,
and Medicaid) is creditable as long as it was not interrupted by a
lapse of more than 63 days in a row.
Special enrollment periods: All group health plans must offer
individuals who previously declined coverage a special opportu
nity of at least 30 days to enroll in group coverage when their
insurance or family status changes. For example, special enroll
ment periods must be offered to people when they marry or have
a child, or when they lose other coverage due to a change in jobs
or expiration of COBRA benefits. Enrollment during these spe
cial periods is not considered a late enrollment.
Certificates: So people can document their coverage history,
HIPAA requires health plans and carriers to issue certificates of
creditable coverage. Certificates must describe the content and
length of coverage and must be issued automatically when cover
age ends. Certificates also must be provided at other times on
request.
Older workers and early retirees are more likely to rely on HIPAA
group health plan protections, given their poorer health status. Though
not prevalent in group health plans prior to HIPAA, lifetime exclusions
of preexisting conditions were not unheard of. HIPAA limits on such
exclusion periods could be important to older workers and early retir
ees. HIPAA requirements for portability and special enrollment peri
ods can help people manage the transitions of work and family status
that arise increasingly in this age group.
Enactment of this federal law was an important contribution
because these protections were not applicable in all states and all health
plans before 1996. Prior to HIPAA, states had been active in enacting
similar reforms in their small group markets. State reforms varied
widely and often were not as comprehensive as the federal law required
(Pollitz et al. 1999; Institute for Health Policy Solutions 1998). Only a
handful of states applied insurance reforms in the large group market
and, of course, no states could regulate coverage under self-insured
employer plans. Thus, the enactment of HIPAA expanded legal protec-
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tions for all Americans in group health plans. Older workers and early
retirees who maintain group coverage and who need to switch between
group health plans can be assured of more consistent and comprehen
sive protections no matter where they live or what level of government
regulates their group coverage.
State insurance reforms beyond HIPAA
Some states have gone beyond the national floor of group health
protections guaranteed by HIPAA. These additional state protections
may be most helpful for older workers or early retirees who decide to
establish their own business or who work for very small firms.
Because these protections vary so widely, however, it is important for
older workers and early retirees to familiarize themselves with the laws
in their own state.
Fifteen states (Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Mexico,
North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont, and Washing
ton) have applied some or all of their group market reforms to the selfemployed or groups of one. In Arizona, Colorado, North Carolina, and
Rhode Island, the self-employed are guaranteed access only to certain
small-group policies; they are not guaranteed the issuance of all prod
ucts as HIPAA requires for groups of 20-50. In Maryland, the selfemployed are guaranteed access to small-group policies only during
semiannual open seasons. In New Mexico, the self-employed can be
considered a group if they buy family coverage, but only through the
state's small-employer purchasing alliance. In South Carolina, spouses
who work together in a family-owned business can be considered a
group of two. For older workers who leave a job to set up their own
business, these state reforms can be very helpful.
Most states also have gone beyond HIPAA's requirements to estab
lish rating limits in their small-group markets. It is in small groups that
one older worker's age or poor health may have a more tangible impact
on the entire group's premium. State small-group rating reforms also
vary considerably. Two states (New York and Vermont) require pure
community rating, under which neither the age nor the health status of
workers may cause a small group's premium to vary. Ten states require
modified community rating, which permits no premium variation due
to health status but allows variation based on other demographic fac-
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tors such as age. In three states (Hawaii, Michigan, and Pennsylvania),
community-rated coverage is available only through certain carriers.
Thirty-one states impose rate bands that allow limited rate variation
based on health status, as well as variations based on age and other
demographic factors. Two states (Arizona and New Mexico) require
modified community rating for some small-group products and rate
bands for others. Virginia imposes rate bands on only two products
sold to only certain small groups. Only Illinois and the District of
Columbia have no small group rating restrictions at all (Pollitz et al.
1998).
Affordability of Group Coverage
In addition to guaranteeing access to group coverage that is offered
by employers, federal law does provide one protection that may
improve the affordability of health coverage for some older workers
and early retirees in limited circumstances.
The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) was passed in 1993
primarily to help workers balance the needs of job and family.3 It may
also provide important, though short-lived, assistance to older workers
who leave the workforce involuntarily due to illness or to care for a
sick relative.
The FMLA guarantees up to 12 weeks of job-protected leave for
workers when they become ill or disabled or when they need to care for
a newborn or for a sick or disabled family member. The law guaran
tees only unpaid leave, although people must be allowed to draw sick
pay, vacation pay, or disability income insurance benefits they have
accrued. The law also requires employers to continue health benefits
during leave. Unlike HIPAA and COBRA, therefore, the FMLA does
provide for a subsidy to make group coverage affordable.
According to the Bipartisan Commission on Family and Medical
Leave, family leave to care for a seriously ill family member and medi
cal leave for one's own health accounts for almost 80 percent of all
leave taken by employees. When surveyed about their future need for
family and medical leave, about 40 percent of employees responded
that they expect to need such leave within the next five years. The most
frequently cited reason was to care for a seriously ill parent. While the
length of leave varies depending on the reason for taking leave, the
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median length for all leave-takers is 10 days. Eighty-four percent of
people taking leave return to work, 10 percent remain on leave, and
only 6 percent do not return to work (Bipartisan Commission on Fam
ily and Medical Leave 1996).
The FMLA can offer some early retirees a brief bridge of afford
able health coverage before they move on to COBRA or other group or
individual insurance. However, because the law only applies to firms
with 50 or more employees, because the benefit guarantees are so time
limited, and because it is structured primarily to be a reform to help
people return to work, it is unlikely that FMLA health coverage pro
vides much of a lifeline to very many individuals.
Access to Individual Coverage
As noted above, the near-elderly rely more heavily on nongroup
coverage than do younger people. Reliance on individual coverage
may increase if current trends toward declining employer-sponsored
retirement health benefits continue. Individual insurance markets are
much less tightly regulated than group markets, and the near-elderly
will tend to be vulnerable purchasers of coverage in individual mar
kets.
Individual insurance markets are characterized by the aggressive
ness of their carriers' underwriting practices. Where such practices are
not regulated, individual market insurers may deny coverage altogether
to an applicant determined to be a bad risk. Insurers also may sell cov
erage that temporarily or permanently excludes coverage for a health
condition or an entire body part or system. In addition, they may
charge higher (substandard) premiums based on an applicant's health
status. Premiums may be further increased, typically by a factor of
three or higher for people in their early 60s, due to age and other demo
graphic factors (Chollet and Kirk 1998, p. 44). For older workers and
early retirees who need to buy insurance on their own, these underwrit
ing and rating practices can pose substantial barriers to access. Con
sider the story of one 52-year-old woman who recently "retired" to
Florida.
We moved to Florida with insurance [under my husband's
COBRA plan] and tried to buy individual coverage. [I] was
turned down by no less than 5 companies because of a preexisting

244 Pollitz

condition that was corrected 30 years ago! Was told by BC/BS of
Florida to get a job or get arrested. Since I don't like stripes, I
took a job. Since my husband and I had just retired from New
York, I was not amused, but I am now insured. Our concern now,
is what. .. will [happen] ... to us AFTER COBRA! My husband
is going to be 62 in 1/00! I've found many of my neighbors in our
new community have the same problem. We all didn't come with
"retirement insurance" from our companies, and due to some
minor problems (i.e., heel spurs) many have returned to work
because they cannot get insurance here!4

Federal health reforms have done little to improve this situation,
though some states have acted to secure access to coverage for the
near-elderly and other individuals.
HIPAA
While HIPAA added significantly to people's legal protections
under group health plans, it added little to their protections when buy
ing individual coverage. Whether this result was intended is hard to
know. On the one hand, early retirees and older workers leaving group
coverage to set up their own businesses were typical of the people Con
gress sought to help through HIPAA. On the other, as an incremental
reform, HIPAA was limited and incomplete by design. Congress also
was especially deferential to the goal of state flexibility when it drafted
HIPAA's individual-market provisions. The combination of HIPAA's
small reform increment and great state flexibility left people in the
individual market with little more real protection under the new federal
law than they had before.
HIPAA contained two key protections in the individual market.
First, it required all coverage, including individual policies, to be guar
anteed renewable. That is, carriers are prohibited from canceling or
refusing to renew coverage due to advancing age or declining health.
Second, HIPAA contains "portability" protections for people leaving
group coverage to buy individual insurance when they have maintained
a substantial and continuous coverage history. These people, called
federally eligible individuals, must have had at least 18 months of con
tinuous coverage that was not interrupted by a lapse of more than 63
days in a row. Their most recent day of coverage must have been under
a group health plan, and they must have elected and exhausted any
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available COBRA continuation benefits. Once people become feder
ally eligible, they must purchase individual coverage within 63 days.
HIPAA guarantees federally eligible people access to all policies sold
in the individual market. States can adopt an alternative mechanism for
guaranteeing access to health coverage for federally eligible individu
als, and 39 states did so.
HIPAA lacked one key protection for people buying individual
coverage: rating limits. Consequently, while all individual policies are
now guaranteed renewable in all states, nothing in federal law prohibits
insurers from raising renewal rates so high as to deter people from con
tinuing their coverage. Only where states had already acted to limit
this practice do people have such protections.
The lack of rating protections also made hollow HIPAA's right of
guaranteed issue to private individual coverage. Eleven states and the
District of Columbia adopted this new guaranteed issue protection for
their federally eligible residents. None of these dozen jurisdictions
have individual market rating reforms, however.5 Consequently, poli
cies sold to federally eligible individuals in these areas are priced as
high as 400 to 600 percent of standard rates (Scanlon 1998).
In the 39 alternative-mechanism states, people do have some rating
limits but few new access protections. HIPAA's requirements were so
flexible that all but a few states simply made minor adjustments to the
reforms they had previously enacted. As a result, most people in these
states have the same or similar right of access to individual coverage
after HIPAA as they did before (Pollitz et al. 1999).
In summary, where HIPAA granted a new access protection for
people in the individual market, it was rendered almost meaningless
because the lack of rating reforms let carriers deter access by changing
prohibitive premiums. And, where HIPAA deferred to states in design
ing individual market access protections, most states decided to keep
reforms they already had in place. The result for older workers and
early retirees is that coverage options remain about the same.
State-legislated protections
For the near-elderly, then, like other Americans, access to individ
ual market coverage remains a function of health status and geography.
Some states offer greater access protections than others. The woman
quoted above who retired to Florida might have found it easier to
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obtain individual coverage had she moved to one of the other states
described below.
Access to all individual market policies is guaranteed for all resi
dents in six states. In all of these states, individual policies must be
priced according to community rating or modified community rating
(Figure 1).
In five other states, all residents are guaranteed access to at least
some products sold by some carriers (for example, a Blue Cross/Blue
Shield plan). One of these states does not limit rates that can be
charged for these policies (Figure 2).
Seven jurisdictions require periodic open seasons during which
residents are guaranteed access to some or all individual market prod
ucts (for example, some states require HMOs to conduct annual open
enrollment periods.) Rating protections exist in only four of these
seven states (Figure 3).
Other states have enacted access protections in the individual mar
ket to people who were previously insured. Residents in six states have
broader portability rights than under HIPAA. For example, residents in
these states typically are guaranteed access to some or all individual
coverage whenever they switch health plans, not just when they switch
from group to individual coverage as HIPAA permits. Often only sev
eral months to one year of prior coverage is required to gain such port
ability rights. Again, however, rating protections are only applied in
five of the six states (Figure 4).
In 31 states, early retirees and other leaving group coverage are
guaranteed conversion rights, meaning their group carrier must issue
them an individual policy regardless of health status. Only 10 of these
states limit premiums that can be charged for conversion coverage. In
the other 21 states, conversion rights tend to be hollow (Figure 5).
Affordability of Individual Coverage
In addition to guaranteeing access to coverage, a few states offer
subsidies for private individual coverage purchased by low-income res
idents. These programs, funded with state-only dollars, tend to be
fairly small. Health Access New Jersey, for example, subsidizes the
purchase of commercial health insurance by people under age 65 hav
ing family incomes below 150 percent of the poverty level. The pro-
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Figure 1 States that Require Guaranteed Issue of All Individual Market
Policies at Community Rates to All Residents

Figure 2 States Where All Residents are Guaranteed Issue of Some
Individual Products

*no rating limits apply
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Figure 3 States Requiring Open Season Enrollment for Some or All
Individual Market Policies

* no rating limits applied

Figure 4 States with Portability Protections for Previously Insured
Residents that are Greater than HIPAA Requires

*no rating limits apply
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Figure 5 States Requiring Conversion Rights for Individuals Leaving
Group Coverage

* no rating limits apply

gram had over 14,000 enrollees in 1997. In Massachusetts, the
Medical Security Plan makes subsidized coverage available to people
under age 65 having family incomes below 200 percent of the poverty
level. This program also provides partial premium subsidies for
COBRA continuation coverage for families with incomes below 400
percent of the poverty level. Over 15,000 Massachusetts residents par
ticipated in this program in 1997 (Summer 1998).
Public Coverage Options
Public coverage options tend to offer both access and affordability.
Eligibility under these programs, even entitlements, is limited, so older
workers and early retirees may not always be eligible.
Federal initiatives
Coverage under the federal Medicare program is only available to
people before the age of 65 if they are disabled or suffer from end-
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stage renal disease. As noted earlier, about 6 percent of people aged
55-64 qualify for Medicare coverage this way.
Medicaid also offers coverage to certain low-income people who
become disabled and can no longer work. In the closing days of 1999,
Congress enacted the Work Incentives Improvement Act to expand
access to Medicare and Medicaid for some disabled individuals who
want to return to work.6 People under age 65 who have left the work
force because of a disability may now have the option of returning to
work because of the enactment of this law. It gives states the option to
permit working individuals with a medically improved disability to buy
into Medicaid and to eliminate income, asset, and resource limitations
for those workers who do. It also provides $400 million for demonstra
tion programs and incentive grants to states to encourage the expansion
of these Medicaid buy-in options. In addition, the law permits disabled
Medicare beneficiaries who return to work to continue their Medicare
coverage for six and one-half years, which is significantly longer than
the current 24 months. This extension of health coverage through pub
lic plans may address a key cause of involuntary retirement and enable
more people to return to work without jeopardizing their health insur
ance.
Medicare and Medicaid eligibility have not yet been changed to
extend coverage for non-disabled older workers who prefer to take
early retirement. In 1997, President Clinton proposed legislation to
establish a Medicare buy-in option at actuarially neutral premiums for
certain people between the ages of 55 and 64, but it was not enacted.

State programs offering subsidized coverage
A number of states have used Medicaid 1115 waivers to make lowincome uninsured adults eligible for Medicaid coverage. For example,
Hawaii's Quest program offers subsidized coverage for low-income
uninsured individuals under age 65 with incomes below 300 percent of
the poverty level. MinnesotaCare offers limited benefit coverage at
discounted premiums for adults under 175 percent of poverty and for
parents of minor children with family incomes below 275 percent of
poverty (Summer 1998).
Washington offers subsidized public coverage funded entirely with
state money. The Basic Health Plan offers comprehensive coverage for
a sliding scale premium based on income. Residents with gross
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monthly income up to about $2300 (for a family of 3) could qualify for
eligibility in 1999. Approximately 128,000 residents were enrolled at
the end of last year (Washington State Health Care Authority 1999).

State high-risk pools
Twenty-five states have high-risk pools to guarantee access to cov
erage for the medically uninsurable. Most of these state pools operate
with limited funding, however, and enrollment in all but a few is very
small (under a few thousand individuals). For older workers and early
retirees, the access guarantee offered by many state high-risk pools
might seem particularly incomplete. All state high-risk pools price
premiums using age rating. Premiums for a 64-year-old range from
two to five times higher than those charged for a 24-year-old. Depend
ing on the state and benefit package, it is not uncommon for the nearelderly to face premiums in excess of $500/month under high-risk
pools. A number of state high-risk pools have other shortcomings.
Covered benefits under seven state high-risk pools are subject to signif
icant limitations (such as an annual cap of $75,000 on covered services
in California). Six state high-risk pools set premiums at 200 percent of
standard rates before adjustments for age and other demographic fac
tors are applied. Two states cap enrollment under their high-risk pools,
and so deny access to coverage for the uninsurable when state funding
runs short.7 However, two states (Connecticut and Wisconsin) do offer
premium subsidies through their high-risk pools (Pollitz et al. 1998;
Communicating for Agriculture 1999).

CONCLUSION
As Americans age, their need for health insurance grows but, cov
erage opportunities may decline. People leaving the workforce need
both access to health insurance coverage and the means to pay for it.
The erosion of employer-provided retirement coverage may make both
access and affordability more problematic in the future, and as the
baby-boom generation ages, these problems will be faced by greater
numbers of people.
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Some federal efforts to promote health insurance access have been
significant. The enactment of COBRA and HIPAA group market
reforms in particular have created a floor of protections, though limited
in scope, that people can count on no matter where they live. The nearelderly, most of whom are covered by employer-sponsored health
insurance, are among those whose access protections have been
enhanced as a result.
Older workers and early retirees do rely disproportionately on indi
vidual coverage. In these health insurance markets, their age and
higher risk status threatens their access to coverage. HIPAA did not
add significantly to individual market protections, however, so people's
coverage options were left pretty much unchanged.
Neither of these federal reforms provide subsidies, which are key
to the low-income uninsured gaining private coverage. One recent fed
eral initiative did improve access and .affordability of public coverage
for those disabled older retirees who qualify for Medicare or Medicaid
and who may wish to return to work. Federal policy has not changed
public coverage options for nondisabled older workers and retirees.
Some states continue to try to fill some of the gaps in access and
affordability left by limited federal reforms. However, state efforts are
limited, too, and their success varies. For older Americans, especially
those who relocate later in life only to find themselves covered by a
new and different set of rules, this patchwork of state rules and protec
tions may seem particularly unreliable and confusing. Without the
enactment of more sweeping federal reforms, it seems likely that there
will continue to be no guarantee of health care access or affordability
for the near-elderly.

Notes
1. COBRA stands for the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1985. Among other things, this law amended ERISA to require temporary group
health continuation coverage. COBRA amendments to ERISA are found at 29
U.S.C. 1161et. seq.
2. P.L. 104-191.
3. P.L. 103-3.
4. This comment was left anonymously by a visitor to Georgetown's Health Insur
ance Consumer Guide home page, www.georgetown.edu/research/ihcrp/hippa.
October 1999.
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5. The state of Maryland does limit rates that can be charged only for certain policies
sold to federally eligible individuals
6. P.L. 106-170
7. In Illinois, where the high-nsk pool is part of the state's alternative mechanism
under HIPAA, the enrollment cap may not be applied to people who are federally
eligible.
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Commentary
Katherine Swartz
Harvard School of Public Health

I thought maybe that cold air was supposed to make us more cog
nizant of what it's like to be one of the unfortunates. I've been asked to
pinch-hit as a discussant on these three papers, so let me try to do a rea
sonable job here I want to focus my comments more about the aspect
that Karen just talked about, the dynamic issues involved with job loss,
income, and health insurance coverage. That is to say, if we start with
a job loss, that increases the probability (as Ann was describing) that a
person will have a subsequent job loss, and all of this has ripple effects
on a person's pension, the ability to save (and therefore what kinds of
nonpension savings a person has when starting retirement), and on
health insurance. These papers highlight the dynamic issues that are
involved here. We have unemployment spells, spells without health
insurance, and spells that are short-lived (we hope) of having poor
health.
The first comment I want to make has to do with the bank merger
case study. I found this especially interesting because many people
who lose jobs in these huge bank mergers are lower-wage, less-edu
cated groups of workers. Judging by the response rates to the study's
survey, however, the study has respondents who happen to be older
workers who were better educated and had higher incomes when they
lost their jobs.
I happen to live in Boston now, and as some of you know, Boston
(and New England) has been experiencing bank mergers recently. I
can tell you from colleagues and friends that the recent Bank Boston
merger with Fleet Bank targeted older employees for severance.
They've been provided with very generous severance packages in
part because of their long tenure with the banks so "that the bank
would not be sued for the age discrimination that Jill talks about in her
paper. Her discussion of this issue resonated with what I am observing
in Boston.
However, what I found distressing about this case study is that I'm
seeing similar subtleties at work now in other types of firms and not
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just banks. For example, we now see changes in job descriptions that
are intended to drive workers from their jobs. Changes such as requir
ing a worker to know how to use a new computer system or a new
accounting system are not uncommon. At the same time, employers
are not doing enough of the training, which Wally Maher and Dave
Smith talked about earlier, that would enable workers to learn the new
systems. This situation then leads to what appears to be a voluntary
change of job, so you have a voluntary spell without a job. Or is this
really a "push and shove" and an involuntary job change? The inter
pretation, of course, has impacts on the kinds of health insurance one
may have, what happens to one's pensions, and what happens to one's
current income and ability to save.
I find all of this quite chilling. It leads again to the comment that
Burt Seidman raised earlier about some kind of balance being needed
between flexibility for employers in terms of their employee labor
costs and protections for workers. Employers do need flexibility with
labor; as we have seen in Western Europe, employers complain vocif
erously about all of their labor costs tied up with fringe benefits. On
the other hand, there is a need for employee protections, particularly
for workers 50 and older, who face higher probabilities of chronic
health problems and demands to care for aging parents. Right now, we
have a 10-year demographic trough in terms of the people who are 55
to 64 years old, but I can assure you being on the leading edge of the
baby boom, as are many of you in this room we haven't seen any
thing yet in terms of the needs for employee protections. I suspect,
since the baby boomers have led the way on a lot of things over the last
50 years, we will be heard on this issue as well.
The second point I want to make has to do with the effects of job
losses on incomes and pensions. The finding that Ann and her coau
thor have that earnings are significantly lower after a job loss (between
a quarter to a third less) is incredibly important for those of us who are
studying the issue of job loss among older workers. It means that not
only are such workers' earnings less, but so is their ability to save
money for retirement to round out Social Security and for any health
care costs that they're going to have to incur once they are 65 and older.
Also, the finding that pensions are no longer so connected to par
ticular employers really does alter the incentives to retire or not and to
change jobs. These changed incentives may increase the probability of
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having a spell without health insurance; I found that quite interesting
and would like to see it explored further.
My third set of comments relate to the loss of jobs and the effect on
health insurance coverage. I'll spend more time on this area since my
own research has focused on health insurance. We're primarily talking
here about the effects of an involuntary loss of a job. That's why my
earlier point about how much of job changing or job loss is involuntary
versus voluntary is really important to know. People who are married
and who voluntarily switch jobs are very likely to be relying on a
spouse as a source of access to health insurance. We know that losing a
job does not necessarily cause loss of health insurance, because fre
quently job losers or job changers are covered by health insurance from
their spouse.
However, if a person is not married (and in my paper I show that
the "unfortunates" are much less likely to be married), then clearly los
ing a job increases the probability of having a spell without health
insurance, or it increases the probability of using up a great deal of
one's savings to be able to purchase some type of nongroup health
insurance policy. In addition, if a person has any type of preexisting
health condition that he/she knows about or is concerned about because
of a familial history, then being in a spell without a job and without
health insurance is very scary. The health condition may crop up sud
denly and an individual may not have the money to pay for care. Older
workers also fear that they are less likely to gain a new job because a
potential employer may say, "Well, you look like you're a little older
and even though I worry about age discrimination, I'll just say that the
other person was more qualified for that job." We ought to be worried
about these subtle effects related to preexisting health conditions and
what they do for employment and health coverage.
A third point about job changes and health insurance (as Karen
aptly describes) is that COBRA is not as helpful as it's cracked up to
be. A person has to work for an employer with at least 20 employees to
even be covered by COBRA. A person also has to have an employer
that offers health care coverage. Thus, if an employer goes bankrupt
and the business folds, so a worker loses his or her job, the workers do
not have access to the former employer's health insurance. A person
also needs to have a lot of money to retain coverage under COBRA,
because 102 percent of a premium is a lot of money, especially if a
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former employer offers generous coverage that costs $4,000 or more
annually.
Another issue with COBRA is that people are often misled about
their eligibility at a time when they're most vulnerable. COBRA is
available not just for people who lose a job voluntarily or involuntarily;
it's also there for 36 months for people who, through divorce or the
death of a spouse, lose their access to the employer-sponsored cover
age they have had. Those of you who have been through such circum
stances know that's a particularly vulnerable period of time, and yet,a
person has only 30 days to decide to continue coverage under COBRA.
So, COBRA is not all its cracked up to be, and as Karen pointed
out, HIPAA also does not provide much protection for people. It
doesn't prevent insurers from increasing premiums when a person
changes from group coverage to nongroup coverage. There's nothing
in HIPAA that says that the insurance company can't set whatever pre
mium it deems appropriate. Although HIPAA did help place a floor on
the protections that individuals have when they shift from a group pol
icy to a nongroup policy, it is still the case that the states have the right
to regulate the nongroup, individual insurance market. These markets
are not competitive in terms of premium competition. Rather, they are
competitive in the way that the insurers go about selecting who they
want to cover and who they want to stay far away from. One group that
insurers particularly want to stay far away from is anybody over the
age of 50. They can do this by setting high premiums, say, $15,000 to
$20,000 a year, and most people then say, "I can't afford that." So
technically, while older people may not be denied a policy, they really
are not offered a policy.
Let me add one other observation about the difficulties faced by
older people in trying to purchase affordable nongroup health insur
ance policies. This relates to the web site Karen mentioned: I am
struck by the fact that it is very difficult to find a high-deductible insur
ance policy. This is also true if you have access to insurance through
employer groups. I cannot get a high-deductible policy, and my hus
band's employer does not offer a high-deductible insurance policy.
Most people whom I've asked cannot get a high-deductible insurance
policy from where they work. If you go into the nongroup market and
try to buy a high-deductible, catastrophic policy, I suspect that you will
find enormous difficulty because insurers are immediately suspicious.
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Somebody who wants a high-deductible policy knows something
adverse selection is the issue. Insurers fear that you know that you
have cancer or some kind of cardiovascular problem and you're expect
ing to use medical care in excess of $10,000 a year.
All of which brings me back to where I started the dynamic
aspects of income, pensions, and health insurance facing people who
lose jobs, particularly people who are older than 50 or in the 55- to 64year-old group that we're talking about in this conference. The issue
that we really have to be thinking hard about is how do we develop
public policies to help people during these spells or periods of time
when they are experiencing loss of a job, loss of health insurance, loss
of income without at the same time increasing the moral hazard
incentives for somebody voluntarily to enter a spell without a job. I am
very concerned about unintentionally creating incentives, then, for an
employer to feel that somebody who is 55 to 64 years of age is expend
able because a public safety net exists that will catch a person shoved
from a job. How do we put in place public policies that help older
workers in spells without jobs without at the same time increasing
incentives for more people to enter these spells?
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Permanent Partial Disability
from Occupational Injuries
Earnings Losses and Replacement
in Three States
JeffE. Biddle
Michigan State University
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Boston University
Robert T. Reville
RAND

Many older workers develop disabling health conditions or suffer
disabling injuries. The labor-market consequences of disability can
include job loss, reduced income, earlier retirement, and greater reli
ance on private and social insurance systems to provide income secu
rity. One important source of disability is work-related illness and
injury. In this chapter, we examine the labor-market consequences of
work-related disabling injuries and their relation to the age of the
injured in three states: California, Wisconsin, and Washington. We
also report estimates of the adequacy of income benefits received for
these injuries from workers' compensation.
Earnings losses and related labor-market consequences result from
workplace injuries in a number of ways. Most workers who suffer
workplace injuries have temporary disabilities: complete recovery
from the injury is expected, though some time out of work to recover is
often needed, resulting in lost earnings. During that time out of work,
workers qualify for temporary disability benefits from workers' com
pensation, which replaces some of the earnings loss. In some cases, a
workplace injury results in a permanent impairment or loss of physical
or mental health. This permanent impairment may result in permanent
loss of earning capacity and therefore of actual earnings. The perma
nent impairments incurred on the job do not typically result in the level
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of disability that qualifies for SSDI or SSI benefits. Still, income secu
rity is often threatened, and the onset of retirement may be substan
tially hastened by workplace injury and illness.
A considerable amount is spent compensating workers with perma
nent disabilities from workplace injuries. In California, permanent
partial disability (PPD) income benefits for workers' compensation
paid in 1997 totaled $1.1 billion, which is more than the total amount
paid for the higher number of temporary disabilities. As we will dis
cuss below, this $1.1 billion is only a fraction of the lost earnings of
these injured workers. The remaining burden is shouldered by the
workers and their families, as well as by other private and social insur
ance programs.
As the workforce ages, the issue of permanently disabling work
place injuries potentially becomes more significant. While the proba
bility of a workplace injury decreases with age, according to Mitchell
(1988), the probability of disabling injuries (and death) increases with
age. Recovery from injury often takes longer and is less complete for
older workers (Chirikos and Nestel 1989).
This chapter examines the losses experienced by workers with per
manent disabilities in three states and compares the adequacy of com
pensation received from the states' workers' compensation systems.
We present evidence that older workers suffer proportionately more
injuries with permanently disabling consequences and that the losses
suffered by older workers are greater, on average, than those of
younger workers. We also find that injury-related non-employment is
higher among older workers. Moreover, the older workers in states we
have studied appear to recover a smaller proportion of their losses from
workers' compensation than do other injured workers.
The data we present come from recent estimates of lost earnings of
injured or ill workers in three states: Washington (Biddle 1998), Wis
consin (Boden and Galizzi 1999) and California (Peterson et al. 1997;
Reville 1999). We summarize these recent studies and report new
information about lost earnings from workplace injuries. The esti
mates we present use administrative data on workers' compensation
claims linked to longitudinal earnings data to directly estimate the
earnings losses of injured or ill workers. They follow in the tradition of
earlier "wage loss studies" by Johnson, Cullinan, and Curington (1978)
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and Berkowitz and Burton (1987). Both of these studies linked claims
data to Social Security earnings records.
We begin with a brief description of workers' compensation per
manent disability benefits in California, Washington, and Wisconsin.
We then present the methodology used to derive estimates of injuryrelated lost earnings. Next, we describe lost earnings in the three states
and how these losses are related to the age of injured workers. Finally,
we review estimates of adequacy of workers' compensation benefits
and discuss implications for the income security of older workers.

COMPENSATION FOR PERMANENT
PARTIAL DISABILITY
Workers' compensation is a state-based administrative system that
provides benefits to workers injured on the job without regard to fault.
The benefits are set by formulas that differ from state to state. In Cali
fornia, Wisconsin, and Washington, as in many other states, both tem
porary total disability (TTD) benefits and permanent partial disability
(PPD) benefits are paid. TTD benefits are intended to provide income
support during recovery. PPD benefits are intended to compensate
workers for the losses associated with a permanently disabling work
place injury.
Setting compensation levels for TTD benefits is relatively straight
forward. The goal is income replacement during recovery. Typically,
the benefit amount is set at a level lower than the preinjury wage (often
two-thirds) to provide the worker with an incentive to maintain safety
in the workplace and to return to work when recovery is complete. 1 If
injured workers receive temporary disability benefits for all eligible
workplace injuries and if these benefits are paid for the full duration of
injury-related lost work time, evaluating the adequacy of temporary
disability income replacement is straightforward, since it is set by for
mula. The actual time out of work is usually relatively short days
instead of weeks.
Setting the benefit level and schedule of payments for permanent
disability benefits is considerably more difficult. Unlike TTD benefits,
PPD benefits are intended to compensate for current and future lost
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earnings capacity. The administrative burden and adverse incentive
effects of a system that pays injured workers as the losses are experi
enced (referred to as a wage loss system) are regarded in most states as
prohibitive. For this reason, most states (including the three states
compared in this study) set the benefit level for permanent disabilities
prospectively. Formulas are often complex, and the basis of PPD bene
fits varies from state to state. No states have set the benefit levels or the
schedule of payments for PPD benefits with empirical knowledge of
the economic consequences of disabling workplace injuries. For this
reason, the extent to which PPD benefits achieve the goal of income
replacement is unknown.
We compare estimates of the adequacy of income benefits in three
states (California, Wisconsin, and Washington). The approaches
adopted in these three states to compensating workers with perma
nently disabling injuries are described below. For a discussion of the
method of calculating permanent disabilities benefits in every state, see
Earth and Niss (1999).
To estimate the impact of disability from occupational injuries, we
estimate the losses experienced by injured workers over the years after
the injury in each of the three states.2 The estimation of losses requires
comparing postinjury earnings to a counterfactual: earnings for the
same individual while uninjured. Let y] represent the earnings while
injured, where I denotes "injured" and the subscript t denotes time
from the injury. Let the counterfactual earnings be represented by yfu ,
where U denotes "uninjured." For any individual, the undiscounted
earnings loss between the time of injury, which we will denote t = 0,
and some future date, 7, is
Eq. 1 earnings loss = £ (y^ — y] )
t=0

In the next section, we will describe the estimation of earnings
losses, which is complicated by the need to estimate the counterfac
tual vu.
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To compare the adequacy of benefits across states, we also esti
mate the fraction of earnings loss that is replaced by benefits for the
average PPD case, i.e., the replacement rate:

.
Eq. 2 replacement rate =

benefits
earnings loss

THE ESTIMATION OF LOSSES
We report the estimates of earnings losses for PPD cases from
Reville (1999), Boden and Galizzi (1999), and Biddle (1998). The
results have been updated in some cases (for instance with a longer
period of postinjury earnings for California than in Reville [1999]), and
the analyses have been modified to make estimates as comparable as
possible. However, due to data limitations in each state, the compari
son groups available and therefore the approaches adopted to estimat
ing losses in those papers and among states in this paper are different.
In particular, in each state, a different control group is used. In this
section, we describe the statistical problem raised by the estimation of
losses and the solution adopted in each of the three states. In future
work, we plan to obtain more comprehensive databases in each of these
states (and in several others) in order to compare losses among states
using identical methods.
The statistical problem in the estimation of earnings losses arises
from the unobservability of the counterfactual ;yu in Eq. 1. If we
could observe both injured and uninjured earnings for every injured
worker, estimating earnings loss would be straightforward and given
by Eq. 1. However, y, cannot be observed, and an estimate, yfu imist
be constructed.
At an administrative level, workers' compensation programs must
also estimate yu when setting benefits, and typically they use the preinjury earnings. However, particularly for estimating the long-term
consequences of permanent disabilities, the preinjury wage is not a sat
isfactory proxy. First, without the injury, the worker may have experi
enced wage growth over time, which the preinjury earnings will not
measure. Second, if the injury had not occurred, it is possible that the
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injured worker would have been unemployed or exited the workforce
for different reasons. It is not appropriate to assume that they would
have earned the preinjury earnings in every postinjury earnings period.
Instead of using preinjury earnings, we estimate uninjured earnings
in the postinjury period using the earnings of a comparison (control)
group. This approach draws its inspiration from the training program
evaluation literature (Dehejia and Wahba 1996; Heckman and Hotz
1989; Holland 1986; LaLonde 1986). The control group comprises
workers who were similar to the injured workers with respect to demo
graphic and economic characteristics but who did not experience a
workplace injury during the time period under examination.3
Biddle (1998) and Boden and Galizzi (1999) as well as the esti
mates from Washington and Wisconsin reported below, each used
workers with minor injuries as comparison groups. To correct for
observed differences between injured workers and controls, a fixedeffect earnings regression model is estimated. Reville (1999) and our
estimates for California (reported below) used uninjured workers at the
same firm as controls. Observed differences are corrected for using a
case-control matching methodology. In the remainder of this section,
we describe the particular estimation approach and the data used for
each state.

Washington and Wisconsin
In Biddle (1998) and Boden and Galizzi (1999), as well as in the
Washington and Wisconsin estimates reported below, yu is estimated
from the earnings of workers with minor workplace injuries. The
minor injuries used in the Washington study resulted in less than three
days out of work and no permanent disability benefits (referred to as
medical-only cases). The Wisconsin minor injuries resulted in 8 to 10
days out of work and no permanent disability benefits. In both states,
earnings regressions were estimated using longitudinal data on real
quarterly earnings for a pooled sample of controls and injured workers.
Independent variables included age in the quarter of observation and
calendar year and quarter dummies to control for business cycle effects
common to the earnings of all workers. Also, pre- and postinjury earn
ings were allowed to follow different trends depending on the severity
of the injury. 5
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The regression coefficients were used to project what the earnings
of the injured worker would have been in the quarter of injury and the
postinjury quarters, using that worker's estimated fixed effect and the
coefficients estimated for the comparison group. The earnings loss
estimate for each postinjury quarter was set equal to this earnings pro
jection minus the actual earnings of the injured worker. Quarterly
earnings loss estimates for the quarter of injury and 14 subsequent
quarters were then discounted at a 2.3 percent rate5 and summed to pro
duce a single loss figure.
To check the quality of the control group, the preinjury earnings of
the controls and the injured workers were compared in both Washing
ton and Wisconsin. In Wisconsin, preinjury differences in quarterly
earnings growth6 between the controls and injured workers were small
(under $8) and statistically insignificant (Boden and Galizzi 1999); in
Washington, the difference was about $17 per quarter.
In Washington, the claims data are from the Washington Depart
ment of Labor and Industries and consist of a sample of workers' com
pensation injuries from July 1993 to June 1994. The sample includes
8769 medical-only cases and 34,618 workers receiving income benefits
(TTD and PPD). The claims data are linked to 21 quarterly reports on
earnings provided by employers in the state to the Washington
Employment Security Department.7 The earnings are from six quarters
before to 14 quarters after the injury. The Wisconsin claims data pro
vided by the Wisconsin Division of Workers' Compensation are from
1989 and 1990. They are linked to 24 quarterly earnings reports from
the Wisconsin Division of Employment Security, ranging from 8 quar
ters before to as long as 18 quarters after the injury. The sample con
sists of 6,416 short-term injuries and 47,889 longer-term injuries and
injuries involving PPD benefits.
California
Reville (1999)8 and the estimates reported below for California
used uninjured workers as controls. Each injured worker was matched
to up to 10 uninjured workers at the same employer with earnings
approximately equal to the preinjury earnings for the injured worker.
The mean difference in earnings between the injured and control work
ers in the quarters after injury was then used to estimate losses.9 An
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estimate of cumulative earnings loss is calculated by summing over
time for every worker the earnings loss in every quarter, discounted (at
2.3 percent) to the quarter of injury.
As in Washington and Wisconsin, to test for the quality of the con
trols, Reville (1999) compared the preinjury earnings of the injured
workers to the comparison workers over the years prior to injury. Con
trols were matched to injured workers based on the four quarters prior
to the injury. Eight additional quarters before the first four quarters
prior are available for testing the controls. The match was found to be
very close, with an average quarterly difference in earnings of only
$28, less than 2 percent of the difference found in the quarters follow
ing injury. 10
The claims data are from the California Workers' Compensation
Insurance Rating Bureau and consist of workers' compensation PPD
claims from injuries during 1993 at insured firms. 11 The data are
matched to quarterly earnings data from the fourth quarter of 1989
through the second quarter of 1998 from the California Employment
Development Department. Data on 8,107 claims are matched to earn
ings data for 28,862 uninjured workers.

PERMANENT PARTIAL DISABILITY BENEFITS
IN THREE STATES

The amount paid for temporary disability benefits differs among
states. There are, however, only a few dimensions along which tempo
rary disability benefits vary. Benefits are set as a fraction of the prein
jury wage, where the fraction varies among states. There are also
different maximum and minimum benefits, waiting periods, and maxi
mum numbers of weeks. Most states use the pretax wage as a basis for
temporary disability benefits. However, because workers' compensa
tion benefits are not taxed, other states base their benefits on "spend
able earnings," which are meant to approximate after-tax earnings. The
rules governing temporary disability payments in the three states we
examine are summarized in Table 1.
Differences among states in permanent disability benefits are
harder to categorize along a few dimensions. This reflects the com-
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Table 1 Summary of Income Benefits in California, Wisconsin, and
Washington
California 1993 income benefits

TTD weekly amount

2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum of
$336

TTD waiting period

3 days

PPD weekly amount

2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum

PPD weekly benefit maximum

Maximum: $140 (ratings under 25)
$148 (earnings 25 and above)

Weeks of PPD benefits

Vary by rating:
25th percentile: 24 weeks
50th percentile: 50 weeks
75th percentile: 96 weeks
99th percentile: 426 weeks plus life
pension

Other income benefit:
Vocational rehabilitation
maintenance

2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum of $246

Wisconsin 1989-90 income benefits

TTD payment amounts

2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum of $363
(1989) or $388 (1990)

TTD waiting period

3 days (7-day retroactive penod)

PTD weekly amount

2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum of $125
(1989) or $131 (1990)

Weeks of PPD benefits

10 weeks per percentage point

Lump-sum payments of unaccrued

25th percentile: 13 weeks

benefits generally not allowed

50th percentile: 28 weeks
75th percentile: 60 weeks
99th percentile: 526 weeks

Other income benefit:
Vocational rehabilitation
maintenance

2/3 preinjury pretax wage to maximum of $363
(1989) or $388 (1990)
(continued)
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Table 1 (continued)
Washington 1993-94 income
benefits
TTD payment amounts

From 60% to 75% of preinjury pretax wage,
depending on marital status and number of
dependents; maximum of $2216 per month
paid in bimonthly installments

TTD waiting period

3 days

PPD payment methods

Total awards based on schedule of injuries and/
or percentage disability rating system. If
total award exceeds $6600 dollars, monthly
payments are made according to TTD
payment schedule until full award is paid.

Other income benefit:
Vocational rehabilitation
maintenance

Ordinary TTD benefits can be received during
participation in approved VR program.

plexity of the problem of setting higher benefits for people with greater
disability based on comparing individuals with different injuries. 12 In
most states, there are "schedules" that set dollar amounts for particular
injuries (such as $27,813 for the loss of a thumb in Washington in
1997), though the schedules differ among states and the ranking of
injuries is sometimes reversed in different states. Most states also use
some kind of rating system that ranks different injuries on a scale of 1
to 100 depending upon physician impairment ratings or ratings derived
from medical descriptions of impairments (such as the fraction of range
of motion that is lost in the shoulder). 13 These rating systems are used
either for all injuries, as in California, or only for unscheduled injuries.
Like the schedules, these rating systems rank different injuries, and the
relative ranking of particular injuries in different rating systems can
vary. Some states pay different amounts depending upon whether you
have returned to work or returned to the at-injury employer. In addi
tion, there are differences in weekly amounts and in the number of
weeks that benefits are paid.
In the remainder of this section, we describe more fully the rules
determining the size of permanent benefits payments in each of the
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three states being examined and present some descriptive statistics on
the fraction of claims with permanent disabilities.
Washington
In Washington, there are statutorily determined PPD award
amounts for a list of specified injuries to scheduled body parts (for
example, amputation of the leg above the knee). Workers can also be
given benefits for unspecified injuries to scheduled body parts. In this
case, a rating for the percentage of impairment is multiplied by the
scheduled amputation value of the body part. Finally, there are awards
for unspecified injuries to unscheduled body parts (including, notably,
backs and necks). In these cases, physicians make use of a set of rules
and guidelines issued by the Department of Labor and Industry to
assign a "percentage of total bodily impairment" caused by the injury.
This percentage is then multiplied by a scheduled total bodily impair
ment value, which was $118,800 as of July 1994. As Table 1 indicates,
during the 1993-1994 period, awards below $6,600 (a little over half of
all awards) were paid out in a lump sum, while awards greater than that
amount were paid out in monthly installments.
Table 2 reports the percentage of injured workers receiving perma
nent disability awards in various age categories in Washington, Wis
consin, and California. The figures in the cells reflect the ratio of
Table 2 Share of Workers' Compensation Cases with PPD Benefits by Age
Group (%)
Age group
Sample
Wisconsin3

Under 35

35-54

Over 55

Overall

27.9

18.1

14.1

21.2

Washington6

17.1

27.0

39.0

23.4

California 1991-96
(self-insured)

37.2

47.0

49.2

44.0

California 1993d (insured)

42.9

"Wisconsin Division of Workers' Compensation, authors' calculations
b Washington Department of Labor and Industries, authors' calculations.
c Random sample of self-insured indemnity claims data collected by RAND.
d Workers' Compensation Insurance Ratings Bureau data, authors' calculations.
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claims receiving PPD awards to all claims with income benefits, that is,
all claims involving compensation for lost time and/or PPD benefits.
In Washington, 23.4 percent of claims with income benefits in the
period examined involved PPD awards. However, this percentage rises
with age and is 39 percent for injured workers 55 years or older.
Wisconsin
Wisconsin has two kinds of PPD benefits, functional impairment
benefits and earnings capacity benefits. Functional impairment bene
fits are based upon a physician impairment rating. Earning capacity
benefits are paid only to workers with nonscheduled injuries (typically
head, back, or neck injuries) who do not return to work or who are
rehired at no more than 85 percent of their former wage. Typically,
workers qualifying for earning capacity benefits have not returned to
their former employer. Earning capacity benefits use the same formula
per percentage point of permanent disability, but the disability percent
ages tend to be much larger than for functional impairment benefits.
They are determined by reports of "vocational experts" on the effect of
the impairment on the worker's wage-earning capacity.
Table 1 displays PPD benefit levels in Wisconsin for 1989-1990
injuries. PPD benefits are subject to a maximum weekly benefit of
$125 for injuries occurring in 1989 and $131 for those occurring in
1990. This maximum weekly benefit represents just over one-third of
the maximum weekly TTD benefit. Each percent of permanent disabil
ity of the body as a whole is allocated 10 weeks' benefits. For 1989
injuries, this implies a maximum benefit payment of $1,250 per per
centage point of disability. Generally, benefits are paid monthly, so
that monthly maximum PPD benefits for 1989-1990 injuries were
about $500. Only 18.1 percent of workers with lost-time workers'
compensation cases received PPD benefits in Wisconsin in 1989-1990
(Table 2).
California
California's method for setting permanent disability benefits is dis
tinctive and perhaps the most complex of the three states. All disabili-
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ties are described and ranked in a rating system that is unique to
California. This rating system includes medical descriptions of impair
ments as well as work restrictions (such as different ratings for "no
heavy lifting" and "no very heavy lifting"). It also includes compensa
tion for "subjectives" such as chronic pain, even in the absence of med
ical evidence to support it.
As a result of this relatively permissive description of permanent
disability, California has a considerably larger fraction of claims with
permanent disability. As seen in Table 2, more than 40 percent of indi
viduals receiving income benefit payments also receive permanent dis
ability benefits. As in Wisconsin and Washington, the fraction with
permanent disabilities increases with age, so that for workers over 55,
almost half receive permanent disability benefits. 14
California is also unique in the extent to which benefits are
adjusted to account for the individual circumstances of the injured
worker. On the assumption that the same injury will lead to different
losses depending upon the occupation of the injured worker, Califor
nia's disability rating system assigns different values for the same
injury in different occupations. For instance, an injury that affects
speech will lead to higher benefits for a radio announcer than for a
bricklayer; however, an injury that affects the shoulder will lead to a
higher benefit for the bricklayer. Finally, on the assumption that recov
ery is harder with age, higher benefits are paid for older workers.
Table 1 shows that the maximum benefit levels for temporary and
permanent disabilities in California are similar to those in Wisconsin
(and difficult to compare with Washington's). The formula for weeks
is very complex, with the number of weeks for each additional disabil
ity rating point increasing with the disability rating. Using the actual
distribution of PPD awards, the table shows the number of weeks of
PPD benefits by quartile of award for Wisconsin and California. In
general, California has longer periods of PPD than Wisconsin.
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EARNINGS LOSS AND REPLACEMENT RATE
ESTIMATES BY STATE
In Table 3, we report the losses for all three states, together with
the total income benefits paid, the preinjury average quarterly earnings,
and the pretax replacement rate. Total income benefits paid includes
temporary total disability and permanent partial disability benefits in
all three states. In addition, in California and Wisconsin, injured work
ers are allowed to accept a cash settlement for the future value of the
medical care in exchange for releasing the insurer or employer for any
liability for future medica expensesl. This is not allowed in Washing
ton. Finally, all three states pay a vocational rehabilitation (VR) main
tenance allowance, which is paid while the worker is unable to work
due to participation in VR. 15 Losses are reported in each state for 3.5
years and 10 years after injury. In all three states, the estimates at 3.5
years are based on observed postinjury earnings. Estimates at 10 years
are based on projecting the losses an additional 6.5 years, discounted
and based on the loss estimated for the final year observed.
Table 3 shows that losses in Washington and Wisconsin are very
similar; losses in California appear to be considerably higher. Califor
nia income benefits paid are also considerably higher than those in
Washington and Wisconsin, but not high enough to cover the differ
ences in losses. 16 This is shown in the far right column of Table 3,
which reports the pretax replacement rate at 10 years among states. In
Washington and Wisconsin, the replacement rate is over 45 percent,
while in California, the replacement rate is below 40 percent. 17
Table 3 Average Losses by Years from Injury and Pretax Replacement
Rate, PPD Cases3

Sample
California

Total
Preinjury
quarterly
income
earnings ($) benefits ($)
21,229
5,284
14,196
5,868
14,975
5,601

Wisconsin
Washington
a Dollar values in 1984 dollars.
b Projected.

Losses by years
from injury ($)
10b
3.5
26,383
17,602
15,358

56,340
30,746
32,427

Replacement
rate of
10- yr. losses
0.377
0.462
0.462
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Although useful for comparing among states, the after-tax replace
ment rate might be preferred as a measure of adequacy because work
ers' compensation benefits are tax-free. In after-tax dollars, the
earnings loss would be 20-30 percent lower, and therefore the replace
ment rate would be higher. However, two other sources of bias are in
the opposite direction. First, the choice of 10 years for the replacement
rate is arbitrary. In work in progress by the authors using California
data, losses are found to continue at much the same annual level even
with seven years of observed postinjury earnings. Since virtually all
injured workers have already received all workers' compensation bene
fits by five years, but losses may continue for many years after that, the
replacement rate for longer periods would be lower. Also, fringe bene
fits are a significant source of compensation. 18 Some fringe benefits are
tied to earnings, and others may be lost if the disabled worker cannot
return to the preinjury job. 19
Table 4 shows losses over the observed period of 3.5 years and
losses projected to both 6.5 years and 10 years for three age groups.
Estimates are reported only for Washington and Wisconsin, because
data limitations prevent the calculation of these estimates for Califor
nia. The table shows that, in both states, losses increase with age. In
Table 4 Losses by Age Group and State, PPD Cases (1994 $)
Sample

Under 35

35-54

Over 55

Wisconsin
Preinjury quarterly earnings

4,917

6,625

6,276

Losses (3.5 yr.)

13,832

19,038

26,287

Losses (projected 6.5 yr.)

18,159

23,842

45,880

Losses (projected 10 yr.)

24,317

30,678

56,271

Income benefits received

12,475

15,477

15,990

4,798

6,687

7,556

Washington
Preinjury quarterly earnings
Losses (3.5 yr.)

14,782

15,190

17,691

Losses (projected 6.5 yr.)

22,265

22,825

30,295

Losses (projected 10 yr.)

30,383

31,110

43,969

Income benefits received

14,790

15,650

12,428
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Wisconsin, injured workers under 35 experience losses of $13,832 over
the 3.5 years following injury, while workers over 55 experience losses
almost twice as large. In Washington, the increase in lost earnings with
age is less dramatic, with workers under 35 losing $14,782 over the 3.5
years following injury, and injured workers 55 and over losing an esti
mated $17,691.
Because earnings increase with age, and higher-paid workers will
lose more for the same amount of lost work time, when comparing
among age groups it is useful to normalize the lost earnings by preinjury earnings. Dividing the loss by the preinjury quarterly earnings
provides a measure of lost earnings in terms of quarters of lost earnings
at the preinjury earnings level. Using this measure, the age pattern of
losses for injured workers in Wisconsin is different than in Washington.
In Wisconsin, workers over 55 lose the equivalent of almost one year of
preinjury earnings during the 3.5 years after injury, compared with less
than nine months (three quarters) for each of the other two age groups.
This suggests that older disabled workers in Wisconsin experience
more time out of work following the injury than younger disabled
workers. In contrast, the youngest disabled workers in Washington
experience the largest earnings losses relative to the preinjury earnings.
Injured workers in Washington under 35 experience over nine months
(three quarters) of lost preinjury earnings; by comparison, workers
over 55 experience less than seven months of losses.
Projecting losses to 10 years after injury produces results for Wis
consin that are qualitatively similar to the losses for 3.5 years: older
disabled workers experience considerably larger losses measured abso
lutely or in months of lost earnings. At 10 years postinjury, months of
lost earnings in Washington become similar among age groups. In
both states, replacement of lost earnings during the first 10 years after
the injury is considerably lower for workers over 55. In Figure 1, the
replacement rate of 10-year losses by age group is shown for Washing
ton and Wisconsin. For the two age groups below 55, the replacement
rate is approximately one-half. For the injured workers aged 55 and
over, the replacement rate in both states is 28 percent.20
Our 10-year projections may provide an overstatement of losses
for workers over 55, since by age 65, it is likely they will have retired
even if they had not been injured and therefore would have received no
further earnings losses.21 For this reason, we also report 6.5-year pro-

Session 3: Chronic Illness and Disability 279

Figure 1 Projected 10-Year Earnings Replacement Rate by Age:
Washington and Wisconsin PPD Cases

Under 35

35-54

Wisconsin

Over 55

D Washington

jections for losses (3.5 observed years and 3 projected years at the last
quarter's average loss), which presumably are less likely to be biased in
this manner. The 6.5 year projected replacement rate of 0.41 for Wash
ington and 0.35 for Wisconsin is lower than even the 10-year projected
replacement rate for the younger age groups.
The results in Figure 1 and Table 4 suggest that the adequacy of
replacement rates is lowest for the oldest injured workers. It should be
noted, though, that the 10-year replacement rate provides a limited
window during which to observe losses. It is possible that losses
beyond the observed period for workers in the oldest age category
(over 55) will be considerably lower or nonexistent because many
would have retired even had they not been injured. Younger workers
may lose less during the first few years but over their lifetime may lose
more.22
Table 5 reports on how well PPD benefits are tailored to lost earn
ings. As noted earlier, disability ratings are used in all three states to
predict which workers have greater disability so that higher benefits
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can be targeted to the most serious cases. If this system were success
ful, we would expect benefits would increase at least in proportion to
losses. To examine this, the table divides the distribution of income
benefits into quintiles and calculates the average losses within each
quintile. We would expect that the losses would increase with the
income benefit quintile. In California, the lowest benefit quintile had
losses that are five-sixths the losses of the second lowest quintile; how
ever, benefits in the first quintile are 30 percent of those of the second
quintile. An already low replacement rate of 19 percent for the second
quintile is far lower than that for the first (7 percent). The results for
Washington are even more dramatic. While the highest quintile
receives benefits five times larger than those of the lowest quintile,
losses are only 25 percent higher. Losses in the second and fourth
quintiles are lower than in the first and third, respectively. In contrast,
losses in Wisconsin increase monotonically with income benefits, lead
ing to very similar replacement rates in all but the highest quintile.24
The relative success in equitably distributing benefits in Wisconsin
may be driven by Wisconsin's two-tier system, which pays earnings
capacity benefits only to workers who either do not return to work or
who return at a substantially lower wage. Workers receiving earnings
capacity benefits will almost always have higher losses. Washington's
relative inability to target benefits to the more serious cases may be
driven by the limitations of the impairment-based system used to set
benefits. It is possible that information on the type of injury alone does
not capture as much variation in the postinjury outcomes as economic
factors such as the ability to return to work (the payment of earnings
capacity benefits in Wisconsin) or the personal characteristics of the
injured (the occupational and age adjustments to disability ratings used
in California).
Several recent papers have noted that, particularly in permanent
disability cases, absence from work following the initial return to work
is common among workers with occupational injuries (Biddle 1998;
Butler, Johnson, and Baldwin 1995; Galizzi and Boden 1996; Reville
1999). For this reason, we depart from the approach often adopted in
the workers' compensation literature of examining duration to first
return to work, and instead we examine differences over the years after
the injury between the fraction of injured workers and controls without
reported earnings. This allows both the injured workers and the con-

Table 5 The Relationship of Losses and Total Income Benefits, by PPD Benefit Percentile
Permanent disability benefit percentile
0-20

21^0

41-60

61-80

Losses at 3.5 yr. ($)

14,654

17,818

26,319

37,043

69,937

Losses projected 10 yr ($)

24,120

29,948

43,107

55,754

114,226

1,695

5,689

12,391

24,158

61,621

7

18.9

28.7

44.1

53.9

Losses at 3.5 yr. ($)

13,493

13,499

16,199

5,915

17,679

Sample
California 1993 injuries

Income benefits received3 ($)
10-yr. replacement rate (%)
Washington 1993-94
injuries

Wisconsin 1989-90
injuries

81-100

Losses projected 10 yr. ($)

30,512

28,834

34,555

32,485

35,775

Income benefits received3 ($)

4,395

8,859

14,095

18,086

29,433

10-yr. replacement rate (%)

14.4

30.8

408

55.7

82.3

Losses at 3.5 yr. ($)

6,078

9,209

14,616

18,976

37,595

Losses projected 10 yr. ($)

8,255

13,816

20,957

32,036

65,713

Income benefits received3 ($)

3,299

6,259

9,912

14,703

38,425

40.0

45.3

47.3

45.9

58.5

10-yr. replacement rate (%)
1 Temporary plus permanent disability benefits.
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trols to move in and out of the labor force, but if the fraction of injured
workers out of the labor force exceeds the fraction of controls, then we
assume this is injury-related.24 This estimate of injury-related nonemployment is reported in Table 6 for 3, 5, 10, and (where available)
20 quarters after injury.
Table 6 shows that in all three states, injury-related non-employ
ment continues to be significant even 10 quarters following injury. It is
clear that California's considerably higher earnings losses are associ
ated with much higher rates of injury-related non-employment. Both
the 1992 and 1993 injured workers have injury-related non-employ
ment exceeding 15 percent for the first 21/2 years, though similar rates
are never observed in Washington or Wisconsin, not even during the
first quarter after injury. As shown in Reville and Schoeni (1999),
injury-related non-employment is higher in recessions, and the differ
ence between the states may be in part driven by the severity of the
recession experienced in California in the early 1990s. There may be
other reasons for the difference, including differences in litigation rates
among the states and differences in the characteristics of jobs, workers,
and industries. We plan to explore these differences in future studies.
Table 7 shows non-employment for Washington and Wisconsin by
age group. In both Washington and Wisconsin, compared with nondisabled workers, workers over 55 with permanently disabling injuries are
increasingly likely to be out of work as time from the injury increases.
This suggests that a disabling workplace injury (as with the onset of
other health conditions) may lead older workers to choose to retire ear
lier than they would have otherwise.
Table 6 Injury-Related Non-Employment Rate by Quarters
from Injury (%)
Quarters
Sample

3

5

10

20

California 1993 injuries

25

23

17

9

Washington 1993-94
injuries

12

11

9

NDa

Wisconsin 1989-90
injuries

12

12

12

ND

a ND = no data available
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Table 7 Injury-Related Non-Employment Rates by Quarters from Injury
and by Age Group, PPD Cases in Wisconsin and Washington (%)
Quarters
Sample

3

5

10

11

10

9

8

11

12

12

17

27

Wisconsin
Age <35
Age 35-54
Age 55+
Washington
13

11

7

Age 35-54

12

12

10

Age 55+

13

15

18

Age <35

CONCLUSION
This paper examines the losses experienced by workers with per
manent disabilities in California, Washington and Wisconsin and com
pares the adequacy of compensation received from those states'
workers' compensation systems. We find evidence of substantial
losses from permanently disabling injuries in the three states. The state
programs differ substantially in the proportion of workers' compensa
tion cases receiving permanent disability benefits and in the average
losses sustained by these injured workers, reflecting both differences in
the laws and practices in those states. In general, California stands out:
a higher proportion of injured workers received permanent disability
benefits in California, experiencing higher average losses and receiving
higher average benefits (but replacing a lower fraction of lost earnings).
Wisconsin's system appears to lead to better targeting of benefits to
losses, while Washington's impairment-based PPD schedule leads to
losses unrelated to benefits paid.
It is possible that some of the differences among the states are
driven by differences in industry mix, demographics, and economic
conditions. At this point, we also cannot rule out the possibility that
the differences are driven, at least in part, by differences in methods
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used. However, our preliminary research (which is still in progress) on
disabling injuries in Florida, a state with industry mix and demograph
ics that are similar to those of California, has found losses that are at
least as close to those in California as to Wisconsin's or Washington's.
This research has used the same methods we have used in Wisconsin,
which suggests that the methods do not drive the observed differences.
In our ongoing research, we are estimating losses with similar control
groups and will examine how measured interstate differences (such as
industry mix) affect the disparities in the losses we have measured.
Besides differences in earnings losses, California also pays PPD
benefits to more than twice the proportion of workers with lost-time
injuries than do the other two states (see Table 2). This does not neces
sarily imply that more workers in California suffer long-term losses; as
noted earlier, California has a relatively more permissive definition of
permanent disability than the other states, with greater reliance on sub
jective complaints (such as pain) and on work restrictions. However,
Biddle (1998) and Boden and Galizzi (1999) both found that individu
als with long-term temporary disability benefits (more than four
weeks) but lacking permanent disability benefits have losses that are,
on average, almost as large as those in PPD cases and that these losses
continued at least to the end of the period they observed.25 The longterm TTD group is larger in these states than the group receiving per
manent disability benefits. Since they do not receive PPD benefits but
have similar losses, these workers also had the lowest replacement
rates. Within this group, there are certain to be a significant number of
people who would have qualified for PPD benefits had they been
injured in California. Accounting for this might reduce the differences
in replacement rates among states, even if it does not reduce the differ
ences in earnings losses.
Our data indicate that workplace injuries and illnesses are impor
tant sources of disability throughout the working life, but that they are
particularly so for older workers. When older workers are injured, they
appear to suffer more permanently disabling injuries, and those with
permanent disabilities experience more injury-related non-employ
ment. Current evidence on the relationship of age and losses is ambig
uous. Still, older workers in the states we have studied appear to
recover a smaller proportion of their losses from workers' compensa
tion than do other injured workers, at least over the first few years after
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injury. This raises concerns about the extent to which the uncompensated burden of work-related disabilities of older workers falls on the
workers and their families or is absorbed by other public and private
insurance systems.
The mechanisms behind the age-related differences in employment
and losses are unclear. We do not know the extent to which they are
simply caused by age-related physiological effects like delayed and
incomplete recovery, nor do we yet understand the interaction between
retirement decisions and the onset of work-related disabilities. Health
and disability has been shown to be a primary reason for retirement
(Anderson and Burkhauser 1985; Blau, Gilleskie, and Slusher 1997;
Bound 1991; Sherman 1985; Stern 1988), but the extent to which
health and disability is driven by occupational factors is unknown.
Finally, we have questions about how the nature of employer accom
modations may differentially affect older and younger workers. Stud
ies have shown that when the employers provide accommodations for
disabled workers and rehire injured workers, time lost from work is
reduced substantially and the employment trajectory is improved
(Burkhauser, Butler, and Kirn 1995; Galizzi and Boden 1996).
The analysis of disability from workplace injuries is likely to prove
useful not only in its own right, but also in helping us to understand
more about the labor-market impacts of nonworkplace health shocks
on older workers. In particular, occupational injuries provide unusu
ally good availability of administrative data and potential access to
more detailed data about the behavior of both the supply and demand
sides of the labor market for disabled workers.

Notes
The authors gratefully acknowledge the support of the National Institute for Occupa
tional Safety and Health, and the State of California Commission on Health and Safety
and Workers' Compensation.
1. A considerable literature in economics exists on the incentive effects of temporary
disability benefits. See, for instance, Moore and Viscusi (1990), Krueger (1990),
and Meyer, Viscusi, and Durbin (1995)
2. For a discussion of some theoretical issues in the interpretation of earnings losses
as a measure of welfare of injured workers, see Reville, Bhattacharya, and Sager
(1999)
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3. Earnings losses have also been estimated using similar methods in the literature
on the impact of downsizing. See, for instance, Jacobson, LaLonde, and Sullivan
(1993) and Schoeni and Dardia (1996).
4. Workers were categorized into severity groups based on number of days missed
and whether PPD benefits were received, and workers in different groups were
allowed to have separate premjury trends of earnings. The specification allowed
the earnings of workers in the comparison group to follow a linear trend in the
postmjury period as well, while for each of the injured worker groups, dummy
variables for the quarter of injury and the five subsequent quarters allowed earn
ings to follow a flexible, nonmonotonic path following the injury. After this sixquarter period, a separate linear earnings trend was specified for each injured
worker group. Variables were also included to control for the impact of any sub
sequent injuries on earnings. The Washington estimates were based on a fixedeffects specification, while the Wisconsin estimates used a first-differences
approach. The results showed little sensitivity to the specification used.
5. Boden and Galizzi (1999) used a 3 percent rate, but the estimates presented below
use a 2.3 percent rate.
6. The use of a fixed-effect regression technique controls for any persistent preinjury
differences in the level of earnings between injured workers and the workers in
the comparison group. Even before controlling, however, these differences
amount to less than 5 percent of quarterly earnings.
7. In each of the three states, workers' compensation claims data are linked to longi
tudinal quarterly earnings data collected by the state for administration of the
unemployment insurance (UI) program. The earnings data are obtained for both
the injured workers and the comparison workers. The UI data reports all withinstate, before-tax earnings at Ul-covered employers (approximately 95 percent of
employment in each of the states). If no earnings data are reported for a particular
quarter for either injured workers or controls, we assume that zero earnings are
received. Earnings data for the self-insured and for workers who move out of
state will be missing. This will not bias estimates unless disabled workers are sys
tematically more or less likely to receive these types of earnings.
8. See also Peterson, Reville, Stem, and Earth (1997).
9. For a general discussion of matching in econometrics, see Heckman, Ichimura,
and Todd (1997).
10. This test is not directly comparable to the test in Washington and Wisconsin. The
$28 difference in California is in levels, while the $17 and $8 differences for the
other states reported above were in changes (or growth).
11. Two-thirds of employees in California work at insured firms (firms that purchase
insurance). The remaining one-third are employed at self-insured firms.
12. States vary in the statutory justification for permanent disability benefits. Many
states, such as California, justify it as compensation for loss of future earnings
capacity. Construction of an ordinal scale to rank injuries and set compensation is
equally complex with the justifications used in other states, such as compensation
for "impairment."

Session 3: Chronic Illness and Disability

287

13. The most commonly used rating system is the American Medical Association's
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment (1993)
14. Table 2 reports the fraction with PPD by age using a new sample of self-insured
claims recently collected by RAND. Data on age for workers with temporary dis
ability benefits are not available for the insured firms examined in this paper.
15. In addition, workers' legal and medical-legal expenses have not been subtracted
from the indemnity paid to the worker, even though they are usually directly paid
to attorneys or evaluating doctors.
16. In Reville (1999), estimates of the replacement rate use simulated benefits paid
out over time according to the schedule using the information from the WCIRB
data on actual disability ratings and various benefits paid. This was intended to
insure that the time window for losses and benefits coincide and to eliminate the
impact of the settlement of medical costs in the replacement rate. This led to
lower total income benefit payments (reflecting the fact that five years of losses
were reported and therefore the benefits represented five years of benefits) and
therefore lower replacement rates. This approach is not adopted here for consis
tency with the data available from other states.
17. Berkowitz and Burton (1987), using data from claims in 1968, also found thai,
replacement rates were considerably higher in Wisconsin than in California.
18. According to U.S. Department of Labor (1998), nonwage benefits account for
approximately 38 percent of wage and salary income.
19. We interpret the replacement rates as the fraction of losses replaced by workers'
compensation benefits Another interesting estimate would be the fraction of
losses replaced by all government benefits. While most of the injured workers are
not disabled enough to receive Social Secunty disability benefits, we suspect thai,
they are more likely to receive them than their controls, and therefore replacemeni.
rates counting all benefits would be higher. However, we do not have data on
Social Security disability benefits for these workers.
20. This, too, may be somewhat exaggerated by the projection method for losses,
which does not account for the decline in losses associated with retirement.
21. The regression specification includes a fourth-order polynomial in age, and there
fore we expect that we have accounted for age during the observed period flexibly
enough to correctly estimate losses even given the decline in labor force participa
tion after age 65.
22. Benefits for PPD in state workers' compensation systems differentially reflect the
two opposing effects of age on lost earnings. As noted earlier, in California.,
higher benefits are paid to older workers to compensate them for their diminished
ability to recover from injury. In contrast, in Colorado, lower benefits are paid to
older workers (Barth and Niss 1999), presumably because they are closer to
retirement and will not experience lost earnings over as many years.
23. In all states, the replacement rate results for the highest quintile may be exagger
ated relative to the lower quintiles by the use of a 10-year projection period. This
group is likely to have large and long-term losses.
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24. As with earnings, in all three states we found no evidence of significant differ
ences in labor force participation of injured workers and controls prior to injury.
25. Some people who have not received PPD benefits may nevertheless have perma
nent impairments that cause long-term earnings losses. This may reflect a limita
tion in the disability rating mechanism used by the state. Alternatively, long-term
losses may occur because of labor-market effects that persist after recovery from
injury. For example, workers who stay off work several months may lose their
preinjury jobs and their investments in skill and senionty at those jobs. Earnings
and employment after return could be affected, even if they fully recover from the
effects of the injury. Finally, some of the long-term losses may be attributable to
employers' unwillingness to hire people with the stigma of past workers' compen
sation injuries and illnesses. Employers may believe that long spells of work
absence mark someone as unreliable or otherwise unacceptable for employment,
thus limiting employment opportunities and reducing future earnings for this
group.
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How Working-Age People
with Disabilities Fared over the
1990s Business Cycle
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I am pleased to report that the American economy today is healthy
and strong. Our Nation is enjoying the longest peacetime eco
nomic expansion in its history, with almost 18 million new jobs
since 1993, wages rising at twice the rate of inflation, the highest
home ownership ever, the smallest welfare rolls in 30 years, and
unemployment and inflation at their lowest levels in three
decades.
This expansion, unlike recent previous ones, is both wide and
deep. All income groups, from the richest to the poorest, have
seen their income rise since 1993. The typical family income is up
more than $3,500, adjusted for inflation. African-American and
Hispanic households, who were left behind during the last expan
sion, have also seen substantial increase in income.
—President William Jefferson Clinton
Economic Report of the President (1999)

As President Clinton's remarks indicate, the 1990s were an eco
nomically enriching period for the vast majority of American families.
Robust economic growth has produced the lowest unemployment and
inflation rates in 30 years and lifted living standards across the income
distribution. Importantly, the economic recovery of the 1990s reached
traditionally economically vulnerable groups including African Ameri
cans, Hispanics, those with less than a high-school education, and sin-
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gle mothers with children, often lifting their income to levels beyond
previous business cycle peaks (U.S. Census Bureau 1999).
While President Clinton and Americans generally have every rea
son to be pleased with the current economic expansion, it is important
to put this good news into perspective by understanding which, if any,
groups have been systematically left behind. One group that frequently
is overlooked in such discussions is people with disabilities, even
though they constitute a group more likely to be sensitive to economic
fluctuations than the general population. In this chapter, we examine
how people with disabilities fared over the 1990s business cycle.

MEASURING ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE
Cross-sectional comparisons of the economic well-being of Amer
icans over time are sensitive to the years over which the comparisons
are made. Figures la and Ib use two general economic indicators of
the business cycle used in the Economic Report of the President
(1999) median real family income and civilian unemployment
rates to demonstrate this point. (The actual values are reported in
Appendix Table Al.) As can be seen in these figures, business-cycle
peaks in 1973, 1979, and 1989 were followed by business cycle
troughs in 1975, 1982, and 1992. While an up ward-sloping line can be
drawn across median real family income points in either the peak or the
trough years over this period, this growth was not accomplished
smoothly. There were periods of rising median income and falling
unemployment (1975-1979 and 1982-1989) as well as periods of eco
nomic decline (1973-1975, 1979-1982, and 1989-1992). Under these
circumstances, a judicious choice of starting and stopping years could
yield upward, downward, or constant measures of economic wellbeing.
President Clinton's opening paragraph in the 1999 Economic
Report of the President focused on the growth years of the 1990s busi
ness cycle 1993 through 1997 and found that every American was
made better off during the period. However, to capture how Americans
fared in the 1990s, it is more appropriate to make comparisons over the
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Figure la Median Family Real Income, 1970-1998
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SOURCE:
Economic Report of the President, 1994 (Table B-29) and 1999
(Table B33).

Figure Ib Civilian Unemployment Rate, 1970-1998
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SOURCE: Economic Report of the President, 1994 (Table B38) and 1999 (Table B35),
and Current Population Report P60-206.
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entire business cycle, by comparing peak-to-peak or trough-to-trough
years. Consequently, we will examine how people with and without
disabilities have fared during the most recent expansion by comparing
changes in economic well-being between 1989, the peak of the last
business cycle, and 1998, the most recent year of data and the highest
year in our data of the 1990s business cycle. 1
We find that while economic expansion since 1992 has improved
the economic well-being of most working-age people, the gains have
been much smaller for working-age people with disabilities than for
the rest of the working-age population. Furthermore, although the
gains through 1998 have returned the average person with a disability
to his or her level of economic well-being in the peak year of the 1980s
business cycle, the incomes of a large fraction of the population with
disabilities in 1998 remained well below that of their 1989 counter
parts. Finally, we find that despite a robust economic expansion, men
and women with disabilities became less involved in the labor market
and more dependent on public transfers during the 1990s.

DATA SOURCES AND MEASUREMENT ISSUES
We compare the employment, labor earnings, and economic wellbeing of the noninstitutionalized population with and without disabili
ties over an 11-year period (1987-1998) using data from the March
Current Population Survey (CPS). The CPS is a monthly survey of a
nationally representative sample of U.S. households. The annual
March Demographic Supplement contains detailed questions about
household composition, employment, and sources of income, making
it a valuable source of time-series data on the economic well-being of
the noninstitutionalized United States population. The sample sizes in
each year are in excess of 55,000 households.
Defining the Sample
Our examination focuses on the experiences of men and women of
ages 25 to 61. This limited age range avoids confusing reductions in
work or economic well-being associated with disability, with reduc-
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tions or declines associated with retirement at older ages, or with initial
transitions in and out of the labor force related to job shopping at
younger ages. Men and women in the Armed Forces are excluded from
our analysis.

DEFINING THE POPULATION WITH DISABILITIES

The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) defines dis
ability as a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more major life activities, a record of such an impairment, or being
regarded as having such an impairment. This definition of disability is
much broader than the widely accepted measure developed by Nagi
(1965, 1969,1991).
The Nagi measure, the dominant one in the social science litera
ture, distinguishes among three states of diminished health. The first
state describes the existence of a pathology, the presence of a physical
or mental malfunction and/or the interruption of a normal process. The
second level, an impairment, combines a pathology with a functional
requirement a physiological, anatomical, or mental loss or abnormal
ity that limits a person's capacity and level of function. The final state,
disability, is then defined as an inability or limitation in performing
roles and tasks that are socially expected. For men and, increasingly,
for women of working age, market work is a socially expected role.
What is most controversial about Nagi's definition is the relative
importance of pathology and environment in determining how a given
pathology results in an impairment that then leads to a disability. Less
controversial is the recognition that the definition gives to disability as
a dynamic process in which the individual pathology and the socioeconomic environment interact. The Nagi measure of disability is more
limited than the ADA measure in that it ignores the broader population
with disabilities that has successfully integrated into society, as well as
those who are not integrated into employment because of perceptions
concerning an impairment that does not limit work activity. For a
broader discussion of the definition of disability in the context of the
ADA, see Gordon and Groves (2000).
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AN EMPIRICAL ESTIMATE OF THE WORKING-AGE
POPULATION WITH DISABILITIES
Neither the Nagi or the ADA conceptualizations of disability are
fully captured by our data. CPS information on health is self-reported
and is couched in terms of work limitations. The problems inherent in
these types of data are well documented (see Parsons 1980, 1982; Bazzoli 1985; Bound 1991). Still, researchers have shown these measures
to be highly correlated with more objective assessments of health (see
Bound 1991; Stern 1989). Moreover, as discussed elsewhere
(Burkhauser and Daly 1996), we believe such data are capable of iden
tifying people with serious pathologies.
In the CPS, the population with disabilities is defined by a survey
question that asks, "Does anyone in this household have a health prob
lem or disability which prevents them from working or which limits
the kind or amount of work they can do? If yes . . . , Who is that?
(Anyone else?)" While this single question measure of disability is
coarser than a measure based on a more detailed set of self-reported
questions like those in the National Health Interview Survey or on
actual medical examination, we believe it is a reasonable first approxi
mation of the population with disabilities.2
Based on this question, we find that the prevalence of self-reported
disability increased across almost every age, gender, race, and educa
tion group between 1988 and 1999. 3 Appendix Table A2 reports the
prevalence of disability in the working-age population (aged 25
through 61) for 1988 through 1999. In addition to an increase in the
prevalence of disability, there have been changes in the composition of
the population over the decade. Appendix Table A3 reports gender,
age, race, and education group distributions within the populations
with and without a disability for the year 1988 through 1999. Women,
those aged 35 to 54, Blacks, Hispanics, and those with more than a
high school education comprised a greater share of the population with
disabilities in 1999 than they did in 1989. However, with the exception
of women, these same categories have grown among those without dis
abilities. Therefore, it is unlikely that the changes in relative economic
well-being between those with and without disabilities that we report
are artifacts of changes in population composition.
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Measuring Economic Well-Being
Although we are primarily concerned with the economic status of
individuals, we recognize that most people share resources with other
coresident individuals and have access to income that does not flow
directly to them (this is particularly important for nonworking
spouses). Although most researchers agree that the income-sharing
unit should be broader than the individual, there remains the issue of
precisely who should be included in it. Some U.S. income distribution
scholars have defined the unit as encompassing people related by blood
or marriage who coreside, i.e., the CPS family sharing unit definition
(see, for example, Karoly and Burtless 1995; Danziger and Gottschalk
1995). Others use the broader, household-based, common residence
definition.4
In this study, we use the CPS household sharing unit definition.
We define household income as the sum of all income received by indi
viduals residing in a single residence.5 This is pretax, posttransfer
income.6'7 To account for the fact that $500 a week provides a higher
standard of living for a single-person household than it does for indi
viduals belonging to larger households, we adjust household income by
an equivalence factor. Since there is no universally accepted scale, we
assume an elasticity with respect to household size of 0.5.8 Because
we are comparing income across years, we adjust income using the
CPI-UXI; all income values are in 1998 dollars. Finally, to eliminate
potential measurement error at the bottom of the distribution and topcoding at the top of the distribution, we delete the top and bottom 1
percent of the given earnings or household income distribution in each
year.9 However, when we analyze the percentiles and deciles of the
distribution of household income, we delete the top and bottom 5 per
cent.
Measuring Labor Force Activity and Wage Earnings
The analysis focuses on the role that employment and labor earn
ings play in the economic well-being of men and women with disabili
ties. Individuals who report that they work at least 52 hours annually
(at civilian jobs or businesses, including temporary, part-time, or sea
sonal work) are considered to have been employed in the year. 10
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Annual labor earnings include income from all market sources, includ
ing primary and secondary jobs and bonus income. Self-employment
income is excluded from the calculation of labor earnings.

Measuring Government Transfer Receipt
An important component of income for many individuals with dis
abilities is government-provided transfers. Throughout this chapter,
transfers are classified in two ways: individually based and disabilityrelated (disability benefits), and household-based and of any type or
form (public transfers). Disability benefits include income from work
ers' compensation, the Social Security Disability Insurance Program,
veterans' benefits, and Supplemental Security Income. Public transfers
include all cash benefits not specifically related to health.

HOW THOSE WITH AND WITHOUT DISABILITIES
FARED IN THE 1990s
As Figure 1 showed, 1989 marked the initial peak and 1992 the
trough of the 1990s business cycle. While the final peak of the 1990s
business cycle has not yet been reached, the most recent year of CPS
income data (1998) is used in Table 1 to compare the economic wellbeing of working age (aged 25 through 61) men and of women with
and without disabilities and to examine how it changed over the
period. 11
Both mean and median household-size-adjusted income for our
four groups fell as the economy moved down from its 1989 business
peak to the 1992 business cycle trough. Importantly, the households of
men and women with disabilities experienced a greater percentage
decline. Likewise, six years of recovery (1993-1998) lifted the mean
real household-size-adjusted income of all groups. However, for those
with disabilities, the recovery did not bring the same economic rewards
observed for the population without disabilities. 12 Mean income for
men with disabilities rose between 1992 and 1998, but the percentage
increase was less than that for men without disabilities 7.0 percent
for men with disabilities compared with 14.3 percent for men without
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Table 1 Mean and Median Household-Size-Adjusted Real Income and
Household Poverty Rates of Civilians Aged 25-61, by Gender
and Disability Status3

Measure/group15

Percentage change0
19891992- 19891992
1998
1998

1989

1992

1998

Men without
disabilities

36,460

34,465

39,756

-5.6

14.3

8.6

Men with disabilities

21,493

20,159

21,619

-64

7.0

0.6

Women without
disabilities

32,973

31,723

36,526

-3.9

14.1

10.2

Women with
disabilities

19,998

18,701

20,074

-6.7

7.1

0.4

Men without
disabilities

32,142

30,476

33,840

-5.3

10.5

5.1

Men with disabilities

17,154

16,161

16,419

-6.0

1.6

-4.4

8.6

5.4

Mean household
incomed ($)

Median household
incomed ($)

Women without
disabilities

29,075

28,175

30,698

-3.1

Women with
disabilities

15,256

13,755

14,658

-10.3

6.4

-4.0

5.1

6.2

5.1

20.3

-19.3

0.0

22.1

22.9

23.2

3.7

1.4

8.7

9.7

8.1

11.2

-18.7

5.1
-7.5

28.5

30.1

28.0

5.6

-7.5

-1.9

Household poverty
ratee (%)
Men without
disabilities
Men with disabilities
Women without
disabilities
Women with
disabilities

SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1990-1999.
(continued)
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Table 1 (continued)
a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Force are excluded. In
our study, persons are considered to have a disability if they report having a health
problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount
of work they can do.
b Disability status is for the year following the income year. In 1994 there were several
changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample
weights based on the 1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the
1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new disability ques
tions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the
population with disabilities either through changes in the sample weights or in the
way respondents answered disability questions.
c When calculating percentage change, we use the average of the two years as the base.
d All dollar amounts are in 1998 dollars. Income is household size by dividing income
by the square root of household size. Negative sources of income were converted to
zero. In addition, the bottom and top 1 percent of the household size-adjusted income
distribution are excluded from the analysis.
e An individual is in poverty if his or her household's income falls below the house
hold's threshold income, which is determined by the Census Bureau and considers
household size and composition.

disabilities. Income growth was sufficient to return mean real house
hold-size-adjusted income for men with disabilities to its 1989 high,
but just barely, and relative to men without disabilities, the growth in
household-size-adjusted income between 1989 and 1998 was small.
The circumstances for women with disabilities were similar. The mean
real household-size-adjusted income of women with disabilities was
greater in 1998 than in 1989, but the percentage gain was less than for
men and women without disabilities.
Looking at the median rather than the mean of household-sizeadjusted income for our four groups yields a bleaker picture for those
with disabilities. In 1998, median real household-size-adjusted income
of men and women with disabilities remained substantially below its
1989 peak; in contrast, among men and women without disabilities,
median income was more than 5 percent higher than its 1989 peak.
Table 1 also contains information on the prevalence of poverty among
men and women with and without disabilities. The fluctuation in the
poverty rates across these groups provides further evidence of the
importance of business cycle effects on economic well-being. The
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peak-to-trough movement at the start of the 1990s increased the preva
lence of poverty in all groups, but recovery reduced poverty rates back
to or below their 1989 levels for all but men with disabilities. Poverty
among men with disabilities continued to rise over the entire period.
Accounting for Declines in Economic Well-Being of
Working-Age People with Disabilities
In all modern industrial societies, earnings from work is the princi
pal source of income for working-age people. Business cycles have a
powerful effect on household economic well-being because they
greatly impact both employment and labor earnings. Table 2 shows the
sensitivity of the average employment, rate, average hours of work, and
average annual labor earnings over the 1990s business cycle for men
and women, with and without disabilities. 13 The movement from peak
to trough at the start of the 1990s had its most powerful effect on men,
especially those with disabilities. They experienced lower average
employment, and those men who did work had lower average annual
hours of work and lower average annual earnings.
Recovery returned men without disabilities to near their 1989 peak
in average employment and above their 1989 peak in mean hours
worked and mean and median annual earnings. The story is much less
sanguine for men with disabilities. Not surprisingly, average employ
ment fell among men with disabilities between 1989 and 1992, but sur
prisingly, it continued to fall between 1992 and 1998. In 1998, the
average employment rate for men with disabilities was 34.4 percent,
well below their trough average employment of 41.6 percent. As a
result, men with disabilities were less integrated into the labor market
in 1998 then they were in 1992, the trough year of the recession. For
those men with disabilities who were employed, average hours of work
and mean annual earnings also declined significantly between 1989
and 1992, but then rose as the economy recovered. However, the
growth in mean earnings and hours was below that experienced by
working men without disabilities.
In general, women fared better than men during the 1990s. Aver
age employment, average hours worked, and mean earnings of women
without disabilities rose between 1989 and 1992 and grew even more
with the economic recovery. The gains for women with disabilities
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Table 2 Employment Rates, Mean Annual Hours, and Mean Real
Earnings of Civilians Aged 25-61 Who Worked, by Gender and
Disability Status3
Percentage change0
1992198919891998
1992
1998

1989

1992

1998

Men without
disabilities

96.1

94.8

95.1

-1.4

0.4

-1.0

Men with
disabilities

44.0

41.6

34.4

-5.5

-19.0

-24.5

Women without
disabilities

77.1

77.6

80.8

0.7

4.0

4.7

Women with
disabilities

37.5

34.3

29.5

-8.9

-14.8

-23.7

Men without
disabilities

2,165

2,121

2,214

-2.1

4.3

2.3

Men with
disabilities

1,595

1,560

1,577

-2.2

1.1

-1.1

Women without
disabilities

1,743

1,772

1,831

1.7

3.2

4.9

Women with
disabilities

1,275

1,295

1,312

1.6

13

2.9

Men without
disabilities

38,557

36,352

40,993

-5.9

12.0

6.1

Men with
disabilities

20,582

18,964

21,172

-8.2

11.0

2.8

Women without
disabilities

21,920

22,459

24,814

2.4

10.0

12.4

Women with
disabilities

12,491

13,165

14,232

5.3

7.8

13.0

Measure/group*3
Employment rated (%)

Mean annual hoursd

Mean annual
earnings'1 ($)
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SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1990-1999.
a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Force are excluded In
our study, persons are considered to have a disability if they report having a health
problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount
of work they can do.
b Disability status for the year following the income year. In 1994 there were several
changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample
weights based on the 1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the
1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new disability ques
tions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the
population with disabilities either through changes in the sample weights or in the
way respondents answered disability questions.
c When calculating percentage change, we use the average of the two years as the base.
d Include only those who work 52 hours or more and have positive earnings. For mean
earnings only those with positive earnings are included All dollar amounts are in
1998 dollars. The bottom and top 1 percent of the earnings distribution are excluded
from the analysis.

were less pronounced but still surpassed those for men with disabili
ties. Like their male counterparts, employment for women with dis
abilities fell throughout the period, but for women with disabilities who
remained employed, average hours and mean labor earnings grew rapidly.
The dramatic drop in employment of men and women with disabil
ities, even during the strong recovery period following 1992, provides
one explanation for the decline in household-size-adjusted income
shown in Table 1. Although those with disabilities who continued to
work saw their real earnings increase, only about one-third of the popu
lation in 1998 was employed.
Table 3 provides a more detailed look at the various sources of
household income for our four groups and how they changed over the
1990s business cycle. 14 Mean real household income is divided into
five components own labor earnings, the labor earnings of other
household members, own public disability transfers, all other sources
of public transfers, and all other sources of household income. The
sum of the means of these five income sources equals mean household
income. Own labor earnings and the labor earnings of other household
members are quite sensitive to the 1990s business cycle, falling (except
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Table 3 Mean Real Income from Various Household Income Sources for
Civilians Aged 25-61, by Gender and Disability Status3

($)

Percentage change0

1989

1992

1998

19891992

19921998

19891998

Men without
disabilities

34,128

31,569

36,613

-7.8

14.8

7.0

Men with
disabilities

8,029

6,834

6,352

-16.1

-7.3

-23.3

16,127

16,711

19,461

3.6

152

18.7

4,250

4,151

3,942

-2.4

-5.2

-7.5

Men without
disabilities

18,097

17,533

19,884

-3.2

12.6

9.4

Men with
disabilities

12,580

12,151

13,564

-3.5

11.0

7.5

Women without
disabilities

30,550

28,282

32,170

-7.7

12.9

5.2

Women with
disabilities

16,291

15,365

15,119

-5.9

-1.6

-7.5

Men without
disabilities

82

97

98

16.6

0.8

17.3

Men with
disabilities

4,117

4,425

4,710

7.2

6.2

13.5

172

155

145

-11.0

-6.6

-17.5

2,261

2,628

3,551

15.0

29.9

44.4

Measure/grousb
Own earnings

Women without
disabilities
Women with
disabilities
Earnings of other
household members

Own public
disability transfers'1

Women without
disabilities
Women with
disabilities

Session 3: Chronic Illness and Disability

305

Table 3 (continued)
Percentage change0

($)
1989

1992

1998

19891992

19921998

19891998

Men without
disabilities

1,214

1,601

1,298

27.5

-20.9

6.7

Men with
disabilities

2,937

3,392

3,244

14.4

-45

9.9

Women without
disabilities

1,564

1,880

1,531

18.3

-20.4

-2.1

Women with
disabilities

3,150

3,487

3,167

10.2

-9.6

0.6

Men without
disabilities

8,637

7,624

9,104

-12.5

17 7

5.3

Men with
disabilities

7,948

6,533

7,337

-19.5

116

-8.0

Women without
disabilities

8,222

7,184

8,779

-13.5

20.0

6.5

Women with
disabilities

6,708

5,276

6,353

-23.9

18 5

-5.4

Men without
disabilities

62,158

58,424

66,998

-6.2

13.7

7.5

Men with
disabilities

35,611

33,336

35,208

-6.6

5.5

-1.1

Women without
disabilities

56,635

54,211

62,085

-4.4

13.5

9.2

Women with
disabilities

32,659

30,907

32,132

-5.5

3.9

-1.6

Measure/group15
All other public
transfers6

All other sources of
household income6

Household income

(continued)
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Table 3 (continued)
SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1988-1999.
a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 and people in the Armed Force are
excluded. In our study, persons are considered to have a disability if they report hav
ing a health problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the
kind or amount of work they can do. All dollar amounts are in 1998 dollars. Nega
tive sources of income were converted to zero. In addition, the bottom and top 1 per
cent of the household income distribution are excluded from the analysis. These
results are not adjusted for household.
b Disability status for the year following the income year. In 1994 there were several
changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample
weights based on the 1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the
1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new disability ques
tions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the
population with disabilities either through changes in the sample weights or in the
way respondents answered disability questions
c When calculating percentage change, we use the average of the two years as the base.
d Public disability transfers include Social Security income, disability-related veteran's
payments, worker's compensation, Supplemental Security income, and disability
income from other government sources.
e Other transfers include the public disability transfers of other household members and
other personal or household public transfers (public assistance and welfare, other
forms of veteran's payments, unemployment compensation, and government educa
tion assistance).

for women without disabilities) during the early peak-to-trough years
and rising for all but those with disabilities thereafter. The labor earn
ings of other household members uniformly fell peak-to-trough and
rose thereafter for all but the households of women with disabilities.
Not surprisingly, own public disability transfers are a negligible
part of the household income of men and women without disabilities,
but they are a sizable part of the household income of men and women
with disabilities. Public disability transfers rose in real terms between
1989 and 1998 for both men and women with disabilities and offset, in
part, the decline in their own labor earnings. Among men with disabil
ities, real mean public disability transfers increased by 13.5 percent
between 1989 and 1998; for women the increase was even larger, jump
ing by 44.4 percent during the period. The increase in real public dis-
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ability transfers over the 1990s came primarily from rapid growth in
the value of SSI and SSDI benefits; in contrast, workers' compensation
and veterans' benefits fell in real terms over the period. 15 All other
public transfers rose during the peak-to-trough years but fell with
recovery. On net, other public transfers rose for both men with and
without disabilities over the 1990s business cycle, while remaining
steady or falling for women with and without disabilities.
All other sources of household income fell during the peak-totrough years and rose thereafter for all groups. However, over the
entire period, these sources fell for men and women with disabilities
while growing for those without disabilities. Total mean household
income fell from peak to trough and rose thereafter. Over the entire
1990s business cycle, total mean household income rose for men and
women without disabilities and fell for men and women with disabili
ties. Because we do not adjust for changes in household size in Table
3, gains in real mean household income are somewhat smaller here
than when we do adjust for household size in Table 1, since household
size declined over the period.
Table 4 reinforces the point made in Table 3, namely, that declines
in labor earnings may explain much of the differences in the fortunes
of those with and without disabilities over the 1990s. The table shows
how the shares of the five sources of household income changed over
the period. Working-age men without disabilities provided 57.0 per
cent of household income in the business-cycle peak year 1989. This
fell to 55.1 percent in trough year 1992 but rose to 56.7 percent by
1998. In contrast, the share of household income provided by the labor
earnings of men with disabilities fell over the entire period. Their own
public disability transfer income was the main source of increased
income for the households of men with disabilities. Again, increases in
the share of income provided by SSI and SSDI contributed to this rise.
The share of income provided by SSI nearly doubled between 1989
and 1998, from 19.5 percent to 29.3 percent, while the share provided
by SSDI grew, from 46.4 percent to 51.3 percent. 16
Working-age women without disabilities provided an increasing
share of household income over the entire period. In contrast, the share
of own labor earnings in the households of women with disabilities
declined over the period, but by less than that of men with disabilities.
The largest increase in shares for the households of women with dis-
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Table 4 Share of Various Household Income Sources for Civilians Aged
25-61, by Gender and Disability Status3
($)
Measure/group15
Own earnings
Men without
disabilities
Men with
disabilities
Women without
disabilities
Women with
disabilities
Earnings of other
household members
Men without
disabilities
Men with
disabilities
Women without
disabilities
Women with
disabilities
Own public disability
transfers'1
Men without
disabilities
Men with
disabilities
Women without
disabilities
Women with
disabilities
All other public
transfers6
Men without
disabilities
Men with
disabilities

Percentage change0
1989199219891998
1998
1992

1989

1992

1998

57.0

55.1

56.7

-3.4

2.9

- .5

19.4

16.4

14.9

-16.8

-9.6

-26.2

32.1

34.1

36.3

6.0

6.2

12.3

12.9

11.9

11.7

-8.1

-1.7

-9.8

26.1

27.0

27.5

3.4

1.8

5.2

26.6

27.9

27.5

4.8

-1.4

3.3

47.0

44.9

45.2

-4.6

0.7

-3.9

33.6

32.9

31.4

-2.1

-A.I

-6.8

0.3

04

0.4

28.6

0.0

28.6

19.2

21.5

25.4

11.3

16.6

27.8

0.8

0.8

0.7

0.0

-133

-13.3

15.6

18.7

23.4

18.1

22.3

40.0

3.3

4.8

3.2

37.0

-40.0

-3.1

14.5

15.9

13.7

9.2

-14.9

-5.7
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Table 4 (continued)
($)

Percentage change0
1989199219891992
1998
1998
17.9
-37.4
-19.8

Measure/group13
1989
1998
1992
Women without
5.0
6.1
7.3
disabilities
15.8
3.6
-18.9
19.8
Women with
19.1
-22.5
disabilities
All other sources of
household income
Men without
13.3
12.7
12.2
-4.6
-4.0
-8.6
disabilities
Men with
20.3
18.4
17.9
-9.8
-2.8
-12.6
disabilities
12.9
-8.2
Women without
14.0
12.9
0.0
disabilities
-11.3
18.7
16.7
17.3
Women with
35
disabilities
SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1988-1999.
a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 and people in the Armed Force are
excluded. In our study, persons are considered to have a disability if they report hav
ing a health problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the
kind or amount of work they can do. All dollar amounts are in 1998 dollars. Negative
sources of income were converted to zero In addition, the bottom and top 1 percent
of the household income distribution are excluded from the analysis. These results
are not adjusted for household.
b Disability status for the year following the income year. In 1994 there were several
changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample
weights based on the 1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the
1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new disability ques
tions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the
population with disabilities either through changes in the sample weights or in the
way respondents answered disability questions.
c When calculating percentage change, we use the average of the two years as the base.
d Public disability transfers include Social Security income, disability-related veteran's
payments, worker's compensation, Supplemental Security income, and disability
income from other government sources.
e Other transfers include the public disability transfers of other household members and
other personal or household public transfers (public assistance and welfare, other
forms of veteran's payments, unemployment compensation, and government educa
tion assistance).

310 Burkhauser, Daly, and Houtenville

abilities over the period was in own disability transfers, as was the case
with men with disabilities.

GAINS IN ECONOMIC WELL-BEING ACROSS
THE DISTRIBUTION
The measures of the income distribution discussed above are
designed to summarize an entire distribution with one value. Yet few
distributions can be completely characterized by one parameter. This
is particularly true when attempting to describe outcomes for heteroge
neous populations such as the population of people with disabilities.
Thus, in the remaining analysis we move away from simple summary
measures and examine how income, employment, earnings, and public
transfer receipt has affected the entire distribution of those with disabil
ities.
Table 1 showed that on average men and women with disabilities
fared less well then the rest of the population over the 1990s. Figures
2a and 2b allow us to look within these averages. Figure 2a shows the
change in real household-size-adjusted income between 1989 and 1998
by percentile for the households of women of working age, with and
without disabilities; Figure 2b shows the same for men. 17 Each line
cuts the horizontal axis at the percentile at which real income in 1998
equals real income in 1989, i.e., the "crossover point." 18 Values above
the zero axis mean that persons in that percentile were better off in
1998 than in 1989; values below the zero axis mean that persons in that
percentile were worse off in 1998. Thus, this figure provides a quick
summary of winners and losers across the income distribution over
peak years in the 1990s business cycle.
By 1998, economic growth had "lifted all boats" among the popu
lation of working-age men and women without disabilities, moving
them above their 1992 lows and their 1989 business-cycle peak levels.
While the gains were not uniform, men and women without disabilities
at each percentile had more real household-size-adjusted income in
1998 than they did in 1989. The results for women with disabilities
(Figure 2a) were much different, with those at the top and the bottom
of the income distribution gaining and those in the middle losing. By
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Figure 2a Women—Change in Household-Size-Adjusted Real Income,
1989 to 1998, by Percentile
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SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1990 and 1999.

Figure 2b Men—Change in Household-Size-Adjusted Real Income,
1989 to 1998, by Percentile
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SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1990 and 1999.
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1998, the real household-size-adjusted incomes of women with disabil
ities below the 35th and above the 75th percentiles had surpassed their
1989 peak levels. Yet, women with disabilities in the middle 40 per
cent of the distribution had lower real household-size-adjusted incomes
than their counterparts in 1989.
The results for men with disabilities (Figure 2b) are even gloomier.
Those men below the 15th percentile stayed approximately at the same
level of real household-size-adjusted income as their counterparts in
1989. Those between the 15th and 75th percentiles had less real
household-size-adjusted income in 1998 than did individuals in equiva
lent percentiles in 1989. Only men in the top 20 percent of the distri
bution were better off than their 1989 counterparts. Thus, while by
1998 the entire distributions of men and women without disabilities
had moved above their 1989 highs, nearly 40 percent of women with
disabilities and 80 percent of men with disabilities had been left
behind. Most surprisingly, most of those left behind during the 1990s
had household-size-adjusted incomes in the middle, rather than at the
lower end, of the distribution.
Tables 2, 3, and 4 showed that, on average, men and women with
disabilities worked less, earned less, and received more public transfers
during the 1990s expansion than they did in 1989, the peak of the
1980s business cycle. In Figures 3, 4, and 5, we look behind these
averages and examine how these patterns differed across the distribu
tion of people with disabilities. Figures 3 and 4 show employment
rates and receipt of public transfer rates for men and women with dis
abilities in 1989 and 1998, by deciles of the household-size-adjusted
distribution of income. 19 This allows us to examine employment rates
for individuals with disabilities who were at equivalent deciles of the
income distribution in 1989 and 1998.
Figure 3b shows that employment rates for men with disabilities
were lower in 1998 than in 1989 for all but the highest decile of the
household-size-adjusted income distribution. Not surprisingly,
employment rates in 1989 and 1998 were lowest for those at the lowest
deciles of the income distribution. But, consistent with the results in
Figure 2b, the largest gaps in employment rates between the two years
occurs in the middle deciles of the income distribution. For example,
the average employment rate gap in the bottom three deciles was 9.4
percentage points; in contrast, the average gap in the 4th to 7th decile
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Figure 3a Women with Disabilities—Employment Rates by Decile
of the Household-Size-Adjusted Real Income Distribution,
1989 and 1998a

Lowest

9

Highest

SOURCE: Authors'calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1990 and 1999.
aLowest and highest deciles do not include the bottom and top 5 percent
of the distribution.

Figure 3b Men with Disabilities—Employment Rates by Decile
of the Household-Size-Adjusted Real Income Distribution,
1989 and 1998a
100
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SOURCE: Authors'calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 1990
and 1999.
aLowest and highest deciles do not include the bottom and top 5 percent
of the distribution.
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Figure 4a Women with Disabilities—Percentage of Individuals whose
Household Receives Public Transfers, by Decile of the
Household-Size-Adjusted Real Income Distribution,
1989 and 1998a
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SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1990 and 1999.
aLowest and highest deciles do not include the bottom and top 5 percent of the
distribution.

Figure 4b Men with Disabilities—Percentage of Individuals whose
Household Receives Public Transfers, by Decile of the
Household-Size-Adjusted Real Income Distribution,
1989 and 1998a

SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1990 and 1999.
aLowest and highest deciles do not include the bottom and top 5 percent of the
distribution.
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Figure 5a Women with Disabilities—Differences in Mean Own Earnings
and Household Transfer Income, by Decile of the HouseholdSize-Adjusted Real Income Distribution, 1989 and 1998
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SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1990 and 1999.
aLowest and highest deciles do not include the bottom and top 5 percent
of the distribution.

Figure 5b Men with Disabilities—Differences in Mean Own Earnings
and Household Transfer Income, by Decile of the HouseholdSize-Adjusted Real Income Distribution, 1989 and 1998a
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SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1990 and 1999.
aLowest and highest deciles do not include the bottom and top 5 percent of the
distribution.
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was 11.8 percentage points. The results for women with disabilities
(Figure 3a) are similar. In both years, employment rates are highest at
higher deciles of the household income distribution. However, as was
true for men with disabilities, the largest declines in employment
between 1989 and 1998 the biggest gaps occur in the middle of the
income distribution.
Figures 4a and 4b repeat this exercise for public transfer receipt,
defined as the percentage of men and women living in a household
receiving some type of public benefit.20 For both men and women, the
percentage of the decile population receiving public transfers rose in
all deciles. Again, consistent with the results in Figures 2 and 3, the
largest increases in benefit receipt came in the middle of the house
hold-size-adjusted income distribution. Men and women in the bottom
three deciles were more likely to receive transfers in each year, but the
difference in the proportion receiving benefits by decile evened out
substantially during the 1990s.
Figures 3 and 4 showed the proportion of the population of men
and women with disabilities employed and receiving benefits in 1989
and 1998. Figure 5 shows how mean labor market earnings and the
mean value of public benefits changed between these two years, in
terms of the dollar difference in mean own earnings and mean transfer
income in 1989 and 1998, by decile of the household-size-adjusted
income distribution for men and women with disabilities. The results
in Figure 5 illustrate why the household incomes of those in the middle
of the distribution (Figure 2) declined between 1989 and 1998. For
men (Figure 5b) between the 5th and 7th deciles of the household-sizeadjusted income distribution, the dollar decline in own earnings
between 1989 and 1998 was larger than the dollar increase in public
transfers. 21 For men at most other deciles of the household-sizeadjusted income distribution, gains in public transfers were more than
sufficient to offset the declines in own earnings and to push the house
hold income of men at these deciles above that of men at equivalent
percentiles in 1989. 22 The story is similar for women (Figure 5a).
Declines in own earnings in the middle of the income distribution were
only partially offset by increases in the value of public benefits, leaving
a large fraction of middle-income women with disabilities worse off
than their counterparts in 1989.
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CONCLUSIONS
We confirm President Clinton's report that strong economic growth
since the recession of 1992 has lifted the economic well-being of most
working-age people from the depths at the trough of the 1990s business
cycle. However, working-age men and women with disabilities fared
less well than those without disabilities. When one looks over the
entire 1990s business cycle, the contrast in outcomes between those
with and without disabilities is even starker. Men and women without
disabilities gained across the entire income distribution between the
peak year of the 1980s business cycle, 1989, and the most recent year
of data for the current expansion, 1998. In contrast, men and women
with disabilities in the middle of the distribution of household income
failed to regain the incomes of their counterparts in 1989. While the
employment and labor earnings of men and women without disabilities
were quite sensitive to the 1990s business cycle (falling in recession
and rising with recovery), the employment of men and women with
disabilities, surprisingly, fell over the entire 1990 business cycle
(although less so in recovery than in recession). This shocking finding
explains much of the decline in economic well-being of working-age
people with disabilities, despite increases in their disability transfer
income. What is responsible for the decline in the labor market attach
ment of people with disabilities, over both the economic decline of the
early 1990s and the longest peacetime economic expansion in our his
tory, is a major policy puzzle that must be solved before the rewards of
economic growth are shared by all.

Notes
This research was funded in part by the United States Department of Education,
National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research, cooperative agreement
No. 13313980038. It does not necessarily reflect the view of the National Institute on
Disability and Rehabilitation Research or the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
1. Because we have not reached the peak of the 1990s business cycle, our analysis
will underestimate the net peak-to-peak gams over that cycle. Nonetheless, our
1989/1992/1998 comparisons describe a relative pattern which is unlikely to be
greatly altered as additional years of information become available.
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2. It is important to note that self-perception of a disability as captured by this ques
tion can be influenced by social context. For instance, reports of a work limitation
may change over time, even holding the underlying health condition constant,
because access to accommodation may change one's perception of a work limita
tion over time. See Kirchner (1996) for a fuller discussion of this issue and the
uses of the CPS to analyze "access-oriented" policies. See the appendix for a
fuller discussion.
3. As we discuss in the appendix, small changes were made to the CPS question on
disability in 1994, the year the CPS moved to computer-assisted interviewing.
Although we do not examine this in our analysis, both the question change and the
move to computer-assisted interviewing may explain the nearly 1 percentage
point increase in the prevalence of disability reported in 1994 (Table A2).
4. Atkmson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995) and Burkhauser, Crews, and Daly
(1997) argued that using the family definition, rather than the less restrictive
household-based definition, will produce a bleaker picture of the income distribu
tion because it treats a larger number of individuals as single-person households
even when they reside and share the benefits of living with others.
5. In the CPS data, income includes all cash income received from private and public
sources. It does not include noncash or in-kind benefits or the imputed income
from owner-occupied housing. We convert all negative sources of income to zero.
6. The CPS data do not provide net-of-tax income information. Many income ine
quality studies do not adjust for taxation (see, for example, Karoly and Burtless
1995; Danziger and Gottschalk 1995), but it would be useful to do so. We have
done so elsewhere with other data sets; see, for instance, Burkhauser and Poupore
(1997).
7 Specifically, household income is the sum of income from labor earnings, selfemployment, fanning, alimony, dividends, rent, and interest, as well as income
payments from the Social Security system, unemployment and workers' compen
sation systems, and state and federal public assistance programs.
8. Others who also use an equivalence scale of this approximate value include
Karoly and Burtless (1995) and Atkmson, Rainwater, and Smeeding (1995).
Equivalence scales contain assumptions about the returns to shared living. Many
such scales, even complicated ones, can be approximated well by a single-param
eter scale (see Buhmann et al. 1988). An equivalence scale with an elasticity with
respect to household size of 1 (the per-capita scale) implies no economies of
scale. An elasticity of 0 (i.e., with no size adjustments to household income)
implies that an infinite number of individual can live equally well with a given
household income as a single person household with that income. See
Burkhauser, Smeeding, and Merz (1996) for a discussion of the sensitivity of dif
ferent equivalence scales in cross-national comparisons. The household size elas
ticity implicit in the U.S. Bureau of the Census poverty scales is approximately
0.5 (Buhmann et al. 1988). While most poverty studies in the United States use
this official scale, it has been severely criticized (see, for example, Citro and
Michael 1995).
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Deleting the bottom and the top 1 percent of the household-size-adjusted income
distribution does not materially affect our results.
Annual hours are calculated by multiplying number of weeks worked by average
hours worked per week
For a complete time-series (1987-1998) of mean and median household-sizeadjusted income for men and women with and without disabilities, see Table A4.
Given that we are using cross-sectional data, a natural concern is that we are sim
ply picking up compositional changes in the population of people with disabili
ties. To test for this possibility we did a simple shift-share analysis, controlling
first for changes in age, race, education, and household size and controlling sec
ond for these demographic variables and changes in employment rates The
results of this analysis (Table A5) show that if the composition of the population
with disabilities was the same in 1998 as it was in 1989, the economic outcomes
for those with disabilities would have been worse than those we report. This sug
gests that the findings we report are not an artifact of demographic shifts, but
rather the result of changing economic rewards for the population with disabili
ties.
For a complete time series of employment rates, mean annual hours worked, and
mean and median annual earnings for men and women with disabilities, see
Tables A6 and A7.
For a complete time series of the shares of these various sources of household
income, see Table A8.
See Table A9 for the complete time series of mean public nondisability and dis
ability transfers, by program.
See Table A10 for the complete time series of shares of public nondisability and
disability transfers, by program.
For each of our four groups, we first estimate real household-size-adjusted income
for each percentile of our sample in 1998 and compare it to this same variable for
1989. The difference in their two means is reported in Table 2.
For examples using this technique, see Danziger and Gottshalk (1995), Burtless
(1996a, 1996b), and Burkhauser, Crews, and Daly (1997).
The lowest "decile" only contains those in the 6th through 10th percentiles. The
highest "decile" only contains those in the 96th through 100th percentiles
The results for household public transfer receipt are similar to those obtained
using own public disability transfer receipt.
The real value of other sources of income, such as other household earnings, did
not change significantly for any decile of the household-size-adjusted income dis
tribution between 1989 and 1998.
An exception to this is men with disabilities in the highest decile of the house
hold-size adjusted income distribution. For these men, large gains in the earnings
of other household members offset declines in own earnings.
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Appendix
Current Population Survey Data
and Disability Measurement
Limitations of Using the CPS to Measure
the Working-Age Population with Disabilities
Although the Current Population Survey (CPS) has extensive economic in
formation, a number of factors make it less than ideal for examining the popu
lation with disabilities. First, the CPS does not survey institutionalized
individuals. Second, all information is reported by a single respondent in the
household (a "responsible adult"). This person may or may not be the person
in this household with a disability and hence may not accurately report infor
mation about that person's disability. Third, the CPS has very limited self-re
ported information on health. Despite these shortcomings, the consistency of
the time-series and the coverage of the U.S. population make it a reasonable
source of information on the economic fluctuations of the population with dis
abilities.
Changes in CPS Disability Question in 1994
In our chapter, persons are considered to have a disability if they report or
are reported as having a health problem or disability that prevents them from
working or limits the kind or amount of work they can do. From 1988 to 1993,
CPS interviews were conducted by individuals without the help of computerassisted personal or telephone interviewing. Starting in 1994, interviewers
were prompted with names and possible inconsistencies by computer software.
As part of this change, the questions we use to define disability,
Does anyone in this household have health problem or disability which
prevents them from working or which limits the kind or amount of work
they can do? If yes . .., who is that? (Anyone else?),
were changed to
(Do you/does anyone in this household) have a health problem or disability
which prevent (you/them) from working or which limits the kind or
amount of work (you/they) can do? If yes..., who is that? (Anyone else7)
In addition, sample weights based on the 1980 census were replaced with
sample weights based on the 1990 census. Furthermore, the Monthly Basic
Survey was revised and three new disability questions were added. It is possi
ble that these changes affected the measurement of the population with disabil
ities either through changes in the sample weights or in the way respondents
answered disability questions.
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Table Al Macroeconomic Indicators of
the Business Cycle
Real median family Unemployment
rate (%)
income (1998 $)
Year
4.9
1970
39,694
5.9
1971
39,669
5.6
41,507
1972
4.9
42,360
1973
1974
5.6
40,869
1975
8.5
39,817
41,046
1976
7.7
7.1
41,289
1977
6.1
42,598
1978
5.8
43,143
1979
7.1
41,636
1980
7.6
40,501
1981
9.7
39,952
1982
9.6
40,379
1983
7.5
41,466
1984
7.2
42,014
1985
7.0
1986
43,809
6.2
44,436
1987
5.5
44,353
1988
5.3
44,972
1989
5.5
44,089
1990
1991
67
43,009
7.5
42,489
1992
6.8
41,689
1993
6.1
42,654
1994
5.6
43,434
1995
5.4
43,943
1996
4.9
45,260
1997
4.5
46,737
1998
SOURCE: Economic Report of the President, 1994
(Tables B-29 and B38) and 1999 (Tables B33 and
B35), adjusted to 1998 dollars using CPI-U, and
Current Population Report, P60-206, p. 13.
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Table A2 Prevalence of Disability among the Working- Age Civilian Population3 (%)
1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994b

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

7.2

7.2

7.4

7.5

7.6

7.8

8.4

8.3

8.3

8.3

8.1

7.9

25 through 34

4.4

3.9

4.2

4.4

4.6

4.8

5.0

4.7

4.4

4.3

3.6

3.8

35 through 44

5.9

6.2

6.0

6.3

6.4

6.5

7.0

7.3

7.2

7.1

7.0

6.7

45 through 54

9.1

9.3

9.7

9.7

10.0

10.0

10.8

10.8

10.8

10.9

10.7

10.4

55 through 61

15.6

16.0

16.6

15.8

15.9

15.6

17.1

16.7

16.8

16.9

16.4

16.2

7.6

7.6

7.8

7.7

8.1

8.4

8.8

8.5

8.2

8.2

7.8

8.0

7.2

8.0

8.2

8.4

8.3

8.3

7.9

Groups
All
Aged

Gender
Men

6.7

6.8

7.0

7.2

7.2

White

6.7

6.8

6.9

6.9

72

7.4

7.8

7.7

7.6

7.8

7.6

7.4

Black

11.6

11.0

11.6

11.9

11.4

10.8

13.4

13.3

13.7

13.3

12.3

12.9

7.8

7.4

7.0

7.1

7.2

Women
Race/ethnicity

Hispanic0

7.0

6.2

7.5

7.3

7.1

7.7

7.8

16.1

16.9

17.0

16.8

18.1

18.2

20.7

19.3

19.0

18.7

18.1

17.3

6.6

6.6

7.3

7.4

7.6

8.0

8.6

9.1

8.9

8.9

8.9

9.0

Education
Less than high
schoold
High school

More than high
school but
less than
college

5.7

5.5

5.1

5.6

6.0

6.5

6.7

6.8

6.9

7.2

7.0

7.1

College or more

2.6

2.6

2.8

3.0

2.7

2.6

27

3.0

3.2

3.2

3.1

3.1

SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 1988-1999.
a Persons less than age 25 or more than age 61 and people in the Armed Forces are excluded. In our study, persons are considered to have
a disability if they report having a health problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount of work
they can do.
b ln 1994 there were several changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample weights based on the
1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the 1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new dis
ability questions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the population with disabilities either
through changes in the sample weights or in the way respondents answered disability questions
c Spanish ethnicity superceded race; we receded Hispanics to be non-White, non-Black, and non-other race.
d Beginning in survey year 1992, educational attainment questions in the CPS were changed to reflect credentials and degrees rather than
grades (years) complete.
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Table A3 Gender, Age, Race/Ethnicity, and Education Distributions within Populations with and without
Disabilities3 (%)
Gender
With disabilities

Without disabilities

Survey
year

Male

Female

Male

Female

1988

48.7

51.3

52.1

47.9

1989

48.8

51.2

51.5

48.5

1990

48.6

51.4

51.8

48.2

1991

48.7

51.3

50.4

49.6

1992

48.7

51.3

51.6

48.4

1993

48.7

51.3

52.8

47.2

1994b

48.8

51.2

51.5

48.5

1995

48.9

51.1

50.0

50.0

1996

49.0

510

48.5

515

1997

49.1

50.9

48.8

51.2

1998

49.2

50.8

47.5

52.5

1999

48.9

51.1

49.2

50.8

Age
With disabilities

Without disabilities
1987

25-34

35.44

45-54

55-61

25-34

35-44

45-54

55-61

37.9

30.1

20.1

11.9

22.6

24.5

245

28.5

1989

37.7

30.5

20.3

11.5

19.9

26.1

25.8

282

20.6

11.2

20.3

24.9

27.0

278

1990

369

31.3

1991

36.1

32.0

20.6

11.3

20.6

26.6

26.5

26.3

1992

35.3

32.4

21.4

11.0

205

26.6

27.9

25.1

1993

34.2

32.5

22.3

11.0

20.6

26.9

28.4

24.0

22.6

10.5

19.8

27.0

29.5

23.7

1994b

33.9

33.0

1995

33.2

33.1

23.3

10.4

17.9

28.8

30.4

22.9

1996

32.5

33.2

236

10.7

16.7

287

307

239

1997

31.5

33.5

24.3

107

15.7

28.4

31.7

242

11.1

13.2

28.8

33.0

25.0

11.4

13.6

27.9

32.8

25.6

1998

30.6

33.5

24.8

1999

29.6

33.4

25.5

Race/ethnicityc
Without disabilities

With disabilities

White

Black

Hispanic

Other

White

Black

Hispanic

Other

1988

78.7

10.4

7.5

3.3

72.7

17.8

7.3

2.3

1989

78.2

10.6

7.7

3.4

73.8

17.0

6.6

2.6

1990

78.0

10.7

7.9

3.5

72.2

17.6

8.0

2.3

1991

77.7

10.7

8.0

3.6

71.5

17.9

7.8

2.7

1992

77.2

10.8

8.2

3.8

726

168

7.6

3.0
(continued)

Table A3 (continued)
Race/ethnicity
With disabilities

Without disabilities
1993

76.7

11.0

84

39

73.3

15.7

8.3

2.7

1994b

75.7

10.9

94

4.0

69.9

18.6

8.7

2.9

1995

75.7

110

9.6

3.7

69.9

18.7

9.0

2.5

1996

74.7

11.0

9.8

44

68.4

19.3

8.7

3.7

1997

73.9

11.0

10.3

4.7

69.2

18.7

8.6

3.5

1998

73.3

11.2

10.6

4.9

69.1

17.9

9.2

3.8

1999

73.2

11.2

10.7

5.0

67.6

192

9.7

3.6

Education*1
With disabilities

Without disabilities
Less than
high school

High
school

More than
H.S., less
than college

College or
more

24.1

39.8

36.9

15.1

8.3

19.4

25.2

40.2

36.7

14.5

8.6

39.9

203

25.1

37.7

39.5

13.8

9.0

25.2

36.0

39.2

15.3

9.5

Less than
high school

High
school

More than
H.S., less
than college

1988

16.0

40.6

19.3

1989

15.3

40.1

1990

14.7

College or
more

1991

14.4

39.8

20.7

1992

13.6

36.4

24.8

25.3

36.3

36.3

19.0

8.5

1993

12.8

35.4

25.8

25.9

33.9

36.6

21.2

8.3

1994b

12.4

34.3

27.1

26.3

35.3

35.2

21.4

8.1

1995
1996

12.0
12.3

33.6
33.2

27.3
27.0

271
27.5

31.7

22.1

31.9

36.8
36.0

9.3
10.0

1997
1998
1999

121
11.7
11.4

33.3
33.0
32.4

27.0
27.0
26.9

27.7
28.3
29.2

30.7
29.5

36.0
36.9

21.1

37.3

22.0
233
23.3
23.9

10.1
10.3
11.0

SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 1988-1999.
a Persons less than age 25 or more than age 61 and people in the Armed Forces are excluded. In our study, persons are considered to have
a disability if they report having a health problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount of work
they can do. Disability status is for the year following the income year.
b ln 1994 there were several changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample weights based on the
1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the 1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new dis
ability questions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the population with disabilities either
through changes in the sample weights or in the way respondents answered disability questions.
c Spanish ethnicity superceded race; we recede Hispanics to be non-White, non-Black, and non-other race
d Beginning in survey year 1992, educational attainment questions in the CPS were changed to reflect credentials and degrees rather than
grades (years) complete.

Table A4 Mean and Median Household-Size-Adjusted Real Income of Civilians Aged 25-61, by Gender and
Disability Status3 ($)
Median

Mean

Women

Men

Women

Men
Income
year

Without
disabilities

With
disabilities

Without
disabilities

With
disabilities

Without
disabilities

With
disabilities

Without
disabilities

With
disabilities

1987

35,266

21,473

32,305

19,459

31,210

17,219

28,706

14,862

1988

35,748

20,865

32,591

19,597

31,831

16,516

28,961

14,775

1989

36,460

21,493

32,973

19,998

32,142

17,154

29,075

15,256

1990

35,258

20,010

32,261

20,190

31,159

16,182

28,397

15,288

1991

34,491

20,624

31,884

18,983

30,631

16,386

28,259

14,403

1992

34,465

20,159

31,723

18,701

30,476

16,161

28,175

13,755

1993

34,383

19,386

31,712

18,190

30,310

15,155

27,908

13,480

1994b

34,965

20,005

32,281

19,349

30,760

15,139

28,377

14,958

1995

36,241

20,303

33,626

19,717

30,902

15,672

28,541

14,830

1996

36,940

20,265

34,255

19,288

31,340

15,339

29,088

14,035

1997

38,124

20,828

35,457

20,307

32,035

15,835

29,958

14,633

1998

39,756

21,619

36,526

20,074

33,840

16,419

30,698

14,658

SOURCE: Authors' calculations are based on the March Current Population Survey, 1988-1999.

a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Forces are excluded In our study, persons are considered to have a disabil
ity if they report having a health problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount of work they can
do. Income is household size by dividing income by the square root of household size. Negative sources of income were converted to
zero. In addition, the bottom and top 1 percent of the household size-adjusted income distribution are excluded from the analysis. Dis
ability status is for the year following the income year.
b ln 1994 there were several changes in the CPS It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample weights based on the
1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the 1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new dis
ability questions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the population with disabilities either
through changes in the sample weights or in the way respondents answered disability questions.
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Table AS Mean Household-Size-Adjusted Real Income When
Controlling for Changes in Age, Race, Education, Household
Size, and Employment for Civilians Aged 25-61, by Gender
and Disability Status3
($)c
1989

1998

Percentage
changed

Men without disabilities

36,460

39,756

8.6

Men with disabilities

21,493

21,619

0.6

Women without disabilities

32,973

36,526

10.2

Women with disabilities

19,998

20,074

0.4

Men without disabilities

36,460

37,928

3.9

Men with disabilities

21,493

20,539

-4.5

Women without disabilities

32,973

34,042

32

Women with disabilities

19,998

19,179

-4.2

Men without disabilities

36,460

38,077

4.3

Men with disabilities

21,493

21,551

0.3

Women without disabilities

32,973

33,945

2.9

Women with disabilities

19,998

19,800

-1.0

Groupb
No controls
(Same as Table 1)

Controlling for changes in
age, race, education and
household size

Controlling for changes in age,
race, education, household size
and employment

SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1990-1999.
a We controlled for changes in population characteristics by imposing the 1989 propor
tion in each subpopulation when we calculated the 1998 mean. Those less than age
25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Forces are excluded. In our study, persons are
considered to have a disability if they report having a health problem or disability
which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount of work they can do.
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Table AS (continued)
b Disability status is for the year following the income year. In 1994 there were several
changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample
weights based on the 1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the
1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new disability ques
tions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the
population with disabilities either through changes in the sample weights or in the
way respondents answered disability questions.
c All dollar amounts are in 1998 dollars. Income is household size by dividing income
by the square root of household size. Negative sources of income were converted to
zero. In addition, the bottom and top 1 percent of the household size-adjusted income
distribution are excluded from the analysis.
d When calculating percentage change, we use the average of the two years as the base.

Table A6 Employment Rates and Mean Annual Hours of Civilians Aged 25-61 Who Worked, by Gender and
Disability Status3 b
Employment ratec (%)
Men

Mean annual hours for the employed
Women

Men

Women

Earnings
year5

Without
disabilities

With
disabilities

Without
disabilities

With
disabilities

Without
disabilities

With
disabilities

Without
disabilities

With
disabilities

1987

94.5

42.9

75.2

33.9

2,151

1,568

1,725

1,276

1988

94.5

42.9

76.6

36.2

2,163

1,559

1,735

1,299

1989

96.1

44.0

77.1

37.5

2,165

1,595

1,743

1,275

1990

95.9

42.1

77.6

34.9

2,145

1,553

1,748

1,316

1991

95.4

41.5

77.8

35.1

2,113

1,548

1,759

1,303

1992

94.8

41.6

77.6

34.3

2,121

1,560

1,772

1,295

1993

94.4

37.1

78.3

33.4

2,153

1,521

1,777

1,295

1994

94.8

38.0

79.1

36.0

2,177

1,552

1,775

1,274

1995

94.7

34.9

79.7

33.9

2,180

1,602

1,804

1,285

1996

94.9

382

80.1

33.9

2,184

1,525

1,808

1,287

1997

95.2

35.5

80.7

31.9

2,193

1,477

1,815

1,277

1998

95.1

34.4

80.8

29.5

2,214

1,577

1,831

1,312

SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 1988-1999.

a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Forces are excluded. In our study, persons are considered to have a disabih'ty
if they report having a health problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount of work they can do.
Disabih'ty status is for the year following the income year.
b In 1994 there were several changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample weights based on the
1980 Census were replaced with sample weights based on the 1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new dis
ability questions were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the population with disabilities either through
changes in the sample weights or in the way respondents answered disability questions.
c Employment is defined as working 52 hours or more annually.
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Table A7 Mean Real Earnings of Civilians Aged 25-61 Who Worked
and had Positive Earnings, by Gender and Disability Status3
(1998 $)
Men

Women

Earnings
year

Without
disabilities

With
disabilities

Without
disabilities

With
disabilities

1987

38,623

22,265

21,402

11,964

1988

38,853

21,383

21,640

12,873

1989

38,557

20,582

21,920

12,491

1990

37,018

20,337

21,919

13,253

1991

36,065

20,462

22,019

12,582

1992

36,352

18,964

22,459

13,165

1993

36,261

18,789

22,503

13,672

1994b

36,953

20,118

22,793

12,855

1995

37,958

20,699

22,974

13,180

1996

38,325

19,994

23,276

12,044

1997

39,334

19,325

23,893

13,490

1998

40,993

21,172

24,814

14,232

SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1988-1999.
a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Forces are excluded. In
our study, persons are considered to have a disability if they report having a health
problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount
of work they can do. In addition, the bottom and top 1 percent of the earnings distri
bution are excluded and only those who work 52 hours or more annually with positive
earnings are included in the analysis. Disability status is for the year following the
income year.
b ln 1994 there were several changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted
survey interviews. Sample weights based on the 1980 Census were replaced with
sample weights based on the 1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised,
and three new disability questions were added. It is possible that these changes
effected the measurement of the population with disabilities either through changes in
the sample weights or in the way respondents answered disability questions.

Table A8 Share of Various Household Income Sources for Civilians Aged 25-61, by Gender and
Disability Status3 b
Men
With disabilities

Without disabilities
Others'
labor
earnings

Public
disability
tranfersc

Other
public
tranfersd

All
other
income

19.4

26.2

197

14.8

199

12.9

18.8

26.0

20.3

15.2

19.7

3.3

13.3

19.4

26.6

192

14.5

20.3

0.3

3.8

13.4

17.5

26.5

19.6

15.3

21.2

26.9

0.3

4.2

12.9

17.7

27.5

202

15.2

19.4

55.1

27.0

0.4

4.8

127

16.4

279

21.5

159

18.4

1993

55.0

27.5

0.3

4.9

12.3

14.7

27.0

20.7

17.7

19.4

1994

56.1

27.5

0.3

4.4

11.7

16.4

26.5

22.2

161

18.8

1995

56.9

27.5

0.4

4.3

10.8

16.1

27.1

22.9

16.0

177

1996

56.9

279

0.4

4.0

10.9

17.1

27.1

22.4

16.8

16.7

1997

56.4

27.7

0.4

3.5

12.0

14.6

27.0

26.0

15.0

17.1

1998

56.7

27.5

0.4

3.2

12.2

14.9

27.5

25.4

13.7

17.9

Income
year

Own
labor
earnings

Others'
labor
earnings

Public
disability
tranfersc

Other
public
tranfersd

All
other
income

1987

57.8

25.1

0.3

3.5

13.2

1988

581

25.4

0.3

3.3

1989

57.0

26.1

0.3

1990

56.2

26.3

1991

55.7

1992

Own
labor
earnings

(continued)

Table A8 (continued)
Women
Without disabilities

With disabilities
Others'
labor
earnings

Public
disability
tranfersc

Other
public
tranfersd

All
other
income

11.3

35.4

154

19.2

18.5

13.8

13.2

33.1

16.4

17.9

19.3

6.1

14.0

12.9

33.6

15.6

19.1

18.7

0.7

6.3

14.0

12.6

34.5

17.0

18.0

17.9

45.6

0.7

7.0

13.4

12.7

32.7

18.0

19.2

17.3

34.1

44.9

08

7.3

12.9

11.9

32.9

18.7

19.8

16.7

1993

34.1

44.9

0.9

7.4

12.7

124

31.7

19.0

19.4

17.1

1994

34.5

45.6

0.9

6.7

12.3

13.0

340

18.1

17.6

17.1

1995

35.2

46.0

0.9

6.3

11.7

13.2

35.8

19.4

16.7

149

1996

35.6

45.8

0.9

6.0

11.7

124

35.2

20.6

17.2

14.6

1997

35.9

45.2

0.7

5.6

12.6

11.7

33.2

22.0

15.6

16.9

1998

36.3

45.2

0.7

5.0

12.9

11.7

31.4

23.4

15.8

17.3

Income
year

Own
labor
earnings

Others'
labor
earnings

Public
disability
tranfersc

Other
public
tranfersd

All
other
income

1987

31.0

47.5

0.8

6.7

14.0

1988

31.8

47.2

0.7

6.6

1989

32.1

47.0

0.8

1990

32.7

46.3

1991

33.3

1992

Own
labor
earnings

SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 1988-1999.

a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Forces are excluded. In our study, persons are considered to have a disability
if they report having a health problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount of work they can do.
Negative sources of income were converted to zero. In addition, the bottom and top 1 percent of the household income distribution are
excluded from the analysis.
b Disability status is for the year following the income year. Beginning hi survey year 1994, computer-assisted interview were used,
which slightly modified the question we use to define disability.
c Public disability transfers include Social Security income, disability-related veteran's payments, worker's compensation, Supplemental
Security income, and disability income from other government sources.
d Other transfers include the public disability transfers of other household members and other personal or household public transfers (pub
lic assistance and welfare, other forms of veteran's payments, unemployment compensation, and government education assistance).

Table A9 Mean Public Transfer Real Income from Various Sources for Civilians Aged 25-61, by Gender and
Disability Status" (1998 $)

Income year
Men without
disabilities
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994b
1995
1996
1997
1998

Total public
transfers

Public
nondisability
transfers

Total public
disability
transfers

345
314
301
363
443
531
475
409
427
382
321
313

254
225
218
273
356
434
387
317
319
290
231
215

90
90
82
91
88
97
88
92
108
92
90
98

From specific public disability transfer programs
Disability
Workers'
veterans'
compensation
benefits
SSDI
SSI

8
8
8
13
16
15
15
19
15
17
15
11

50
45
43
44
44
55
45
46
62
48
47
53

31
31
28
33
27
25
27
26
31
27
27
33

1
6
3
1
1
2
1
1
0
0
1
1

Men with
disabilities
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994b
1995
1996
1997
1998

4,520
4,721
4,526
4,353
4,580
4,970
4,445
4,515
4,900
4,742
5,323
5,167

429
557
414
486
428
545
526
493
466
375
292
457

4092
4164
4112
3866
4151
4426
3919
4022
4434
4366
5030
4710

545
686
663
565
744
776
892
814
865
977
1,016
1,136

2,456
2,373
2,392
2,402
2,413
2,603
2,478
2,673
2,951
2,903
3,375
2,930

709
745
668
571
644
597
495
481
567
454
607
595

382
360
389
328
350
450
54
54
51
32
32
49

(continued)

Table A9 (continued)

Income year
Women without
disabilities
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994b
1995
1996
1997
1998

Total public
transfers

Public
nondisability
transfers

Total public
disability
transfers

487
458
485
497
517
554
611
585
522
491
425
390

323
307
312
342
371
399
421
382
340
309
258
244

164
151
173
156
146
155
190
203
183
182
167
147

From specific public disability transfer programs
Disability
Workers'
veterans'
compensation
benefits
SSDI
SSI

24
24
23
25
26
34
47
37
46
49
38
36

137
123
143
125
117
117
139
164
133
130
127
108

3
3
4
3
2
1
3
1
4
2
1
2

0
1
3
3
1
3
1
1
0
1
1
1

Women with
disabilities
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994b
1995
1996
1997
1998

2,881
2,930
2,854
3,091
3,091
3,317
3,360
3,275
3,545
3,575
3,627
3,968

677
645
597
619
623
687
671
718
684
577
443
410

2203
2283
2257
2472
2467
2631
2690
2556
2861
2999
3185
3559

828
740
757
892
870
925
1,030
963
1,072
1,088
1,130
1,188

1,282
1,314
1,248
1,391
1,431
1,469
1,623
1,528
1,750
1,875
1,981
2,225

10
35
51
48
46
52
22
38
17
5
46
125

83
194
201
141
120
185
15
27
22
31
28
21

SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey, 1988-1999.
a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Force are excluded. In our study, persons are considered to have a disability
if they report having a health problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount of work they can do.
In addition, the bottom and top 1 percent of the household income distribution are excluded from the analysis. These results are not
adjusted for household. All dollar values are in 1998 dollars. Disability status is for the year following the income year.
b In 1994 there were several changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer-assisted survey interviews. Sample weights based on the 1980 Cen
sus were replaced with sample weights based on the 1990 Census The Monthly Basic Survey was revised, and three new disability questions
were added. It is possible that these changes effected the measurement of the population with disabilities either through changes in the sample
weights or in the way respondents answered disability questions.
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Table A10 Shares of Public Transfer Income from Various Sources for
Civilians Aged 25-61 Who Receive Public Transfer Payments,
by Gender and Disability Status3 (%)
From specific public disability programs
Total public Total public
Income nondisabihty disability
transfers
transfers
year

SSI

SSDI

Disability
veterans'
benefits

Workers'
compensation

Men without disabilities
1987

82.1

17.9

1.5

6.5

9.7

0.2

1988

81.3

18.8

1.7

6.8

9.9

0.4

1989

81.9

18.0

1.6

7.2

8.8

0.4

1990

84.1

15.9

2.4

5.8

7.5

0.2

1991

86.3

13.7

2.1

4.5

6.9

0.2

1992

86.5

13.5

1.9

5.5

5.8

0.3

1993
1994b

14.4
17.5

6.6
8.0
7.5

0.2
0.3

17.7

2.2
3.3
2.3

5.4
5.9

1995

85.7
82.5
82.3

1996

82.3

17.8

3.5

80.4

19.5

3.6

77
7.5

6.6

1997

8.2

0
0.2

20.4

2.6

8.2

9.3

0.3

82.1
82.1

156
19.6

47.3
46.8

13.3

5.9

1988

17.9
17.9

10.1

5.6

1989
1990

17.1
19.3

82.9

19.5
17.3

46.4
48.2

108
9.3

6.2
5.9

1991

17.2

21.5

47

8.8

5.5

1992

17.9

21.8

6.1

19.0

466
47.5

7.6

1993

82.1
81.0

6.9

1.1

1994b

18.3

81.7

22.8

8.0

1.3

1995

15.0

85.0

23.2

49.6
521

8.2

1.5

1996

14.1

86.0

25.4

53.7

6.2

0.7

1997

9.1

90.9

25.2

58.8

6.6

0.3

1998

10.7

89.2

293

51.3

8.0

0.6

79.5
.1998
disabilities
with
Men
1987

80.7
82.8

25.5

7.8

0.1
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Table A10 (continued)
Total public Total public
Income nondisability disability
year
transfers
transfers

From specific public disability programs
Disability
veterans'
Workers'
SSDI
compensation
SSI
benefits

Women without
disabilities
1987

76.0

24.1

3.8

19.4

0.8

0.1

1988

76.9

231

4.2

18.2

0.6

0.1

1989

75.7

24.4

4.0

19.1

05

0.8

1990

79.3

20.8

3.7

15.9

0.5

07

1991

82.0

3.6
4.4

0.4

0.2

806

18.0
19.2

13.8

1992

13.9

0.3

0.6

1993

80.5

19.5

54

13.6

0.3

0.2

1994b

77.6

22.4

4.9

17.1

0.2

0.2

1995

76.2

23.8

6.5

167

06

0
0.3

1996

75.5

24.5

6.5

17.2

1997
1998

76.1
76.8

238

6.2

17.2

0.5
0.3

0.1

23.2

6.5

16

0.5

0.2

68.8

27.2

38.6

0.6

2.4

1988

31.1
27.9

72.3

27.4

39.3

1.2

4.4

1989

27.2

27.6

39.2

1.0

5.1

1990

29.4

72.9
70.7

28

1991

28.6

71.4

28.8

37.9
38.4

1992
1993

27.5
27.0

72.5

28.3

73.0

1994

29.3

70.8

1995
1996

24.5

75.5

22.5

77.6

1997

18.4

81.5

1998

15.9

84.0

Women with
disabilities
1987

0.9

3.9
3.6

38.7

06
0.8

4.7

30.6

41.6

0.3

0.5

30.3

38.6

0.8

1.1

319

42.7

0.4

0.5

32.7

0.3
0.7

1.0

32.6

43.6
47.4

0.8

34.1

48.1

1.4

0.4

SOURCE: Authors' calculations based on the March Current Population Survey,
1988-1999.
(continued)
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Table A10 (continued)
a Those less than age 25 or more than age 61 or in the Armed Forces are excluded. In
our study, persons are considered to have a disability if they report having a health
problem or disability which prevents them from working or limits the kind or amount
of work they can do. In addition, the bottom and top 1 percent of the household
income distribution are excluded from the analysis. Disability status is for the year
following the income year.
b ln 1994 there were several changes in the CPS. It moved fully to computer assisted
survey interviews. Sample weights based on the 1980 Census were replaced with
sample weights based on the 1990 Census. The Monthly Basic Survey was revised,
and three new disability questions were added. It is possible that these changes
effected the measurement of the population with disabilities either through changes in
the sample weights or in the way respondents answered disability questions.

Health, Disability, and the
Aging Workforce from the
Employer's Perspective
Bruce G. Flynn
Watson Wyatt Worldwide

Each year, the Washington Business Group on Health and Watson
Wyatt Worldwide survey large employers regarding their disability
management practices. This year's survey collected responses from
178 large organizations (greater than 1000 employees) representing all
segments of the economy (finance, manufacturing, high technology,
etc.)- The survey results indicate that employers have seen their dis
ability costs level off or even decrease during the last three years, in
large part due to state workers' compensation reform and a competitive
insurer marketplace for disability coverage (Figure 1, on p. 352).
However, many attribute a significant portion of the stability of
short-term disability (STD)/workers' compensation (WC)/long-term
disability (LTD) costs to the emergence of integrated disability man
agement programs that seek to control disability costs through early
identification, medical case management, and early return-to-work
(RTW) interventions in the workplace. Approximately 43 percent of
large employers now report having implemented integrated disability
management (DM) programs (up from 26 percent four years ago).
Such programs encompass a broad range of activities including safety
training, case management, transitional work programs, and supervi
sory training (Figure 2). The effectiveness of these programs is typi
cally linked to a reduction of disability benefit costs.
The survey further reveals that the most effective disability cost
containment outcomes are correlated with implementation of multiple
disability management program activities (Figure 3a, b, c). The inte
gration of multiple program elements across occupational and nonoccupational disability programs also resulted in improved disability
benefit cost control outcomes (Figure 4).
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Despite DM program developments, the strategy of choice for
many organizations has been and continues to be to actively assist indi
viduals in obtaining Social Security Disability Income (SSDI) benefits
(Hunt et al. 1996). Thus, when private sector employers fail to accom
modate individuals and return them to work, the final solution is one of
cost-shifting to public disability programs. Although DM and accom
modation activities by employers have slowed the departure of individ
uals with disabilities from the workforce, it appears inevitable that
some portion continue to migrate to public sector disability systems
(Burkhauser, Butler, and Kirn 1995).
Exploring the connection between the impacts of DM programs
and their effects on the costs and utilization of public disability benefits
is the purpose of a research program undertaken by the Rehabilitation
Research and Training Center (RRTC) on Workplace Supports at Vir
ginia Commonwealth University in collaboration with WBGH, Watson
Wyatt, and the UnumProvident insurance company. Current studies
have documented the migration of workers who develop a work-limit
ing disability from private to public sources of income replacement,
referred to as the Progression of Disability Benefits (PODB). In the
next phase of this research, the rate of PODB on an employer-byemployer basis will be compared for employers who have implemented
DM programs and those without DM programs. It is expected that
employers with active DM programs will "pass through" fewer dis
abled employees (from STD and WC to LTD, and on to SSDI) than
those who do not engage in active disability management.
Still, significant challenges loom as the workforce ages:
Health care: a shift in the needs of disabled workers from medical
care for acute injuries and conditions to care for chronic, ongoing
health problems will challenge the health system to respond with
effective prevention and disease management services which will
maintain employees' ability to be productive at work.
Functional outcomes: the integration of health and disability
management will increasingly focus on improvement of func
tional outcomes (not simply clinical outcomes). Development of
valid and meaningful measures of functional improvement will
require collaboration between health and disability researchers,
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purchasers, insurers, policy experts, and quality/accreditation
evaluators.
Workplace flexibility: accommodation of the restrictions of
employees with disabilities requires flexible work policies with
respect to work assignments, work design, and work scheduling.
Successful disability management efforts with aging workers will
hinge on the availability of telecommuting, flexible time, and
work redesign options.
Thus, maintenance of a productive workforce as the average age
increases will require concerted effort from health care providers, policymakers, insurers, and employers to optimally manage chronic condi
tions, track and respond to disability trends in the workforce, improve
or maintain functional abilities, and retain or return employees with
disabilities to work. The following public policy initiatives would sup
port the efforts of employers to attain these goals:
An integrated, seamless disability benefit system linking income
support and return-to-work services regardless of the cause of an
individual's disability;
Confidentiality regulations that protect individual medical infor
mation while assuring that employers and insurers have access to
the health and disability information needed to improve employee
and organizational health and productivity;
Tax incentives for employers who practice effective disability
management; and
Safety, health, and disability discrimination regulation which pro
motes workplace flexibility and rewards efforts of innovative
employers.
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Figure 1 How Have Costs Changed as a Percentage of Payroll over the
Past Three Years?
Workers'
compensation
38

I

I

41
STD

I

0%

20%

D Stayed the
same

14

45

36

• Increased

11

51

Sick pay

D Decreased

I

43

40%

60%

80% 100%

Share of Respondents
SOURCE. Washington Business Group of Health and Watson Wyatt. Staying @
Work—Increasing Shareholder Value Through Integrated Disability Management,
1999, Washington, D.C.

Figure 2 Popularity of Disability Management Activities
• 79%
176%
•169%
>66%

Transitional/modified RTW
Safety/Injury prevention
Behavioral health Interventions
Case management
Independent medical exams
Education of medical provider
Pald-time-off program
Line supervisor Involvement
Work/family programs
Performance standards for vendors
Chargeback of program costs
Employee cost sharing
RTW training for supervisors
Perfect attendance program
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Figure 3a Effectiveness of Top Four Disability Management Activities in
Decreasing Workers' Compensation Costs
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Figure 3b Effectiveness of Top Four Disability Management Activities in
Decreasing STD Costs
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Figure 3c Effectiveness of Top Four Disability Management Activities in
Decreasing LTD Costs
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Figure 4 Effect of Integrating Multiple Program Elements across
Workers' Compensation, LTD and STD
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Commentary
Vicki Gottlich
Center for Medicare Advocacy
Patricia Nemore
Center for Medicare Advocacy

Ms. Gottlich:
Since my boss is sitting in the back of the room, I have to say that I
also just joined the Center for Medicare Advocacy. With Alfred Chiplin, who is an Academy Member, and Toby Edelman, who also used to
be at the National Senior Citizens Law Center, we're establishing the
Healthcare Rights Project.
Trish and I have decided that we're the tokens in this conference.
We're the token nonresearchers, nonacademics. We're advocates and
attorneys, and our comments are going to be based on our clients, who
are really the real people whom Michele Singletary talked about.
I'm going to be talking about employer-sponsored insurance and
Medicare. Trish is going to be talking about Medicaid. I can talk real
fast because I'm from New York.
In terms of employer-sponsored insurance, I wanted to raise three
issues that are crucial for people with chronic illness and people with
disabilities. They are the voluntariness of the program, the cost of the
program, and the lack of recourse available to participants and benefi
ciaries in employer-sponsored health insurance plans.
We've heard a lot today that the health insurance system is volun
tary. You can look at the numbers of people who are covered under
employer-sponsored health insurance as a glass half full or a glass half
empty. I think of it as a glass half empty. I think that there are a lot of
people who work for employers that offer health insurance who are
either not covered by their plan or who can't afford to participate in the
plan.
But when we talk about voluntariness of the employer-sponsored
system, it's more than the voluntary nature of offering a plan. It's the
voluntary design of the plan. Some of the benefit plans are really good,
as Wally Maher said this morning, and some of the plans are really
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awful. And I've had clients say to me I'm not going to enroll in this
plan because it costs too much and I get nothing out of it. It doesn't
help me for the kinds of things that I need.
The other issue with voluntariness is the ability of the employer to
change the health plan whenever the employer wants to with very little
input from the employee community. We as lawyers are familiar with
the case, the McGann case and the Owens case in which employers
decided to terminate coverage for AIDS-related illnesses after benefi
ciaries filed claims for AIDS-related illnesses.
Employers are also terminating retiree health plans, increasing copayments and deductibles in retiree health plans as a result of new
accounting standards. And if you look at the statistics, the number of
people covered by retiree health plans has decreased in the past 10
years. That leads us to cost. We've already heard about the cost of
COBRA health care continuation insurance. You need to remember
that COBRA offers a special benefit for people who have been found
eligible for Social Security disability, and those individuals can pur
chase an extension of COBRA from months 19 through 29 until they
become eligible Medicare. The kicker there is that the premium is 150
percent of the cost, and that's often unaffordable for a lot of people
who really need health insurance.
The other issue of cost is the increase in the cost of premiums,
deductibles, and co-pay. People who used to be able to afford to pur
chase or buy into or be covered by their employer plans can no longer
be covered by those plans because of the costs.
The third issue that I've done a lot of work on is recourse, and I'm
going to give you examples. I cannot tell you the number of clients I
have seen who are people with chronic illness, who had been covered
under a plan, a health plan with very good benefits, who are suddenly
told that they are no longer eligible for those particular benefits or cov
ered for the services that they need. There's not been a change in the
health plan. There's not been a change in their health status. There's
no cap on the benefit. It's just that there is some twitch by the
employer; maybe they'll claim that something that was skilled services
is no longer skilled services. That's very frequent.
And the recourse of the individual is to file an appeal. While under
ERISA you can take legitimately 360 days to complete the appeals pro
cess. There is no expedited review as there is under Medicare managed
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care or under Medicaid. So for clients who are poor, they can't afford
to continue paying for the service out of pocket. Their choice is to
forgo the service, to change their lifestyle; I've had individuals who
could have been cared for at home and end up going to a nursing home
or going on Medicaid. I've seen too many people who should be get
ting benefits under their employer-sponsored plan switch to Medicaid.
It means the employer is off the hook, but we as taxpayers are paying
for the benefit.
Medicare does better for people with disabilities. Of the 39 million
Medicare beneficiaries, 5 million are younger people who are eligible
because they receive Social Security disability benefits. Karen did a
good job of explaining why Medicare provides such a good benefit for
people with disabilities. It's a stable benefit. Once you're eligible for
Medicare, you're eligible Medicare and the population that we're talk
ing about generally does not go off Social Security disability benefits,
so they don't lose their access to Medicare. But Medicare also has
some problems for people with chronic conditions. The first one is the
Medicare coverage package. We hear a lot about the issue of prescrip
tion drugs, and I work on that issue as well as a lot of people in this
room, but another bigger issue is the lack of coverage for chronic care.
There are home health benefits. There are limited long-term care bene
fits. They are not sufficient. There's going to be a roundtable discus
sion tomorrow morning. I encourage people to go hear that discussion,
because it's really an important issue for people with disabilities.
The other issue is one that the Alzheimer's Association has been
working on, which is that routine services that are provided under
Medicare are pursuant to local medical review policies, not provided to
people with certain disabilities. So the Alzheimer's Association has
started to look at several of the local medical review policies and dis
covered that things like MRIs, routine blood work to determine
whether or not you have dementia or maybe have a vitamin deficiency,
or some rehabilitative therapies are not available to somebody with a
diagnosis of Alzheimer's disease, or dementia, or sometimes multiple
sclerosis, or Lou Gehrig's disease to certain kinds of chronic ill
nesses.
The problem with the local medical review policies is that they're
not made up by HCFA. There is no national review of these policies.
And, in fact, if you go through the administrative process and you get
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to the administrative law judge, the ALJ is not bound by these policies;
but they are the first barrier and very few people appeal.
Another issue that affects people with disabilities is the issue of
medigap coverage. As most of you know, people who are on tradi
tional Medicare often will buy a medigap policy to supplement their
Medicare coverage. The Medicare statute guarantees that medigap
policies will be issued to people who become eligible for Medicare,
based on age. So if you're 65 and you become eligible for Medicare,
there's a window in which you are guaranteed to be issued a medigap
policy regardless of your health condition or your health status.
There's no such guarantee for people with disabilities. The Depart
ment of Health and Human Services tried to get that included in the
Balanced Budget Act of 1997. It was not passed. It's a very important
issue for people with disabilities. The other thing that is interesting is
that in a lot of states there are no medigap policies available for people
with disabilities or else the policies that are available are low-rated pol
icies.
I'm going to conclude with one anecdote. When I was in Tennes
see, the State Health Insurance Counseling Program told me they'd
received a phone call from a man who was on Medicare because of dis
ability. He had previously worked in the State Insurance Office, so he
was very familiar with the insurance policies. He tried to get a medi
gap policy. The only policy that was available to him was very costly
and it was rated D. So he said, I as an insurance commissioner am not
going to pay a lot of money for a policy that is a worthless policy. It's a
very important issue.
Ms. Nemore:
Last week, Vicki and I attended the Families USA Health Action
2000 conference, which, as you might expect, was a little bit different
in tone from this conference, and we heard in the opening plenary the
exhortations of Michael Moore, the film maker who produced "Roger
and Me" and "The Big One," basically exhorting us to take to the
streets with cameras in hand to document the failings of our health care
system. And so it's an interesting shift for me to come to your confer
ence and hear the presentations of researchers who I would hope are
providing the research base for us to move into public policy stances
that are consistent with the name of the National Academy for Social
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Insurance. I feel like we haven't heard a lot about the concept of social
insurance today, and I hope that that topic will continue to emerge in
the remaining hours of the conference today and tomorrow.
Vicki and I are on the panel as presenting a consumer perspective
on the issues of health care for people with chronic disabilities; neither
Vicki nor I are consumers of Medicare or Medicaid, and I think it's
really important for us all to be aware of that. We are advocates for
those people, but we are not consumers of those programs. And I sus
pect if you had consumers of those programs presenting a perspective,
they would be a lot less polite than I think this forum warrants us to be.
That said, I would like to remind us of some things about the Med
icaid program and what its role is in coverage of people with chronic
disabilities, people with disabilities, and generally with the more needy
segments of our society.
The Medicaid program is a needs-based program, so in order to get
benefits you have to have low income and resources. It is a program
based on both categorical and financial eligibility. You have to fit into a
category. You have to be a child who needs care or the parent of a child
who needs care under the old AFDC segment, or you have to be a per
son in the SSI segment who is aged, blind, or disabled. Generally,
most of Medicaid requires that you fit into one of those two categories,
and you have to meet the financial income and resource tests.
A good thing about Medicaid is that it does focus resources on the
people most in need and on people with very high medical expenses.
Another good thing about Medicaid is that it has a core package of ser
vices that are required to be provided by all states. There is also in
Medicaid a whole range of services that are not required to be provided
by states, that are optional, and I'll get a little bit more into that in a
minute. That can be a serious problem for people. It's one of the less
salient features of the program in terms of meeting people's whole
needs.
It's an entitlement program. If you fit into the categories and you
fit the financial eligibility, you are entitled to Medicaid. That makes it
different from CHIP; the new CHIP program for children is not an enti
tlement, and that makes a big difference. There are issues about how
we expand public coverage and which direction to go.
A really important aspect of Medicaid that we often hear compared
with the private health insurance sector is due process rights under
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Medicaid. The review system in Medicaid is really very good. It
doesn't always work as well as it's supposed to, but what's on paper is
a constitutional guarantee of due process, due to the Goldberg v. Kelly
case from 1969 that says people in brutal need have a constitutional
right to due process, and there is a fair hearing process and review pro
cess that's really better than what we who have private sector insurance
have, and it's really better than Medicare. So that's a very good aspect
of it. And there is a huge body of case law that fleshes out what peo
ple's rights are in Medicaid, which has some very, very strong positive
elements of what it means to be entitled to a core package of services.
What does Medicaid do for people with disabilities? The easiest
route in is receipt of SSI disability. Generally, until our recent move
into trying to help people back into the labor force, that meant that you
were not working. So in order to get the SSI coverage, you were a dis
abled person who was unable to work.
The one category of Medicaid coverage that is an exceptionto the
"unable to work" norm is called the qualified severely impaired indi
vidual category. This is for people who were on SSI, were not work
ing, have gone back into the workforce, and but for their earnings they
would still be entitled to SSI. So it allows you to disregard all your
earnings and still get Medicaid coverage. That's required for the states
to include in their program.
One of the things that is important to remember about Medicaid is
that there are a lot of categories, and that's a significant drawback to the
policy. That is something that makes Medicare as a public program far
more attractive. You get Medicare because you're 65 or you get Medi
care because you're disabled, period. You don't have to fit into one of
27 different categories.
There are a couple of required Medicaid categories of SSi-related
people who might be disabled people who are entitled to Medicare.
There are also 16 options that states can choose, and that's where some
of the new work incentives pieces from the last couple of years, have
come in. There is a buy-in: states can choose to have a buy-in program
for people with incomes up to 250 percent of poverty. They can
choose, out of the work incentive package that was passed in this past
session of the Congress, to cover people between the ages of 16 and 65,
and the state can set the income and resource levels. That's a very sig
nificant change from normal Medicaid, because even if you fit into the
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working disabled category where your earnings are disregarded, SSI
has resource limitations which are very, very strict, and a lot of people
can't meet those. So under this new option, states can expand, elimi
nate, do what they want with respect to resources. There is another cat
egory for states to choose to cover people who have gone back into the
workforce and are actually found no longer disabled, but who still have
a severe medical condition, and the state can choose to cover those
people as well without the income and resource limits.
Again, the problems are that these are state options. States have to
choose them in order for them to be of any value to people.
The Medicaid program requires states to cover a core package of
services, which includes in-patient, out-patient, lab, x-ray, doctors' vis
its, and a couple of other important things that aren't necessarily partic
ularly relevant for people with disabilities. The things that are most
necessary probably for a lot of people with disabilities are all state
options: drugs, prosthetic devices, durable medical equipment, physical
therapy, other kinds of rehab, private duty nursing, and personal care.
All states provide drug coverage. Most states provide most of
those other services and supplies, but they are state options. A state
can choose to pull out of those services without any legal ramifications.
It can obviously have serious political ramifications and obviously do
terrible harm to people who need the services, but they can opt out of
providing those.
There are a number of people with disabilities who get coverage
under both Medicare and Medicaid, and they don't intersect necessar
ily very well. Medicaid actually has better home health provisions,
which can be very important and beneficial to people with disabilities.
One of the pieces of the work incentives legislation that was passed
this past year was to provide grants for the states to develop an infra
structure to help people going back to work who are disabled. One of
the requirements for a state to get that grant is that it makes personal
care services available to people in the workforce. This is a tremen
dously important benefit and could be very valuable to people.
That is a brief overview of what Medicaid offers. Medicaid is so
complex, and the access to the program through the process of apply
ing and showing how much income you have and how many resources
you have and providing all that verification is an enormous barrier to
people. We've heard over and over again, "I don't want the govern-
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ment messing in my business." "I don't want to have to show that."
That's a huge difference between Medicare and Medicaid. To get
Medicare, you just show you're disabled or over 65, and you're entitled
to Medicare based on your earnings. And that is one of the most seri
ous drawbacks of the Medicaid program.

Commentary
Barbara Wolfe
University of Wisconsin-Madison

These papers address the topic of chronic illness, disability, and
related policy issues for an aging workforce. Biddle, Boden, and
Reville ask about the adequacy of workers' compensation benefits for
those with long-term or permanent disabilities; Burkhauser, Daly, and
Houtenville ask how well the disabled have fared in terms of work and
income over the last business cycle; Gottlich and Nemore provide a
primer on obtaining health care insurance coverage.
What might we like to know about the circumstances that led to
these papers? Here are a few pertinent questions.
1) How well do our insurance/protection systems perform for older
workers who develop chronic illness or suffer an accident that
leads to a disability with long-term consequences? Can we learn
something from alternative approaches among the states that can
guide us in better designing workers' compensation? How well
do our other programs that provide benefits to the long-term dis
abled perform as a safety net?
2) Overall, how well are the disabled doing, and how has this
changed in the last decade? Are the disabled gaining in this
booming labor market? How are they doing in terms of earn
ings? Are they doing as well as other groups; if so, which
groups? How hard were they hit in the last recession and what
might this suggest for the future when macroeconomic condi
tions change? How well do transfers do in maintaining the
income of persons with disabilities and the families in which
they live?
3) Do persons with disabilities have access to comprehensive health
insurance? If working, what are their rights to employer-pro
vided coverage? To individual insurance? What role does the
public sector play in terms of direct provision, helping gain pri
vate coverage? If persons with disabilities were to regain or
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improve health, what is their access to coverage? Does the "sys
tem" inhibit the return to work of disabled individuals? What are
the recent changes designed to minimize this negative incentive
to return to work?
4) And, finally, we would like to derive a sense of how well the dis
abled are doing overall in earnings, income, total compensa
tion, and health insurance coverage. How are they faring
compared with how they would have been expected to fare if not
disabled? How well are they faring in terms of avoiding poverty?
Addressing these issues is clearly a tall order; however, I am going
to use this framework to think about these papers. I discuss them in the
order they were presented.

BIDDLE, BODEN, AND REVILLE

The first paper, by Biddle, Boden, and Reville, analyzes the experi
ence of three states with regard to the replacement of earnings by
workers' compensation. It is an interesting presentation of those poli
cies, including the schedule in each of the three states and the philoso
phy underlying these approaches. Learning about replacement of lost
earnings is more difficult in the case of workers' compensation,
because there are continuing earnings in most cases, in contrast with
the traditional income replacement programs such as Social Security
(SSDI). The calculation when individuals have earnings is much more
complicated than when they do not.
The authors calculate a unique replacement rate: replacement of
earnings that the individual would have expected to receive if not
injured. This way of asking the question poses a technical or econo
metric difficulty: how to know the correct counterfactual, or what the
person would have earned if not injured. The authors use different
approaches in each state; the biggest difference is between California
and the other two states. (It would be preferable if the authors could
use a similar approach, but it is not clear whether this is possible given
data constraints.)
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The Comparison Groups for the Counterfactual
Are Troublesome
Why use individuals who had "some accident"? Is this the appro
priate counterfactual? Why use individuals in the same firm, since this
leads to very small sample sizes and many firms have very heteroge
neous workers? What do they do with individuals who work in smaller
firms where there are few similar employees? I'd prefer to see the
authors use employees of the same occupation, age, gender, and indus
try to develop the counterfactuals. This should be feasible among
states.
Methodology
Using fixed effects may overcorrect for factors that directly influ
ence earnings. They want to correct for unobserved factors such as
motivation, drive, etc., but they also correct for young children at home
(which changes over time) and for on-the-job training, which also
changes over time.
Discount Rate
The rate they use, 2.3 percent, is rather low; they should test for
sensitivity.
Results
Perhaps most interesting is the relative success of a two-tiered sys
tem, such as that of Wisconsin, where payments are better targeted on
those with the greatest need. Thus, the comparison using quintiles pro
vides insight on the relative success of these alternative workers' com
pensation programs. This is a system that uses a functional impairment
benefit along with an earnings capacity benefit, and the advantage of
this, at least as indicated by the results, appears to be that they can tar
get payments to individuals who do not return to work or are rehired at
a much lower proportion of their former wage.
The comparison among states also suggests that there is a trade-off
between the percentage of awards that provide cash for permanent dis
ability and the replacement rate (which is not surprising). Unfortu-
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nately, since the statistical match and dates differ somewhat among
states, the paper cannot fully eliminate the role of state differences in
comparing the states.

BURKHAUSER, DALY, AND HOUTENVILLE

I turn next to the paper by Burkhauser, Daly, and Houtenville, who
address an interesting question: how well have disabled persons and
their families fared in this labor market during an economic boom?
They cover two aspects: how persons with disabilities fare in the labor
market, and the probability of application to, and the resulting leniency
and generosity of, transfers to persons with disabilities.
During a labor market expansion, especially a sustained one, we
would expect a decline in unemployment among all groups, including
those with disabilities. We expect opportunities to substantially
increase for most persons and, given a sustained increase, to improve
for those with the poorest labor market opportunities, including the dis
abled.
We also expect that with welfare reform (TANF) there will be
some increase (shift over) of claims for SSDI and SSL A recent Lewin
report (1999) tracks some of this, and we know that there has been a
considerable expansion of the earned income tax credit (EITC),
designed to make work pay for lower-income workers with children.
We don't know a great deal about health coverage of this population,
although we do know that insurance coverage is down for adults, espe
cially those with health difficulties (and there may be associated incen
tives concerning working).
Approach
The authors use annual CPS data. The key identification issue is
who is disabled, which they base on a general question on disability:
whether the respondent is limited in ability to work or kind and amount
of work. This is a very general question, as the authors recognize. The
years covered in the analysis are 1988-1999. This is undoubtedly the
best data source, but the disability measure is limited, and there are sig-
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nificant underreporting issues, especially of income from transfers that
have increased over time. 1
The authors first examine the pattern of disability, finding an
increase through 1994 and then a decline, as we would expect. One
can see in particular a decline in the number of young people with
reported disabilities, such that mean age is up over the period. In addi
tion, there appear to be more females with disabilities; and in terms of
education, high school graduates show the biggest increase. Overall,
the pattern of demographic changes might lead one to expect a decline
in earnings and earnings-related transfers. (On average, females earn
75 percent on the dollar.) This would be the case without a change in
the macroeconomy, simply focusing on demographic characteristics.
Minor Issues

Why use a 0.5 equivalence scale? There is at least some increasing
agreement that it is preferable to use two- and three-parameter scales
for the poverty measure, as they better incorporate economies of scale.
I would like to see a sensitivity test using alternative scales.
Studies of income distribution are heavily affected by the different
procedures that researchers choose to measure inequality. A major
issue is to assess the direction and the extent of the change in inequality
when different adjustments for household size and composition are
allowed. For example, Coulter, Cowell, and Jenkins (1992) found that
when the value of e was increased from zero to 1, inequality first
decreases and then increases, forming a U- shape. They explained the
theoretical relationship between equivalence scales and inequality: the
well-being (W,) of an individual is a function of four different vari
ables: total household income (//), household size (5), elasticity of
scale (e), and household characteristics (r\):

An example of a two-parameter scale is that for OECD:
W =

H
1 + 0.7(A-1) + 0.5C
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where A are adults and C are children. So, there is an issue with regard
to the relatively arbitrary value of an equivalence scale utilized.
There is an issue regarding the sample as well: Why call someone
with 1 hour of work per week a member of the labor force? What
would happen if they looked only at those who work a minimum of 20
hours per week for at least half of a year? The authors might perform a
sensitivity analysis to see how sensitive the results are to this broad
definition.
Bigger concerns include the EITC, other noncash forms of com
pensation, and a change in underreporting. The EITC was greatly
expanded over this time period, which is most important for those with
low earnings and with children. While it is not clear how important
this issue is to this population, it seems clear that omitting the EITC
leads to an understatement of income. There is systematic underreport
ing, but it is not consistent across types of income. Most recently there
has been a big shift concerning transfers: a large decline in reporting
relative to administrative totals, so underreporting is likely to add to the
decline in reported (but not in actual) income. This problem has grown
worse in recent years. For example, Douglas Besharov (1999) has
stated that
assertions about declines in Medicaid coverage are often based on
analyses of the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey
(CPS), the government's primary data source for measuring
employment, earnings, poverty, welfare receipt, and a range of
other important outcomes. Unfortunately, the survey appears to
miss about one-third of AFDC/TANF, food stamp, and Medicaid
recipients. Perhaps even more important, this problem has been
getting^worse in recent years, a deterioration that has important
implications for judging the impact of welfare reform.

According to the CPS, between 1993 and 1997 the number of chil
dren under 15 enrolled in Medicaid declined by 3.2 million. But reli
able administrative data from the Health Care Financing Admin
istration (HCFA) show an increase of 400,000. For the period 19951997, HCFA data also show a decline of 700,000 children, but the CPS
shows a much larger decline of 1.7 million. These kinds of discrepan
cies document the importance of underreporting.
Another issue concerns the measurement of income. Is the mea
sure reported the one that the analysts should be interested in, or is it a

Session 3: Chronic Illness and Disability

369

fuller measure of disposable income and close substitutes? If the latter,
then there are two questions: 1) whether and how to value noncash
income, such as health insurance and, for those of low income, food
stamps; and 2) how to measure disposable income rather than gross
income (subtract taxes).
Noncash income to U.S. families has grown substantially in the
past 25 years. In the 1980s, over half of government transfer spending
for the poor was in the form of noncash benefits, according to the U.S.
Bureau of the Census. This growth of benefits to the poor has been
paralleled by a growth of nonwage compensation to wage earners,
induced in part by tax laws exempting such compensation from income
and payroll taxes. By 1990, employer costs for nonwage compensation
had grown to over one-quarter (27.6 percent) of total compensation
costs, up from 19.4 percent in 1966. By excluding this form of income
and its distribution, the story is incomplete.
To conclude, it may well be true that persons with disabilities have
not done as well, and this clearly seems to be the case for earnings.
The authors might improve this study if they included an imputed value
for EITC; conducted a Oaxaca decomposition to see how much is
change in characteristics (more women, older); tested for sensitivity to
equivalence scale used; and adjusted for underreporting following Cen
sus Bureau methodology. Finally, there is a puzzle regarding applica
tions for benefits. A recent Lewin study (1999) found a sharp decline
in SSI applications after 1993. While these are not strictly comparable,
the big difference is surprising.
The pattern that the authors find, however the largest declines in
employment in middle-income groups, far bigger increases in dollars
of SSDI awarded to women, and lower income among women and men
in the middle-income group compared to 1989 levels seems unex
pected and surely worthy of further exploration to try to understand
why these individuals and their families are not doing as well as we
might anticipate.
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GOTTLICH AND NEMORE
The final paper, by Gottlich and Nemore, is a useful guide for any
one interested in learning how to obtain benefits under three different
sets of programs (private, Medicaid, or Medicare), taken one at a time.
This is very useful to someone who wants to know the options for cov
erage. For researchers and policymakers, it might be more useful to
draw them together to obtain a picture of the probability that older per
sons with disabilities could obtain private, social security, or public
health insurance (Medicaid or Medicare) coverage. And, the authors
could usefully add a discussion of the issue of returning to work; that
is, if a person has coverage through one system, such as Medicare, and
wishes to return to the work force, what are the options and probabili
ties of private coverage? Finally, it would be very helpful to have some
sense of adequacy of coverage; that is, are these folks at high risk of
lacking coverage? Of lacking coverage for some required care? Are
high deductibles or high required co-pays an issue that needs to be con
sidered? If these are policy problems, it would be a welcome addition
if the authors would make suggestions for obtaining and improving
coverage.
Other questions could be asked. Is ERISA a problem in terms of
persons with disabilities obtaining coverage, or does it help? Are there
antidiscrimination laws that might aid this population under ERISA?
Is an individual with a specific medical condition who is returning to
work more likely to be covered with a firm under ERISA or under state
law? (And does the answer differ by state?) Are there likely to be
labor market consequences if there is increased regulation on the provi
sion of coverage? There is an issue that links this paper to the others,
and here I quote from Daniel Weinberg (1995):
Of key concern to understanding well-being is the valuation of
medical benefits, both the government health programs Medi
care (medical aid to the elderly) and Medicaid (medical aid to the
poor) and employer-provided health insurance. The valuation of
medical benefits is particularly difficult, because coverage of high
medical expenses for someone who is sick does nothing to
improve his or her poverty status (although the benefits clearly
make him or her better off). Even if one imputes the value of an
equivalent insurance policy to program participants, these benefits
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(high in market value due to large medical costs for the fraction
who do get sick) cannot be used by the recipients to meet other
needs of daily living. However, not having coverage clearly
detracts from economic well-being and possibly health itself.

The bottom line of this message is that we need to incorporate the
value of coverage (or lack of it) in order to get a more comprehensive
view of the well-being of persons with disabilities over time, across
characteristics, and in comparison with persons who are not disabled.

OVERVIEW ISSUES

Is the best way to learn about the success of a program to address
the replacement rate? I would like to see more on dollar value of bene
fits. I would like to have the authors address the role of workers' com
pensation in reducing or eliminating poverty, an income concept like
net income of individual and family. What is presented is earnings loss
and replacement of lost earnings, a valid measure of economic wellbeing, nonetheless.
As in the Burkhauser paper, I would like a full measure of income,
including EITC, taxes, and other disability-related transfer programs
benefits such as SSDI and SSI, to see what has happened to income and
to poverty rates over this time period. How are those worst off among
the disabled who receive workers' compensation faring?
To conclude my comments, these three studies bring readers a
sense of the economic well-being and access to health care of persons
with disabilities. At some level the papers all critique the others: earn
ings and income as defined in the Burkhauser study does not include
the value or even the-presence of health insurance, which is clearly
very important for this population. Workers' compensation is only one
part of income. We would like to know more about its role and interac
tion with other transfers and with earnings. The studies are also linked
in trying to answer an additional question: "Does the potential for high
medical expenditures influence future earnings opportunities?"
Ultimately these studies are purely descriptive. They do not ask
whether a change in one program, such as health care coverage, would
influence such choices as whether or not to work and number of hours,
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nor whether better labor market opportunities change the generosity of
workers' compensation. The studies all add to our knowledge of the
situation of persons with disabilities with regard to income and access
to health care coverage, but our picture is still incomplete. In the
future, we would like to add to the picture painted by Burkhauser,
Daly, and Houtenville the presence and value of health care coverage
and workers' compensation benefits (though they may be included), to
adjust for underreporting of various sources of income, and take
account how these change with the state of the economy, with the
workers' compensation policy of the state, and state and ERISA laws
regarding health insurance coverage.

Note
1. According to the Census Bureau, ". . . for many different reasons, there is a ten
dency in household surveys for respondents to underreport their income. From an
analysis of independently derived income estimates, it has been determined that
income earned from wages or salaries is much better reported than other sources
of income and is nearly equal to independent estimates of aggregate earnings"
(Coder and Scoon-Rogers 1996).
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The United States and other industrial nations face key challenges
associated with a graying population. Depressed birth rates and rising
longevity have increased the dependency ratio throughout the industri
alized world. Population projections of the Social Security Trustees
suggest the U.S. aged-dependency ratio the ratio of Americans older
than 64 to Americans aged 20 to 64—will increase almost 70 percent
between 2000 and 2030. The increase will be even larger in some
other rich countries. As the U.S. population grows older, the cost of
paying for pension and health benefits must rise, boosting tax burdens
and impairing the nation's ability to pay for other government obliga
tions. The burden imposed by an aging population would rise more
gradually if workers could be persuaded to delay their retirements and
continue contributing to the health and pension systems.
In this chapter, we consider long-term trends in retirement, as well
as recent trends that signal at least a pause in the historical pattern of
earlier withdrawal from the workforce. We also discuss public policies
that might reinforce the very recent trend toward greater labor force
participation among older workers.

RETIREMENT TRENDS

At the beginning of the last century, retirement was relatively
uncommon but not unknown. Two out of three American men past age
65 were employed, but one-third were not (U.S. Department of Com
merce 1975, p. 132).' By middle of the twentieth century, retirement
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was far more common. Fewer than half of men 65 and older held a job
in 1950. By 1985, the proportion at work fell still further. Just 16 per
cent of men over 65 were employed or actively seeking a job; 84 per
cent were outside the active labor force. The percentage of women
past 65 who were employed or looking for work also shrank during the
first four decades after World War II, though this was mainly because
the average age of women past 65 was rising. The reduction in
women's employment was far smaller than among men in part because
the percentage of older women who worked outside the home was
quite low in the 1940s.
The decline in labor force participation at older ages has not been
confined to the United States. It is characteristic of all rich industrial
ized countries. In most European countries, employment rates among
the elderly are now significantly below those in the United States
(Quinn and Burkhauser 1994). Along with a shrinking work week and
rising paid employment among married women, earlier retirement
among men has been a distinctive feature of economic progress in all
the developed countries.

Trends in the United States
The pattern of declining work among older men is clearly evident
in Figure 1. Each line in the figure traces the labor force participation
rate of older American men, by age, in a different year of the past cen
tury.2 (A person is considered to be a labor force participant if he or
she holds a job or is actively seeking work.) The top line shows agespecific participation rates of older men in 1910. Note that there is a
clear pattern of labor market withdrawal with advancing age. Even at
age 72, however, the male participation rate in 1910 was over 50 per
cent. Participation rates in 1940, 1970,1984-1985, and 1998-1999 are
displayed in the lower four lines. Each of these lines shows a charac
teristic pattern of labor market withdrawal as men grow older. The cru
cial difference between 1910 and later years is that the fall-off in labor
force participation begins at an earlier age and proceeds at a faster
pace.
The decline in male participation was neither smooth nor uniform
over the century. By far the largest proportionate declines in participa-

Session 4: Is Working Longer and Retiring Later Possible?

377

Figure 1 Labor Force Participation of Men at Specific Ages, 1910-1999
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tion occurred among men past the age of 65. In 1998-1999, for exam
ple, the participation rate among 72-year-olds was only one-quarter of
the equivalent rate in 1910. The fall-off in participation was smaller at
younger ages. In general, large declines in participation occurred in
the early and middle parts of the century for the oldest age groups;
major declines occurred after 1960 among younger men. The largest
percentage declines among men older than 70 occurred between 1910
and 1940. The fastest declines among 65- to 69-year-olds took place
between 1940 and 1970. The biggest declines among men under 65
did not occur until after 1960, after the earliest age of eligibility for
Social Security benefits was reduced to 62. A striking feature of Figure
1 is that there has been no decline in older men's participation rates
since the mid 1980s. After a long period of decline, the participation
rates of older men stabilized or even increased slightly after 1985.
The story for older American women is different. Older women's
participation rates in the post-World War II era have reflected two par
tially offsetting phenomena: the early retirement trend of older workers
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in general and the increasing labor force participation of married
women. As a result of the latter, the participation rates of older women
did not exhibit the dramatic postwar declines seen among men.
Instead, as shown in lower panel of Table 1, age-specific labor force
participation rates generally increased among women. Between 1950
and 1998-1999, the female participation rate rose 39 percentage points
at age 55, 26 points at age 60, 8 points at age 65, and 7 points at age 70.
What is similar to the male experience is the shift in trends after
1985. As with men, there is a noticeable break from the earlier trend in
older women's labor force participation. Between 1970 and 1985,
older women's labor force participation rate barely increased at all, and
it even declined among people past age 62. In contrast, female partici
pation rates surged in the 15 years after 1985. Figure 2 shows the
annual percentage-point change in participation at selected ages in the
Table 1 Labor Force Participation Rates at Selected Ages by Sex,
1940-1999 (% of population)
Year

Age 55

60

62

Men
1940
80
82
90
88
1950
80
82
90
1960
79
83
1970
73
81
89
1984-85
50
83
69
1998-99
55
68
83
Women
15
17
20
1940
1950
21
23
28
29
43
1960
35
43
50
1970
36
44
32
1984-85
52
43
67
49
1998-99
SOURCE: Munnell (1977), p. 70, and authors' tabulations
tion Survey files for 1984, 1985, 1988, and 1999.

65

70

67
68
54
47
32
34

44
45
33
27
17
21

12
6
16
8
12
20
22
11
17
10
24
15
of March Current Popula
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Figure 2 Annual Change in Labor Force Participation Rate at Selected
Ages, 1970-1985 and 1985-1999
Men
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Women

70

SOURCE: Authors' tabulations based on Munnell (1977), p. 70, and March Current
Population Survey files for 1984, 1985, 1998, and 1999.
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two different periods. The top panel shows trends in the participation
rate of older men, and the lower panel shows trends at the same five
ages for women. At age 62, the male participation rate fell 1.5 percent
age points a year from 1970 to 1985. The rate among 62-year-old
women declined 0.2 points a year over the same period. Between 1985
and 1999, the male participation rate at age 62 rose 0.3 percentage
points per year; the female rate increased 0.7 points per year. At each
age, the rate of increase in participation rates accelerated, the rate of
decline in participation rates shrank, or a decline in participation rates
was reversed. The similarity of the break points in the male and female
time series is striking (Quinn 1999b). Women's participation rates at
older ages have risen strongly over the past 15 years, while among
older men, the long-term decline in participation rates has ended and
may even have reversed.
Historical information about participation rates can be used to
trace out the long-term trend in retirement. Figure 3 shows the trend in
the "average" male retirement age if we define that age as the youngest
Figure 3 Average Retirement Age of American Men, 1910-1999
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SOURCE: Authors' tabulations of data in Ransom, Sutch, and Wllliamson (1991) and
Munnell (1977) and in March Current Population Survey files for 1963-1999.
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age at which fewer than half the men in the age group remain in the
workforce. Under this definition, the average male retirement age fell
from 74 years in 1910 to 63 years in 1998-1999, a drop of about 1.2
years per decade. The tabulations in Figure 3 also indicate, however,
that the trend toward earlier male retirement has recently slowed and
may even have ceased.
The decline in the average retirement age has occurred in an envi
ronment of rising life expectancy among older Americans, especially in
the period since 1940. Falling mortality rates among the elderly added
almost four years to the expected life span of a 65-year-old man and
more than 5.5 years to the life expectancy of a 65-year-old woman after
1940. Since expected male life spans increased about 0.8 years per
decade during a period in which the retirement age dropped 1.2 years
per decade, the amount of the male life span devoted to retirement
climbed about 2 years per decade, adding almost 12 years to the
amount of time men spend in retirement. Retirement now represents a
substantial fraction of a typical worker's life. For many workers,
retirement will last longer than the period from birth until full-time
entry into the job market.
Trends in Other Rich Countries
The long-term trend toward earlier retirement in the United States
has been matched and usually surpassed by equivalent trends in
other rich countries. In a recent survey of the determinants of retire
ment in rich countries, OECD economists produced estimates of the
average retirement age in 24 high-income nations (Blbndal and Scarpetta 1998). They estimated the average age at which men and women
withdrew from the active workforce for selected years between 1950
and 1995. Their estimates show that the average retirement age has
declined in nearly all of the countries since 1950. In 1950, the average
retirement age for men was 65 or higher in almost all the 24 countries.
By 1995, the male retirement age had fallen everywhere except Ice
land. In most countries, the drop in the average retirement age was at
least three years. In a quarter of the countries, an average male now
leaves the workforce before attaining age 60. The drop in the average
retirement age of women has been even faster.
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As one of the richest OECD countries, the United States might be
expected to have one of the lowest retirement ages. Instead, it has one
of the highest. In 1950, its average retirement age placed the United
States in the middle of the 24 countries surveyed by the OECD. By
1995, it had one of the oldest retirement ages. Only four out of the 24
countries had a higher male retirement age (Iceland, Japan, Norway,
and Switzerland) and only five had a higher female retirement age (Ice
land, Japan, Norway, Sweden, and Turkey). Figure 4 shows the 19601995 trend in average retirement ages in the seven largest OECD econ
omies, separately for men and women. In all seven countries, women
retire at a younger age than men. (The male/female gap in retirement
ages averaged 2.5 years in 1995.) In all seven countries, the average
retirement age of both men and women has fallen over time; but, the
decline has been smaller in the United States, and especially in Japan,
than in the other five countries.
Some of the recent divergence in retirement trends is due to differ
ences in the state of the overall job market. The United States and
Japan maintained much lower unemployment rates than the other five
countries through most of the 1990s. The tighter labor markets in those
two countries probably encouraged older workers to remain employed
longer than they would have if the unemployment rate approached
European levels. It is also likely, however, that cross-country differ
ences in old-age and disability pensions, unemployment benefits, and
health insurance coverage played important roles in keeping older
American and Japanese workers in the labor force (Gruber and Wise
1999).
The retirement-age trends displayed in Figure 4 obviously have
different implications for a nation depending on whether its workingage population is growing or shrinking. The extra burden implied by
an earlier retirement age is easier to bear if the working-age population
is expanding rapidly, either as a result of natural population increase or
immigration. In this respect, Canada and the United States enjoy a sig
nificant advantage over the other five countries. High immigration and
moderate fertility rates ensure substantial labor force growth in North
America over the next few decades, even if U.S. and Canadian retire
ment ages should continue to fall. Germany, Italy, and Japan face
much less favorable prospects; fertility in all three countries is
extremely low, and immigration into Japan is negligible. The three
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Figure 4 Estimates of the Average Age of Transition out of Active
Workforce in the G-7 Countries, 1960-1995
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countries face a future in which their active working populations will
decline, even if the average retirement age remains unchanged (Bosworth and Burtless 1998). If the average age at retirement continues to
decline, these countries will face even heavier burdens in supporting
their growing elderly populations.

EXPLAINING THE TRENDS
Research by economists and others has shed valuable light on the
evolution of retirement in the United States. Most of the early research
on American retirement trends was conducted by analysts in the Social
Security Administration using survey information from retired workers
receiving Social Security benefits or workers who had recently retired
(Quinn et al. 1990, pp. 43-53; Quinn 1991, pp. 119-123). In the earli
est surveys of new retirees, an overwhelming majority of male respon
dents said they retired because they were laid off by their last employer
or were in such poor health that further work was unappealing or
impossible. In the 1940s and early 1950s, fewer than 5 percent of new
retirees reported leaving work because of a wish to retire or enjoy more
leisure; about 90 percent left because of poor health or a layoff. These
explanations for retirement dominated survey responses and the
research literature from the 1940s through the early 1970s. Only a
very small percentage of retired men reported leaving work because
they wanted to retire. An early analyst suggested that "most old people
work as long as they can and retire only because they are forced to do
so ... [O]nly a small proportion of old people leave the labor market
for good unless they have to" (Quinn 1991, p. 120).
In recent surveys of new Social Security beneficiaries, a larger per
centage of pensioners reports leaving work because of a desire to enjoy
additional leisure or to retire. By the early 1980s, the desire to leave
work explained nearly half of all retirements among men 65 or older,
while poor health accounted for only a little over 20 percent and invol
untary layoff about 15 percent of retirements. The proportion of work
ers who say they have retired for purely voluntary reasons is plainly on
the increase.
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Many people will accept these responses at face value, but there
are reasons to be skeptical of the story they tell. From 1940 through
the early 1970s, well over a third of respondents explained their entry
into retirement as the result of involuntary job loss. While this expla
nation might seem plausible, labor economists recognize that millions
of workers lose their jobs each year without choosing to retire. The
overwhelming majority of workers who state that job loss was the rea
son for their retirement lost several jobs earlier in their careers, but on
no previous occasion did their layoffs cause them to permanently exit
the labor force. When forced into unemployment at younger ages,
these same workers looked for another job and eventually found one.
It is natural to ask why job loss pushed them into retirement on this one
occasion but not on the others.
Even the explanation of "poor health" should be treated with cau
tion. Social Security beneficiaries may account for their retirement
with the explanation that bad health left them no alternative, but it
seems reasonable to ask whether their decision to retire would have
been different if Social Security or other pensions were unavailable. In
the early postwar era, some retirees may have explained their employ
ment status in terms of job loss or bad health because the desire for
more leisure was not yet considered an acceptable reason to be without
a job. As retirement has come to be considered a normal and even
desirable part of life, workers may feel less reason to describe their joblessness as involuntary.
Wealth, Health, and the Physical Demands of Work
However we interpret the survey responses of people who collect
pensions, it should be plain the long-term trend toward earlier male
retirement has had an important voluntary component. The trend in
survey responses suggests this is true, and a growing body of research
evidence also supports the conclusion. The simplest and probably
most powerful explanation for earlier retirement is rising wealth. The
United States and other industrialized countries have grown richer over
time. Real per capita GDP in the United States has more than doubled
since 1960, increasing about 2 percent a year. Some of this increased
wealth has been used to purchase more leisure. Americans stay in

386 Burtless and Quinn

school longer than they once did, enter the workforce later, work fewer
hours per year, and leave the labor force earlier.
For many of today's retired workers, the increases in wealth flow
ing from greater national prosperity have been augmented by windfall
gains from two sources: higher prices for the houses they own and gen
erous benefits from Social Security and Medicare. Because the Social
Security system has historically been very generous, most generations
retiring up to the present have received larger pensions than their con
tributions alone could have paid for if the contributions had been
invested in safe assets. Workers who retired under Social Security
before the mid 1980s received pensions well in excess of the benefits
they would have received if Social Security offered normal returns on
their contributions (Leimer 1994; Geanakopolos, Mitchell, and Zeldes
1998). Retired Americans continue to receive Medicare benefits that
are vastly larger than those that could be financed solely out of their
contributions and the interest earnings on those contributions. This
fact is well known to students of social insurance, who recognize that
most early contributors to a pay-as-you-go retirement system obtain
exceptional returns on their contributions. The exceptional returns on
Social Security and Medicare taxes, like those on owner-occupied
homes, have increased the amount of consumption that older Ameri
cans can afford. One way workers have used these windfall gains is to
retire at a younger age.
While some researchers have attributed most of the postwar
decline in male labor force participation to the introduction and liberal
ization of Social Security, most specialists think the impact on retire
ment has been considerably smaller. Because of the long-term rise in
productivity, workers are much wealthier today than they were at the
beginning of the twentieth century. This would have led workers to
retire earlier than previous generations, even in the absence of Social
Security and Medicare. Social Security, Medicare, and employersponsored retirement plans were established and expanded in part to
help workers achieve the goal of living comfortably without work in
old age. If these programs had not be developed, it is likely that work
ers and employers would have found other ways to achieve the same
goal.
Of all the explanations advanced for earlier retirement, two of the
least persuasive are declining health and the changing physical require-
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ments of work. While nearly all good retirement studies find that
health plays an important role in the timing of retirement, there is no
convincing evidence that the health of 60-year-olds or 65-year-olds
was declining over the period in which older Americans' labor force
participation rates were falling. Declining mortality rates as well as
recent evidence about the trend in the physical disabilities of the aged
suggest instead that the health of Americans is improving, at least in
early old age. Moreover, analyses of the growth of different kinds of
occupations and in their physical requirements imply that the physical
demands of work are now easier to meet than they were in the past. A
much smaller proportion of jobs requires strenuous physical effort; and
a larger percentage requires only moderate or light physical exertion
(Manton and Stollard 1994; Baily 1987). Of course, within every gen
eration there will be workers who are in poor health and who work in
physically demanding jobs. These workers will be among the first to
retire. But it seems unlikely that general health deterioration or wide
spread increases in the physical demands of employment can explain
the general tendency for recent generations to retire earlier than work
ers in the past.
Financial Incentives
Besides increasing most current retirees' lifetime wealth, the
Social Security system also affects the financial attractiveness of
remaining at work. Most workers can choose to collect Social Security
starting at age 62, and many do. The effect of Social Security on retire
ment behavior before age 62 depends on the Social Security tax and on
the benefit formula that links eventual monthly pensions to a worker's
past covered earnings. Employers and workers pay a combined tax
equal to 12.4 percent of wages into the system. The tax thus reduces
workers' wages by about 12 percent in comparison with the wages they
would earn if the program did not exist. On the other hand, contribu
tions allow a worker to earn credits toward a Social Security pension.
The pension entitlement goes up as the worker's covered lifetime
wages increase. Whether the increase in the pension entitlement is
large enough to compensate a worker for his extra contributions is an
empirical question. Low-wage workers typically receive favorable
treatment under the Social Security benefit formula, so they often
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receive a generous return on their extra contributions. High-wage
workers usually receive lower returns. For any worker who is less than
62 years old, Social Security affects the marginal return from working
by reducing net current pay by about 12 percent and increasing the
present value of future Social Security pensions. Whether this
increases or reduces the willingness of a worker to continue working
depends on the exact amount of the future pension increase (which
depends on the worker's expected longevity) and on the worker's feel
ings about the relative value of current versus future income and the
attractiveness of immediate retirement.
Starting at age 62, Social Security has a different kind of effect on
the retirement decision. When a worker delays receipt of retirement
benefits by working another year after the earliest age of eligibility, two
things happen, one good and one bad. The bad news is that the worker
passes up the chance to collect a Social Security check. The good news
is that future retirement benefits will be higher because average life
time earnings are recalculated and because the monthly pension check
is increased for every month of delay in asking for benefits. If a worker
is entitled to a $500-per-month pension, for example, she sacrifices
$500 in retirement income every month she postpones retirement past
age 62. If her regular monthly pay is $10,000, this represents a small
sacrifice. But if her usual pay is $1,000, the sacrifice amounts to half
her wage. Between the ages of 62 and 64, the Social Security formula
offers average workers a fair compensation for giving up a year's bene
fits. Monthly benefits are adjusted upwards about 8 percent for each
year's delay in claiming them. For workers with average life expect
ancy and a moderate rate of time preference, this adjustment is just
large enough so that the sacrifice of a year's benefits is compensated by
eligibility for a higher pension in the future. After age 65, however, the
benefit formula has historically been less generous toward delayed
retirement. Postponement of retirement after that age was not fairly
compensated by increases in the monthly pension. For most workers
this is true even taking account of the fact that the basic pension calcu
lation gives them extra credit for their most recent wages.3 In essence,
the Social Security formula forces workers who delay retirement after
65 to accept a cut in the lifetime value of their Social Security pay
ments. This is a clear inducement to retire no later than age 65.
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It is worth noting that almost no workers are "average." A benefit
calculation rule that is age-neutral or actuarially fair on average can
still provide strong financial incentives to retire for a worker who has
below-average life expectancy. This worker may not expect to live
long enough for the future benefit increase to make up for the benefits
he gives up by delaying retirement for one more year. Similarly, a
worker who applies a high discount rate when evaluating future bene
fits may not be impressed that the pension adjustment is "fair" for an
average worker. For workers who are impatient to consume, an 8-per
cent hike in benefits starting one year from today may not be enough to
compensate for the loss of 12 monthly benefit checks over the next
year. Even an actuarially fair pension adjustment might be insufficient
to persuade workers who are tired of their jobs to delay retirement.
One reason that many people must retire in order to collect a Social
Security check is that the program imposes an earnings test in calculat
ing the annual pension. Workers who are between age 62 and 64 and
who earn more than $10,800 a year lose $1 in annual benefits for every
$2 in earnings they receive in excess of $10,800. Until recently, work
ers between 65 and 69 lost $1 in benefits for every $3 in annual earn
ings in excess of $17,000. (Pensioners age 70 and older did not face an
earnings test.) At one time the earnings limits were much lower, dis
couraging pensioners from work and possibly encouraging them to
postpone claiming a pension until they were confident their earnings
would remain low.
Many employer-sponsored pension plans are structured similarly
to Social Security pensions. Workers who are covered under an oldfashioned defined-benefit plan earn pension credits for as long as they
work for the employer that sponsors the plan (sometimes up to a maxi
mum number of years). The longer they work under the plan, the
higher their monthly pension. Most defined-benefit plans are struc
tured to encourage workers to remain with the employer for a minimal
period (say, 10 years) or until a critical age (say, age 55). Workers who
stay for shorter periods may receive very little under the plan. On the
other hand, workers who stay in the job too long may see the value of
their pension accumulation shrink. This would happen if the plan
offered benefits to workers starting at age 55 but then failed to signifi
cantly increase the monthly benefit for workers who delayed retirement
after age 55. If a 55-year-old worker can collect a monthly pension of
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$1,000 when he retires immediately and a monthly check of $1,001 if
he delays his retirement one year, he will clearly lose a substantial
amount of lifetime benefits nearly $12,000 for each year he post
pones receipt. The worker essentially suffers a pay cut when he
reaches age 55, and the cut is equal to the loss in lifetime benefits he
suffers by postponing retirement. Such a pay cut might seem illegal
under U.S. age discrimination laws, but it is perfectly legal as long as
the pay cut is reflected in reduced lifetime pensions rather than reduced
money wages. Many employers find this kind of pension formula to be
an effective prod in pushing workers into early retirement.
There is one important difference between Social Security and
employer-sponsored defined-benefit pensions. Social Security imposes
an earnings test on income received from all employment, including
self-employment. Employer-sponsored pensions may impose an even
tougher earnings test, but the test applies only to earnings received
from the sponsoring employer or group of employers. Workers who
wish to claim a pension may be forced to leave the job on which they
earned the pension, but they are not forced to leave work altogether.
Nevertheless, the effects of employer-sponsored pensions on retire
ment may be similar to those of Social Security, because many older
workers find it hard to get attractive job offers after they have retired
from their career jobs.
This explanation of the financial incentives in Social Security and
employer-sponsored pensions sheds some light on the retirement
trends discussed earlier. Social Security is now the main source of cash
income of households headed by someone 65 or older. The program
provides slightly more than 40 percent of the total cash income
received by the aged. Among aged households in the bottom 60 per
cent of the elderly income distribution, Social Security provides over
three-quarters of cash income. Until 1941, Social Security provided no
income at all to the aged. Today the program replaces about 42 percent
of the final wage earned by a full-career single worker who earns the
average wage and claims a pension at age 65. If the worker has a nonworking dependent spouse, the benefit replaces 63 percent of the
worker's final wage. Benefits are clearly large enough so they can be
economically significant in influencing the choice of retirement age.
The distributions of male retirement ages in 1940, 1970, and 19981999 are plotted in Figure 5. The chart shows the percentage of men
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Figure 5 Male Retirement Rate by Age, 1940-1999
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leaving the labor force at each age from 56 to 72, computed as a frac
tion of the men in the labor force at age 55.4 The calculations are
based on the data displayed in Figure 1. Not surprisingly, the retire
ment-age distributions for 1970, and especially for 1998-1999, are
skewed toward the left. Labor force withdrawal occurred at earlier
ages in those years than it did in 1940. Both the 1970 and 1998-1999
distributions show evidence of clustering in retirement at particular
ages. In 1970, the peak rate of retirement occurred at age 65; by 19981999, the peak occurred at age 62. There are peaks in the distribution
of retirements in 1940 at ages 65 and 70, but these are far lower than
the peaks in 1970 and 1998-1999, when the timing of retirements was
influenced by Social Security.
Our description of the financial incentives in Social Security sug
gests a simple explanation for the clustering of retirements at ages 62
and 65, at least in years after 1940. Workers who continued to work
beyond age 65 gave up Social Security benefits for which they were not
fairly compensated. This feature of the benefit formula clearly encour
ages retirement at age 65. The clustering of retirements at age 62 can
be explained using similar logic. Starting in 1961, age 62 became the
earliest age at which men could claim a Social Security pension.
Before 1961, there was no evidence of clustering in retirements at age
62, but by 1970, retirement was more common at 62 than at any other
age except 65. By the mid 1990s, age 62 was by a wide margin the
most popular age of retirement. In principle, the Social Security for
mula fairly compensates "average" workers if they delay claiming a
pension past age 62. As we have seen, however, a worker with a high
rate of time preference or short life expectancy might not regard the
compensation as fair. In that case, we should expect many workers to
prefer retiring at age 62 rather than a later age.
Of course, the clustering of retirements at ages 62 and 65 may be
due to factors other than Social Security. It is hard to believe, however,
that health or work opportunities decline abruptly at particular ages.
Another explanation is that some workers were affected by mandatory
retirement rules. This explanation may have been valid in 1940 and
1970, when mandatory retirement rules covered up to one-half of
American workers, but it is not persuasive today. Amendments to the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act passed in 1986 prohibit
employers from dismissing workers solely on account of their age.
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The simplest alternative explanation for the clustering of retire
ment ages is that workers are affected by employer-sponsored pension
plans, yet many older workers are not covered by an employer plan.
The Current Population Surveys suggest that employer-sponsored pen
sions do not provide a large percentage of income to older Americans
except in more affluent households. But, for those workers who are
covered by a private pension plan, the financial incentives in the plan
may provide powerful incentives for workers to leave their career jobs
at a particular age.
Health Insurance
Unlike most other industrialized countries, the United States does
not provide universal health insurance to its citizens. Instead, most
working-age Americans receive health insurance coverage as part of an
employer's compensation package. In 1995, 72 percent of American
workers between 18 and 64 had health insurance coverage under an
employer-based plan, either through their own employer or through the
employer of another family member. Some workers obtain insurance
through publicly provided Medicaid or privately purchased health
plans, but 18 percent of American workers were left uninsured. Some
employers offer continuing health insurance to their workers, even
after they leave the firm. In 1995, of those full-time employees in
medium and large firms who had health insurance on their jobs, 46 per
cent also had retiree health coverage before age 65, and 41 percent had
retiree coverage at ages 65 and older. The percentage of the labor force
employed by firms offering such protection is shrinking, and many
employers now require their retired workers to pay for more of the cost
of the plans (EBRI 1997a).
The nation's peculiar health insurance system provides a compli
cated set of incentives for retirement. Health insurance is particularly
important for workers who are past middle age but not yet eligible for
Medicare, because many of them face high risk of incurring heavy
medical expenses. Workers with health insurance on the job who
would lose it if they retire have an obvious incentive to remain on the
job, at least until age 65 when they become eligible for Medicare.
Those with postretirement health benefits have less incentive to remain
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employed, although how much less depends on how the insurance
costs after retirement are shared between the employee and employer.
As with Social Security and private pensions, there is considerable
evidence that health insurance coverage before and after retirement has
an important influence on individual retirement decisions. Gustman
and Steinmeier found, for example, that the effects of insurance plans
are similar in nature to those of employer-sponsored pension plans
(Gustman and Steinmeier 1994). If workers can become eligible for
retiree health benefits only after a delay, the availability of the plan
tends to delay workers' retirements until they gain eligibility. After eli
gibility has been achieved, the availability of retiree health benefits
encourages earlier retirement than would occur if no benefits were
offered. Quinn estimated that men and women in career jobs in 1992
were 8 to 10 percentage points less likely to leave their jobs over the
next four years if they would lose health insurance coverage by doing
so (Quinn 1999a). Inferring the overall effect of health insurance
incentives on retirement patterns is tricky, however. A number of com
ponents of employee compensation, including wage rates, pension cov
erage, health insurance, and retiree health benefits tend to be highly
correlated with one another. This makes it difficult to distinguish sta
tistically between the separate effects of each component of compensa
tion. Nonetheless, the rising importance of health insurance coverage
to older Americans suggests that the evolution of the public and private
health insurance system may have had a sizable impact on retirement
patterns.
The Change in Retirement Trends after 1985
There are two types of explanation for the slowdown or reversal of
retirement trends in recent years. One hypothesis is that permanent
changes in the environment for retirees have encouraged additional
work by older Americans. Under this conjecture, the long-term trend
toward earlier retirement is over. Another view is that temporary cycli
cal factors are responsible for a pause in the historical retirement trend.
When these cyclical factors are behind us, the historical trend toward
earlier retirement will resume. Although it will be many years before
we can be sure of the relative importance of these explanations, it is
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possible to assess some of the permanent and temporary factors that
have influenced recent retirement trends.
The most important cyclical factor affecting retirement is the state
of the economy. The American economy is currently growing strongly,
and the unemployment rate is near a 30-year low. The second half of
the 1980s and the 1990s saw lengthy economic expansions and strong
employment growth. There was only one recession after 1985. These
factors made it easier for workers to find jobs when they were dis
missed and more likely to find the terms and conditions of employment
that they desire. In contrast, economic growth was much lower even in
the 15 years after 1970. That period saw three recessions, and two of
those recessions in 1974-1975 and 1981-1982 were the worst of
the postwar era. Weak labor demand discourages jobless workers from
persisting in their job search. Strong demand creates employment
options for older workers who want to keep working.
Although we think a strong economy has contributed to the recent
rise in older Americans' participation rates, it is probably not a big part
of the story. The economy also grew strongly and unemployment
reached very low levels in the 1960s, yet older men's labor force partic
ipation rates fell in the decade and older women's participation rates
changed very little (see Table 1). In earlier work, Quinn estimated the
impact of the business cycle on older workers' participation rates and
found that changes in the overall unemployment rate account for a rel
atively small proportion of the change in participation trends since
1985 (Quinn 1999b). Most of the change in participation trends since
1985 is probably due to factors other than the cyclical movement in
economy-wide unemployment.
It is easier to point to factors that have permanently changed in a
way that encourages later withdrawal from the job market. One impor
tant change is that the nation's main pension program, Social Security,
is no longer growing more generous. Workers who retired between
1950 and 1980 retired in an environment in which Social Security ben
efits were rising, both absolutely and in relation to the average earnings
of typical American workers. Most workers received pensions that
were higher than those they would have obtained if their Social Secu
rity contributions had been invested in safe assets. The maturation of
the Social Security program meant that fewer workers who retired after
1985 received windfalls from the program. The Social Security
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amendments of 1977 and 1983 brought an end to a four-decade expan
sion and liberalization of benefits. In fact, the amendments trimmed
retirement benefits modestly in order to keep the program solvent.
Congress has changed Social Security rules and the pension for
mula to make work late in life more attractive. The amount of income
a recipient can earn without losing any Social Security benefits has
been increased, and the benefit loss for each dollar earned over the
exempt amount was reduced (from 50 to 33 cents) for pensioners
between 65 and 69. In 2000, the earnings test was eliminated alto
gether for workers aged 65 and older. In the 1977 and 1983 Social
Security amendments, Congress also increased the reward that workers
receive for delaying initial benefit receipt past the normal retirement
age (NRA). Instead of penalizing work after the NRA, Social Security
is becoming more age-neutral. When this formula change is fully
implemented, for workers attaining age 62 after 2004, the adjustment
for delayed benefit receipt will be approximately fair for retirements up
through age 70. It is nearly so today. There will be no financial pen
alty for delaying retirement beyond the normal retirement age.
Important changes have also occurred in the private sector. There
has been a sharp increase in the relative importance of defined-contribution pension plans and a continuing decline in the importance of
defined-benefit plans. Defined-contribution plans are age-neutral by
design, and therefore they have none of the age-specific work disincen
tives that are common in traditional defined-benefit plans. As a grow
ing percentage of workers reaches retirement age under definedcontribution plans, there will be less reason for workers to leave their
jobs to avoid a loss in lifetime retirement benefits.
Some changes in the environment for retirees are the result of pol
icy initiatives aimed specifically at encouraging more work at older
ages. For example, mandatory retirement has been nearly eliminated
in the United States. In the early 1970s, about half of all American
workers were covered by mandatory retirement provisions that
required them to leave their jobs no later than a particular age, usually
age 65. In 1978, the earliest legal age of mandatory retirement was
raised from 65 to 70, and in 1986, mandatory retirement provisions
were outlawed altogether for the vast majority of workers. The
increase and eventual elimination of mandatory retirement ages not
only increased the options open to older employees who wanted to
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remain on their jobs, but also sent an important message to Americans
about the appropriate age to retire.
This message was reinforced by a provision of the 1983 Social
Security amendments that is gradually raising the normal retirement
age in Social Security from 65 to 67. The higher NRA will become
fully effective for workers who reach age 62 in 2022. So far as we
know, the United States was the first industrial nation to pass a law lift
ing the retirement age under its main public pension program.
Although few workers may be aware of the higher retirement age,
many are affected by it already. Workers reaching age 62 in 2000 face
a normal retirement age of 65 years and 2 months, which means that
they will qualify for age-62 pensions that are 1 percent smaller than
age-62 benefits under the traditional NRA. The delay in the eligibility
age for unreduced pensions has an effect on benefit levels that is almost
identical to across-the-board benefit cuts.
These changes suggest that the future will not look like the past.
The relative attractiveness of work and retirement at older ages has
been altered in favor of work, though the changes may have produced
only modest effects so far. The break in the early retirement trend that
occurred in the mid 1980s suggests that changes in the retirement envi
ronment are having an impact in the expected direction.

SHOULD WE ENCOURAGE LATER RETIREMENT?

Even if the trend toward earlier retirement has stopped or reversed,
it is natural to ask whether the nation should take additional steps to
encourage later retirement. One reason for doing so is concern over
public finances. Social Security is the largest item in the federal bud
get. In 1995, Social Security outlays represented 4.6 percent of GDP
and a little less than 22 percent of overall federal spending. After the
income tax, the program is the most important source of federal tax
revenues. Over the next 10 to 15 years, the financial outlook for Social
Security is relatively secure, even under pessimistic assumptions about
the state of the economy. When the baby-boom generation reaches
retirement age in the second decade of the century, however, benefit
payments will begin to climb much faster than tax revenue. Outlays
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will exceed taxes and will eventually exceed tax revenues plus interest
payments earned by the trust funds. Under the intermediate assump
tions of the Social Security Trustees, the trust funds will begin to
shrink. Unless benefits are trimmed or tax rates increased, the trust
funds will eventually fall to zero, making it impossible under current
law to make timely benefit payments. The financial condition of the
Medicare program is more perilous than that of Social Security. The
reserves of the system are smaller, and they will be depleted much
sooner than the OASDI trust funds.
Restoring both Medicare and Social Security to long-term sol
vency will be costly. The federal budgetary cost of achieving solvency
would obviously be smaller if workers' eligibility for benefits under
the two programs were delayed. In the remainder of this chapter, we
focus on options to encourage later retirement under the Social Secu
rity program.
The solvency of Social Security, like that of any pension program,
depends on four crucial elements: 1) the contribution rate imposed on
workers and their employers; 2) the pension fund's rate of return on its
investments; 3) the age of eligibility for pensions; and 4) the average
monthly pension paid to retirees. The first two elements determine the
annual amount of funds flowing into the system, and the last two deter
mine the annual amount flowing out of the system. Each of the four
elements must be carefully calibrated to ensure that benefit promises
are matched by expected future revenues. If a pension program is
exactly solvent and one of the four elements changes, some adjustment
in the other three elements may be necessary to restore the solvency of
the program. For example, if the rate of return on pension fund invest
ments falls, it will be necessary to increase the contribution rate, delay
the age of eligibility for pensions, or lower monthly pensions in order
to restore the pension program to solvency.
Improvements in life expectancy increase the funding requirements
of a pension plan. If contributors live one additional year in retirement,
the plan must find enough extra resources to finance the added benefit
payments. To keep the pension system solvent, this requires higher
contributions to the program, a higher rate of return on investments, a
delay in the retirement age, or a reduction in monthly benefits. It is
worth emphasizing that this is true for every type of pension plan,
whether public or private. If Social Security had never been estab-
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lished, increases in American life spans over the past half century
would have required private pension plans to increase their contribu
tion rates, find investments that yield higher rates of return, delay the
age of eligibility for pensions, or reduce monthly pension payments.
A large part of Social Security's long-term funding problem arises
because of good news about longevity.5 Americans now live longer
than their parents and grandparents did. Their children and grandchil
dren can be expected to live longer than we do. The improvements in
longevity mean that living Americans will survive much longer past
age 65 than was true when Social Security was established in the Great
Depression. The longevity increases provide the equivalent of a benefit
increase to Social Security recipients. The benefit increase must be
paid for if the system is to remain solvent.
Political Unpopularity
While it might seem logical to raise the retirement age in Social
Security to reflect improvements in longevity, that logic has so far
escaped the general public. American voters and workers routinely
reject the idea of a higher retirement age when it is suggested as a solu
tion to Social Security's problems. Lawrence Jacobs and Robert Shapiro recently summarized the findings of 18 polls that asked Americans
about their attitudes toward an increase in the retirement age (Jacobs
and Shapiro 1998, pp. 381-384). The polls were conducted over a 20year period ending in 1997, and each poll was administered to at least
750 respondents. With rare exceptions, solid majorities of respondents
reject any proposed hike in the retirement age. The size of the majority
opposing a higher retirement age was higher in the 1990s than it was in
the 1980s. Political leaders apparently take their cue from the polling
numbers. Nearly all of the presidential candidates in both political par
ties have expressed strong opposition to the idea of a higher Social
Security retirement age.6
Americans' hostility to a higher retirement age does not provide
much guidance to policymakers, however. Solid majorities also
oppose other basic steps that would solve Social Security's long-term
funding problem. Most poll respondents are against higher payroll
taxes, lower monthly benefits, and investment of Social Security
reserves in stocks, where they would earn a higher return (Jacobs and
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Shapiro 1998; EBRI 1997c, p. 11). Many workers may oppose a
higher retirement age in Social Security because they intend, or at least
hope, to retire several years before attaining the early eligibility age for
Social Security benefits. When asked in an EBRI poll when they hope
to start retirement, one-third of active workers answered "age 55 or
younger." When asked when they actually expect to retire, however,
only 15 percent thought their retirements would occur before age 56
(EBRI 1997b, Chart 1). If the Social Security retirement age were
increased, early retirement would become a less affordable dream.
Other Options
There is no compelling reason to raise either the Social Security
retirement age or the average retirement age, of course. If Americans'
incomes continue to grow 1 or 2 percent a year, some fraction of the
increase can be used to finance comfortable incomes during longer
spells of retirement. This means, however, that more of the income
earned by active workers must be set aside to pay for longer retire
ments. This could take the form of higher payroll or income taxes to
pay for Social Security benefits to the currently retired or higher per
sonal saving to make up for the loss of monthly Social Security bene
fits if Social Security pensions are trimmed to preserve solvency.
There is some evidence that workers understand this trade-off. When
forced to choose between the option of making larger contributions to
pay for retirement or accepting smaller pensions after they retire, most
workers opt to make larger contributions. By a 2-to-l majority, work
ers favor higher payroll taxes over reduced Social Security pensions
(EBRI 1997b, Chart 6). This suggests a simple conclusion: Americans
would rather set aside more of their wages for retirement than postpone
their retirement.
Workers can offset the effect of higher retirement contributions by
working longer hours during their prime working years. There is some
evidence this is occurring. American work patterns have changed
slowly but significantly over the past generation. Since the 1960s,
three major trends have affected adults' use of time. Women have
joined the paid workforce in record numbers; men have retired from
their jobs at younger ages; and both men and women have devoted
more years to formal schooling. The effects of these trends on average
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work effort can be seen in Figure 6, which shows changes in weekly
hours of paid work between 1968 and 1998. The weekly average is
calculated as the total hours of work during the survey week divided by
the total number of men and women in the indicated age group. People
who do not work are included in these estimates. (The estimates would
show higher average hours if they reflected the work effort only of peo
ple who held jobs.)
In spite of the trend toward earlier male retirement since 1968, the
figure shows a sizable jump in the total amount of time that Americans
spend at work. The increase in hours was driven almost entirely by the
surge in women's employment. The CPS interviews show only a small
change in average weekly hours among men and women who actually
hold a job. Averaging across all ages, women worked 49 percent more
hours in March 1998 than they did in March 1968 (20.3 hours a week
in 1968 versus 13.6 hours in 1968). The rise was due to a 45 percent
jump in the fraction of women holding jobs. Partly offsetting the rise
in women's employment was the dip in men's paid work. Most of the
Figure 6 Average Hours of Work by Age Group in the U.S. Population,
1968 and 1998
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drop occurred as a result of decreasing employment among men past
age 54. Across all age groups, the male employment rate fell 6 per
centage points (or 8 percent) between 1968 and 1998, but it fell 15 per
centage points among men between 55 and 64 and 9 points among men
past 64.
The combined effects of the shifts in male and female work pat
terns are displayed Figure 6. Averaging the trends of both men and
women, we see that hours spent on the job increased for people 18 to
54 years old and declined for people past age 54. Older Americans
clearly enjoyed more free time in 1998 than did their counterparts in
1968, mainly because of earlier male retirement. For adults between
25 and 54, however, the estimates imply that paid employment con
sumes a much bigger percentage of available time. The employment
rate of people in their prime working years jumped 11 percentage
points (almost 17 percent) between March 1968 and March 1998,
boosting the average amount of time spent in jobs from 28 hours to 32
hours a week. This increase is equivalent to five extra 40-hour work
weeks a year for adults between 25 and 54. In short, Americans are
working longer hours between 25 and 54. The increase in hours should
help them pay for shorter hours and longer retirements when they are
older than 55.

HOW COULD WE ENCOURAGE LATER RETIREMENT?
Assuming that it is desirable to do so, how might we encourage
American workers to delay their retirements further? In this section we
consider some alternatives and discuss their likely impact on future
trends in the average retirement age.
Changing the Incentives in Social Security
Since the eligibility age for pensions is one of the main features of
Social Security affecting its solvency, it is sensible to consider adjust
ments in the eligibility age to help restore the system's financing. One
possibility is to accelerate the increase in the normal retirement age
already scheduled under present law. Instead of phasing in the increase
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over 23 years (with a 12-year hiatus between the change from 65 to 66
and the change from 66 to 67), Congress could phase in the NRA
change over just 12 years. This would mean that the higher NRA will
be fully implemented for workers reaching age 62 in 2011, rather than
2022.
A second possibility is to increase the NRA automatically in line
with increases in life expectancy after 65. A majority of members of
the 1994-1996 Social Security Advisory Council proposed increasing
the NRA as necessary after 2011 to maintain a constant ratio of retire
ment years to potential years of work. Retirement years is defined as
life expectancy at the NRA, and potential years of work as the number
of years from age 20 to the NRA. Under the Social Security Trustees'
intermediate assumptions, this proposal would push up the NRA to age
70 by about 2080. The Social Security Actuary estimates that the com
bination of accelerating the NRA increase and then increasing the
NRA in line with longevity improvements eliminates nearly one-quar
ter of Social Security's long-term funding gap.
Lifting the NRA while leaving the early eligibility age (EEA)
unchanged produces almost exactly the same effect on retired workers'
Social Security benefits as a proportional reduction in the full pension
(usually referred to as the "primary insurance amount," or PIA). Even
though most people describe an increase in the normal retirement age
as a "delay" in the retirement age, it is in fact closer to a reduction in
the monthly benefit amount. Workers can still obtain pensions at the
same age as before, but their monthly pensions are smaller, no matter
what age they choose.
There are some important non-economic differences between rais
ing the NRA and cutting the full Social Security pension, however.
First, increasing the NRA signals to workers that the same monthly
benefit can be obtained by postponing retirement, which may encour
age some workers to delay retirement rather than accept a lower pen
sion. Sponsors of employer pension plans might also be induced to
modify their plans to encourage delayed pension acceptance if the
Social Security NRA were increased. Second, in light of the wellknown improvements in life expectancy, American workers might find
increases in the retirement age to be more understandable and fairer
than equivalent reductions in full pensions. By increasing the retire
ment age rather than reducing full pensions, Congress conveys the
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message that the benefit level is appropriate, but the timing is not
workers ought to postpone their retirements.
Congress might increase the early eligibility age (EEA) at the same
time and at the same pace as it increases the NRA. An increase in the
EEA is fundamentally different from an increase in the NRA. If the
EEA is increased above age 62, 62-year-old workers will be prevented
from obtaining old-age pensions. Under current law they can collect
reduced old-age pensions or they can apply for Disability Insurance
(DI) pensions. When the possibility of obtaining old-age pensions is
eliminated, some 62-year-olds who otherwise would have received oldage pensions will apply for DI. This will increase Social Security
administrative costs, because eligibility is much more expensive to
determine in the DI program. It may also impose serious hardship on
workers whose DI applications are denied.
These consequences of increasing the early eligibility age make
many people reluctant to tamper with it. Many policymakers are more
uneasy about a reform that denies benefits completely to an identifiable
class of people than they are about one that reduces benefits modestly
to a much wider population. It is important to recognize why Social
Security has an early eligibility age, however. If workers could apply
for benefits as soon as they accumulated enough earnings credits, some
low-income workers would be tempted to apply for benefits in their
late fifties or even their late forties. At such ages, however, their
monthly benefits would be very low, because early pensions are
reduced below the full pension in proportion to the number of months
between the age a worker claims benefits and the NRA. The low level
of the initial pension might not represent a problem for a worker who is
50 or 60 years old and can supplement monthly pensions with modest
wages or an employer-sponsored pension. But, it could cause serious
hardship when a worker reaches age 68 or 70 and finds she is no longer
able to work and the company pension no longer covers the cost of gro
ceries and the monthly rent. The existence of the early entitlement age
prevents short-sighted workers from applying for pensions that will be
too small to support them throughout a long retirement.
When the NRA eventually reaches 67, workers claiming early pen
sions at age 62 will receive 70 percent of a full pension, a 30 percent
reduction below the full pension rather than the current 20 percent
reduction. If the NRA were eventually increased to 70 and the early
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eligibility age remained unchanged, workers claiming pensions at age
62 would receive monthly benefits as low as 52 percent of a full pen
sion probably too little to live on for a low-wage worker with few
other sources of income. If the NRA is increased above 67, it seems
sensible to increase the early eligibility age as well. Since Social Secu
rity is intended to assure a basic floor of support for retired Americans,
it seems perverse to allow full-career workers to claim benefits so early
that their monthly benefit will be too low to live on. This implies that
the early eligibility age must eventually be raised above 62 if the NRA
rises much above age 67. In order to implement this reform in a
humane way, Congress might consider liberalizing eligibility require
ments for Disability Insurance benefits starting at age 62. People who
have worked in physically demanding occupations and are in impaired
health could be given access to benefits that permit them to retire with
a decent standard of living, even if they do not meet the strict standard
for health impairment that is used to evaluate DI applications today.

Effects of Changing the NRA and EEA on
Actual Retirement Ages
It is natural to ask whether increasing the early and normal retire
ment ages would have much effect on when workers actually retire.
Almost all researchers who have examined this question agree that
such reforms would tend to increase the average age at retirement,
though the effect may not be large. This conclusion was reached in a
great majority of economists' studies conducted in the 1980s and early
1990s. Most studies found that even large changes in Social Security
would cause only small changes in the average retirement age. Burtless and Moffitt (1985) estimated, for example, that increasing the nor
mal retirement age in Social Security from 65 to 68 would add only a
little more than four months to the full-time working careers of men
who have no disabilities.7
One way to assess the impact of Social Security reforms is to
examine differences in retirement patterns among people who face dif
ferent incentives because the program has been changed in an unantici
pated way. In 1969 and again in 1972, Social Security benefits were
increased much faster relative to wages than at any time in the recent
past. By 1973, benefits were 20 percent higher than would have been
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the case if pensions had grown with wages as they did during the 1950s
and 1960s. In 1977, Congress passed amendments to the Social Secu
rity Act sharply reducing benefits to workers born in 1917 and later
years (the "notch" generation) in comparison with the benefits avail
able to workers born before 1917.
Burtless (1986) studied the first episode, and Krueger and Pischke
(1992) examined the second. Both studies reached an identical conclu
sion: major changes in Social Security generosity produced small ini
tial effects on the retirement behavior and labor force participation of
older men. Burtless found, for example, that the 20 percent benefit
hike between 1969 and 1973 caused only a two-month reduction in
average retirement age of men who were fully covered by the more
generous formula. This is equivalent to a reduction in the labor force
participation rates of 62-year-old and 65-year-old men of less than 2
percentage points. The effects of the 1977 amendments found by Krue
ger and Pischke were even smaller.
These findings suggest that an increase in the normal retirement
age will probably have only a small effect on the age that male workers
withdraw from the workforce. It is harder to predict the effects of an
increase in the early retirement age because we do not have good
enough historical evidence to evaluate the impact of this kind of
change. When the earliest age of eligibility for Social Security retire
ment benefits was decreased from 65 to 62 (in 1956 for women and in
1961 for men), labor force participation rates fell significantly and
much faster than they had previously. The reversal of this policy would
likely have a larger impact than the change in the normal retirement
age, especially for low wage workers who have no other sources of
retirement income except Social Security. The magnitude of the
increased labor force participation would depend, in part, on how
employer pensions responded to the change in Social Security rules
and the extent to which eligibility criteria for DI benefits were loos
ened.
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EMPLOYER RESPONSES
Some people wonder how employers would respond to changes in
the early and normal retirement ages in Social Security. Would firms
with defined-benefit pension plans increase their early retirement
incentives to offset the loss of the Social Security incentives or to make
their plans more age-neutral? If workers wanted to delay their retire
ments to become eligible for more generous Social Security pensions,
could the economy create enough extra jobs to employ them? Would
employers discriminate against older job seekers, making it hard for
them to find and keep jobs?
Historical evidence about the job-creating capacity of the U.S.
market is reassuring. Over the long run, the U.S. labor market seems
capable of absorbing large numbers of extra workers without a signifi
cant rise in joblessness. From 1964 through 1989, when the babyboom generation reached adulthood and entered the job market, the
labor force grew by 50.4 million persons, or slightly more than 2 mil
lion new entrants a year. Most of this surge was driven by the jump in
U.S. fertility between 1946 and 1964, but part was also due to a grow
ing demand for employment by women, who entered the workforce in
record numbers. From 1964 to 1989, the number of Americans holding
jobs climbed by 47.7 million, or slightly more than 1.9 million workers
a year. In other words, about 95 percent of new job seekers in the
period were able to find jobs, though the number of people available
for work swelled by two-thirds. The unemployment rate rose only
slightly, increasing from 5.0 percent to 5.2 percent.
Many people find it surprising that so many extra job seekers can
be absorbed by the labor market. They overlook a basic reality of flex
ible labor markets like those in the United States. In the long run,
employers are free to change their product lines and production meth
ods to exploit the availability of a newly abundant type of labor, and
they can adjust relative wages in response to the entry and exit of dif
ferent classes of workers.
In the 1970s, for example, the wages received by younger workers
fell in comparison with those earned by older workers, in large mea
sure because younger workers became much more abundant. Faced
with a huge increase in the availability of workers who had limited job
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experience, employers adopted production methods that took advan
tage of less experienced workers. Restaurant meals were prepared and
served by eleventh-grade students and high school dropouts rather than
by experienced cooks or waiters. Gardening and domestic cleaning
were performed by unskilled and semiskilled employees rather than by
homeowners themselves. In the end, 95 percent of new job seekers
were successful in finding jobs. Of course, many of the new jobs were
not particularly well paid. The huge increase in the abundance of lessexperienced workers is one reason that pay in many jobs fell.
If older workers were forced to wait for two or three extra years for
full Social Security retirement benefits to begin, many would choose to
remain in their career jobs for a few months or years longer than work
ers presently do. Older workers who lose their jobs would try harder
and more persistently to find new jobs. The jobs that many would find
would pay lower wages than the jobs they previously held, as is the
case for most workers who leave career jobs today. The availability of
increased numbers of older workers would almost certainly depress the
relative wages of aged job seekers. Yet, low U.S. fertility means the
future labor force will grow slowly, placing some pressure on employ
ers to retain older workers and make jobs attractive to older job-seek
ers.
Although some observers are pessimistic about the willingness of
employers to accommodate the special needs of an aged workforce,
such pessimism seems misplaced. Employers have created millions of
part-time jobs to accommodate the needs of students and mothers who
are only available to work short weekly hours. People who work on
part-time schedules pay a price for short hours in terms of low weekly
earnings and lost fringe benefits, but they accept these jobs nonethe
less. Comparable accommodations could be made for the special
needs of older workers. Many older workers who want jobs to tide
them over between the time their career jobs end and eligibility for full
Social Security pensions will be able to find suitable employment.
Other Policies
As noted above, Social Security rules are moving toward age-neu
trality. Employer pension coverage is shifting toward defined-contribution plans, which have none of the age-specific retirement incentives
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present in traditional defined-benefit plans. Mandatory retirement has
been eliminated for the vast majority of American workers, and equal
employment opportunity laws forbid employment discrimination based
on age. Federal policies have been enlightened in these areas and are
partly responsible for the changes in men's and women's retirement
patterns over the past 15 years. Are there other policies that would
improve the employment prospects of older Americans? Several come
to mind:
Permit workers aged 65 or older to opt out of additional Social
Security contributions. If this option were chosen, workers
would also forego the increases in future benefits that these earn
ings would have caused. A variant of the same idea would be to
exempt earnings up to some dollar limit from F.I.C.A contribu
tions as well as Social Security benefit recalculation. This would
lower employers' cost of hiring older workers, because their pay
roll tax liabilities would fall, and it would make older workers rel
atively more attractive to hire and retain. It would also require
Congress to find a source of revenue to make up for payroll taxes
lost as a result of the reform.
Allow employers to offer prorated fringe benefits for employees
working less than full-time hours, rather than requiring them to
provide the same fringe benefits to all employees working more
than 1,000 hours per year (as the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act, or ERISA, currently mandates). The present law
encourages employers to restrict the hours worked by part-time
employees to fewer than 1,000 per year. Giving employers more
flexibility would allow older employees and employers to work
out mutually agreeable fringe benefit packages that might keep
more older workers employed.
Make Medicare the first source of health insurance coverage for
workers over age 65. Current law requires that the employer's
health plan serve as "first payer" for a worker who has dual insur
ance coverage. Employers could provide additional insurance
coverage if they chose. The reform would lower employers' cost
of hiring or retaining older workers. Of course, it would also
increase Medicare outlays, which in turn would require lawmak
ers to find additional sources of revenue for that program.
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Expand the Earned Income Tax Credit to include workers aged 65
and older who have no dependent children. This would provide a
federal earnings subsidy to aged low-wage workers who are cur
rently ineligible for the credit, and it could boost the available
supply of older workers.
Repeal the earnings test to eliminate the perception that pension
ers who continue to work after age 62 lose Social Security bene
fits by doing so. It is true that workers do lose benefits during any
year in which their earnings exceed the exempt amount. But for
the average worker, the actuarial adjustment before age 65 returns
all or most of the foregone pensions through higher future bene
fits. Of course, most workers are not average, and those who
anticipate shorter than average life expectancies or who have high
discount rates will still find the earnings test a disincentive to
work Even for average workers the existing test can act as a work
disincentive. Most Social Security recipients seem unaware of
the benefit adjustment, so the current earnings test discourages
them from earning more than the exempt amount. The repeal of
the earnings test would probably increase recipients' earnings
modestly, and the long-term budgetary cost would be negligible.
In an economy as strong as the one we have enjoyed over the past
five years, none of these reforms may be needed to encourage higher
employment among the aged. But if voters and policymakers want to
provide incentives that will delay workers' exit from the labor force or
change employers' attitudes toward older job applicants, some or all
the reforms could be helpful.

CONCLUSION
After a long period of decline, the trend toward earlier retirement
came to at least a temporary halt in the mid 1980s. The labor force par
ticipation rates of American men past age 60 leveled off, and in the past
few years they have actually increased slightly. Participation rates
among older women have risen significantly since 1985, though this
trend may be the result of the historic shift in women's attitudes toward
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career employment rather than to a change in their retirement behavior
per se. Along with workers in Japan and Scandinavia, Americans now
leave the paid workforce later than workers anywhere else in the indus
trialized world.
The question is, do Americans retire at an age that will ultimately
prove unaffordable? As life spans increase, the fraction of life spent in
retirement will rise unless we delay our exit from paid work. Improved
longevity places heavier burdens on active workers if retirees are sup
ported by contributions from current payrolls. Even without any fur
ther improvement in longevity, the long-term decline in birth rates has
slowed labor force growth and will eventually increase the ratio of
retired to active workers. This will place extra pressure on retirement
programs like Social Security and Medicare that depend on payroll
taxes for most of their funding. To reduce this pressure, the country
could adjust the age of eligibility for early and/or normal retirement
benefits and take other measures to encourage workers to postpone
their exit from the labor market. These steps would directly improve
the finances of Social Security and Medicare. They would encourage
some workers to delay their departure from career jobs and induce oth
ers to find bridge jobs to tide them over until full retirement benefits
begin. The United States has already taken several steps in this direc
tion, and these steps have contributed to the recent growth of employ
ment among older Americans.
Although most workers today claim that they expect to keep work
ing after age 65, or after "retirement," most oppose additional changes
in the retirement system that would push them to retire at a later age. A
majority resists the idea that a higher retirement age is needed to pro
tect Social Security. The United States is a rich country and will
become wealthier in the future. It can certainly afford to maintain cur
rent retirement patterns if its citizens choose to spend their additional
wealth in this way. The important public policy issue is the importance
of this goal in comparison with other legitimate uses of the rise in
wealth.
Proponents of a higher retirement age often focus on the long-term
trend in older people's employment rates without considering what has
happened to work effort and productivity among people before they
reach the retirement age. They worry about the budget cost of retire
ment at age 62 without reflecting on the fact that younger workers may
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be paying for their longer and healthier retirements by working harder
and more productively in their preretirement careers. As long as pro
ductivity continues to improve, American society and individual work
ers can choose how they want to allocate the income gains that flow
from higher productivity. The evidence of the twentieth century sug
gests they will use at least part of it to pay for a longer retirement.
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The authors are Senior Fellow, The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. 20036
(G.B.), and Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, Boston College, Gasson Hall 103,
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467 (J.F.Q.). Both authors are affiliates of the Center for Retire
ment Research at Boston College. We gratefully acknowledge the research assistance
of Claudia Sahm of Brookings. This paper was prepared for the annual conference of
the National Academy of Social Insurance, Washington, D.C., January 26-27, 2000.
The views are solely those of the authors and should not be ascribed to Brookings, the
Boston College Center for Retirement Research, or NASI
1

Retirement patterns were much more difficult to measure among women because
most worked primarily within the home (and without pay) during most of their
adult lives.
2. Labor force participation rates for 1910,1940, and 1970 are based on responses to
employment questions in the decennial censuses. See Ransom et al. (1991), espe
cially pages 45-46, and Munnell (1977), page 70. Rates for 1984-85 and 199899 are the arithmetic average participation rates on the March Current Population
Survey (CPS) files for 1984, 1985, 1998, and 1999. Participation rates measured
on the Census differ somewhat from those measured by the CPS, partly because
the main goal of the CPS is to obtain reliable labor force statistics. Adjusting the
decennial Census statistics to make them strictly comparable to the CPS estimates
would have only a slight effect on the patterns displayed in Figure 1, however.
3. Before their 62nd birthdays, workers who contnbute to Social Security for an
additional year obtain better future pensions because the basic pension formula is
based on workers' average lifetime wages. Between ages 62 and 64 workers who
contribute to Social Security obtain that benefit enhancement plus an actuarial
increase equal to about 8 percent of the basic pension to compensate them for giv
ing up one year's benefit payments.
4. If the labor force participation rate at age 63 is designated LFPR63, the retirement
rate at age 63 is calculated as (LFPR^ - LFPR^) + LFPR55- This calculation
ignores the complications involved in computing true cohort distributions and the
effects of mortality rates, immigration, and temporary withdrawal from the labor
force. It offers a picture of the timing of labor market withdrawal based on the
participation choices of men aged 55 through 72 in a particular year.
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5

Much of the future funding problem is due to the maturation of the program (most
future retirees will reach the retirement age with enough earnings credits to
receive a full pension), slow growth in the future working population, and a longterm slowdown in the rate of real wage growth (which has deprived the system of
anticipated revenues). Increased longevity explains only part of the system's
funding shortfall.
6. In the GOP presidential candidates' debate in Manchester, New Hampshire, on
December 5, 1999, Steve Forbes, Senator John McCain, and Governor George W.
Bush all expressed views on increasing the retirement age Forbes described the
idea as a "betrayal": "that's not fair to the people. They were made a promise and
it should be kept." McCain said that a retirement age increase was unnecessary.
Governor Bush flatly ruled out the possibility he would ask for a retirement-age
increase for people already near retirement, and he expressed "hope" such a step
would not be needed for younger workers. The Democratic presidential candi
dates have been equally vehement in their opposition When asked by Tim Rus
sell whether he supported or opposed hiking the retirement age, Vice President
Gore responded "Tim, I strongly oppose raising the retirement age." When Gore
posed the same question to Bill Bradley, Bradley responded "We said no. We said
no.... OK?" (Meet the Press, December 19, 1999)
7. Other economists' predictions are discussed in Joseph Quinn et al. (1990).
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Employer Perspective on
Retirement Trends and Policies
to Encourage Work
among Older Americans
Anna M. Rappaport
William M. Mercer, Inc.

As a response to the chapter by Gary Burtless and Joseph F. Quinn,
I here consider the environment for employers and how they are
responding to the challenges of an aging society.

EMPLOYERS, POLICY, AND OLDER-WORKER ISSUES
The Burtless and Quinn paper focuses on older workers. When
employers focus on human resource issues, they generally do not focus
on a particular demographic subset of employees, but rather on the
business and on the people needed to get the work done. However,
when worker shortages occur, employers seek out any method they can
to fill in the gaps.
Burtless and Quinn focus on the impact of Social Security and
Medicare benefits, as well as that of pensions and retiree health, on
workers' decisions to retire. They also note that employment discrimi
nation is banned, but they do not explore the many requirements of age
discrimination legislation. They then provide a list of ideas for policy
changes that might encourage later retirement. They approach these
ideas from a policy and individual perspective, rather than an employer
perspective.
I contend that employers need to be careful if they provide special
programs or focus on particular demographic groups. The United
States protects older workers through age discrimination legislation.
(Other groups are protected as well by different legislation, but the
requirements differ.) Age discrimination requirements are complex
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and apply to many aspects of employment. These requirements must
be considered in structuring human resource programs, whether the
programs target older workers or not. Employers, in considering new
programs, must first focus on business need, but in addition they should
focus both on compliance and on avoiding litigation. Involuntary ter
minations of employment and real or perceived unequal treatment can
lead to costly litigation, whether the employer's action was justified or
not. That is why employers should exercise care throughout the entire
employment process. Whether these requirements deter employers
from implementing otherwise desirable programs is unknown. It
would be helpful to have research on the implications of this legislation
to better understand how it impacts human resource programs and pol
icies and whether it has served as a deterrent to innovation.
Some benefit plan requirements definitely serve as a deterrent to
programs that would facilitate older worker employment and phased
retirement. It would be desirable to offer programs that allow for par
tial payment of pensions and continued work. However, such pro
grams are not feasible under current U.S. law. Programs may not allow
payment of pensions during periods of continued work prior to normal
retirement age, usually age 65. Plans may provide for payment of pen
sions during periods of continued work after normal retirement age, but
this practice is rare. The author located anecdotal information about a
retailer and a financial institution who allow continued payments to
part-time workers after retirement. The number of retirees electing to
work is substantial. There is no provision for plans to make partial
payments during periods of reduced work. A desirable next step would
be a review of pension legislation to seek out changes needed to
accommodate phased retirement. Congress has given a strong signal
that it supports the notion of phased retirement in its unanimous vote to
repeal the Social Security earnings test. It needs to support that deci
sion with appropriate changes in private pension regulation.

DEFINITION OF RETIREMENT

Burtless and Quinn define retirement based on exit from the labor
force. They define the average age at retirement as the point when half
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of men have left the labor force. This definition works well from a
social perspective, but not from an employer perspective.
From an employer's perspective, the common definition of a retiree
is one who has retired from that organization, and what is important is
whether benefits are being paid, not whether the individual has found
other work. Other work, in the form of bridge jobs, is common.
Retirement often takes place in steps, with multiple retirements before
a person leaves the labor force. This phenomenon is not new. Tradi
tionally, it was common in the military and certain types of public ser
vice (such as police and fire) to retire early, get a benefit, and then go
on to further employment, maybe several times.
Today, most gradual or phased retirement uses one or more bridge
jobs at an organization other than that of the long-term employer. A
key question is whether more employers will develop programs to
encourage long-term employees to phase down within their own orga
nizations rather than accepting a bridge job elsewhere.
We need to give further consideration to the definition of retire
ment. It has been suggested that we should seek a new set of terms to
describe different life stages. I do not seek new terms, but rather a dif
ferent idea. If phasing down through a series of bridge jobs is com
monplace, then the idea of retirement as a one-time event does not
work any more. We might think of retirement in terms of a financial
situation: focus on a period of building assets and a period of using
assets to replace or supplement current earnings. The point of retire
ment is the crossover point. Of course, labor force participation rates
would not help us measure retirement on that basis.

COST/BENEFIT OF USING OLDER WORKERS
Equity markets demand better performance from companies, and
employers, in turn, put greater demands on employees. This raises the
question, are there advantages in having a workforce with one set of
demographics versus another?
I am not aware of any definitive research on this topic. The value
and cost of using older workers likely offers both advantages and dis
advantages. Older workers have more experience, which can lead to
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better judgment. This experience is extremely valuable for some types
of jobs, particularly those with a long learning curve and a lot of need
for human capital, particularly firm-specific human capital. Customers
also value long-term relationships and generally do not like to see the
people they are doing business with change frequently. In many cases,
employers lose valuable history when a long-term employee leaves an
assignment. On the other hand, with changes in organizations and
technology, current education and training gain importance. If skills
are not maintained, the value of long-term experience is largely lost. In
addition, some experienced people focus on the past and resist change.
The ideal is to have to a balance of experience, current training, and
willingness to embrace change.
In recent interviews, top managers at a major financial institution
made these comments:
Some jobs have high firm-specific human capital, whereas others
have low firm-specific human capital but a lot of technical knowl
edge. Employees in the latter jobs move between jobs easily, and
long service does not add much value. An example of the first
group is the account manager for a major account, and a foreign
securities trader is an example of the second.
Burnout can be a factor, particularly for high-stress jobs. At the
point of burnout, it is important for both the employer and
employee that the employee make a change and move on, either
within the organization or outside of it.
Customers and the organization both value continuity of service;
however, that does not mean people will stay until traditional
retirement age.
Technology will replace many jobs, particularly in the back
office. Some of these employees can be retrained and placed in
other jobs, but it will not work out for others.
The bottom line is that human resources policies should support
long service but not lock people into jobs that they no longer want. I
also encountered parallel issues in a specialized manufacturing envi
ronment. The engineering and technical staff, as well as the account
representatives, have a lot of knowledge that is important to the firm.
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Yet for many jobs, the training period is short, and experience adds lit
tle value after an initial period, whether that is one day, one month, or
one year.
Also, significant cost issues must be reviewed for both pay and
benefits. In traditional seniority-based pay systems, longer-term
employees got paid more, and older employees with longer service
were likely to be among the higher paid. Where the value contributed
by a longer-service person is not commensurate with the higher pay,
the organization can save money by replacing higher-paid, longer-ser
vice employees with lower-paid, shorter-service employees. Employ
ers today address this issue by using different types of compensation
programs that are much less linked to seniority.
Employee benefits in the United States may comprise 30 40 per
cent of cash compensation. Older workers may have higher benefit
costs depending on the structure of the programs. Some general com
ments on benefit costs follow.
Traditional defined-benefit plans (based on final average pay) cost
more for both longer-service and older employees. For large
employers in the private sector, the average value of a traditional
pension plan is 3-5 percent of pay. Pension benefits and costs in
public employment tend to be much higher.
Defined-contribution plans, unless they have formulas linked to
age or service, have the same cost regardless of age or service.
Employer contributions to defined-contribution plans range from
no contribution to 15 percent of pay.
Medical care for individuals generally costs more with increasing
age (except for maternity benefits, which have a high cost for
younger employees). Per employee costs are also influenced by
number of covered dependents. The average number of depen
dent children is likely to increase by age and then decline. How
the cost of a health benefit plan varies by employee age depends
on the structure of the plan, the numbers of covered dependents,
and the plan's cost-sharing provisions. Employer spending per
active employee averaged $4,097 in 1999 according to the 1999
Mercer Foster Higgins National Survey of Employer Sponsored
Health Plans. Spending per active employee includes the cost of
coverage for the employee and covered dependents.
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Vacation time often increases with length of service, so it costs
more for longer-service employees.
Life insurance and disability benefits become more expensive
with increasing age.
Many factors affect absences, and no generalization can be made
about patterns of absence and age.
The bottom line is that experienced employees bring greater value
to some jobs and that older employees do cost more in many benefit
programs. Whether the net impact of these factors is an advantage or
disadvantage in employing more longer-service employees depends on
the situation.
Companies who offer continued health care to retirees have an
added cost for this benefit. As indicated by Burtless and Quinn, the
availability of retiree health benefits is an important factor in individual
retirement decisions; a lack of retiree health benefits prior to Medicare
eligibility is a barrier to retirement. Benefit costs can be a major factor
in competition. For example, in the auto industry, the major traditional
car companies had mature workforces and provided substantial bene
fits to retirees. They were competing against start-ups who were either
foreign companies manufacturing in the United States or joint ventures
and overseas companies. The companies with mature workforces had
a substantial cost disadvantage, partly due to benefit costs. These com
panies had to downsize and ultimately restructure to remain competi
tive.

ENVIRONMENT FOR EMPLOYER
RETIREMENT PROGRAMS
In the year 2000, the environment provides a backdrop for the
employer response to employee benefit issues. Some of the key factors
that affect private businesses are as follows.
Employers are facing shortages of skilled workers for certain
jobs. The recruitment and retention of employees has become a
high-priority issue for many businesses. This issue creates a good
situation for focusing on creating better opportunities for older
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workers. However, Burtless and Quinn indicate that economic
conditions are not a major factor in determining older worker
labor force participation rates.
Business is becoming more global. Many global businesses are
working to create common cultures.
Mergers and acquisitions have become commonplace. Some of
the deals are large, and they often cut across countries. Often, the
aftermath of the deal is to sell lines of businesses that do not fit
the large organization, which results in one large organization and
several smaller ones. Many mergers result in the dislocation of a
substantial number of employees. Nearly all require revisiting
the appropriate retirement programs in the new organization. To
integrate organizations, it is usually necessary to provide a com
mon pension program for future periods. In some of these situa
tions, employers offer new benefit packages after the merger. It is
common to use early retirement window programs to help imple
ment postmerger changes and workforce adjustments.
The common trend is to have employees assume more responsi
bility for their own retirements, including stressing the impor
tance of employee saving, and employers are offering more
opportunities for employees to save. However, Americans save
relatively little; this strategy is therefore likely to disappoint many
people.
U.S. equity markets have performed with uneven results. While
some organizations have seen huge increases in the value of their
stocks, others have not. Markets demand strong performance,
which drives the fine-tuning of organizational structure. Key
employees commonly receive stock options, and many employ
ees get stock purchase opportunities. In many organizations,
company stock is an important source of employee wealth that
will facilitate retirement.
The compensation systems of emerging e-commerce businesses
have focused much more attention on stock options and owner
ship opportunities. These businesses, particularly start-ups, can
have a large part of their compensation package based on stock.
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Traditional businesses as well as new start-ups are feeling the
impact of this competition.
Technology and electronic business are changing the way busi
ness is being done. Employees are faced with constant and, at
times, overwhelming change. Only some workers adapt well to
change. Dealing with employees who do not adapt well can be
awkward.
Employers use a variety of employment systems. These systems
include full-time, part-time, contract work, use of temporary
employees, and increased use of individuals working as consult
ants and doing projects on a consulting basis. Some of the most
attractive opportunities for using older workers may be outside of
full-time employment.
There is a widespread belief that employment patterns are chang
ing and that employees will change jobs more frequently in the
future. Trend data on length of service with current employer by
age group show a long-term trend of modest reductions in male
length of service and increases in female length of service. The
biggest reductions are for males at and just before early retire
ment age. Male and female tenure patterns are becoming more
similar. The data show modest change and do not match the per
ceptions of radical change.
Companies are taking employee performance more seriously and
working diligently to measure it. In addition, there is much less
tolerance to retain a marginal performer. The demands of the
competitive environment and equity markets push companies to
improve productivity.
Regulatory and legislative requirements have increased greatly
over the last 25 years, and employment-related litigation can be
costly. Employers need legal advice when developing virtually
all employment policies and practices.
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PRIORITIES FOR HUMAN RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
During 1999, William M. Mercer, Incorporated, surveyed large
employers in the United States, the United Kingdom, and continental
Europe to better understand their priorities and the factors driving
retirement strategies. Table 1 shows the priorities of the multinational
respondents to this survey.
Controlling cost levels and attracting new talent were the most
important workforce issues faced by respondents, with more than 9 in
10 rating each as critical or major. The biggest difference between
U.S.-headquartered companies and companies headquartered in the
United Kingdom or continental Europe was that 28 percent of U.S.
respondents cited retaining employees longer as a critical issue, com
pared with only 5 percent of U.K./Europe respondents.
Table 1 Major Workforce Issues of Multinational Employers
in 1999 (%)
Critical
issue

Major
issue

Minor
issue

Not an
issue

Attracting new talent

46

46

8

0

Controlling the level of costs

45

48

7

0

Controlling the variability of
costs

24

54

21

1

Retaining employees longer

19

41

32

8

Aligning benefit programs with
corporate goals

18

54

25

3

Achieving/maintaining
competitive benefit levels

17

65

17

1

Having consistent benefits across
the organization

9

48

34

9

Having employees invest in
company stock

5

18

32

45

Giving employees benefit
choices

4

38

49

9

Reducing average years of
service

0

7

37

56

Workforce issue
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The Mercer results include responses from 230 organizations with
international operations; 63 percent are headquartered in the United
States, 12 percent in the United Kingdom, 23 percent in continental
Europe, and 2 percent in Australasia. The respondents' international
operations range from one location outside the headquarters country to
almost 200, averaging 23. U.K./Europe-based companies averaged 30
countries of operation, compared with 17 for U.S.-based respondents.
Forty-four percent of respondents have at least 10,000 employees
worldwide. These results point to employers trying to retain workers
longer, but doing it in a way that controls costs. I view the use of alter
native employment arrangements as particularly promising in that
regard.

RETIREMENT PLAN STRUCTURES AND TRENDS
In the United States, we can define differences in retirement plan
trends by size and type of employer. Larger private-sector employers,
those with at least 1000 employees, often include in their retirement
packages a combination of a base plan (which is paid for totally by the
employer) and a savings plan (usually a 401 (k) plan). The savings plan
generally provides for employee contributions and often an employer
match, typically 50 percent of the amount paid by the employee up to 6
percent of pay. The base plan may be a traditional final average pay
plan, a hybrid plan (like a cash balance plan), or a defined-contribution
plan. Traditional plans are still most common, but hybrids are growing
in popularity. Many employers also offer employees and dependents
continued health care on a cost-shared basis. Nearly all provide a com
bination of tax-qualified plans and supplemental plans; the supplemen
tal plans are used to make up amounts that cannot be paid in a taxqualified plan.
In addition, these employers may offer other programs that help
the employee build assets for retirement and help the employee own
company stock. Medium-sized employers are more likely to use a sin
gle plan, most often a defined-contribution (DC) plan, which includes
an opportunity for employees to save. Such plans are usually managed
through a single outsourced vendor such as a major mutual fund com-
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pany. Medium-sized employers are unlikely to offer retiree health ben
efits. Most small employers, those with under 50 employees, do not
offer any retirement benefits. Those that do offer retirement benefits
are most likely to offer only a defmed-contribution plan.
The use of defmed-contribution plans has grown in the United
States, with these plans part of a combined program in larger organiza
tions and the sole program in medium and smaller organizations.
Many countries experience parallel trends. A recent study "Defined
Contribution Retirement Plans around the World: A Guide for Employ
ers", published by William M. Mercer, Incorporated, shows the growth
in popularity of defined contribution plans and the truly global nature
of this trend. Table 2 shows the percentage of companies having plans
today and projected to have them in 2003 for selected countries.

WHAT CAN EMPLOYERS DO?

Many employers are concerned about retention, but relatively few
have focused on delaying retirement beyond normal retirement age as a
Table 2 Employers Sponsoring Defined-Contribution
Retirement Plans, Selected Countries (%)
1998

2003 (projected)

Australia

80

90

Hong Kong

75

85

Indonesia

30

45

0

10

Belgium

45

60

France

40

50

Germany

10

12

United Kingdom

25

35

Canada

80

80

United States

60

70

4

25

Country

Japan

Mexico
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method of increasing retention. However, many of those employers
who had large "cliffs" in their retirement plans have focused on this
issue. A cliff is a liberal early retirement benefit, so an employee who
qualifies for this benefit gets a subsidized benefit. For example, the
benefit might be available at age 55 with 30 years of service. Such
benefits encourage people to stay until the point of the cliff and then do
little to encourage staying after that point. They artificially bunch
retirements. Many of the employers who had cliffs have redesigned
plans to eliminate them for future employees. A variety of transition
plans are used to phase-out such provisions. Benefits already earned
are protected by law, but benefits to be earned in the future are not.
Plans generally reserve the right to the plan sponsor to change benefits
to be earned in the future. When plans are changed, most larger organi
zations offer transition benefits greater than what is legally required to
protect employees near retirement, because they often will have made
plans based on expected benefits. Eliminating cliffs smooths out retire
ments by removing or reducing incentives to retire at a particular point
in time.
For those employers who want to encourage longer work, a variety
of strategies is available. The most important strategy is creative work
options. Some older workers would prefer to continue working, but
with a different schedule and pace than full-time workers. This option
particularly applies to professional and technical people, who have
faced increasing demands and schedules for a number of years. Inno
vative work options are an important first step. Pension design needs
to be considered together with innovative work options ensure benefits
make sense in light of the work options. As indicated by Burtless and
Quinn, defined-contribution plans are age neutral with regard to
encouraging retirement. The same is true for cash balance plans.
However, neither type of plan automatically goes to the next step and
supports phased retirement. Optimal support of phased retirement
requires legal changes.
Some of the work options used today involve temporary and con
sulting work. Under such arrangements, generally no provision is
made for benefits and no implication of continued employment beyond
the immediate project or assignment. The individual can, however, be
hired for further assignments. Many organizations prefer such arrange
ments, which involve no long-term commitment and less legal risk,
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although they may require higher out-of-pocket spending for the spe
cific assignment. Some organizations use retiree pools as a method of
enabling their retirees to secure temporary work in the company.
Another important issue is to establish a culture that values experience
as well as provides training to maintain skills and stay up to date.
To be successful with a program to encourage older workers to stay
longer, an organization needs to have a strong performance manage
ment system fairly applied to all employees. This system is necessary
so poor performance can be dealt with fairly. When an organization
fails to manage performance effectively, it can sometimes look to
retirement as a substitute for managing performance.
Medical benefits are also important. Many people seeking bridge
jobs need medical coverage. Offering some medical coverage to parttimers would be a way to attract this group. Cafeteria benefits are also
a good idea as employees can tailor their benefits to personal needs.

NEXT STEPS

The ideas for further work and exploration include the following:
Research the impact of age discrimination legislation on pro
grams to encourage later work.
Identify policy changes needed to accommodate phased retire
ment programs that would permit partial payment of benefits
together with continued work.
Investigate alternative definitions of retirement and the implica
tions of using them.
Burtless and Quinn have also suggested several ideas for further policy
incentives. It would be helpful to expose these ideas to various stake
holders to get their reactions.

Living Longer, but Able to Work?
Glenn Pransky
Liberty Mutual Center for Disability Research
and
University of Massachusetts Medical School

There is ample evidence that retirement is much more common and
is occurring at younger ages than at any previous time in U.S. history.
Despite earlier suggestions that this trend is caused by declines in the
average health of older working populations (Verbrugge 1984), more
recent data has effectively rebutted this assumption by demonstrating a
significant wealth effect (Yeas 1987; Shephard 1995). Social welfare
policy now seeks to postpone publicly financed retirement. Whether
this will succeed or not depends on the ability of those who would
retire on Social Security but are now expected to work longer to
sustain continued and substantial employment. In part, this will be a
function of their health status and functional capacity, manifest as the
capacity to work in those jobs that will be available to them.
The work status of an individual at any point in time is a function
of retirement choices, functional capacity, and the requirements of
employment. Involvement in the workforce can be viewed on a contin
uum from regular, full-time employment to informal, part-time or
occasional work. Salary, benefits, and other dimensions of work may
vary independently of the level of involvement. Retirement choices
reflect an individual's economic resources (including wage replace
ment benefit adequacy and availability), preferences, employment
alternatives, and outlook, as well as societal norms.
The ability to work is also an important influence on the retirement
decision. This is best understood in relation to the demands of a partic
ular job and is determined by prior skills and training, the effects of
normal aging processes, and the presence of chronic diseases. Job
demands include cognitive, interpersonal, and physical requirements;
they may be expressed as typical or minimal requirements and may be
moderated by accommodations. In order to appropriately assess the
effect of aging and health on capacity to work, the contribution of all of
these factors must be considered.
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LONGEVITY AND HEALTH
There is no doubt that Americans are living longer (Table 1).
Much of the reduction in mortality over the past decade is attributed to
improvements in the diagnosis, treatment, and prevention of cardiovas
cular and other chronic diseases, as well as to lifestyle modifications
such as improvements in diet, exercise, and rates of cigarette smoking.
Has success in mortality reduction resulted in an aging population
with more morbidity, less ability to function, and thus less average
work capacity at a given age? Or, have gains in morbidity paralleled
gains in mortality, so that there is a prolongation of disease-free and
highly functional years of life? A definitive answer would require
repeated, objective measures of illness and function for large succes
sive cohorts of Americans near retirement age information that is not
now available. Most attempts to address these questions have relied
upon data from large, national, cross-sectional self-report surveys
(Current Population Survey, the National Health Interview Survey
[NHIS], and the Health and Retirement Study), or smaller longitudinal
datasets from specific studies, such as the University of Pennsylvania
graduates study.
The NHIS has been conducted as a stratified, cross-sectional sur
vey of thousands of Americans each year since 1957. Detailed ques
tionnaires ask about health, functional limitations, medical care, and
socioeconomic status. Table 2 shows the dramatic age-related increase
in men in the prevalence of selected self-reported chronic diseases and
Table 1 Life Expectancy in the United States at Birth and at Age 65,
by Sex (yr.)
At age 65

At birth

Females

Year

Males

Females

Males

1900

46

48

12

12

1950

66

71

13

15

1970

67

75

13

17

1995

73

79

16

19

SOURCE: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/about/otheract/aging/trendsoverviewhtm
(Accessed May 2000); Kramarow et al. 1999.
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Table 2 National Health Interview Study, Disease/Condition Prevalence
by Age (per 1000 Males)
NHIS, 1996

NHIS, 1981
Disease or condition
Hypertension

Age 45-64

65-74

45-64

65-74

203

315

233

352

Diabetes

56

29

62

131

Respiratory

13

42

11

59

132

266

143

362

163

270

Heart disease
Less than good health
Limited in major activity

195

450

165

251

Limited in any activity

230

490

220

334

SOURCE: Adams, Hendershot, and Marano 1999.

limitations in ability to perform one's major life activity. Major life
activity is defined as working or keeping house in those age 45-64.
The reported prevalence of several chronic conditions increased signif
icantly from 1981 to 1996. This likely represents a real change, but
may be due to reporting biases as a result of better and earlier disease
detection (Verburgge 1984, 1989). Despite these increases, the impact
of these conditions on function appears to be significantly less in 1996
than in 1981, especially in the elderly. This is consistent with greater
prevalence yet lower functional impact of these conditions. Data from
a smaller but more detailed Finnish longitudinal study of municipal
workers further supports this premise (Tuomi 1997). Only 11 percent
of workers with chronic illness said that their health was good in 1981,
but the number was 42 percent in 1992. Similar findings also appear in
the Health and Retirement Study (Crimmins et al. 1995), where the
age-related increase in prevalence of chronic diseases was higher than
the age-related increase in disability incidence.
Tables 3 and 4 demonstrate trends in self-reported work disability
by age, emphasizing that those who have some functional limitations
are much less likely to be working as they age. These responses are
somewhat biased by current employment and retirement status. Per
sonal beliefs also influence responses; for example, surveys of those
with cardiac conditions have demonstrated self-reported work limita-

434 Pransky

Table 3 Persons with Work Disability by Age, 1998 (% of population)
Age group

With work
disability

With work
disability, not severe

With work
disability, severe

16-24

4.1

1.5

2.7

25-34

5.5

2.0

3.5

35^4

9.1

3.0

6.1

45-54

13.2

4.6

8.6

55-64

23.1

7.7

15.4

65-69

23.0

14.9

8.1

70-74

26.4

18.5

7.9

Table 4 Persons with and without Work Disability Who are Employed or
Employable, by Age and Sex, 1998 (percent of group who are
employed or employable)
Males
Age group

With
work disability

Females

Without work
disability

With work
disability

Without work
disability

16-24

30.9

675

43.8

63.2

25-34

418

96.1

36.3

79.4

35-44

35.8

97.1

35.4

81.8

45-54

37.5

97.3

28.9

83.5

55-64

21.6

814

15.7

635

65-69

10.5

31.4

7.4

22.6

70-74

9.5

18.6

3.3

11.6

SOURCE: U.S. Census Bureau 2000.

tions that are inconsistent with objective evidence of normal function
and disease status (Fitzgerald 1993).
Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that an increased risk of chronic
disease and associated functional limitation is an expected conse
quence of surviving into old age. Although the rates of illness and
functional limitations increase with age, in some cases in a nonlinear
fashion, there is no evidence of a specific age threshold where dramatic
and consistent effects occur (Garg 1991). Although this observation
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could be a consequence of limitations in available data, the consistency
of findings across studies lends credence to this conclusion.
One consistent finding is a major concern in relation to Social
Security postponement. Low-income persons are most likely to be
entirely dependent on Social Security for retirement. In the NHIS data,
the rates and severity of illness and disability are inversely related to
income. The American Changing Lives survey (House 1994) also doc
umented a dramatic difference in significant functional limitations in
low-income persons versus higher-income persons in every decade of
age after 45 years old. A recent longitudinal study of university alumni
found that healthy lifestyles were correlated with more disability-free
years of life (Vita 1998); however, there is a strong inverse correlation
between negative health risk behaviors and income. Thus, survey
results and economic projections that are not stratified by income may
not be helpful in answering questions about Social Security postpone
ment.

AGING AND WORK CAPACITY
The effects of the normal aging process may be a much more com
mon potential limitation to extending regular employment for most
workers than are specific diseases. Many studies have documented
age-related decrements in sensory, cardiovascular, motor, and cognitive
function, and decreases in long-term memory, reaction time, learning
ability, isometric strength, and job performance (Garg 1991; Robertson
and Tracy 1998; de Zwart, 1995). Average changes over a 40-year
working lifespan were frequently on the order of 5-15 percent. How
ever, those studies that employed a longitudinal design have often
found that the most consistent age-related change is increased variance,
greater than the mean change for most measures (de Zwart, FringsDresen, and VanDijk 1995; Robertson and Tracy 1998). Thus, it
appears that there is more variation in physical and cognitive abilities
among older people than among the young. This would also argue
against a standard cut-off age for retirement. In a classic review of
studies of age-related changes in job performance, Doering (1983)
concluded that the results were mixed and inconclusive, although older
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workers did appear to consistently have difficulties in those rare jobs
that required maximal levels of physical exertion.
Work capacity is significant only in relation to the demands of a
specific job. Studies of persons with severe disabilities who are highly
motivated to seek and maintain employment demonstrate that "objec
tive" measures of ability to engage in gainful employment are poor pre
dictors of actual employability. Many older workers with impairments
gradually transition out of physically demanding jobs as they age.
Thus, to understand the effects of health on work, job demands and
accommodations, job selection, and motivation must all be considered
(WHO 1993). Studies of older workers suggest that specific workplace
design, training, organization, and accommodation approaches will
increase employability (Shephard 1995).
As the economy evolves, the range of jobs available to older work
ers will change (Table 5), presenting both opportunities and challenges.
As work shifts to less physically demanding jobs, many functional lim
itations will become less important. However, increased cognitive
demands, new technologies, and requirements for longer work hours
Table 5 Projected Job Growth for the Top Ten Occupations, 1998-2008
Occupation

Employment in 1998
(thousands)

ChanSe b? 2008
Thousands
%

617

577

94

Retail salespersons

4,056

563

14

Systems analysts
Cashiers

3,198

556

17

General managers and top
executives

3,362

551

16

Truck drivers, light and heavy

2,970

493

17

Office clerks, general

3,021

463

15

Registered nurses

2,079

451

22

429

439

102

746

433

58

1,192

375

31

Computer support specialists
Personal care and home
health aides
Teacher assistants

SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics 2000.
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may present more challenges for older than for younger workers. Inno
vative training, work organization, and accommodation strategies will
be required in order to engage and retain them in these jobs (Sterns and
Doverspike 1988).

CONCLUSION
Although an impressive body of literature is available on health,
aging, and work, few conclusions are broadly generalizable. Recent
findings of improvement in the average work capacity of older workers
does not necessarily lead to a positive conclusion about the feasibility
of continued work for those who will depend upon Social Security.
Further research is needed to define and evaluate these issues for those
who will primarily depend upon this source of income in their later
years.
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Commentary
Teresa Ghilarducci
University ofNotre Dame

Who can argue that older people staying active, engaged, and pro
ductively working is a bad thing? Brookings Institution's Gary Burtless and Boston College economist Joseph Quinn want older people to
work more. They show that the institutional rules of Social Security,
social norms, economic prosperity, and employer pension and health
plans affect retirement behavior, and they offer changes in tax laws and
pension rules that would "incent" more older people to work. Yet,
there is considerable disagreement over how much choice people
should have between working or not after a certain age.
There is a lot right about Burtless and Quinn's study. It is a compi
lation of these experts' empirical findings on retirement and work and
the detailed interactions of the Social Security's complex delayed
requirement credits and earnings test. They sweep over a century of
behavior lucidly in order to build the case for specific and easy-tounderstand changes in the Social Security system and tax laws. There
are, however, serious weaknesses that ultimately make their case for
raising the retirement age in Social Security their major policy pre
scription fail. The paper ignores the important differences between
the longevity of whites and blacks, the employ ability of older women
compared with that of men, and the relative importance of Social Secu
rity benefits for married couples versus single women. Their proposals
benefit employers as a group and the highest-earning professionals.
The benefits of increasing the retirement age (thus cutting benefits) are
not tremendous; Quinn and Burtless admit that increasing longevity is
not the major reason for the Social Security system's projected short
fall (their note 18). Moreover, the benefits of maintaining the system
are large. Workers will pay higher taxes to keep the retirement age
from increasing.
Joseph Quinn and Gary Burtless describe how older people in the
United States have connected themselves to their work over the last
century. Men are retiring at younger ages except during the last
decade. Women are increasing their paid work at all ages. Allowing a
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paragraph's worth of celebration of the working class's achieving some
leisure at the end of their working lives due to increasing wealth, the
paper's main focus is to structure policies so that the elderly workers
work longer.
The protagonist in the paper is the "U.S. taxpayer" and the burden
on this central player is the "burden imposed by an aging population,"
which could be lessened if workers "could be persuaded to delay their
retirements and continue contributing to the health and pension sys
tems." If people are to be persuaded to work longer, then the paper
rightly identifies reasons about why people and by that they mean
mostly men have been persuaded to retire earlier (except in the most
recent decade). One theory is that workers have poor health; a second
is that older workers face labor market discrimination; and a third is
that workers want to retire and can increasingly afford it.
The authors reject the first theory by asserting the physical jobs
requiring youngish bodies are on the decline, and that, on average, peo
ple live longer. Let us look closely at this bit of received wisdom: first,
at the cost of this longevity and, second, at the extent and distribution
of it. Figure 1 shows that increased longevity and work ability of the
elderly is overblown. The top line shows that life expectancy for a 65year-old male has increased only a few years since 1950 age 78 to
age 81 an increase, but not a dramatic one. What is dramatic, as
Burtless and Quinn also emphasize, is that male labor force participa
tion rates are falling. This is a clear demonstration of how workers
have chosen to spend the increases in the nation's productive capacity.
The "gap" between work and death also represents a long hard fight for
victory that workers pay for from employers and the state.
Averages hide crucial differences. Unlike whites, African-Ameri
can males are not enjoying significant increases in longevity. Since
five years ago, white males at age 65 live 2.6 percent longer almost
two years while an African-American male's expectation went up
seven months. Even worse is that the lower expected longevity of an
African-American male entering the work force at age 20 in 1994
means that on average he'll retire for less than two months at full bene
fits. Robert Ball warns us that the Social Security system cannot right
work and social injustices, but raising the normal retirement age has
profound differential effects by race (Table 1).

Session 4: Is Working Longer and Retiring Later Possible? 441

Figure 1 Workers Won Retirement: The Gap between Death and Work,
1950-1994
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SOURCE: Steurele and Bakija (1994).

In addition to the variation in longevity among groups, it seems
that the desire to work past 65 is concentrated in a few select groups.
Only 4 percent of the elderly in the lowest income quintile have earn
ings, whereas almost 40 percent in the top have earnings (EBRI1995).
This corroborates other evidence that higher-income professionals are
most likely to voluntarily work past normal retirement age (Bovbjerg
1998).
Quinn and Burtless acknowledge, and I agree, that people with
jobs requiring stamina and brawn should get early retirement through
the disability insurance system; this is an administrative change and
helps those too old to work but not entirely disabled to retire. This pro
posal increases costs.
The authors argue that retirement became more acceptable as it
became more affordable, and that social norms alone affect behavior
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Table 1 Longevity by Race and Sex, 1979-1980 and 1995
in 1979-1980
(yr.)

in 1994
(yr)

Increase in longevity
in 15 years (%)

White male

72.5

74.4

2.6

White female

79.4

80.4

1.3

Black male

66.4

67.1

1.1

Black female

74.9

75.5

0.8

White male

79.3

80.6

1.6

White female

83.6

84.1

0.6

Black male

78.3

78.6

0.4

Black female

82.1

82.2

01

Race/sex
Expected age at death for
those at age 20

Expected age at death for
those at age 65

SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce 1997.

(controlling for all the other factors). In support of the social approba
tion hypothesis, they suggest that that ADEA of 1978 that gradually
eliminated most mandatory retirement ages may have encouraged the
recent increases in work among the elderly by reducing age discrimina
tion and sending a signal to older Americans that work was socially
acceptable.
The fact that the social signal affects some groups—like white,
upper-income professionals—more than others is not a factor in their
analysis. Most workers do not want to retire later and they are willing
to pay for it. Most importantly, "encouraging" working more by low
ering pensions has high costs paid by some and benefits reaped by oth
ers.
To this point, I am reminded of a conversation I overheard in 1997
between the former President of the Bricklayers and Allied Craftworkers Union, John Joyce, and Estelle James, lead author of the World
Bank's 1994 pension study, which had a theme similar to that of Burtless and Quinn. She complained about his remarks given in a speech as
misinterpreting the World Bank's support for advance funding and par
tially privatizing the world's pay-as-you-go retirement systems. Our
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argument is complicated, she protested. Such policies would protect
the old and promote economic growth.
He turned, facing her directly and said, "Don't you want workers
to work longer?"
"Yes," she said, "That's part of it."
The union president replied, "Then you are taking something away
and giving nothing back."
I recall the conversation to make meaningful two observations that
Burtless and Quinn acknowledge in their otherwise unambiguous call
for older retirement ages. First, they argue that it may desirable to raise
the retirement age but U.S. workers don't want to work longer. (They
show us that older Americans work longer than most workers in OECD
nations.) Eighteen polls over a 20-year period ending in 1997 showed
that Americans oppose raising the retirement age. Burtless and Quinn
imply that people may be responding to the survey this way because
they want to retire even earlier, before age 55. However, Burtless and
Quinn concede that workers may understand the cost of what they
want; they cite a recent EBRI poll that showed that, by a 2:1 majority,
"workers favor higher payroll taxes over reduced Social Security pen
sions."
Indeed, when given a chance, Americans are willing to pay for
what they want. Union demands reflect the preferences of the average
worker rather than the marginal or last worker hired in nonunion set
tings (Freeman 1981). The preferences of union and nonunion workers
between pensions and wages are startling. According the Employment
Cost Index in the 10-year period between 1980 and 1990, union work
ers had negative real wage increases but positive two-digit increases in
pension contributions. Nonunion workers had the opposite experience:
real wages increased by a bit, but pension costs plummeted. There are
many factors—age of the workforce and industries—that can explain a
huge difference in compensation patterns, but the simplest is consistent
with other evidence. When asked, as they are when they vote for a col
lectively bargained contract, workers are ready to pay for their end of
career leisure with reduced wages (Ghilarducci 1997). In other ways,
U.S. workers have also demonstrated they will pay to retire. Payroll
taxes increased by 16 percent in 1983 when Congress endorsed many
of the recommendations of the Greenspan Commission.
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Quinn and Burtless also acknowledge that households are also pay
ing for retirement by increasing hours of work when they are younger.
The average hours of work by the U.S. population has increased signif
icantly since 1968. Workers between 25-54, on average, work 14 per
cent more hours than they did 30 years ago, because more women took
jobs.
Quinn and Burtless have six proposals.
1) Raise the age at which full Social Security benefits can be
received to age 67 (or an age that is increased according to
increases in average longevity). This lowers benefits.
2) Exempt older workers from payroll taxes.
strains the Social Security program.

This, of course,

3) Make employers prorate fringe benefits for part time workers so
that firms will more likely hire older workers for more than 35
hours if the cost of hiring them for less increases. This will raise
the cost to employers.
4) Make Medicare the first insurance payer. This will raise Medi
care costs but might reduce the employers' costs for older work
ers.
5) Raise the EITC for older workers. This is paid for by general
revenue.
6) Repeal the earnings test so that workers receive full Social Secu
rity benefits regardless of earnings. This helps those earning
over $17,000 per year.
Who wins and who loses?
• Employers win in three ways from Burtless and Quinn's propos
als. First, there are significant wage subsidies for employers hir
ing older workers inherent in expanding the EITC, repealing the
earnings test, making Medicare the first payer, and lowering pay
roll taxes. These reduce wage costs. Second, increasing the sup
ply of workers reduces the bargaining power of all workers and
puts downward pressure on wages. Third, higher-income work
ers would pay for an expanded EITC through general revenues
generated by the progressive federal tax system. Proposal three,
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however, requiring employers to partly pay for the fringe benefits
of part time workers, may increase costs if employers don't
switch part-time workers to temporary status.
• Higher-income older workers win. Workers who would have
worked longer anyway—white-collar professionals—are reward
ed by getting a larger delayed retirement credit and by the elimi
nation of the earnings test. Higher-income workers also benefit
more than lower-income workers do because they are unlikely to
retire at the earlier ages and take the lower pension.
• Middle-class workers lose. Instead of raising the retirement age,
the Social Security system can raise payroll taxes. Lower-income
workers—those in the first two quintiles—are almost fully subsi
dized by the EITC. So middle-income workers would have to
pay the bulk of this increased cost if the earnings cap is not
expanded. However, since these workers are more likely to retire
at age 65 or earlier, then they pay for their retirement and "get
something back" from their taxes.
• Blue-collar workers, workers in stressful jobs, and jobs sensitive
to the business cycle will lose when the normal retirement age
increases because they are much more likely to leave at the earlier
ages and accept a lower pension.
• Older women lose. Women who do not work longer, and conse
quently receive a lower pension, will have lower earnings. This
group is already at greater risk of poverty; the poverty rate for
older single women is 22 percent, compared with 4 percent for
older couples (who are more likely to get income from earnings).
The wage gap between older men and women is also higher, sug
gesting that work opportunities for older women are more limited
than for older men.
• Workers of all ages lose. If older workers have to work two to
three years longer to get full benefits, then the increased supply of
older workers searching for jobs depresses bargaining power and
wages.
The gap between death and retirement shows a potential labor
force ready to work if other sources of income—like Social Security
and pensions—are made less certain and generous. In the year 2000,
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approximately 4.2 million Americans over the age of 65 are expected
to be in the labor force. If the labor force participation rates rise to the
1950s level because of smaller Social Security benefits, the number
jobs created would have to triple or unemployment will soar, which in
turn will suppress wages. Burtless and Quinn assure us that the "jobcreating capacity" of the American economy will accommodate this
increase supply of workers. They credit the "flexible" U.S. labor mar
ket's ability to absorb workers. They acknowledge that "if older work
ers were forced to wait for two or three extra years for full Social
Security retirement benefits to begin," many would work longer in their
jobs or spend more time looking for work. This would "certainly
depress the wages of aged job seekers."
British Philosopher Bertrand Russell helps us step back from the
costs and benefits of reducing pensions and encouraging older people
to work by commenting on the urge behind the urge. He writes in the
1935 essay In Praise of Idleness (p. 17),
The idea that the poor should have leisure has always been shock
ing to the rich . . . When I was a child, shortly after urban working
men had acquired the vote a number of public holidays were
established. I remember hearing an old Duchess say, "What do
the poor want with holidays? They ought to work.

In sum, this paper does not make the case for increasing the retire
ment age; the current projected numbers of retirees can be paid for
through a modest increase in the payroll tax, which by all evidence
seems to be acceptable to the American public. Moreover, the cost
incidence of raising the retirement age would benefit high-income pro
fessional workers and employers at the expense of middle-income and
women workers. Given the persistent problem of growing income ine
quality, any proposal that increases the gap between the top and bottom
is unadvisable.
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Policy Options for Filling Gaps in
the Health Insurance Coverage of
Older Workers and Early Retirees
Len M. Nichols
The Urban Institute

This chapter offers answers to two questions concerning the health
insurance of Americans between the ages of 55 and 64: 1) who has the
greatest need for health insurance policy intervention? and 2) which
types of policies are likely to be most effective for these subgroups?
The chapter draws upon recent literature and other chapters of this
book. I present a brief analysis of a broad range of policy options, as
well as some quantitative simulation exercises which highlight key fea
tures of alternative targeted coverage strategies. While care was taken
to make the estimates realistic, all simulations are at best illustrative of
certain principles and should not be interpreted as definitive estimates
of the cost or coverage impacts of particular proposals. Finally, I use
the lessons from the examples to explore a relatively new way of think
ing about financing subsidies for the purchase of health insurance.
This view may have particular relevance for the age 55-64 cohort as it
grows in the coming decades.

WHO HAS THE GREATEST NEED FOR HEALTH
INSURANCE POLICY INTERVENTION?
Recent policy discussions of coverage expansion options often
focus on children or their parents, partly because members of the age
55-64 cohort are among the non-elderly most likely to have health
insurance in the United States (Campbell 1999; Swartz and Stevenson
2001). Swartz and Stevenson report that only 15 percent of this group
lacked health insurance in 1998, compared with 30 percent of 18- to
24-year-olds and 24 percent of 25- to 34-year-olds. Only the prime age
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working population, 45-54, had a lower incidence of being uninsured
(13.6 percent).
However, a compelling case can be made that the consequences of
being without health insurance are potentially much more damaging to
this oldest pre-Medicare cohort than to other non-elderly citizens, for
two reasons. First, the financial risk of no coverage is greater.
Table 1, constructed with 1987 National Medical Expenditure Sur
vey (NMES) data, makes the point about higher financial risk. It
reports ratios of per capita spending amounts for all adults, not just
workers, by age and health status category. It shows that a 55- to 64year-old man in good health (self-reporting excellent or good) should
expect to spend 2.5 times as much as a young man (21-29) in equally
good health. But the age-cost gradient is steeper for men in bad health
(fair or poor), at 4.2. For women, the direction is the same, but the
severity of the effect is less, largely because maternity costs are associ
ated with younger women. Interestingly, the pure health status gradi
ent is identical across genders at 2.7. Thus, the near-elderly in bad
health can expect to spend 2.7 times as much as their cohort counter
parts in good health.
Table 2 shows the percentage of each age cohort, by gender, that
reported fair or poor health status in the 1987 NMES. These data show
that the incidence of bad health increases dramatically with age. So,
while they are relatively well covered as a group, 55- to 64-year-olds
are indeed more likely to be financially vulnerable to the absence of
health insurance coverage than other non-elderly Americans; they can
expect to spend more if uninsured for both age and declining health
status reasons.
Table 1 Per-Capita Spending Ratios by Gender, Age, and Health Status
Males

Females

Good health3 Bad health

Good health Bad health

Ages 55-64 / 21-29

2.5

4.2

1.3

1.9

Age 55-64, bad/good health

—

2.7

—

2.7

SOURCE: Author's calculations using 1987 NMES data.
a Good health = excellent or good; bad health = fair or poor
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Table 2 Share of Each Age Group in Fair or Poor
Health Status (%)
Age

Men

Women

21-29

8^8

12X)

30-54

14.8

18.1

55-64

34.1

35.6

SOURCE: Author's tabulations using 1987 NMES.

Second, potentially greater vulnerability from having no health
insurance is greater health risk. Many studies have found that the unin
sured enjoy less access to care and that both their health status and
mortality risk are worse than is the case for the insured (Franks,
Clancy, and Gold 1993, Franks et al. 1993). None as yet (to my knowl
edge) have found an age-related dimension to worsened outcomes or
greater health risk from being uninsured, but this is surely a testable
hypothesis. If it turns out to be true, this would strengthen the case for
why the 55- to 64-year-old cohort should be a policy priority. If the
hypothesis is false, then the case for helping 55- to 64-year-olds is
mostly financial (there would still be access differentials relative to
need, since their average need is greater than younger cohorts).
Having established that the age 55-64 cohort deserves policy
attention, who within the cohort is the most deserving? The usual and
correct answers are the low income and those with low (fair or poor)
health status. These two groups always fare less well in the U.S. sys
tem of voluntary insurance markets, because comprehensive health
insurance is now very expensive relative to low incomes and because
insurers protect themselves against adverse selection by imposing lim
its, restrictions, and outright refusals to insure at any price for some
preexisting conditions (Chollet and Kirk 1998; GAO 1998). Among
the 55-64 cohort, those living in family units with income less than
200 percent of poverty (hereafter, low-income family units) comprise
half the uninsured in the cohort, and those with fair or poor status
regardless of income comprise 26 percent of the uninsured in the age
group. Seventeen percent of the uninsured in this cohort are both lowincome and in bad health.
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It is important to remember, as Swartz and Stevenson (2001) and
Pollitz (2001) report, that public insurance programs play a vital role
for the sickest in this age group, covering about 10 percent of all 55- to
64-year-olds but over half of those who report not working because
they are ill or disabled. Given the size of the uninsured population who
report fair or poor health status to survey researchers, the public pro
grams are clearly not able to cover all those who need coverage and
can't afford to buy it on their own. Still, without Medicare and Medicaid's disabled and medically needy programs, the coverage problem of
this age group would be much worse. Also note that because Medicaid
and Medicare cover the most disabled of the cohort, the risk of adverse
selection from expanding voluntary coverage options for this age group
is somewhat reduced.
Swartz and Stevenson report that some subgroups are particularly
likely to be uninsured. The unmarried, especially women, and those
who had lost a spouse to death or changing circumstance (separated
and divorced) of both genders were more likely to be uninsured.
Never-married women are particularly vulnerable. Women in general
are more likely to rely on nongroup insurance (Swartz and Stevenson
2001), which is less stable in an underwriting environment (which pre
vails in most of the United States) than is group or public insurance.
Thus, the most in need of policy intervention are the low-income and
the less-healthy, especially women.
Predictable Future Strains

This picture is bleak enough for those who are other than healthy,
married, high-income workers, but two trends make it imperative that
policymakers begin to consider coverage expansion options for this
population in a serious way: the size of the aging baby-boomer cohort
and the decline of employer-sponsored retiree health insurance. In
1998, there were 22.9 million people between the ages of 55 and 64; by
2008, there will be 35.2 million. So whatever unique problems they
have in getting and keeping health insurance coverage, these problems
are going to increase in aggregate magnitude by roughly half in the
coming decade.
In addition, a major pillar of coverage for 55- to 64-year-olds,
employer-sponsored retirement health insurance (RHI), is eroding.
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Partly due to an accounting rule change that created strong incentives
to drop RHI and immediately improve a company's balance sheet and
stock price, and partly due to the changing labor market in which RHI
is perceived as less crucial to attract good workers in an increasingly
mobile global economy, there is a clear tendency on the part of
employers to reduce the generosity of postretirement health insurance
offerings (GAO 1998; McArdle et al. 1999). Between 1985 and 1993,
the fraction of workers with access to employer-sponsored retirement
health insurance declined from about 75 percent to about 50 percent
(U.S. Department of Labor 1995). Perhaps most ominously, even large
firms are both dropping RHI and charging early retirees higher and
higher premiums for such coverage (McArdle et al. 1999; Loprest and
Zedlewski 1998). Employer surveys indicate that fewer workers are
likely to have access to RHI in the future (McArdle et al. 1999).
Of course, the other side of the coin is that the absence of good
early retirement health insurance options probably keeps workers in
the labor force longer (Johnson, Davidoff, and Perese 2000; Karoly and
Rogowski 1998; Gruber and Madrian 1995). If public policy were to
make generous subsidies widely available, rates of declines in labor
force participation by older workers could regain their 1970s momen
tum (Blau and Gilleskie 1997). Of course, some retirements are invol
untary and health-related, even though the person might not be
disabled enough to qualify for Medicare or Medicaid. Striking a bal
ance here is clearly important, and thus any new subsidy proposal must
be mindful of likely labor force (and payroll tax base) effects. These
effects have been established qualitatively, but no consensus has been
reached on the magnitude of likely responses to subsidies of varying
degrees. This is an important and active area of research. 1

WHICH TYPES OF POLICIES ARE LIKELY TO BE MOST
EFFECTIVE FOR THE NEEDIEST SUBGROUPS, THE
LOW-INCOME AND THOSE WITH HEALTH PROBLEMS?

There are two key dimensions to coverage expansion policies for
the near-elderly: the subsidy mechanism and the range of market
opportunities for insurance or health services on which the beneficiary
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may spend the subsidy. The interactions of these dimensions is crucial
in determining the ultimate effect of any policy initiative, and thus they
really should be considered in tandem. To that end, I present Table 3,
which should be thought of as a 4 x 3 matrix, each cell of which is a
potential type of coverage expansion policy. This table tries to help the
reader see that both dimensions are key to understanding the full set of
implications about each policy alternative.
In this section, I briefly discuss some pros and cons of each
approach.
COBRA Extensions
What I mean by mandates are laws forcing employers to make
COBRA coverage available to workers for longer periods of time after
they leave the firm. Under current law, if an employer offers insurance
to active workers, then workers who sever employment (in firms with
more than 20 workers) for any reason must be offered the option of
continuing to enroll in the employer's plan—in exchange for paying
102 percent of the total premium—for as long as 18 months (and
longer under certain circumstances). COBRA provides bridge cover
age to Medicare for many individuals who retire before age 65
(Loprest and Zedlewski 1998). The idea behind extending COBRA is
Table 3 Policy Options for Filling Health Insurance Coverage Gaps for
55- to 64-Year-Olds

Subsidy mechanism
Employer mandates (COBRA
extensions)
Existing public program
expansions
Tax credits
Direct subsidies

Current
nongroup
market
NAC

Reformed
nongroup
market3
NA

Existing nsk
pools5 or New
Group Purchasing
Authority
V

NA

NA

V

V
V

V
V

V
V

a Guaranteed issue, premium restrictions, etc.
b Purchasing co-ops, FEHBP, Medicaid, Medicare, state high-risk or HIPAA pools.
c NA = not applicable.
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to permit access to the group market longer, maybe 36 months or until
the age of Medicare eligibility is reached (this is sometimes offered as
a complement to proposals to raise the age of Medicare eligibility to
67). The virtue of extending COBRA is that access to a shared-risk
pool (the employer group) would be enhanced at low (nominally zero)
cost to the federal government.
The downsides to COBRA extensions are 1) it does nothing for
nonworkers save dependents of recent retirees; 2) while lower than
most nongroup premiums, 102 percent of the employer premium is still
more than many early retirees can afford to pay; and most seriously, 3)
it constitutes an implicit tax on existing workers and firms, since wages
will (on average) be lowered to pay for the higher premiums required
to cover the cost of retirees. There would also be a second-order reduc
tion in federal tax revenues, since wages are taxed and employer-pro
vided health insurance premium payments are not. Thus, COBRA
extensions are not "free" and, on the whole, do not seem to be a partic
ularly effective way of extending coverage to those in this cohort who
need it most. Recall, many of those most in need for early retiree
health insurance worked for firms that did not offer employer-spon
sored insurance to active workers. Having access to COBRA is fairly
highly correlated with income in the first place (Loprest and Zedlewski
1998).
Public Program Expansions
An administratively straightforward way to expand coverage for
those most in need would be to change eligibility for Medicaid or
Medicare or both. These programs already serve the very sick and dis
abled (see Pollitz [2001] for a brief overview of each), and Medicaid
also covers many low-income individuals, though typically much
younger than this cohort. This approach, like the COBRA extension,
would permit coverage expansion to avoid the complexities and ineffi
ciencies of the private nongroup insurance market. These complexities
can be severe, as we discuss presently.
The downsides to public program expansion are partly technical
but mostly political. The technical problem is in "slightly" increasing
the range of conditions or functional diagnoses that are considered
"disabled" enough to merit inclusion in either Medicare or Medicaid.
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There is concern and some evidence that medical judgments are incon
sistent and elastic, leading to an "endogenous" assignment of disability
that could expand public program rolls well beyond the intent of the
law and agreed upon medical need (Kubik 1996).
The larger objections to public program eligibility expansions are
political. The obvious point is the considerable resistance in the Con
gress to expanding any entitlement program, especially our entitlement
insurance programs. In addition, if Medicaid—the joint state and fed
eral program—is the preferred vehicle (and in general it has been the
program expanded to accept broader definitions of disability in recent
years), then truly effective expansion requires states to share the new
federal goals, for they will be asked to spend their own money on this.
The variance in state coverage and enrollment of different types of
Medicaid eligibles suggests that this "goal sharing" should not be taken
for granted.
Tax Credits
In contrast to public program eligibility expansion, there is cur
rently something of a groundswell of bipartisan political support for
tax credits that could be used for the purchase of health insurance.
Briefly put, many are attracted to the principle of tax credits, even if
there is no agreement yet on key details. This movement seems to be
propelled by a confluence of forces in support of one or more of the
following: 1) tax equity (why subsidize employer premiums but not the
self-employed or nonworkers?); 2) individual choice (partly philosoph
ical and partly a more subtle form of the current backlash against man
aged care, led by those who have a strong stake in the fee-for-service
system and blame employers for foisting managed care on workers); 3)
target efficiency (which tax credits can be designed to be); and 4) tax
cuts (as tax credits can be described for political purposes). Two recent
papers have analyzed tax credits of various forms (Gruber and Levitt
2000; Pauly and Herring 1999b) for the general non-elderly popula
tion.
The major downside of tax credits is that they must be adminis
tered within the income tax system. This makes it difficult to reach
those who have no federal tax liability and do not file tax returns
(approximately 45 percent of the uninsured in all age brackets [Gruber
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and Levitt 2000]). The tax system is a cumbersome avenue for any eli
gible person of a means-tested program. (The opposition of Treasury
professionals to administering subsidies through the tax system is leg
endary inside the Beltway). Thus, using the tax system to administer a
subsidy is likely to result in lower enrollment than would subsidies of
equal size that could be obtained with less applicant and administrative
burden. Second (and related), for tax credits to work well for the target
low-income population, they must be both refundable (for those with
zero or low tax liabilities) and available when premiums must be paid,
i.e., up front, not in April of the following year. The low-income popu
lation cannot finance health insurance with an interest-free loan, other
wise they wouldn't need a subsidy in the first place. Refundability and
prepayment raise serious year-end reconciliation complexities and
potential reductions in target efficiency. Finally, as Pauly and Herring
show and others have long stated (Blumberg 1999), tax credits must be
fairly large to do any good at all for the low-income population. This is
not a critique of tax credits per se, but rather a statement that they may
work better for lower middle-income people than for the truly lowincome population.
Direct Subsidies
Direct subsidies (a new program, not an extension of Medicare or
Medicaid) could be designed to have the technical advantages of tax
credits (target efficiency, horizontal equity) without the administrative
disadvantages of using the tax system for a means-tested subsidy pro
gram. This is not to say that the administrative difficulties of setting up
a new subsidy program are trivial. But the motivating idea of a "new
and different" subsidy program would be to provide direct purchasing
power (and, perhaps, health plan purchasing expertise; more on this
later in the discussion of market opportunities) without the regulations
and complex vendor-relations histories of Medicare and Medicaid.
One downside of a new direct subsidy program is shared with tax
credits, and that is that the subsidies must be large to engender much
new coverage. The resulting public price tag contributes to direct sub
sidies' major political problem, the absence of a widely shared new
political vision for a new expansive health insurance entitlement.
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Using the Current Nongroup Market
The nongroup health insurance market is functional in all 50 states
and works better than its reputation in some health policy circles, at
least according to a new book by Mark Pauly and Brad Herring
(1999a). They make one overarching and controversial empirical
claim: risks are pooled to nearly equal (and imperfect) degrees by
large-group, small-group, and nongroup insurers. They conclude that
there is no systematic empirical evidence of aggressive risk rating by
nongroup insurers.
Even if one accepts Pauly and Herring's new empirical claims (and
I suspect they will remain controversial for at least a while yet), their
fundamental deduction is that the primary differences between insur
ance markets stem from their inherently different administrative load
ing costs. Group insurance can exploit economies of scale and thus
costs less than nongroup insurance can. Thus, high administrative
costs are a major downside of the current nongroup market.
Other reports about the actual workings of the nongroup market are
not so sanguine on the relative absence of aggressive risk rating (Chol
let and Kirk 1998; GAO 1997; Hall 2000). Also, recall that risk rating,
as well as age rating (which is ubiquitous and quite reasonable given
the expenditure facts presented in Table 1), means that people in our
cohort will pay higher equilibrium premiums under the current nongroup market's relative laissez faire regulation, even if they can on
average find policies to buy as Pauly's empirical results suggest. So,
paying more for a given set of benefits plus paying a higher administra
tive load is the reality for 55- to 64-year-olds in the unreformed nongroup market.
Reforming the Nongroup Market
Almost all discussions of the actual behavior of nongroup insurers
(Hall 1999; Chollet and Kirk 1998), as opposed to the empirical results
of Pauly and Herring, invariably lead to calls for some kind of reforms
(Swartz and Garnick 2000; Chollet and Kirk 2000; Hall 2000). The
basic idea is that guaranteed issue and restrictions on premium vari
ances would guarantee access at affordable prices for most people try
ing to purchase coverage in the nongroup market. A reformed
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nongroup market could indeed look a great deal friendlier to the garden
variety 55- to 64-year-old than it does in most states today (Pollitz
2001 ;BCBSA 1999).
However, reforms that increase access for older and sicker wouldbe purchasers raise average premiums and are quite likely to raise by a
substantial amount the premiums of most of those who were purchas
ing in the prereform environment (Nichols 2000). Empirical evidence
on the effect of nongroup reforms is scant if not rare, but the studies
that have been done uniformly find that nongroup reforms do indeed
reduce net insurance coverage overall (Marsteller et al. 1998; Zuckerman and Rajan 1999; Sloan and Conover 1998). Thus, while reforms
would undoubtedly help some (perhaps especially those 55-64 with
the greatest health needs), these reforms would also likely cause others
to pay more and might cause them to go without coverage altogether.
Perhaps those who would obtain or would retain coverage in a
reformed nongroup insurance environment have worse health status
than those who voluntarily drop coverage because of premium
increases. This is an important area of future research which is not
well known at the moment. There are also case studies of how reforms
have been implemented with relatively little obvious downsides
(Swartz and Garnick 2000; Hall 2000; Nichols 2000). But these suc
cessful implementation strategies require a degree of political will
(e.g., requiring group insurers to offer products in the nongroup mar
ket) that is not present in most states and does not appear to be present
in Congress either.
Buying into Existing Risk Pools
If an unreformed nongroup market is unpalatable to most observers
and a reformed nongroup market is fraught with tradeoffs for the
unsubsidized to bear, then allowing 55- to 64-year-olds to take their tax
credit or direct subsidy into a group setting to purchase health insur
ance makes a tremendous amount of sense. Large pools exist and
could be expanded at much lower administrative costs than either type
of nongroup market could offer. Furthermore, they provide natural and
existing risk-pooling mechanisms. Among the more attractive options
are statewide purchasing cooperatives for employees of small busi
nesses (CHIP in California), the Federal Employees Health Benefit
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Plan (FEHBP), or state employee plans (e.g., CALPERS in California).
In addition, administrative and marketing efficiencies would result if
new subsidies of whatever form were allowed to be used to buy into
Medicare or Medicaid. Finally, state high-risk pools or the mecha
nisms created by states to comply with HIPAA "federal eligibles"
could also be opened up to the new beneficiaries at relatively low
administrative costs.
The downside of using existing pools is that existing members
might not be willing to be rated collectively with the new enrollees,
especially if they turned out to be higher than average risks, even con
trolling for age. Conversely, the new enrollees might not like being
charged actuarially fair premiums with high-risk pool members, if that
were the mechanism of choice. But once the decision is made to rate
the populations separately, some of the administrative efficiencies of
group purchase would be lost.
Allowing the newly subsidized 55- to 64-year-olds to buy into pub
lic programs would not raise cost issues, because these programs are
and would remain free to currently qualified beneficiaries. However, if
the new enrollees got substantially different benefit packages—for
example, if they got prescription drug coverage through a Medicare +
Choice HMO—there might be stronger equity-based opposition raised
by current beneficiaries. Further, deciding what price to charge the
"buying" enrollees is no simple matter for a public program, for here
the relative risk-rating heterogeneity and controversies seep back into
the calculation.
Organizing New Risk Pools and Purchasing Authorities
Alternatively, with a new federal health insurance subsidy program
targeted directly at 55- to 64-year-olds, the government could set up a
whole new purchasing agency, modeled after the best private or public
health plan purchasing agencies, that would organize enrollment and
health plan options for the new beneficiaries. This entity could write
RFPs and negotiate with health plans and insurers, while coordinating
enrollment, beneficiary plan choice, and financial transactions to maxi
mize administrative efficiencies for all. Eligibility standards would
have to be established and enforced, but these functions have to be per
formed somewhere by someone. Creating a whole new purchasing
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agent would have the major virtue of allowing the new program to
establish its own relations with beneficiaries, vendors, and insurers
without the legacies and resentments each might bring from the Medicaid or Medicare programs. It may also be the only quick way to get
creative about risk adjusting and competitive bidding, both of which
may be particularly helpful for insuring the 55-64 population, as we
shall discuss later after presenting some simulation results.
The downside of a new agency is that it would surely cost more to
run at the outset than the marginal cost of adding these functions to
existing Medicare or Medicaid programs. Plus, it would be vulnerable
to the charge of government proliferation, since a new federal entity
would be born. These disadvantages would have to be weighed against
the potential long-run advantages of freedom from existing programs'
rules. The ultimate judgment may hinge upon how much like a private
sector "sponsor,"—e.g., the Buyer's Health Care Action Group in Min
nesota or the Pacific Business Group on Health in San Francisco—
Congress would want this new purchasing agent to be. The more free
dom to contract and aggressive use of government bargaining power on
behalf of beneficiary choices and welfare are valued, the more likely
the optimal choice would be a new entity. However, if the public orga
nization of subsidized beneficiaries' purchase of participating health
plans is intended to be as passive as most Medicare and Medicaid
health plan purchasing has been to date, i.e., if policymakers think of
the program as a provider support device as much as a beneficiary sub
sidy mechanism, then creating a new entity is not likely to be worth the
political and administrative trouble.

A FEW SPECIFIC POLICY SIMULATIONS
In this section, I present some simulation results of the policy
options that seem promising and efficient enough to be feasible in our
current political environment of parsimony towards coverage expan
sions (i.e., they are on a financial scale commensurate with Vice Presi
dent Gore's proposal to cover parents of Medicaid and CHIP children
and Governor Bush's modest tax credit proposal). Table 4 presents
some contextual facts and basic assumptions.
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Table 4 Some Basic Facts and Assumptions
Total 55-64 population (millions)
Uninsured

22.9
3.4

Nongroup

2.0

Low income
Fair/poor health

6.1
5.4

Low income and bad health
Est. standard premium ($)
Est. high-risk premium ($)
Est. community rate ($)

2.6
2,500
6,750
3,900

SOURCE: 1999 CPS and author's calculations in 1998 dol
lars.

First, recall that there are approximately 23 million people between
55 and 64 today. About 3.4 million are uninsured, while another 2 mil
lion purchase coverage in the nongroup market, and thus their hold on
health insurance is more tenuous than those insured through work (past
or present) or in public programs. About 6 million people in this
cohort have incomes below 200 percent of poverty, and 5.4 million
report fair or poor health status. Finally, 2.6 million are estimated to
have both low income and bad health status.
The key assumption in all policy analyses of coverage expansions
is the premium that must be paid for the desired insurance product, for
this parameter simultaneously determines both total program cost and
enrollment (conditional on the income distribution) in the likely event
that some (maybe all) will be made eligible for a partial subsidy. With
out exaggeration, one can state that the reliability, representativeness,
and quality of publicly available premium data for the nongroup mar
ket range from fair to poor. I consulted studies of the nongroup market
(GAO 1998; Chollett and Kirk 1998; Chollett 2000; Kirk 2000; Swartz
and Garnick 2000; Hall 2000; Pauly and Herring 1999a), high-risk
pools (Communicating for Agriculture 1999), analyses of Medicare
buy-in proposals (Loprest and Moon 1999; CBO 1998), and both
NMES and MEPS data (the latter supplied by John Eisenberg). The
premium assumptions in Table 4 represent a judgmental average of all
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the above sources, where each source estimate or fact was adjusted to
account for the particular nature of the underlying pool.
For example, high-risk pool premiums must be adjusted for the
fact that they are set below the actuarial value, but claims and adminis
trative costs are published along with premium receipts, so this is fairly
simple. What is not published is the degree to which adverse selection
into high-risk pools is likely worse than would result from the kinds of
subsidy programs for the persons aged 55-64 who are uninsured (and
thus not in a state high-risk pool) today. CBO and others made analo
gous adjustments from the published estimates of nongroup premiums
when predicting who would take a Medicare buy-in option. In addi
tion, MEPS data were provided for workers only, and they are healthier
than nonworkers in every age cohort. The NMES per capita spending
data are in the public domain, and the data based on them that I pre
sented in Tables 1 and 2 are for all 55- to 64-year-olds. They include
nonworkers, obviously, but have the disadvantage of also including
publicly insured individuals who are unlikely to switch into the new
subsidy program and are most likely to be the sickest of all. Plus, the
NMES data are from 1987, and while they can be "aged" using HCFA's
national health account growth rates, the delivery system is quite dif
ferent today, so the age- and health status gradients may have changed
(though I suspect not much).2
I welcome suggestions for better ways to estimate premiums for
these kinds of policies, but I believe these estimates are at least "in the
town the ballpark is in," to invoke Bob Reischauer's famous descrip
tion of health reform estimates, and that will suffice for discussion pur
poses at least. The important fact to note about them is the gap
between the high-risk premium ($6,750) and the standard premium
($2,500). The former are computed for those with fair or poor health
status, and the latter for those in excellent or good health. The commu
nity rate ($3,900) represents the weighted average of each type of per
son if all nonpublicly insured 55- to 64-year-olds were to become
insured through the hypothetical new subsidy program and the ratio of
(fair + poor) -=- total is the same as in 1987.
Table 5 summarizes and compares the three subsidy policy initia
tives I explore in some detail. My objective is to maximize coverage of
the target population at minimum cost, so in each case, I assume a
direct subsidy (to maximize participation and target efficiency) and that
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Table 5 Subsidy Options Simulated
Income-based subsidy for 55-64 year olds
100% for those below poverty
Sliding scale between 100-200%
Not available for those m public, with ESI/RHI
Group purchase mechanism
Health status-based subsidy for 55-64 year olds
100% for those with fair or poor health
Not available for those in public, with ESI/RHI
Group purchase mechanism
Income and health status-based subsidy for 55-64 year olds
100% for low income with bad health
Not available for those in public, with ESI/RHI
Group purchase mechanism

beneficiaries will be allowed to select plans through some kind of
group purchasing mechanism, the exact nature of which is not speci
fied. To be conservative, I assume this group purchasing agent is less
efficient than either Medicare or large employers, and I therefore
assign an administrative load on expected health care costs (which
includes eligibility determination costs plus the agency's and the
insurer's administrative costs) of 20 percent. Other institutional
assumptions are that beneficiaries will be guaranteed issue (i.e., no one
can be denied coverage because of health status) and that the newly
subsidized population will be rated separately from participants in cur
rent markets. In each case, I assume the subsidy is targeted and avail
able only to those who are not currently enrolled in a public program
and do not have access to ESI/RHI, but I presume that 90 percent of
current participants in the nongroup market who are made eligible will
participate in the program, and that 10 percent of those with ESI/RHI
will drift over into the program either by choice or because their
employers will induce or force them to.
The first policy is targeted to low-income 55- to 64-year-olds. It
would provide 100 percent of the cost of a plan (presumed to cost the
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community rate of $3,900 in the income-related case) for all persons
55-64 who have incomes at or below poverty and who are not eligible
for Medicare or Medicaid and without access to ESI or RHI. Starting
at incomes just above 100 percent of poverty, subsidies (and participa
tion) decline along a sliding scale to 0 at 200 percent of poverty.
The second policy is targeted at those who have the greatest health
needs. It would grant a 100 percent subsidy to all persons with fair or
poor health, regardless of income. The price of coverage for each of
these persons is presumed to be $6,750. Eligibility for this kind of pol
icy could be determined or certified by physicians, in a process similar
to the individual functional assessment test now given to potentially
"disabled" Medicaid enrollees. Alternatively, and preferably from my
point of view, one can imagine using a kind of underwriting process,
similar to that used by nongroup insurers all the time, but in coopera
tion with the purchasing authority so it can be standardized across
plans. Postenrollment encounter data could be required of participat
ing health plans to assess the accuracy of ex ante assessments, and this
would work best if a competitive bidding process was also imple
mented to set the price the government pays for this population.
In essence, this option is for the government to become an orga
nized purchaser for those between 55 and 64 and in poor health.3 In
principle, there is no reason that moral hazard on the part of insurers
should be debilitating for this scheme, and competitive bidding (and
concomitant data reporting requirements just like private sector orga
nized purchasers use) may be all that is necessary to minimize this risk
and monitor the effectiveness of competition. If insurers can define
health states that we agree deserve this kind of subsidy, then we can
write an RFP for covering people who possess them and competitive
bidding should be able to elicit a fair price for the government to pay.
"Fair + poor" self-reported health status is merely a simplified way I
can approximate a concept like "bad health" using nationally represen
tative survey data. Using all of those currently reporting fair and poor
health in the analysis of this option probably represents an upper bound
of the numbers of people that AHRQ and private insurers would
declare to be possessors of the appropriately targeted health states, i.e.,
those that lie between current definitions of disabled and the health sta
tus level underlying the concept of "standard" risk in the insurance
industry. Competitive bidding is a powerful tool for eliciting cost-
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based prices of services that has typically been absent when Medicaid
and Medicare disability determination were being made. At a mini
mum, it seems worth provoking a conversation about how this might be
implemented, if people do agree that helping those with low health sta
tus is a primary goal for coverage expansion policy, especially for the
55-64 population which has a far greater percentage of members with
fair + poor health status than the nonelderly age cohorts (remember
Table 2).
The third policy explored is a combination income-health status
subsidy. The idea is to provide 100 percent for all the low-income per
sons who also have fair or poor health status. Again, the subsidy would
not be available to those who have public coverage or access to ESI/
RHI.
Table 6 reports the bottom line results of these policy simulations.4
No subsidy approach dominates in all dimensions, so that a case can be
made for and against each of the subsidy targets. They were of course
designed to illustrate certain prototypical features of each subsidy type.
The income-only subsidy covers the most people and is relatively
target-efficient. The health-status-only subsidy costs more, but covers
the vast majority of those with a compelling and unmet health-statusrelated demand for health insurance. The income + health status sub
sidy is cheaper and more efficient than the health-status-only subsidy
alone, for it covers 55 percent of the fair + poor people at 65 percent of
the cost of the health-status-only subsidy scheme. This is because the
fair + poor are more numerous in the lower income ranges.
Table 6 Simulated Results of Policy Options
Basis for subsidy
Income

Health

Income and
health

Newly covered (millions)

1.2

0.77

0.5

% of uninsured newly covered

34

23

15

% of uninsured in fair/poor health covered

44

85

55

Total cost ($, billions)
Cost per newly insured ($)

6.6

7.1

4.3

5,674

9,280

8,644

SOURCE: Author's calculations using CPS, NMES, MEPS, and other data.

Session 5: Filling Gaps in Health Coverage 469

The relative efficiency of income + health status-based subsidies
for this population is appealing to the economist in me, but it does
leave out those in poor health at higher incomes. One might infer that
those who remain uninsured do so voluntarily, since their families have
means, but two facts about the current nongroup market in most states
give pause to reaching this conclusion. First, in most states, insurers
are allowed to refuse to sell in the nongroup market except to the rela
tively small number of HIPAA eligibles. Pauly and Herring report that
if the underwriting process leads a nongroup insurer to think that a per
son's health merits a premium of 3 times standard, they most often
refuse to sell at all. Recall that the NMES data support the existence of
a 2.7 health status multiple within the 55-64 age cohort. If nongroup
insurers measure applicants' health risks relative to the population stan
dard, as seems likely, then many of those with fair or poor health status
who are uninsured despite having higher incomes may very well have
had trouble finding a willing seller. Second, even if they could find a
willing seller at actuarially fair prices, the $6,750 price I estimated is
more than 10 percent of income until income exceeds 8 times poverty
(for single individuals). And of course, some insurers may offer a price
far above the actuarially fair one in order to discourage purchases by
individuals who are feared to be quite sick.
This price/income fact made me think about an addition to the
income + health-based subsidy, an addition that relates to a choice
between subsidies and separate group purchase mechanisms on the one
hand versus subsidies and a reformed nongroup market on the other.
Suppose that instead of creating a new group purchasing entity, we
gave the newly eligible subsidies and sent them off into a reformed
nongroup market to purchase would they could. This approach would
likely include some kind of community rating (CR) requirement, at
least within age cohorts. Let h = the high-risk premium and c = the
community rate. The idea is that the unsubsidized, those with incomes
above 200 percent of poverty, say, could buy a policy at c. In that
sense, you could say they were "community rate-protected," in that
they would never pay more than c.
Because I am wary of trying to accomplish wholesale reform of the
nongroup market in today's political climate, I recommended creating
the separate group purchase mechanism and the types of subsidies I
have described. But we could easily create a subsidy just for the
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amount above the community rate, h - c, for those who have incomes
between 200 percent of poverty and 800 percent of poverty. That way,
those with fair + poor health and incomes above 200 percent would pay
c, the exact community rate they would have paid if we had reformed
the nongroup market, but we could avoid the collateral damage to those
whose premiums would have been increased. Presumably, most if not
all of those in fair or poor health with reasonable incomes would gladly
pay c to get guaranteed issue health insurance.
Table 7 reports the results of this type of subsidy. The first column
is the same as column 3 from Table 6, the income + health status sub
sidy. The "CR Protection alone" column reports what this h - c sub
sidy does for those with incomes between 200 and 800 percent of
poverty, and the final column combines it with the income + health sta
tus subsidy we've already analyzed. There we see that the total cost is
still modest, the target efficiency on those with fair or poor health is
very good, and the overall target efficiency in cost per newly insured
person is improved from that obtained with the income + health status
subsidy without CR protection.
Finally, Table 8 compares the required net increase in average fed
eral income tax rates necessary to finance the income + health status +
CR protection subsidy (0.108 percent, that is, one-tenth of 1 percentage
point) with the average premium increase in the nongroup market for
55- to 64-year-olds if the same number of subsidized purchasers
entered the nongroup market with guaranteed issue and community ratTable 7 Simulated Results of Community-Rating Protection
Basis for subsidy
Income +
health

CR
protection Income +
health + CR
alone

Newly covered (millions)

0.5

0.25

0.75

% of uninsured newly covered

15

7

22

% of uninsured in fair/poor health covered

55

28

83

Total cost ($, billions)
Cost per newly insured ($)

4.3

12

5.5

8,644

4,972

7,333

SOURCE: Author's calculations using CPS, NMES, MEPS, and other data.
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Table 8 Alternative "Tax" Rates from Subsidizing Low-Income
+ High-Risk Protection (%)
Increase in average federal income tax rate required to
finance Income + Health + CR

0.108

Increase in average premium from putting same number
of high risk into nongroup market with CR

23.9

Share of nongroup market that would be high risk under
reform

45.2

ing (23.9 percent). This large premium increase results because the
fraction of nongroup purchasers who would be in fair or poor health in
that cohort would basically double to 45.2 percent. I have no doubt the
tiny income tax increase would cause much less disruption than this
large premium increase, except perhaps in certain ideological circles
which oppose all publicly financed coverage expansions.

CONCLUSIONS
The need for health insurance policy options for the 55-64 group is
compelling now and is going to intensify as the baby boomers expand
that cohort in the next decade. The financial risk of going without cov
erage is high for members of this cohort, the health risks could be sub
stantial (we do not know a great deal about this at the present time),
and a traditional pillar of pre-Medicare coverage, employer-sponsored
retiree coverage, is expected to continue to decline in prevalence.
Reasonably inexpensive and targeted subsidy programs can be
devised and implemented that would go a long way toward covering
the neediest near-elderly, those with low incomes and low health status.
The subsidy and purchasing entity that achieves the best overall out
come, in my view, has the virtue of highlighting the fact that subsidies
most efficiently eradicate need when they reflect both income and
health status dimensions of people's lives.
Researching and writing this paper has forced me to reflect on
many dimensions of coverage expansion options. I would like to con
clude by offering the following normative principles for health insur-
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ance subsidy policy that seem particularly applicable to the 55- to 64year-old cohort and maybe others as well.
• No poor person should pay for health insurance. (Corollary: No
person who makes more than 10 times poverty should tell a per
son in poverty what that poor person can afford to pay.)
• No person with poor health should pay more than the actuarially
fair community rate unless their income is high.
• The people of the United States can afford to offer substantial
relief to 55- to 64-year-olds with low incomes who are also in bad
heath, and indeed to most of those in poor health regardless of
income.
• We can offer this relief with very modest income tax rate
increases. This is a much less costly financing mechanism—in
terms of social disruption—than forcing nongroup insurers to
charge community rated premiums to all purchasers.

Notes
I am grateful to Kathy Swartz, Rich Johnson, Karen Pollitz, Alan Monheit, Marilyn
Moon, Bo Garrett, Linda Blumberg, and Frank Sammartino for many helpful conversa
tions and to Joseph Llobrera for timely research assistance. I remain solely responsible
for all errors or omissions. The views expressed herein are mine alone and not those of
the Urban Institute, its Trustees, or its sponsors. My address is 2100 M Street, NW,
Washington, DC, 20037; (202)261-5697; lnichols@ui.urban.org.
1. See Johnson, Davidoff, and Perese (2000) for a summary of recent and ongoing
work.
2. Berk and Monheit (1992) show that the distribution of health expenditures has
been remarkably stable since 1929, so that the skewness (10 percent of the popu
lation accounting for 70 percent of the spending) that was present in the 1987 data
is very likely to still be present.
3. The hypothetical new program needs a name. For this cohort, all concepts are
"near-something" (-Medicare, -work, -elderly, etc.). "Near" makes me think of
something off in the distance, somehow better than what we have now. This all
suggests Avalon, the mythical Arthurian island, shrouded in mist, where the Lady
of Lake lives, where Arthur was taken after he was slain, and from whence Camelot will return, if it ever does. It could be the Avalon Purchasing Authority
(APA), with apologies to the American Psychological Association.
4. In each case I assumed that a 100 percent subsidy would engender an 85 percent
participation rate from the currently uninsured who were targeted, 90 percent
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from current nongroup purchasers who would be eligible, and 10 percent of cur
rent ESI and RHI holders who are ineligible but expected to drift. I also assumed
that participation would decline linearly as the subsidy falls to zero.
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Commentary
Deborah Chollet
Mathematica Policy Research

The fact that older women are less likely to have health insurance
coverage than they were a decade ago is not surprising, but the fact that
they are about half as likely to have individual coverage than a decade
ago is surprising. That they are about half as likely as younger women
to have health insurance coverage as a dependent is sobering, as is the
fact that nearly a quarter of older working women with health problems
have no health insurance at all.
From the CPS, we have evidence that small firms are more likely
than large firms to employ low-wage workers. We also see persistently
lower wage levels among women, and especially among older women.
It shouldn't altogether surprise us that these paths converge in a way
that disadvantages older women in the workforce.
So there are a couple of problems to be solved. Len was charged
with solving those problems—and did indeed think outside the box—
and he certainly is a good seller of his perspective. But his discussion
raised at least two questions in my mind: what would be the source of
coverage for this population and what would be the source of subsi
dies? These are low-wage individuals and low-wage families; as was
mentioned in the last session, we know that these families require sub
sidies to buy insurance. While I wouldn't expect to dictate what an
individual should pay for health insurance, I would guess it would be
something less than a tithe, less than 10 percent of family income.
Therefore, I would guess that virtually all families below 200 percent
of poverty, and perhaps higher, would need a significant subsidy to buy
health insurance.
Len raises several possibilities for pooling risk, including FEHBP
and state employee plans. We have been the route of mandated
employer coverage in the private sector, and we abandoned it for a cou
ple of reasons. Groups of any size don't like to accept individuals.
From an underwriting perspective, individuals are a very different cast
of characters. Employee plans are groups that form not for the purpose
of insurance, individuals arrive explicitly for coverage, raising signifi-
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cantly the potential for adverse selection. People who seek coverage
when they are sick are more expensive than the population average and
more expensive than a group community rate. The only question is
how much more expensive will these people be? It is not a question of
whether individuals would like to be pooled with employee groups,
but, from an insurance perspective and from an underwriting perspec
tive, the two are very different. We have to worry also about people
dropping away and destabilizing the group when they believe that they
no longer need health insurance. Pools of employees don't pose that
problem to the extent that pools of individuals do in a voluntary sys
tem.
The program that Len envisions is appealing in some dimensions,
but I would argue it is very unappealing in others, such as equity. Why
would we want to construct yet another narrow program for a narrow
subset of the deserving whomever? Why does an older woman who is
sick and of low income deserve coverage more than a younger woman
who is sick and of low income, or an older man who is sick and of low
income? I don't understand why we would discriminate across a popu
lation on the basis of age and gender, when in fact we don't allow that
discrimination in any other aspect of our civic life.
We already have some programs expressly for people who are low
income and people who are sick: Medicaid and Medicare. We have
additional, usually very small programs in many states. In 28 states,
there are more or less well-functioning high-risk pools. I would like to
spend a few minutes talking about what those high-risk pools are and
why HIPAA, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
that Karen Pollitz talked to you about yesterday, might be a model for
helping them to work better.
As I mentioned, 28 states have high-risk pools, although in five big
states—California, Florida, Louisiana, Illinois, and Utah—they are
closed to new enrollment. Despite the fact that high-risk pools are
struggling in these and many other states, there are only seven states in
this country that have no provision at all for high-risk individuals.
Among the states that provide for high-risk individuals, one requires
guaranteed issue and risk adjustments. Another caps the proportion of
high risk that any one insurer must accept relative to its total business.
TennCare blends Tennessee's high-risk pool with its Medicaid and
CHIP programs. But the most common model is a separate high-risk
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pool, and the most common source of funding for these high-risk pools
is an assessment on commercial insurers and Blue Cross/Blue Shield
plans.
Well, you see the problem. States that fund a high-risk pool with a
tax on insurers in effect reward employers who are self-insured. In
turn, the tax base to support high risk becomes smaller as employers
remove themselves from it. Hence, without federal action helping
high-risk pools, they may be a lost cause; but with federal action on the
model of HIPAA, they might work quite well by reaching across group
plans, individual plans, insured plans, and self-insured plans, treating
them as an insurance system that would support high-risk individuals
without access to group coverage.
There are other aspects of high risk that might be fixed with
HIPAA-type federal legislation. Many states have narrowed insurers'
rating practices, especially in the small-group market but also in the
individual market. At present, six states limit rate variation for health
to less than two to one in the individual market, and eight states pro
hibit health rating altogether in this market. The latter is the commu
nity rate that Len talked about; there are indeed problems with low-risk
people dropping coverage. But if there were a high-risk pool that
would readily accept and fully subsidize excess risk, the community
rate could be much lower in the general market.
In fact, the literature on the effect of a community rate on coverage
in the individual market is extremely meager. I have not yet seen a
study only of the individual market that evaluates the impact of regula
tion. Nevertheless, Len's comment that some kinds of regulation
depress coverage in the small-group market seems true from what we
know thus far, and it is probably also the case in the individual market.
Yet, if a high-risk pool accepted all extreme risks, then one would
expect the standard rate in the conventional market could be signifi
cantly lower and prohibition of health rating would not depress cover
age. For example, Minnesota has the largest high-risk pool in the
country, with over 25,000 people participating. Minnesota is a market
in which insurers underwrite aggressively, and the high-risk pool actu
ally has a distribution of risk. Its rates are affordable because of the
distribution of risk in the pool as well as the usual subsidy to the pool.
At present, 11 states limit age rating in the individual market sig
nificantly, and 3 states prohibit rating on age altogether in the individ-
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ual market. Eleven states also limit composite rating: that is, all rate
factors taken together cannot produce greater variation in rates than the
statutory limit. Those markets have not fallen apart, and they deserve
closer investigation as potential models for new federal law constrain
ing insurer rates, especially in the presence of a state program to absorb
high risk.
In closing, I would argue that a principal danger is to try to fix too
much. That is especially a danger when looking at private/public com
binations that rely heavily on private markets to resolve problems of
noncoverage. One example of attempting to fix too much may be
states' efforts to reduce the waiting period for coverage of preexisting
conditions, eliminating it or making it very brief. There I would argue
that HIPAA offers a reasonable model. HIPAA provides that, if you do
not come from an insurance plan, you have a waiting period on preex
isting conditions up to 12 months, with a 6-month look-back. It is not
perfect, but it recognizes the frailties of a voluntary system. If we are
not going to require coverage, either of individuals or employers, then
we must deal in reasonable improvements, knowing that they assure
neither seamless protection nor universal coverage, especially for peo
ple with health problems.

Commentary
Frank McArdle
Hewitt Associates

I've been asked to comment on this general issue from an
"employer perspective," and I would like to remind everyone that we
cannot easily generalize about the employer perspective because
employers are such a diverse group. Employer reactions can vary very
widely depending on their business, their locale, the size of their busi
ness, their labor costs, their margins, their competition, their employee
relations, and even their individual company cultures.
When you step up from individual employers to larger groups of
employers—the business groups and the employer trade groups—you
will find that there is somewhat more consistency across employer
groups, but even at that level there are very significant differences
when you are talking about employer positions on public policy. So,
there is a wide diversity among the employer group, and as I speak on
the employer perspective, I urge you to remember that.

THE UNINSURED
Let me say by way of context that the problem of the uninsured is
indeed viewed as an employer problem as well, in two ways. For one
thing, employers intuitively realize that they are paying more for health
care because the costs of uncompensated care are being reflected in
what they pay providers. The second thing is that large employers also
realize that they are covering more individuals than they would have to
cover under their plan if other employers offered coverage. So the
problem of the uninsured is recognized by most of the large employers
that we at Hewitt Associates deal with, but (with some notable excep
tions), employers generally don't feel, at least at the individual com
pany level, that the problem of the uninsured is something they can do
very much about.
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I think that you will see some thought leadership emerging on this
issue and more attention devoted to it. But you'll find that employers
have not devoted a lot of thought to the uninsured in their daily opera
tions. For example, I am meeting with a company tomorrow which has
spent $1.4 billion on health care this year for retirees and active
employees. When you are spending $1.4 billion, it is hard for you to
relate to what is needed for the uninsured, because your population is
so well insured and so well covered. And large employers generally
insure their employees at a very high rate.

TAX CREDITS
Len and others have talked about tax credits and tax incentives. In
my experience, the combination of individual tax credits for the unin
sured combined with a subsidy—such as an ability to buy into Medicaid or state Children's Health Insurance Programs—employers would
not lose a lot of sleep over that. If there were a direct and transparent
tax increase on business associated with the subsidy, then I think you
would get a different and stronger reaction. As the policy realm is
evolving right now, it seems the individual tax credits would be most
likely considered as a way of extending coverage for the uninsured and
not as a way of replacing the current employer coverage or the current
federal income tax exclusion, which would be potentially a major con
cern for employers.
From personal experience, I would like to add one administrative
caution about tax credits. Len talked about the need to have refundable
tax credits and to have the money paid up front. Well, I agree, but that
is also a guaranteed formula for an overpayment. And as someone who
has had to work with Supplemental Security Income beneficiaries and
Social Security beneficiaries, attempting to take back money from a
low-income group or a barely moderate-income group is not a politi
cally pleasant exercise, let me assure you.

Session 5: Filling Gaps in Health Coverage 483

PROGRAM COORDINATION
Whenever public policy uses subsidies and tax credits and govern
ment programs in relationship to the private sector, there arises the
question of coordination. It is an important question but often over
looked, particularly in the legislative developments that we see now. In
my view, the idea of combining a government share of an insurance
premium and an employer's share of the premium would not be well
received by employers. A lot of companies that we deal with tend to
want to avoid interactions with government agencies, especially when
money is trading hands.
For example, in a recent study we did for the Henry J. Kaiser Fam
ily Foundation, Hewitt asked how many employers would accept the
direct government subsidy under President Clinton's prescription drug
proposal. About 25 percent said they would accept it, while many of
the others don't want anything to do with it. There are lots of reasons
for employers to do something different than accepting the subsidy, but
one reason among several was their dread over docu-mentation, audits,
etc., and the attendant bureaucracy when money crosses hands between
the federal government and a private sector benefit sponsor.
Likewise, in the area of retiree health, whether it is extending
Medicare coverage to pre-Medicare eligible retirees or reforming
Medicare options for post-65 retirees, there are bigger issues of coordi
nation because of the existence of Medicare.
COBRA
Len also mentioned that the extension of COBRA continuation
coverage is an attractive policy option, but also an option that is not
free. When you talk to large employers and employers of any size,
there is a real disconnect between what they think are the costs of
COBRA and what the legislators think are the costs of COBRA. For
example, according to the latest survey that I've seen by Charles D.
Spencer & Associates, the actual average claims cost of COBRA bene
ficiaries is 156 percent of the cost of active employees. Because the
employer can only charge a 2 percent additional premium for that
COBRA coverage, what you get, in effect, is another 54 percent or so
that is coming from the individual's former employer and from the
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employees at the individual's former company; there is that subsidy
that passes back. So not only is COBRA not free, it is still subsidized
to a significant degree by the individual's former employer.
Now when you talk about extending current COBRA eligibility
periods( from the current 18 to 36 months available) up until age 65,
you can see that the employer subsidy of COBRA would be much,
much higher. Even allowing for the employer to charge 125 percent of
the premium as some have proposed wouldn't come even close to cov
ering those costs. So that proposed policy change is bound to generate
opposition from employers on the matter of cost and also on a certain
matter of equity for active employees.

Mandates
Mandates are a nonstarter for businesses. They are scary for
employers, conjuring up images of high costs, limited flexibility, and
stiff imposition of government rules. For better or for worse, those
feelings are well established and in my opinion have not evolved since
the 1993-1994 debate. I think we are still there. I would not expect
mandated coverage to become feasible on a large scale for employers
anywhere in the near term.

Retiree Health Coverage
On retiree health coverage, and in particular regarding pre-65 retir
ees, again citing the Hewitt report for the Henry J. Kaiser Family Foun
dation, we found a continuing decline in employer provision of retiree
medical benefits. Most large companies with more than 1,000 employ
ees are likely to provide retiree medical coverage. They are also more
likely to provide coverage for pre-65 retirees than for post-65 retirees,
because there is no Medicare available for pre-65 retirees. But even
among this group, there has been a very significant decline. And based
on questions that we asked employers about what kinds of changes
they would consider over the next three to five years, we expect contin
ued retrenchment in the employer-provider system. As many as 30 per
cent said they would "seriously consider" eliminating retiree health
coverage on a prospective basis in the next three to five years, meaning
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for new hires. Current retirees and near retirees are likely to be grandfathered under any situation.
I think the continuing decline in retiree coverage surprised some
analysts who expected that after the accounting rules were adopted in
the early 1990s—the FAS 106 rules, that forced such a big change
among employers—a lot of people thought it was a one-time reaction
to those accounting rules and that it would stabilize. Well, it hasn't,
and our data shows it is not only continuing to decline, but has acceler
ated slightly.
I do think there are some options out there that could slow the ero
sion of employer-provided retiree coverage that wouldn't cost a great
deal of new money and may even raise money in some ways. So, I
would say in general that it is worth discussing policy measures that
would slow the erosion of employer coverage. In doing so, we must
also recognize that we have to be creative about how we would do that
and also recognize that it may be an evolution toward a newer model—
a model in which alongside the direct provision of a defined-benefit
system there also might be room for a defmed-contribution approach as
well.
Here are some specific ideas.
1. A recent report from an ERISA Advisory Council work group
suggests that it is a good idea to use pension surplus assets to
fund and prefund retiree medical expenses for this same group of
employees in the pension plan and with guaranteed protections
for those employees in the pension plan. There is a huge wealth
of surplus pension assets, particularly as a result of the recent
stock market performance, and applying those assets to stabilize
retiree medical is probably not a bad idea.
2. There are also some relatively small changes in the tax code that
would help, such as allowing employers to take future inflation
into account when prefunding retiree medical benefits through
what's called a Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association
(VEBA); that's another positive change.
3. A third idea is talking about development of some kind of indi
vidual account that would allow employees and employers to
save for retiree health expenses. The key to the tax treatment here
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would be that the accumulated funds would be usable by the
retiree for health care expenses only and without incurring tax
able income for the purchase of coverage, which is not available
to a broad extent in the tax treatment of 401(k) plan withdrawals
right now.
So, creation of a dedicated account where employers and
employees could contribute could be a meaningful contribution to
meeting retiree health care expenses later on. And, it would also
facilitate coordination with Medicare, in the sense that the retir
ees could then allocate the money to a plan of their choice for
supplemental or high-option coverage that they wanted or for outof-pocket expenses associated with that plan, without incurring
taxable income.
In this sense, it really is something very compatible with what Len
has talked about, but in a different setting. Len says there are two key
dimensions to expand coverage policies for the near elderly: the sub
sidy mechanism and the range of market opportunities the beneficiary
will have in which to use that subsidy. I think you could substitute for
subsidy the employer and the employee contributions and the tax bene
fits conferred thereon. In essence, what you need is money and a place
where you can buy coverage at an affordable price. We don't always
need to think of employer coverage as a specific comprehensive benefit
plan, and I think we should broaden our horizons to think of a combi
nation of both defined-benefit and defined-contribution approaches, not
just one traditional approach.
Speaking of saving for retiree medical expenses, I don't think that
this issue gets enough publicity on the retirement side of the equation
in terms of underscoring that individuals do need to factor into their
target replacement ratios future retiree medical expenses. Nor do I
think Social Security in its replacement ratios gets credit for the Medi
care coverage that is also provided with the additional PICA payroll
taxes. In other words, a 40-50 percent average replacement ratio is a
lot more when the lifetime Medicare coverage is added on.
A couple of years ago, we did some very rough estimates, rough
calculations that we did internally. For example, for someone without
employer retiree health coverage who is age 40 and earning $25,000,
we estimated that individual would need to save between 7 and 13 per-
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cent of pay at age 40 for retiree health expenses if they were to retire at
age 62. Naturally the amount required as a percentage of pay goes
down with income, but it rises with age. At age 50, a worker making
$25,000 would have to save between 15 and 25 percent of pay if he/she
had no employer retiree health coverage.

CLOSING
I would like to close with a couple of comments. Len talked about
his preferred option of creating a new group purchasing entity to facili
tate group market conditions, and Deborah has commented on that too.
I have to tell you that from an employer perspective, "Avalon" sounds
like the 1993-1994 HIPCs (health insurance purchasing cooperatives).
It conjures up this image that, if it is government-initiated, it is going to
be unwieldy, expansive, and bureaucratic, and employers are going to
be nervous about it as a group.
I also think we may be at the beginning of a stage where we are
going to see some new intermediaries emerge in the marketplace who
may be able to create some of these markets on their own. For exam
ple, with the use of the Internet, some of the relatively big administra
tive loads that Len and also Deborah talked about, there is a potential
for those administrative costs to come way down in a highly electronic
Internet environment. We can also foresee the development of new
intermediaries that would create a virtual marketplace where the
money could be applied and also reduce administrative costs substan
tially by using the Internet and other means, such as standardization of
health plan offerings to increase efficiencies and lower costs.
Finally, in Len's simulations, the cost of the insurance premium
modeled reflects a premium for fairly comprehensive health care cov
erage. Comprehensive coverage has traditionally been the standard of
coverage advocated by most policy analysts, and it certainly remains a
viable policy option for the future.

Commentary
Diane Rowland
Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured

Well, this has been a good panel, and I have learned a lot from all
the presentations.
From Len Nichols, I have learned that when you go and think out
side the box, sometimes you come back to the box as the best option.
And that is what I am going to talk about: the box of public programs
and where they fit into the solution. What I have been listening to
today has convinced me that we ought not to throw out the good in our
public programs, since we seem to encounter even more problems
when we try to replace them with new strategies—when we go outside
the box.
Before I begin to explain why I feel this is true, I would like to
mention a few issues that we shoulda bear in mind. First, people with
out health insurance at any age are vulnerable, and our health insurance
agenda for the uninsured should not segment people by age. It should
segment them by need, and need is the greatest among the lowest
income people at all ages. Today we are focusing on a group of partic
ularly vulnerable people within the low-income population, because
we know that uninsured children are healthier than their older counter
parts—the non-elderly group that we are talking about today. This
group also merits special attention because, while we have made politi
cal advances in coverage of children (because they are popular and
cheap to cover), we have not done so for the population we are talking
about today, a group that is more expensive to cover because they have
greater health needs.
Second, in focusing on the most vulnerable populations, I think it
is very important to go beyond the work that John Eisenberg and his
colleagues at AHCPR did in looking at workers in the near-elderly age
group and look at those in that age group that are outside of the work
force, as they may in fact be among the most vulnerable. The nonworkers may in fact be those who have higher health needs,
contributing to their departure from the workforce. Most importantly, I
think we need to look at the fact that there are some significant differ-
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ences in this group and the general population in terms of the duration
of periods without insurance. These individuals often tend to be out of
the workplace if they are uninsured. Therefore, they are more likely to
have long and extended stays of uninsurance instead of being in the
transitions from one job to another, which is the case with many of the
younger uninsured.
Finally, I would like to remind you of some of the problems with
retiree benefits. Frank McArdle talked a little bit about the work he did
for the Kaiser Family Foundation on this topic. Deborah Chollet also
did some related work for the Kaiser Foundation on the individual mar
ket, which I think really points out the vulnerability of the people in the
near-elderly age group in terms of access to the individual market and
affordable insurance. Her work highlights that states don't absolutely
protect older Americans from being excluded from insurance coverage
because of preexisting conditions and shows that the cost of coverage
can be as high as a $1,000 a month for a 60-year-old male without pre
existing conditions in a high-cost state.
With those issues in mind—the need to help the most vulnerable
groups, the problems with access to employer coverage, and the barri
ers in the individual market—we can turn to understanding this popula
tion. We did some work back in 1996 looking at the very low-income
population, those under 200 percent of poverty, in the 50- to 64-yearold age group. We found some striking differences in health status
between younger and older uninsured low-income people. Nearly half
(46 percent) of those age 50 to 64 in our survey reported fair or poor
health, compared with 18 percent of those 18 to 24 and 24 percent of
those 25 to 49. Health status has been shown to be a solid indicator of
health needs. So that as hard as the problem is and will remain helping
low-income people to gain access to insurance, low-income older peo
ple have some greater health needs that magnify the challenge.
In addition, differences in access to care between low-income peo
ple without insurance and low-income people with insurance is strik
ing. When we looked at access to care for uninsured people who were
sick—people reporting their health status as fair or poor in the age 50
to 64 group with incomes under 200 percent of poverty—29 percent of
that group said they had no physician visits in the prior year, and 22
percent reported that they had no usual source of care. These figures
contrast sharply with those for individuals with Medicaid or private
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insurance who are equally low income and equally in poor health, only
8 percent of whom report any of these difficulties.
Clearly all of the evidence on health needs and insurance differen
tials with the pre-elderly group makes a strong case for helping this age
group as well as for the younger uninsured. And when we look at how
Medicaid performs against private insurance for this age group—they
are typically not eligible yet for Medicare—we see that Medicaid is
performing as well as private coverage in guaranteeing access and
improving coverage.
So, what that leads me to conclude is that we should really look at
the public programs, both Medicare and Medicaid, as a strategy for
protecting this population. First, I think we really need to look very
carefully at Medicare. It hasn't been discussed much here today, but
we have some policymakers proposing raising the age of eligibility for
Medicare. That clearly is a totally counterproductive policy to the
needs of this near-elderly group we are talking about. I did a call-in
show in New Hampshire, and I had about seven uninsured people call
in, of whom five were in the age 60- to 65-year-old group saying, "I am
uninsured and I am waiting for Medicare. I am trying to do all these
things to keep my health going or I am postponing different tests
because I need to wait until I am eligible for Medicare." So, one strat
egy that I would strongly recommend is looking at ways to let people
gain Medicare coverage on a buy-in basis earlier than age 65, with sub
sidies for the lower income. Clearly, raising the age of eligibility of
Medicare would be a counterproductive step.
I would also urge that for people who retire early and take Social
Security benefits at 62, their ability to access Medicare at that point be
changed to allow them to be able to gain Medicare coverage along with
their retirement coverage. We know that workers who retire early tend
to be people who have health problems, so this is a particularly vulner
able group that may in fact not have any access to the individual insur
ance market when they retire if they can't gain access to Medicare.
Second, I would also urge that we really take a harder look at the
policies we have today for coverage of adults under the Medicaid pro
gram. Medicaid has increasingly become—with its decoupling from
welfare—a program for children and pregnant women. We are now
talking about extending coverage to the parents of children who are
covered by Medicaid, but we are not talking about what happens to sin-
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gle adults and childless couples, who no matter how poor now are inel
igible in almost every state for the Medicaid program.
If we want to look at a direct, cost-effective, and efficient way to
cover low-income adults, we really need to look at decategorizing
Medicaid and making it an insurance program by income, not by cate
gory, and really begin to focus on bringing in low-income adults below
the poverty level. That would help a substantial number of the people
in this age group. We can overcome the state variations in Medicaid
coverage that Len Nichols noted by doing the unpopular thing of man
dating coverage across states at a specific income level, as we have
done for children.
The experience with children has shown that public coverage at the
lowest incomes work. But regardless of the specifics of the policy, we
really need to take a much harder look across the age spectrum at how
our low-income program, Medicaid, and its companion CHIP, are cov
ering not just children, but the adults in those states.
And, finally, I would urge that as we look at all of this, we have the
ability to afford coverage as our main criteria, and we do not try to link
any of these efforts to the health status of individuals. I have looked at
Len Nichols' proposal several times, and I know it is fairly attractive to
say we would provide coverage to those who are in fair or poor health.
However, I don't think we are quite ready to develop the instruments
and measures that would enable us to do so. What we see especially in
this age group is that health status can change quite dramatically from
one day to another, and we really don't want to link your ability to get
health coverage to whether you were sick yesterday or are sick today.
In conclusion, I think that as we look forward to trying to provide
better coverage for all Americans, we ought to focus not just on chil
dren and not just on their parents, but on people of all ages that are
without health insurance. It doesn't matter what your risk is. If you
are uninsured, you face problems. And we ought to really look at
building upon the Medicare program and the Medicaid program as
strategies to provide that protection quite efficiently and with help to
those most in need among the low income through the Medicaid pro
gram.
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intervention and, 452
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Fringe benefits
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464r
coverage by, 363-374
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direct subsidies and, 459
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454-455
existing risk pools and, 461-462
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and health problems), 455-463
new risk pools and purchasing
authorities, 462-463
nongroup, 258-259, 460-461
percentage of insured and uninsured
by source of insurance and age
group, 236?
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public coverage options, 249-251
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reforming nongroup market and,
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state guarantees to, 246
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Kaiser Family Foundation, 490
Labor force
annual change in participation rate at
selected ages, 1970-1985 and
1985-1999, 379/
decline in participation at older ages,
375-376
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Labor market
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state requirements of, 361
Medical benefits, bridge jobs and, 429
Medical care
age and, 421
Medicare, 152, 249-250
disabled covered under, 361
eligibility for, 171, 180, 185
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real income, 1989-1998, 31 If,
312-314
differences in mean own earnings
and household transfer income for
those with disabilities (1989 and
1998), 315/
distribution of retirement ages,
390-392, 39 If
earlier retirement by, 401
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disabilities (1989 and 1998), 313/
job loss and pension plans of,
202-203, 205, 206-207
labor force participation by, 377,
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retirement trends among, 376-377
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workforce mobility and, 228

Michigan, benefit exhaustion rates by
age (1994), 120/
Minnesota, subsidized Medicaid
coverage in, 250
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impairments affecting employment
among, 157
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retirement age and, 381
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Oaxaca decomposition, 369
Occupations, projected job growth for
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Old Age, Survivors, and Disability
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ability to work, 431-437
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employer perspective on efforts to
encourage work among,
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409-410
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214-229
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policy options for filling gaps in
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Social Security, 387-388
UI benefit reductions and, 108
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PPD. See Permanent partial disability
benefits

514
Pretax wage, temporary disability
benefits based on, 270
Private insurance companies
health insurance access, affordability,
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Reemployment, 92
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Supports, 348
Replacement of earnings, 364-366
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health coverage for, 484-487
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Retirement
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financial incentives for, 387-393
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disability trends and, 137-138
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disability Social Security,
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employer-sponsored, 454-455
Retirement incentives
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Retirement plans
earlier retirement and, 386
employer, 422-424
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214-215
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impact of Social Security changes on,
395-396
in other rich countries, 381-384
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359-360
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and, 479
Risk pools, 411-419
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485-487
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Self-sufficiency, implications of social
policy changes, 167-169
Seniority-based pay systems, 421
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Social insurance programs
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Social Security, 171
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407-410
financial outlook for, 397-398
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social policy changes and, 169
solvency of, 398-399
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of, 405^06
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Social Security Amendments
of 1956, 150
of 1977,406
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Social Security Disability Insurance
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age and, 150-151
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Medicare for people with disabilities
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Insurance
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States
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247/
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UI eligibility and, 102
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Subsidized health insurance coverage
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policy initiatives for, 465-471, 466/,
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state programs offering, 250-251
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Temporary Assistance for Needy
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Temporary disability benefits, 263, 270
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benefits, 265
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lack of, 256
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measuring receipt of, 298
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States, 102r
Unemployment
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beneficiary outcomes, 112
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replacement rate estimates in,
276?, 276-283, 277?, 279/ 28If,
282?, 283?
estimation of disability earnings
losses in, 268-269
income benefits in, 271?-272?
injured workers receiving permanent
disability awards, 273?,
273-274
part-time earnings and UI benefits in,
104?
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